A new interpretation of Confucianism: The interpretation of Lunyu as a text of
philosophical hermeneutics
Author(s): Cunguang LIN and Mi Li
Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2007), pp. 533-546
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27823313
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Front. Philos. China 2007, 2(4): 533-546
DOI 10.1007/s 11466-007-0034-y
RESEARCH ARTICLE
LIN Cunguang
A new Interpretation of Confucianism:
The interpretation of Lunyu as a text of philosophical
hermeneutics
? Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2007
Abstract Communicating with Confucius based on our own hermeneutical
context, and reading the Analects as a text of philosophical hermeneutics, it
can be concluded that as an epochal thinker, the contribution of Confucius'
thought is that it initiated a humanistic moral ideal with cultural upbringing as
its core. Based on this consciousness of humanistic moral ideal, Confucius
thought and dealt positively with the human existential plight and social political
problems that he faced during his own time, and his thought is more creative than
conservative.
Keywords Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, Lunyu, philosophical
hermeneutics, interpretation
&m*i tels, ig?mft?, mm
Translated by Mi Li from Guanzi Xuekan w f'J (Guanzi Journal), 2006, (1
LIN Cunguang (Ej)
School of Politics and Public Administration, China University of Politics a
100088, China
E-mail: plis@163.com
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534
LIN Cunguang
1 Introduction
All previous Confucian scholars often followed a kind of deep reading when they
read sishu wujing R-157iir. (Four Books and Five Classics). That is to say, they
were fond of exploring the profound implication of the classical words given by
the sages (the ways, methods and the righteous proverbs from short speeches
given by the Ancient Saints and the Former Kings), a phenomenon known as
"Confucian scholars explore the sage's intention when they read the scriptures."
(Wang 1986, Chengcai ?S#). Confucian scholars specifically consider the
Analects to be "the general record of the sage's words and deeds" (Ban 1962,
Kuang Heng zhuan ill ft), and furthermore as a permanent great classic work.
Beyond doubt, this is an idea based on the sanctified view of Confucius who,
with the image of a prophet, gave advice generation after generation while
descendants always searched for the ready-made answers from him and his
works. The first thing we should do before we communicate with the ancients is
to get rid of this deceitful ideological fantasy.
In order to eradicate the bigotry of the fantasy mentioned above, it is necessary
to adopt the reading model of Gadamer on the Analects. The author believes that
if we want to communicate with Confucius as a concrete thinking man, rather
than the mythical sage, and seek a syncretism of horizons, then philosophic
hermeneutics provides us some meaningful tools for comprehending the Analects.
The Analects is just a signifier language system if it is regarded merely as a text
of philosophical hermeneutics. Nevertheless, Confucius as an actor who wanted
to combine thoughts and existence together became a model who can reach the
harmony between faith and the production process of a human being, his entire
life should be regarded as a response to all the questions of the times, and should
provide us with meaningful inspiration even today.
However, communication with the ancient soul is doubtless a kind of
exploration of thought. This exploration is not random, for the communication
should be open. Moreover, it should be that kind of exploration which can lead us
to the fixed subject (Gadamer 1988, p. 86). For the author, the communication
does not mean the search for the only absolutely right way the ancients indicated
for us. More important, it means the search for the positive and possible ways in
which we can solve all the problems of our times in the world full of free thoughts
and multi-values. Confucius encountered a secularized living condition in which
faith in god was on the decline and sages could not be seen. Similarly, we also
face quite the same living circumstance. Therefore, we can communicate with
Confucius based on the fact that we all live in times in which the strength of god
has already disappeared, while at the same time we have been abandoned by
cultural heroes (Saint Kings). Since our problems are created by our own
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A new interpretation of Confucianism 535
behavior, there is no other way to solve them besides relying on everyone's
individual efforts.
2 Hermeneutics' context
The disintegration of the sacred tradition has led to the eclipse of the signification
about existence and the production of anxiety about the crisis of cultural identity.
It pushed the realistic world to a key moment of cultural transform, and at the
same time, the collapse of the traditional semiotic world tempted people into
nihilism. The feelings of inefficiency have also been born as the civilization of
sciences and techniques has prevailed. This is the human being's survival
perplexity that modern people face as being identified by the sensitive thinkers of
the 20th century.
We may have some latent sympathy for Confucius since he lived in a society
enduring chaos and stress and facing the eclipse of the values that had sustained
it. Whether to construct a new set of values or restore the old one, everyone facing
this sort of epochal challenge must provide his own answer. This not only needs
academic considerations but also relates with choices made in real life that cannot
be evaded, so everyone must fulfill this responsibility in his own life in the
process. In order to resolve these questions, Confucius held the viewpoint of
individualistic humanistic idealism and traveled from one state to another full of
the enthusiasm that comes with the sense of rescuing the world. However, he also
had to suffer from the snubs from those who had powers and the jeers of others,
and therefore ultimately faced spiritual self-exile.
Confucius and his undertaking could be best described by the proverb "to keep
trying although one knows that the task is in vain." We must take this seriously
and think directly about the fact that Confucius was a mortal man. The goal of
hermeneutics is to create a mindset as if we live in the same times as he did and
therefore can regard him as a real concrete person.
Therefore, if we try to reach the syncretism of the horizons through the
philosophical hermeneutics of Confucius, we should not research what Confucius
said as a sage or just make simple explanations to his well-known sayings.
Instead, we must regard Confucius as a human being who lived in a concrete
society with a political-historical-cultural relationship. That is to say, we must
regard him as a thinker who lived among the crowd with the same feelings of
hope and fear, and in the context of "communication" of the pre-Qin Dynasty.
Only by this can we really make the words of the author of the Analects go back
to his life (Gadamer 1988, p. 96), and try to understand the sayings we found
related to our own questions (Jaspers 1995, p. 179).
Undoubtedly, modern beliefs about the inherent meaning of traditional
Confucianism and recent eager research on the creative formation of it, meaning
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536
LIN Cimguang
how to understand Confucius and the Confucianism accurately, is not only an
academic business but also an internal challenge which is related directly to
individual life circumstances that we have to face. This is the hermeneutical
context where we can understand the Analects.
3 Tianming (mandate of Heaven) and the interposition of
action
Besides the deification of Confucius, he has also been respected and worshiped
by Chinese as the Father of humanistic education. However, Confucius also
sought to achieve the self-transcendence of life-values and the lofty feelings of a
so-called realistic life even in mundanity. Confucius would insist upon proper
pronunciation when reciting Shying i^?x. (the Book of Songs), Shangshu |p5??
(the Book of Documents) and in observing // (ritual propriety), but he evaded
the subject of tiandao -JiM (the Dao of Heaven) and xingming ?-?h?j (nature and
destiny). He specifically had nothing to say about miraculous happenings, the use
of force, disorder, or the spirits. He held the question of theological belief in
doubt. However, faced with tianming, Confucius often held a reverent feeling
towards it. It is here that we can have insight on Confucius' worldview.
In order to understand and grasp it clearly, it is necessary to briefly inspect and
reconsider the God-theology of the pre-Qin Dynasties. As we know, Di # or
God, a being who controlled the lives and the productive activity of the Shang
Dynasty, was their supreme god. He bestowed them with the wind and rain, gave
them luck and calamity to demonstrate his kindness and stateliness, but he
seldom-inhibited people's moral behavior. Just as xibokanli, Shangshu fnj4$ ? H??J
MM shows, when Zu Yi tried to dissuade King Zhou away from his life of
dissolution, King Zhou Wang unscrupulously announced, "My fate is only
decided by God." However, although people's belief in tian 3i (Heaven) during
the Zhou Dynasty was received from the Shang Dynasty, they made some
important modifications. Compared with Di. tian blessed the kind and punished
the wicked, bestowed people with luck or calamity according to the view of
righteousness which came from the logical apprehension of the Dao. Therefore,
tianming gave only to the person who had de ?? (virtue).
To Confucius, tian had lots of different meanings, so he hesitated to decide on
a certain one. Sometimes tian referred to the natural sky, while sometimes to the
spiritual principle of the world, which means tian seldom gave orders but had the
ability to create the world. However, what is amazing is that the creation of tian
does not have a pure moral meaning. The master said:
A person who offends against tian has nowhere else to pray (Yang 1980, Book
3).
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A new interpretation of Confucianism
537
Tian has given life to and nourished excellence in me. Follow the proper way
(Ibid., Book 7).
If tian were going to destroy this legacy, we latecomers would not have had
access to it. If tian is going to destroy this culture, what can the people of
Kuang do to me (Ibid., Book 9).
Who am I going to fool? Am I going to fool tian? (Ibid., Book 9).
When Yan Hui died, the Master cried, 'Oh my! Tian is the ruin of me! Tian is
the ruin of me!" (Ibid., Book 11).
It is obvious that Confucius' tian hid deeply a profound contradiction: Tran
cannot be deceived or slandered, however, the concern of tian to the significance
of human being's survival included the moral meaning, but it lacked the inevitable
relevance to human morality. Just as Youzuo, Xun Zi ??jT:? \^ records, Zi Lu
asked, "You has heard that, 'Tian recompenses kindness with luck, punishes
badness with calamity.' Nowadays you have accumulated enough benevolence
and moral excellence, and have implemented them for a veiy long time.
Why then do you still live in seclusion?" Confucius replied, "Whether you can
meet a wise emperor depends on opportunity. The reason that the junzi S T
(exemplary person) studies is not to achieve understanding, but rather to live the
poverty-stricken life without sadness and still maintain toughness of will, and
also for knowledge of the beginning and end of calamity and luck." Obviously,
Zi Lu questioned tian's moral justness, but Confucius did not reply to it directly,
as if he intended to avoid it and was unwilling to consider seriously whether the
will of tian was morally just. Observing Confucius' words and activities, it was
this question that puzzled him throughout. Moreover, it was this question which
precisely structured the paradox of Confucius' survival during all his life, and the
sacred sense of mission to save society with moral power came from the profound
insight he had on the will and strength of the person and tianming. Otherwise,
this insight would not enable him to get rid of the puzzle of "the Dao does not
prevail" i?i^?f, nor to form a wish to save society with moral power. However,
in this paradox Confucius dutifully chose a way to change the real world through
the courage of survival and sedulous activities, and he kept trying even though he
knew that it was in vain.
Therefore, to Confucius tianming was a tensional constructive strength to form
junzis moral character rather than a pure negative strength or a positive one. On
the one hand, the master said, "Junzi hold three things in awe: the mandate of
Heaven, persons in high station, and the words of the sages" (Ibid., Book 16).
Obviously, to Confucius what the junzi should save in awe was the mandate of
Heaven. Persons in high station and the words of the sages endowed together
their moral with a kind of strong driving power. Simultaneously, they also make
up the moral finitude of the self-realized person. On the other hand, the master
also said, "Someone who does not understand the mandate of Heaven has no way
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538
LEST Cunguang
of becoming ajunzf (Ibid., Book 20). As the premise of becoming a junzi, the
puipose of the saying "understanding the mandate of Heaven" is to awake a man
to his inherent responsibilities as an actor in the present world. That is to say,
activity which can be understood as the interposition of the world with morals is
the doubtless order to life. Therefore, the master said, "I do not hold any ill will
against tian nor blame other people. I study what is near at hand and aspire to
what is lofty. It is only tian who appreciates me!" He also said, "If the Dao is
going to prevail, it is destiny; ifit is going to be abandoned, it is destiny" (Ibid.,
Book 14). Although "the Dao does not prevail, that has been known already"
(Ibid., Book 18), the thorough understanding of tian and ming did not lead to
giving up salvation. On the contrary, it actually aroused Confucius' moral
consciousness, "When junzi are troubled, they certainly turn to it, as they do
when facing difficulties" (Ibid., Book 4).
It can be said that Confucius confirmed his self-confidence of'"Tian has given
life to and nourished de ? (virtue) in me" by his whole life-practice in persisting
despite knowing that his work was in vain. This kind of self-confidence made it
widely known that the highest life value lies in the existence of courage,
disregarding gain and loss. Although Confucius did not really achieve his moral
salvation ideal, as an agent who was sedulously involved in changing the world
by his moral conduct, he has undoubtedly become an enigma in front of the
common people, making them uneasy and unable to evade, and spurs men's souls
to use moral strength when they make an individual resolution. In brief, tianming
can make people despair and give up the will to act by himself, but can also
arouse people's solemn zealousness to make great efforts in doing something
which seems doomed to "hopelessness." Confucius' view7 of tianming belonged
to the latter condition, and this made him attempt to establish a world which was
controlled by the ethical "should do" while he worked in true-life and then
discarded the traditional belief in god behind him.
4 Ethics of self-government
Confucius laid aside the question of belief, and his view of tianming does not
have a theological connotation. Therefore, he tried to construct a humanistic
world and had to contend with people to introduce the humanistic education
ideals of "being cordial, proper, deferential, frugal and unassuming" (Ibid.,
Bookl).
In the humanistic world, humanity is an independent being existing for its own
purposes instead of a creation of god. Man should become the real master of his
own domain, and thus this has become the social ideal practiced by people
worldwide to construct a truly humanistic world. It was Confucius who began to
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A new interpretation of Confucianism
539
put all man's hope on the virtues?individual self-government and self-discipline.
He said, "How could ren \1 (benevolence) be at all remote? No sooner do I seek
it than it has arrived" (Ibid., Book 7). "Becoming benevolent in one's conduct is
self-originating, how could it originate with others?" (Ibid., Book 12). There is
no doubt that the humanistic world is one in which life becomes conscious. In
this world human beings are not tempted by the guidance or the inducement of
any god's will, for man should save himself with his own power. This kind of
consciousness derives from human beings' moral logos. Stimulated by the moral,
humans should practice humanism consciously so as to become a real human
being and to change the world into a fully humanized one through positive
interaction among people. This is Confucius' humanistic ideal.
Confucius seldom talked about xing 14 (nature), giving it only one sentence,
that is, "Human beings are similar in nature, but vary greatly by experience"
(Ibid., Book 17). It can be said that the proposition "human beings are similar in
their xing" has shown that Confucius took a positive attitude towards human
nature, and on the basis of this attitude Confucius expressly presented a theoretical
hypothesis: human social life should advance towards the definite direction
("benevolence") which is the aim of human moral perfection, just as he said,
"Through self-discipline and observing // ?L one becomes benevolent in one'
conduct. If for the space of a day one were able to accomplish this, the whole
empire would defer to this benevolence" (Ibid., Book 12). The significance of the
phrase "vary greatly by experience" is that it shows the great variety of human
life resulting from social circumstances. Confucius said, "In going astray, people
fall into groups. In observing these divergences, the degree to which they are
benevolent can be known" (Ibid., Book 4). Therefore, the formation of moral
personality makes it necessary for people to communicate with the virtuous, and
to visit sages and men of virtue when he is in other countries. For instance, when
Zigong inquired about the ren, Confucius said, "Tradesmen wanting to be good
at their trade must first sharpen their tools. While dwelling in this state, then, we
should serve those ministers who are of the highest character, and befriend those
shi ? (scholar-apprentices) who are most benevolent in their conduct" (Ibid.,
Book 15).
Confucius despised both the life pursuit which people had when they pursued
shamelessly private interests, high status and wealth. But he did not despise the
value of life. On the contrary, he paid much attention to human blessings based
on the exploration of mankind's inner spiritual pursuit of moral reasoning which
hides in their inner world, trying to reconstruct the order of man's social life and
achieve harmony. In fact, what Confucius adhered to is the anthropological idea:
every individual faces only one fierce force of moral choice; the reality of
humanity lies in relationships; human value is regarded as the moral character
showing forth fully in various possible social-ethical political relationships.
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540
LIN Cunguang
Understood from Confucius' anthropological view mentioned above, "zheng"
? (administrative injunction) is necessary because it is in its core status
transmitting and educating humanity, and plays an important role in constructing
a positive relationship (the way of doing one's utmost (zhong j&) and putting
oneself in the other place (shu ?S) among human beings. Nevertheless,
individuals can only achieve self-fulfillment ideologically. That means self
fulfillment (a human becoming "man") can only be the end of personal affairs,
and the perfection of society lies in each individual's self-fulfillment by
consciously practicing humaneness. Thus, the intercourse in social-ethical
political relationships is limited, its principle is that "if they are unwilling
then desist" (bukezezhi ^njpiij ih) (Ibid., Book 12). Here Confucius only
hoped that the social authorities and political powers could be governed by
self-fulfillment (this is where the significance of zhengming "to insure that
names are used properly" lies), which is also his limitation. Just as the famous
German philosopher Karl Jaspers commented: His (Confucius's) limitation is,
faced with evil and failure, he can only mourn and bear rather than obtain any
motivation from the distress. This limitation explains why he cannot achieve his
ideal (Jaspers 1995, p. 179).
Ultimately, in the humanistic world constructed by Confucius, a human being
as an individual must be guided by self-perfection of morals and by realizing
his wish of becoming a human. Whether he is a man standing in an important
social position and having great powers or if he lives at the bottom of society
and is humble, no one is an exception. The saying that only the benevolent person
can really love or hate is not just a simple expression of human feelings of liking
or disliking, because, for Confucius, the expression of love and hatred is based
on the expectation of one's moral self-perfection and the reasonable requirement
for the shaping of personality, which can be described as "benevolent persons
establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in
seeking to get there themselves" (Yang 1980, Book 6). A true benevolent person
must realize his own value in the process of "establishing others in seeking to
establish themselves and promoting others in seeking to get there oneself"
Therefore, self-fulfillment and supporting others are in harmony. Only through
this can we really understand the meaning of Confucius' saying that "as for
filial and fraternal responsibility, it is, I suspect, the root of benevolence" (Ibid.,
Book 1). Although filial obedience does not exclude a kind of special expression
of private emotion, it has never been restricted to this expression. For Confucius,
it is better to say that family ethics mainly refers to such a moral reasoning:
perfect respect and deep concern for mutual moral personality among the family
are the basis of family relationships. Family ethics can be the foundation of moral
conditioning and good order for the whole society only if humans can expand
their emotion and intellect to others and to the society.
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A new interpretation of Confucianism
5 Dialogue: Specification of moral practice
The idea of self-fulfillment put forward by Confucius is not an idle saying; its
essential character is the specification of ren. From this view, the whole life
practice of Confucius did not fail completely; he acquired great success in private
education, which depended on his taking the principle of ren and applying it to
teaching. The Zhongyong Jif (the Doctrine of the Mean) records that Confucius
said, "A junzi should improve his virtue and deepen his learning." Undoubtedly,
to Confucius "to deepen his learning" had some practical meanings. It was
indispensable for one's maturation, and Confucius, who thought himself a model
studious man, was just a man who asked questions about everything.
As everyone knows, the aim that Confucius ran his schools with was to
cultivate the "person." It was not only intelligent and capable men that had
the abilities to administer a country, but also the new ones who were self-led
and could participate consciously in creating harmony. Confucius' educational
theory was based upon the conception of the whole person, which means
that when people got involved in every realm of social life as moral beings, the
moral self of the individual or the self-fulfillment of "becoming a human" would
have the main function of "comprisal," that is to say, the moral self contains
various socio-political, ethical and cultural activities. Thus, the most essential
character of Confucius' private education was that teaching and broad social
activities were united. Teaching and learning were not isolated courses or
phenomena with limited time. On the contrary, they were concerned with one's
whole life, and were a kind of devotion with heart and soul that could not be
separated from one's life experience, action and self-fulfillment in the concrete
social history and political situation.
Therefore, the strength of enlightenment in Confucius' personality had a
decisive meaning in his teachings. From the dialogical form of the Analects we
can see that deeply investigating the life problem was based upon life choices
that people have to face and cannot flee from. The life problem can not be solved
at once, nor can students be made to acquire identical ways of getting involved in
the society even with an identical education. In the dialogues and communications
between Confucius and his students, it is very important to speak face to face at
random and individually when they confront the actual problems of social living.
As known from the Analects, the students' questions were about Dao, ren, li,
zhi ?n (knowledge), xiao # (filial piety), zheng, ganlu ^P?i (taking office), xuejia
(to learn to farm), junzi, shi, chengi*en $LX (consummate persons), and so
on. Confucius' answers often varied according to different students and different
conditions, especially when he answered the question about ren. Most scholars
affirm that the core of Confucius' idea lies in ren and // since Confucius
emphasized them. However, this is just appearances. What penetrates the thoughts
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541
542
LIM Cunguang
of ren and // is the principle of specification. If we may understand Confucius
"wuke wu b?ke S oJS^FpJ (I do not have presuppositions as to what may and
may not be done)" (Yang 1980, Book 18), in the way, i.e. as Kant's saying that
the reasonable practice of rules is irregular in the Critique of Pure Reason as
cited by Gadamer (Gadamer 1988, p. 107), we can say that what has the crucial
significance to Confucius' system is neither ren nor //, and it is the specification
of abstract morals. He asks how individuals put abstract universal moral principles
into practice in a particular context. That is to say, what morals present to
individual lives is a dynamic particular process of generation and achievement.
Confucius' strong and distinctive personality actually varied from person to
person. He implemented this personality in his teaching by way of "yincai shijiao
(teaching different students according to their different characters)."
Thus, in his teachings, the appraisal of personality, the involvement of emotions
and the difference among individuals were fully encouraged and realized, and it
molded an intimate educational community. As Book 11 says, "Min Ziqian in
attendance at the Master's side was straightforward yet respectful, Zilu was
intent, and Ranyou and Zigong were congenial. The Master was pleased." What
Confucius was pleased was that "le gejin qixing i^?r^K'ft" (to be glad because
they can put their characters to good use). The pleased attitude of Confucius
undoubtedly led to a hypothesis of education about the maturation of one's
personality: the full development of a positive and constructive identity is the
cornerstone on which people can approach the common human nature through
the dialogical relationship of "dangren burang ?t^it (in striving to be
benevolent in your conduct, do not yield ever to your teacher)." The master said,
"Junzi seeks harmony not sameness" (Yang 1980, Book 13). The Master Zeng
also said, "Junzi attracts friends through refinement, and thereby promotes ren"
(Ibid., Book 12). Only when we have understood the untiring efforts of
Confucius, with all his heart put in the process of specification of practical moral
principle, can we realize that to the later generations, Confucius' real strength
was in creating a sort of dynamic and lively spiritual atmosphere by common
participation in community life with the goal of mutual growth. People must
build a genuine dialogical relationship, and then the moral ideal which represents
the right and good life-style can be achieved. This is the essential character of
Confucius' practical philosophy (moral rationality).
6 To narrate and not to invent
Confucius claimed himself to be "to narrate and not to invent, with confidence,
I cherish the ancients" (Ibid., Book 7). The role of consciousness as a narrator
of tradition indicates Confucius' incisive sense of responsibility for culture.
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A new interpretation of Confucianism
Narration is a weighty enterprise which can resolve the living challenges
people face. It has been said that "Tian is going to use your master as a wooden
bell-clapper" (Ibid., Book 3), which means that Confucius was considered as a
transitional cultural hero in his own time. Undoubtedly, Confucius was placed at
the turning point of history, and this role of expectation became the imminent
resource of "attributing the transformation of the reality to Confucius' intention"
in posterity.
Confucius himself once imputed a moral meaning into historical narration and
tradition: "Chunqiu #$C (The Spring and Autumn Annals) has the following
merits: deep and obvious, ambitious and implicit, circumbendibus and well
composed, thoroughgoing and direct, punishing evil and advocating good" (Du
1988, Chenggong Shisinian ??+H^). Mencius also said, "Confucius wrote
the Spring and Autumn Annals which made officials and subjects who wanted to
rebel against the emperor afraid" (Yang 1960, Book 6). Obviously, the moral
meaning contained in historical narration or tradition has a moralistic effect on
"becoming a human" in the sense of "ensuring that names are used properly." On
the basis of normative meaning and moralistic effect, Confucius paid special
attention to the "modification" of"//" in tradition. The reason why Confucius had
a profound respect for the // of the Zhou Dynasty is that he thought that through
modification of the Xia and Shang Dynasties, it was more perfect and approached
"wen ~SC (civilization)," meaning humanization. "The Zhou Dynasty looked back
to the Xia and Shang Dynasties. Such a wealth of culture! I follow' the Zhou" said
Confucius (Analects, Book 3). What is called "wen", as in the saying "wen
through ritual and music" (Analects, Book 14), has a verbal meaning of
"humanization" (becoming a socialized person). Li endowed people with a kind
of order in life practice. Considering its social normative meaning, IVs ideal
meaning is that it can afford a virtuous and correct life form for self-fulfillment
and social life.
However, problems cannot be solved by simple recovery (Gadamer 1988,
p. 141), and Confucius is no exception. From his conception of modification, we
know that he clearly revealed that tradition has a normative and educational
significance to the realization of "humanization." Just as philosophical
hermeneutics tells us: building a meaningful relationship with a tradition is not to
say that traditional normative idea is undoubted or unable to change or beyond
any criticism, on the contrary social life is composed of continuous processes of
changing what we insisted to be right before (Ibid., p. 102). We can say "to narrate
and not to invent" as well as sticking to rectifying // and actively joining in
shaping social community's humanistic order and harmonious life form is just
one of the core ideas of "the Dao of junzF advocated by Confucius.
The medium significance of tradition is recognized through spiritual
conversation with the ancients (so-called dreaming of Zhou Gong), and from the
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543
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LIN Cunguang
perspective of self-fulfillment, it ought rather to be described as talking with the
inner-self. Tradition is not the resource of the holy mandatory power; its medium
significance is bound by people's conscious self-fulfillment. Therefore, when the
culture transformed from god-centered to human-centered, Confucius took on the
mission of rebuilding the social order by using tradition as the medium. It is this
consciousness which changes Confucius from an advocator of old times to a great
philosopher opening a new era, which is coincident with Jaspers' saying that
reflecting on the past may change our views about the past, turning traditional
thinking and custom into conscious principles will lead to the creation of a new
philosophy accordant with the old culture (Jaspers 1995, p. 78). Confucius'
reflection on and advocacy of tradition maintained and widened the succession
and vitality of our tradition, and at the same time stimulated the zhanguo zhuzi
rSfSiii (the hundred schools) to critique their own cultural tradition. Doubtless,
as for the realization of the self-value of humanity, cultural tradition supplies us
with a moral basis. Whether it is conscious advocacy or criticism and reflection,
it is beneficial as long as it leads to enlightenment. Conversely, the simple
affirmation or negation of a cultural tradition actually desecrates the tradition. To
the persons who want to achieve self-fulfillment, tradition does not need to be an
unusual or strange force, but making tradition dogmatic will certainly prevent
personal potential and value from developing.
7 Conclusion
We can assert that Confucius established a humanistic conceptual world led by
the desire for self-fulfillment. This world is against another one dominated by
ego-grounded interests. As Confucius said, "Jimzi understands yi X (what is
appropriate), xiaoren <b? (petty persons) understands // M (personal advantages)"
(Yang 1980, Book 4). Although Confucius had no clear conception of the
unlimited evil as discussed by Gadamer (Gadamer 1988, p. 35), the distinction
between junzi from xiaoren made by Confucius implies that licentious xiaoren
md junzi in their eternal confrontation will perpetually delay an ideal society.
However, from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics the author
believes that the humanistic ideal advocated by Confucius, which means that
everyone should realize fully his own moral value, still has a revelatory meaning
for modern individuals. Facing a world dissimilated by modem technological
civilization, humanistic thinkers call for listening to the internal needs of humanity
itself. The author believes that Confucius' humanistic moral ideal and its
specification principle can still normalize our living practices. Only in the
concrete context of conversation-practice can we feel our actual existence. In
this limited sense, the author tries to comprehend the Analects as a book of
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A new interpretation of Confucianism
545
philosophical hermeneutics. This is the intent of writing this article, moreover,
what the author is determined to refute is the kind of view of Confucianism which
is based on incontinent hackneyed and stereotyped expressions and demagogic
essentialism. This view believes that we can keep the rigid (unchangeable)
so-called "cultural intrinsic character" merely by blindly respecting Confucius,
blindly reading the classics, being superstitious to saints' doctrines and possessing
it once for all. It is ridiculous and unrealistic to Confucius. What is more, it is
really an act of desecration. I would rather believe what Jaspers said, "We must
make self-decision and infer from it, otherwise, everything would exist in a
misleading appearance" (Jaspers 1995, p. 184).
Furthermore, in the author's opinion, and from the perspective of cultural
construction, it is necessary to divide Confucianism clearly into two layers: one
is the conservative Confucius conforming to tradition (the living form under the
ritual tradition); and the other is the radical Confucius who tried to realize social
revolution through rebuilding principles (the Dao of junzi) on the basis of
renewing the knowledge of ren. These two Confucius not only had different
profound and lasting influences on Chinese national history, but also will have
great effects on modem culture. Why Confucius is Confucius lies in that he
cultivated Chinese people's consciousness of cultural self-identification by
systematically reflecting and consciously transmitting the history of our own
culture. Besides, his practical wisdom, which focused on real life and ethical and
political affairs, reveals the "practical reason" which is the original character of
the Chinese traditional thought, and shows a humanistic idea that takes cultural
cultivation as its core. On this consciousness of humanistic idea, Confucius
thought and dealt positively with the strife and political problems he faced during
that time from two aspects.
Confronting the downfall of the emperor's authority, the rigidity and
invalidation of the ritual and musical system, and the collapse and disorganization
of the social order during the Zhou Dynasty, Confucius devoted himself to
transmitting the cultural tradition and the ritual and musical system, expressing
his conservative side. On the other hand, he tried hard to seek a project which
could rebuild and construct the world order, he strived to make a second choice
for the humanistic values and life ideals so that he could instill a new vitality in
the social revolution, and then open a new kind of moral ideal and humanistic
spirit rooted in the subject's self-perfection and ethical ideals, showing his
progressive side. Only on the basis of this differentiation and interpretation can
we actually reveal the meaning of the possible innovations of Confucianism in
modern times. However, in no way does this differentiation mean that we can
accept one and refuse the other. Because the key point is still that when facing
problems in our own times, whether systemic or conceptual, whether we learn
from Confucius' wisdom by narrowly and partially sticking to our so-called
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546
LIN Cunguang
"cultural selfhood" or by consciously constructing the future of our culture
through multiplex conversation, we must make the decision on our own.
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