The Delusion of Impartial Intervention
Author(s): Richard K. Betts
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1994), pp. 20-33
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20046926
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The
of
Delusion
Intervention
Impartial
Richard K. Betts
PREVENTING
have
PEACE
a motto
to
that peacemakers
would
do well
no
nor
harm." Neither
the United
States
the United
adopt: "First, do
Nations
have quite grasped
this. Since the end of the Cold War
unleashed
them to intervene in civil conflicts around the world,
they
have done reasonably well in some cases, but in others they have un
meant to relieve it.
wittingly
prolonged
suffering where they
Physicians
How
does this happen? By following a principle that sounds
like common
sense:
that
intervention
should be both limited and
in on one side of a local struggle un
impartial, because weighing
the legitimacy
and effectiveness
of outside
involvement.
dermines
resonates with
This Olympian
respect for law and
presumption
It has the ring of prudence,
international
fairness,
cooperation.
sense in old-fashioned
and restraint. It makes
U.N.
peacekeeping
where
role is not to make peace, but to
the outsiders'
operations,
a cease-fire
to
that all parties have decided
bless and monitor
a destructive
when
carried
accept. But it becomes
misconception
over to the messier
where
the bel
realm of "peace enforcement,"
more
to gain
to
decide
that they have nothing
ligerents have yet
by fighting.
Richard
K. Betts
is Professor
the Security Policy Program
tional and Public Affairs. His
by the Brookings
[20]
of Political
at Columbia
latest book
Science
and Director
School of Interna
University's
isMilitary
Readiness, published
Institution.
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Volume 73No. 6
of
The Delusion
of Impartial
Intervention
end awar
if the intervenor takes sides,
tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win?
that is, if it is not impartial. Impartial intervention may end awar if
the outsiders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the
and impose a peace settlement?that
local competitors,
is, if it is not
Limited
intervention
may
limited. Trying to have it both ways usually blocks peace by doing
to
from defeating
either belligerent
the other, but not
them stop trying. And the attempt to have it both
enough
the United Nations
and the United
States?and
ways has brought
to
those whom
they sought
help?to
varying degrees of grief in
Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.
enough
keep
to make
WHO
RULES?
many causes, and each war is unique and complicated,
but the root issue is always the same: Who
rules when
the fighting
wars between
the issue may be sovereignty over
countries,
stops? In
or
over third
or influence over
territory,
suzerainty
parties,
disputed
international
transactions.
In wars within
countries the issue may be
Wars
have
or how the country should
group will control the government,
be divided so that adversaries can have separate governments. When
resort to war, it is because
on who
they cannot agree
political groups
gets to call the tune in peace.
which
A war will
a
rather
begin unless both sides in dispute would
war
to
not
avert
if either one
hard
fight than concede. After all, it is
cares
it has to do is let the other side have
primarily about peace?all
what it claims is its due. A war will not end until both sides agree who
is in dispute.
will control whatever
Is all this utterly obvious? Not to those enthusiasts for international
peace enforcement who are imbued with hopes for global governance,
to
or vis
unsympathetic
thinking of security in terms of sovereignty,
sure that war is not a rational
act.
cannot
cerally
political
They
bring
assume
war.
to deal
in
the
themselves
of
currency
forthrightly
They
instead that outsiders' good offices can pull the scales from the eyes of
to violence was a
fighting factions, make them realize that resorting
for force. But wars are
blunder, and substitute peaceful negotiation
not
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS-
November/December
1994
[ 21 ]
Richard K. Betts
no accident that
often continue
rarely accidents, and it is
belligerents
or that the terms of
to kill each other while
they negotiate,
diplomatic
settlements usually reflect results on the battlefield.
Others
sometimes
proceed
what force should be expected
of statements
last spring, for
air strikes against the Bosnian
is not, and should not, become
he declared that the United
from muddled
about
assumptions
to
In a bizarre sequence
accomplish.
threatened
instance, President Clinton
States
Serbs, then said, "The United
as
a
a
involved
partisan in war." Next
States should lead other Western
in ending ethnic cleansing
nations
in Bosnia, only to say a moment
that the United
States or the United
later, "That does not mean
can enter awar, in effect, to redraw the lines ... within what
Nations
was
Yugoslavia."
This profoundly confused policy, promulgated with the best of
cost lives on all sides in Bosnia. For
lawyerly intentions,
inevitably
to kill peo
what legitimate purpose can military
forces be directed
ple and break things, if not to take the side of their opponents? If the
use of
to be
deadly force is
legitimate
killing rather than senseless
means
itmust serve the purpose of settling the war?which
killing,
someone
in power at
who rules, which means
leaving
determining
the end of the day.
is this done without
How
side? And how can
taking someone's
outside powers pretend to stop ethnic cleansing without
allocating
lines? Yet Clinton
and U.N.
is, drawing
territory?that
Secretary
General
Boutros
Boutros-Ghali
did not make
threats to protect
or viable borders, but to enforce
truce
recognized
naturally unstable
lines that made no sense as a permanent
territorial
arrangement.
an
to
Such confusion made
intervention
stalemate,
accessory
pun
too far but not
ishing either side for advancing
settling the issue
that fuels the war.
in the madness. There are two ways to stop awar:
Some see amethod
one side
on the battlefield
impose itswill after defeating the other
having
or
a
having both sides accept
negotiated
compromise. The hope for a
solution accounts for amisconceived
compromise
impartiality.
is compromise
When
When
both
sides
believe that they
probable?
have more to lose than to gain from fighting. Because leaders are often
[22]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Volume73No.6
*I? THE MANE Of PEACE, LAW AND ORDER-SURRENDER
f"
THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE,1963
From
the U.N.
intervention
in the
Congo,
1963
awar
iswhy most
starts, which
rather than combat. But peaceful
by diplomacy
seem
to the opponents
for a war to
has to
impossible
compromise
start, and once it begins, compromise becomes even harder. Emotions
costs grow, demands for recompense
escalate. If com
intensify, sunk
to avert war in the first
was not tolerable
place, it
enough
promise
becomes even less attractive once large amounts of blood and treasure
have been invested in the cause.
sensible, this usually
crises are resolved
If neither
a stalemate
tical? Not
side manages
emerges,
before
happens
does
to
a
the other
pound
compromise
peace
into submission
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS-
more
become
for a long time, and not until many more
November/December
and
prac
lives have been
1994
[23]
Richard K. Betts
seem
invested in the contending
quests for victory. Stalemates
rarely
solid to those with a strong stake in overcoming
them. Belligerents
one set of
stratagems and schemes after another
conjure up
military
or
or out
to
they hope for shifts in alliances
gain the upper hand,
to tilt the balance of power, or
side assistance
they gamble that their
to lose heart and crack. Such
adversary will be the first
develop
ments
InWorld War
often do break stalemates.
I, for example,
trench warfare
in France
ebbed
and flowed
for four
inconclusively
to
allowed the Germans
This
years until the Russian
capitulation.
move armies from the east and achieve a
breakthrough
that unglued
and almost brought them victory in the spring of
turned the tables with newly ar
the Allies
rebounded,
1918. Then
later.
rived American
armies, and won the war six months
is likely to yield to negotiated
Stalemate
compromise
only after it
solution appears hopeless to both sides. In
lasts so long that amilitary
was useful, the two sides
the Iran-Iraq War, where U.N. mediation
Front
theWestern
had fought ferociously but inconclusively for eight years. The United
the way for both sides to lay down their arms, but
smoothed
intervention with as much effect in
it is hard to credit that diplomatic
as
in
and despair of war-makers
the simple exhaustion
bringing peace
is useful, but it helps peacemaking
Tehran and Baghdad. Mediation
Nations
most where
peacemaking
needs help
COMPROMISES
least.
THAT
KILL
If there
is any place where peacemaking
needs help most, and fails
most
theWest's
attempt at limited but
abjectly, it is Bosnia. There,
slow-motion
effort
involvement
abetted
savagery. The
impartial
one
wound
side, and counterbalancing
up doing things that helped
This
alienated both and
actions
the
other.
them by
that helped
enabled them to keep fighting.
tried to prevent the Serbs from consolidat
to consistent mili
going all the way
ing their victory, but without
and Croats. The main U.N. mission
tary support of the Muslims
com
to
was humanitarian
delivery of food and medicine
besieged
to
and
but this amounted
munities,
military
breaking the sieges?a
The United
[24]
Nations
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
No.6
Volume73
The Delusion
of Impartial
Intervention
that the Serbs interfered
effect. It is hardly
surprising
political
it. In line with
the humanitarian
when
they could get away with
the United
Nations
"safe areas"?pockets
of
rationale,
supported
on in areas
Muslims
and Croats hanging
by the Serbs.
conquered
to frustrate the last
Apart from such limited action
phase of terri
to settle the
torial rearrangement
and U.S. attempts
by force, U.N.
war were limited to
an arms
a "no
diplomatic mediation,
embargo,
on
sanctions
fly zone," and economic
Belgrade.
For over a year, the U.N.
forceful reaction to Bosnian
inhibited
presence
Serb provocations
and other units on the
because
Despite
French, British,
were
to retaliation. U.S. and U.N.
ground
hostage
threats were not just weak and hesitant; by trying
to be both forceful and neutral,
at
they worked
First, after much dancing around
cross-purposes.
and wrinp-inp- of hands, the United Nations
and
nato used force on behalf of the Bosnian government,
the best of
lawyerly intentions, an
irrational strategy cost
lives in Bosnia.
albeit with
only
out
air
raids
But
Serb
the
symbolic "pinprick"
against
positions.
to
side powers did this while refusing
let those they were defending buy
arms to defend themselves. Given the awkward multilateral
politics of
arms
as
the
But
embargo, this may have been understandable.
strategy,
a few
itwas
irrational, plain and simple.
the absurdity
Impartiality compounded
in August
the
1994, when
U.N. military commander also threatened the Bosnian government with
attack if it violated the weapons
exclusion zone around Sarajevo. U.N.
to undertake any combat at
strategy thus bounced between unwillingness
on two fronts
to
all and a commitment
fight
against both belligerents.
sense
Such lofty evenhandedness may make
for a judge in a court that can
enforce itswrit, but hardly for a general wielding a small stick in a bitter war.
a
Overall, U.N. pressures maintained
teetering balance of power
the
the
intervenors
refused to let either side
among
belligerents;
win. Economic
sanctions worked
the arms
against the Serbs, while
the Muslims.
The
rationale was
that
against
embargo worked
a
evenhandedness
would
settlement.
The
encourage
negotiated
result was not peace or an end to the
killing, but years of military
slow bleeding,
and delusionary
stalemate,
diplomatic
haggling.
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS-
November/December
1994
[25]
Richard K. Betts
The desire for impartiality and fairness led outside diplomats to
territorial compromises
that made no strategic sense. The
promote
Vance-Owen
the unrealistic
1947
plan and later proposals mimicked
noncon
U.N. partition plan for Palestine: geographic
of
patchworks
vulnerable
corridors
and
tiguous territories,
supply lines, exposed
ever
If
and
indefensible
borders.
such plans
communities,
accepted,
create a territorial tinderbox
to
would
and a perpetual
temptation
renew the conflict. Yet the one case inwhich
said itwas
Washington
to thrust tens of thousands of American
troops into the Bos
willing
nian tangle was to enforce just such an accord.
In Somalia, the United
States succeeded laudably in relieving star
vation.
fall apart again after
that food supply would
on
took
the mission
of restoring civil order.
withdrawal, Washington
more
was
This
ambitious
less limited and
than the outside powers'
in
it
short
of
but
Bosnia,
"strategy"
stopped
taking charge and impos
a settlement on the
warring factions.
ing
at
in Somalia worked
the international
operation
Incongruously,
a local court and
before estab
throwing together
police organization
an executive or
of government,
lishing the other essential elements
forces set out to arrest General Mohamed
legislature. Then U.S.
was not
a troublemaker
but one of the prime
Farah Aidid?who
just
to governing
claimants
any other
authority?without
championing
a
contender. The U.S.
attempts failed, but killed
large number of
waters
in
the
Somalis and further roiled
political
Mogadishu.
Stung
Then,
fearful
to U.S. forces, Washington
pulled out and left U.N.
by casualties
an inde
the bag, maintaining
troops from other countries holding
cisive presence
and taking casualties of their own.
in the chaos of conflict
It may have been wise to avoid embroilment
Somali clans. But then itwas naive to think that interven
between
tion could help to end the local anarchy. As author Michael Maren
aren't keeping the
asked in The New York Times y"If the peacekeepers
since the cost of interven
peace, what are they doing?"?especially
was not
tion topped $1.5 billion. The U.N.
only indecisive,
operation
Maren argued, but fueled the fighting by letting the feuding factions
and cash. In areas where U.N.
for U.N.
compete
jobs, contracts,
in order to
forces were absent, the parties reached accommodation
[26]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS-
Volume73N0.6
The Delusion
of Impartial
Intervention
resources.
rather than jockeying for U.N.
commerce,
Clinton
had raised
rhetoric by President
After
early forceful
about U.S. action, Bosnia and Somalia helped to brake
expectations
in New York andWashington
for taking on other peace
enthusiasm
It is indeed wise to be more selective than in the heady
operations.
reestablish
security that followed the end of the Cold
days of hope for collective
_
_
if theWestern
but it will be unfortunate
War,
such
abandon
powers and the United Nations
Washington dithered
If they do not quit com
missions
altogether.
with sanctions against
same
attempt to bring
problem?an
pletely, the
arise
peace?can
peace turning out to postpone
Haiti, then signed a
are
it
that
if
the
misconceptions
produced
again
deal with the junta.
not recognized.
Of course, not all problems are due to impar
States and United Nations
for example, the United
tiality. In Haiti,
the exiled president,
sides, supporting
Jean
clearly did choose
Bertrand Aristide. And eventually the unmistakable U.S. willingness
to back down. Even here,
to invade forced the junta in Port-au-Prince
however, suffering was prolonged by the initially limited character of
the intervention.
For over a year after the junta reneged on the Governor's
Island
relied on economic
sanctions against Haiti,
agreement, Washington
a
was bound to hurt the inno
"trickle-up" strategy of coercion that
cent
the
long before the guilty. The blockade gradually devastated
were
to
health and welfare
of the country's masses, who
powerless
make
the policy changes demanded
and on whose
by Washington
behalf the sanctions were
supposedly
being applied. Yet sanctions
to Haiti's
offered no incentive
elites to cut their own
kleptocratic
the generals
throats, and sanctions were not what made
sign the
accord brokered by former President Jimmy Carter. Instead, the many
months
sanctions were left to work were used by the
during which
supporters at a steady pace.
junta to track down and murder Aristide
in the long tragic saga of Haitian misgovernment
is a
Meddling
dubious gamble for the United States, considering the formidable dura
the relatively
bility of the country's predatory political culture. While
was
of
the
U.S.
forces
the fledgling
welcome,
peaceful entry
occupying
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
November/'December
1994
[27]
Richard K. Betts
in democracy may not outlive the
experiment
departure of U.S.
armed forces. The September agreement did not disband the Haitian
or even
military
completely purge its officer corps, whose
corruption
terror
tactics have long been most of the problem. Even worse, the
and
Haitian
accord hinted that?for
the first time in the crisis?Washington
might
have again erred on the side of impartiality. American
leaders spoke of
the generals' "military honor," U.S. troops were ordered to cooperate
the usurpers' security forces, and many of the anti-Aristide
gang
sters were left free to plot to
to
whether
inter
regain power. Deciding
vene inHaiti was
was done, however,
a
agonizing. Once that
picking
side was certainly wise. But that choice was weakened
by dithering too
to waver in support for the chosen
long with sanctions, then appearing
side when U.S. military force was finally applied.
remains a norm inmany other cases. It has
Impartiality nonetheless
cases
in
worked
that lie beyond traditional peacekeeping,
such as the
cease-fire mediation
between
Iran and Iraq, or the political receiver
with
ship of theU.N. Transitional Authority inCambodia (untac). When
at the reasons for their success, however, it becomes apparent
looking
intervention
is needed least: where
that impartiality works best where
wars have
out and the
played themselves
fighting factions need only
arms.
to
the good offices of mediators
is
lay down their
Impartiality
more
cases?where
likely to work against peace in the
challenging
intervention must make the peace, rather than just preside over it?
because it reflects deeper confusion over what war is about.
IMPERIAL
If outsiders
IMPARTIALITY
such as the United
States
in wars
or the United
Nations
are
for peace
where
have not
demands
passions
burned out, they can avoid the costs and risks that go with entan
aloof and letting the
the mandate?staying
by refusing
glement
locals fight it out. Or they can jump in and help one of the con
sooner than
the other. But can they bring peace
tenders defeat
if they remain impar
from prolonged
exhaustion
carnage would,
a
but with an active,
restrained
tial? Not with
gentle,
impartiality
that overpowers
both sides: an imperial impar
harsh impartiality
faced with
[28]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Volume73No.6
The Delusion
of Impartial
Intervention
and it is
is a tall order, seldom with many
supporters,
tiality. This
cases
to
it
has
worked.
think of
where
hard
actually
in
The best example of imperial impartiality is the U.N. operation
takeover of much
of the administrative
grand-scale
a
a new govern
authority in the country, and program for establishing
a
ment
through supervised elections and constituent assembly. Despite
fulfilled most of itsmandate.
great obstacles and tenuous results, untac
Cambodia?a
should be given its due. As amodel to rescue the ideal of
limited and impartial intervention, however, it falls short.
did not nip a horrible war in the bud. As
First, the United Nations
with Iran and Iraq, it capitalized on 15years of exhaustion and bloody
stalemate. The outside powers recognized that the main order of busi
ness was to determine who rules, but
not act before the local
they did
factions were weary enough to agree on a procedure for doing so.
was
intervention
limited only in one sense: it
Second, U.N.
of the transition agreement when
avoided direct enforcement
local
contenders proved recalcitrant. Luckily, such incidents were manage
have been a fiasco. In other
able, or the whole
experiment would
respects, the scale of involvement was too huge to provide a model.
untac was the most
in Korea and Kuwait,
from the wars
Apart
massive U.N.
in history. It involved thousands of per
intervention
a
sonnel from host of countries and billions of dollars in expenditures.
so
a time when other
The Cambodia
operation proved
expensive, at
demands on the United Nations were escalating dramatically,
that it
more than once in a blue moon.
cannot be
repeated
should count as a success?especially
after
Third, although untac
the election
it conducted
against all odds in 1993?the
operation's
a tremendous U.N. presence,
results have been unstable. Despite
the
terms of the transition agreement were never
faithfully followed by all
to erode after untac's
the local combatants
and continued
departure.
For example, because the Khmer Rouge reneged, none of the Cam
to the
bodian factions disarmed
degree stipulated in the agreement;
never
a
after the election, the constituent
assembly
seriously debated
or less
but more
Prince Norodom
constitution,
rubber-stamped
Sihanouk's
and sporadic fighting
between
the Khmer
demands;
This
Rouge
success
and other parties
FOREIGN
and after untac
continued
before
AFFAIRS-
November/December
1994
left.
[29]
Richard K, Betts
and more
to the
success was linked with
point, the U.N.
not in effect. The real success of the
impartiality only in principle,
overseen
untac
was
a final
not in
transition
by
fostering
peaceful
in
the
in
but
Cambodia,
among
compromise
parties
altering the
one. The
worst
balance of power among them and marginalizing
the
transition did not compel an end to violent strife, but it did facilitate
the realignment
of parties and military
forces that might
bring it
Fourth,
about. The
Khmer
Phnom
old Cold War
Son Sann, and the
alignment of Sihanouk,
the Vietnamese-installed
in
government
against
Rouge
Penh was
transformed
into a new coalition
of everyone
against the Khmer Rouge. Any
will come from the new balance
MEDDLING
The
"peacekeeping"
fortify peace,
but
peace Cambodia
of power.
WITHOUT
is likely to achieve
MUDDLING
that has been the United Nations'
forte can help
it does not create peace as "peace enforcement"
is
supposed to do. Since the end of the ColdWar, theUnited States and
into several imbroglios where itwas
were up to, and there has been
they
the gray area between operations under
the United Nations have stumbled
not clear which of the two missions
much
head-scratching
about
Chapters VI andVII of theU.N. Charter.Washington
andNew York
have responded to rough experiences by remaining mired in indecision
and hamstrung
(Bosnia), facing failure and bailing
by half-measures
a
out (Somalia), acting
only after
long period of limited and misdi
or
rected pressure
back from action where more
(Haiti),
holding
awesome disaster than
anywhere else called for it (Rwanda). To do
better in picking and choosing,
itwould help to be clearer about how
means
for political ends.
should be marshaled
military
that to make peace is to decide who rules. Making
peace
Recognize
war ends. If Americans
or U.N.
means
how
the
forces
determining
are
to make peace, they will often have to kill
going to intervene
to do this, it
people and break things in the process. If they choose
should be after they have decided who will rule afterward.
in the local fracas are not clear enough to
If claims or capabilities
make this judgment,
then they are not clear enough for intervention
[30]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS-
Volume73N0.6
The Delusion
of Impartial
Intervention
same token, international forces should not mix
bring peace. By the
in the dangerous
business
of determining
who
governs without
can be
An
intervention
that
expecting deadly opposition.
stopped in
its tracks by a few dozen fatalities, like the U.S. operation
in Somalia
was, is one that should never have begun.
Avoid half-measures.
If the United
States or the United Nations
wish to bring peace to violent places before tragedy unfolds
in full,
either lending their
detail, they should act decisively?by
gruesome
to one side or
to
In
military
weight
forcing both
compromise.
or
either case, leaders
outside powers
should avoid what
the nat
to
ural
instincts of successful
a middle
course.
politicians
and bureaucrats
tell them
is
sensible:
Half-measures
often make
sense
in domestic
politics, but that is
interests accept
precisely because peace already exists. Contending
in legislatures,
in courts, and
compromises
negotiated
adjudicated
on orga
enforced by executives
because
the state has a monopoly
nized force; the question
of "Who rules?" is settled. That
is the
in peace. In war, that premise
iswhat the fight
premise of politics
course in
a
ing is all about. A middle
intervention?especially
grad
ual and symbolic use of force?is
likely to do little but muddy both
fuel their hopes of victory, or kill people for prin
related to the purpose of the war. If deadly
ciples only indirectly
to peace, it must engage the
force is to make a direct contribution
sides' calculations,
determination
of borders
purposes most directly related to war?the
and the distribution
of political power.
Do not confuse peace with justice. If outside powers want to do the
a
right thing, but do not want to do it in big way, they should rec
a
on
than
ognize that they are placing
higher premium
legitimacy
on peace. Most
international
interventions
since the end of the
were
not
War
Cold
driven by the material
interests of the outside
interests:
powers but by their moral
securing peace and justice.
are not natural allies, unless
Peace and justice, however,
right just
to coincide with
happens
might.
an issue when
in a civil war usually becomes
Outside
intervention
the sides are closely enough matched
that neither can defeat the other
quickly. And
when
material
FOREIGN
interests
AFFAIRS-
are not
directly
involved,
November/December1994
it is
[31 ]
Richard K. Betts
to expect great powers or the United Nations
to
expend
for an overwhelming
and decisive military
action. So if
should
take precedence,
intervention
should
the
peace
support
of the rivals, irrespective of their legitimacy. If the United
mightiest
impractical
the resources
Nations had weighed in on the side of the Serbs, or had helped Aidid
inMogadishu
rather than trying to jail him, there might
well have been peace in Bosnia and Somalia long ago. If justice takes
a
limited
intervention
however,
may well
precedence,
lengthen
an
to
conflict. Perhaps putting
end
killing should not be the first pri
but interventionists
should admit that any
ority in peacemaking,
a
intervention
involves such
choice.
take control
in assessing
and justice
also arises
peace
like those proposed
If the aim is to
territorial divisions
for Bosnia.
reduce violent eruptions, borders should be drawn not to minimize
the transfer of populations
and property, but to make borders coher
ent, congruent with political
solidarity, and defensible. This, unfor
the solution to ethnic cleansing.
It
tunately, makes ethnic cleansing
also will not guarantee
against later outbreaks of revanchism. But it
Tension
between
can make war
less constant.
Better
the model
of India and Pakistan
than that of Lebanon.
Do not confuse balance with peace orjustice. Preventing
either side
a
war
from gaining
military
advantage prevents ending the
by mili
are
are
a
war
means.
not
to
that
Countries
tary
likely
losing
keep fight
seem
indecision
makes
until
ing
winning
prolonged
hopeless. Out
siders who want to make peace but do not want to take sides or take
control themselves
try to avoid favoritism by keeping either side from
an indecisive balance on the battlefield. This
supports
overturning
costs more lives.
and
the
war,
stalemate,
lengthens
military
intervention militarily
rational. Sometimes
the
humanitarian
or save the
to stop
too
much
starving should be
slaughter
imperative
war
even for the most hard-boiled
intervention
and
be
realists,
may
in
ranted even if it does not aim to secure peace. This was a motive
Make
there involved presence in battle
and Somalia, but interventions
areas, constant friction with combatants or local political factions, and
skirmishes that escalated without
any sensible strategic plan. Bad expe
in the
intervention
riences in those cases prevented rapid multilateral
Bosnia
[32]
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Volume73No.6
The Delusion
in Rwanda,
butchery
Operation
in northern
of Impartial
Intervention
could have saved many more
the U.S. humanitarian
Comfort,
which
Provide
lives.
intervention
recent unilateral French action in Rwanda
Iraq, and the
In these cases, the intervening
forces carved
provide better models.
out lines within which
could
take
command
without
they
fighting,
if necessary?areas
within which
the
they could defend
intervenors themselves would rule temporarily. Then they got on with
to the
and protecting
them from
ministering
needy populations
assault. Such action is a stopgap, not a solution, but it is less likely to
but which
make
the war
worse.
In Bosnia, by contrast, the "safe areas," weapons
exclusion zones,
were islands surrounded
and towns supplied by American
by
airdrops
inwhat was
hostile forces and represented messy territorial anomalies
a Serb conquest.
It was no surprise that the Serbs would
effectively
to pounce whenever
hover, waiting
they thought they might be able
to get away with it,
and
testing the resolve of the outsiders to
probing
to tire of the effort to
for the international
community
fight, waiting
on life support.
keep the enclaves
to mistakes,
attention
and uncomfortable
confusions,
Calling
to discredit
choices
is not intended
intervention
It is
altogether.
meant
to argue for caution, because confusion
about what is at issue
can make
such undertakings
cause conflict
rather than cure it. Doing
it right is not impossible. The United States andUnited Nations have
in
collaborated
in the past, most notably in
successfully
peacemaking
wars
over
the
Korea and Kuwait. Enthusiasm
for widespread
involve
ment
in local conflicts
in the early 1990s was based on expectations
that itwould require a small proportion of the effort of those two huge
this was probably true in some cases where
enterprises. Unfortunately,
the United Nations
held back, as in Rwanda, and untrue in some cases
where it jumped in, as in Bosnia. Peacemaking
will not always cost as
as
it did in Korea and Kuwait. The
much
issues, however,
underlying
are much the same?who
is in charge, and inwhat pieces of
territory,
a
war
as if the issues are
after
ends. Intervention
that proceeds
that is
different, and can be settled by action toward the belligerents
both evenhanded in intent and weak in capability, will more likely
prevent
peace
than enforce
FOREIGN
it.?
AFFAIRS
November/December
1994
[33]