© Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University
The Revival of “Northeast Asia” in Japan:
Why Have Japanese Opinion Leaders Begun to Speak of
“Northeast Asia”?*
NAKAGAWA Ryoji**
Abstract
The term “Northeast Asia” is undergoing a revival in Japan, with
many opinion leaders discussing and proposing strategies for
Northeast Asia. In contrast, only 20 to 30 years ago, although many
opinion leaders discussed South Korea, North Korea (1), China and
the Soviet Union separately, there was no discussion of Northeast Asia
as a region in a political or economic sense and the general public seldom came across the term “Northeast Asia”. The “revival” in interest
in Northeast Asia is the combined result of three movements: the
movement from a “Japan Sea Rim Economic Area” to economic cooperation within “Northeast Asia”; the movement to establish a new
“Northeast Asia Common House” security order as proposed by WADA
Haruki and KANG Sang-jung; and the movement toward an upgrading
of the role of Japan, China and South Korea in the ASEAN+3 framework, which offers the most effective framework so far for the economic
integration of East Asia. This “boom” is a kind of mosaic rather than a
unified movement, but there are points of similarity among its parts.
Cooperation in Northeast Asia requires a comprehensive approach
that brings together the three movements.
Keywords:
Northeast Asia, Collaborative Development, Economic Cooperation,
Collective Security, Japan
RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol.3, pp.81-104 (2005).
* The present article is based on a lecture given at Ritsumeikan Doyo Koza (Ritsumeikan
Saturday Seminar) on June 26th 2004 and a presentation made at the International Joint
Symposium by Ritsumeikan University and Yanbian University at Yanbian University,
China, on September 1 2004. The author appreciates the useful comments made by discussion participants.
** Professor of Development Economics, Faculty of International Relations, Ritsumeikan
University, e-mail:rnt20014@ir.ritsumei.ac.jp
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Introduction
The term “Northeast Asia” is undergoing a revival in Japan, with
many opinion leaders discussing and proposing strategies for Northeast
Asia. In contrast, only 20 to 30 years ago, although many opinion leaders
discussed South Korea, North Korea,1) China and the Soviet Union separately, there was no discussion of Northeast Asia as a region in a political
or economic sense and the general public seldom came across the term
“Northeast Asia” in newspapers, journals or on television.
The purpose of the present article is to analyze the background to this
revival and to show that this “Northeast Asia boom” results from a combination of three strands of opinion.
Ⅰ. A SHORT HISTORY OF “NORTHEAST ASIA” IN JAPAN
1. Before WWII
The date of the introduction of the term “Northeast Asia” from China
is not clear, but before WWII, the Imperial Universities of Japan had
established Manchuria, Mongolia, Korea and China as a field of research
with a view to imperial expansion into these countries. The concept of
East Asia (“To-a”) was established but it referred mainly to China, including Manchuria and part of Mongolia. In 1940, the Japanese government
released a plan for a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” in which
“Greater East Asia” included Southeast Asia. (“co-prosperity” however did
not mean prosperity for Asian countries on an equal basis; rather these
countries were forced under the sway of Japan). The change of term was a
reflection of the change in the imperial policy of Japan
2. From the end of WWII to the 1970s
After WWII, the Ministry of Greater East Asia was abolished and the
Bureau of Asia, including the Office of China and the Office of Northeast
Asia and Southeast Asia, was set up within the new Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in imitation of the organization in the United States. The new
1) In the present article, in line with popular English usages such as China and South Korea,
“North Korea” is used as an abbreviation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The acronym DPRK is however also used in citations and where it forms part of a proper
noun.
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word “Northeast Asia” was a translation from English.
In 1951, in the middle of the Korean War, the US announced a
Proposal for the Development of Southeast Asia to constrain the spread of
communism. In response to the Proposal, and also with an element of selfinterest, the YOSHIDA administration of Japan drafted a plan for economic
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. It was against this background that the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was set up
in 1954. After its demise in 1977, it was replaced by the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The concept of Southeast Asia thus
became well-established in Japan. At the same time, historians began to
use the term East Asia (“Higashi Ajia”) to include China, Korea and Japan
to avoid “To-a” which reminded of Japanese imperialism and “Northeast
Asia” which not only was a translation from English but also distorted the
history of traditional Sino-central order in East Asia. In any case, the fact
of the Cold War in Northeast Asia prevented its recognition as a unified
region. Although the Office of Northeast Asia in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs had not changed name, Japanese people seldom came across the
term “Northeast Asia” in newspapers, magazines or on television from the
1950s to the 1970s.
Ⅱ. “J APAN S EA R IM ” TO “N ORTHEAST A SIA ”:
MOVEMENT IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA “BOOM”
THE
F IRST
The turning point came in the 1980s, when cities located on the
domestic Japan Sea coast, especially Niigata and Shimane, began to advocate a “Japan Sea Rim Economic Area.” The aim was to revive the cities
through cooperation with the Soviet Union, China and North and South
Korea In the process of Japan’s rapid economic growth from the 1950s to
the 1970s, the Japan Sea Rim area had lagged behind the “Pacific Rim”. A
key concept for remedying this situation was the “Japan Sea Rim
Economic Area,” a plan promoted by the end of the Cold War in the region.
The Soviet Union began the process of “Perestroika” (restructuring) in
1986 and President Gorbachev visited Japan seeking new diplomatic relations between the two countries. China started its Reform and Open-door
Policy (“Gaige Kaifang” in Chinese) in 1978, establishing normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1989 and with South Korea in
1992. South Korea established normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet
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Union in 1990, and North and South Korea acceded to the United Nations
simultaneously in 1991. The Tumen River Development Project, in which
the Soviet Union (Russia), China and North Korea cooperated in the
development of a shared port and special economic zone, was launched
under an initiative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
in 1991. Although the Japanese government did not participate formally,
the project had a positive impact in Japan on the move toward a “Japan
Sea Rim Economic Area.”
The initiative for a “Japan Sea Rim Economic Area” made real
progress, but the name “Japan Sea” troubled China and North and South
Korea, as North and South Korea call it the “East Sea” and China has no
coastline on the Japan Sea. North and South Korea and China therefore
tended to use the term “Northeast Asia” rather than “Japan Sea
Rim”(Shimakura ed.1992 pp.2-4). Moreover, the “Japan Sea Rim Economic
Area” movement reminded some Korean opinion leaders of Imperial
Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”2)
Japan Sea Rim cities were reluctant to use the term “Northeast Asia”
for fear of being neglected in economic terms, but gradually came to accept
it in the interests of cooperation with North and South Korea and China.
Under the leadership of OHKITA Saburo, former Japanese minister of
foreign affairs, and Dr. C HO Lee-jay of Korea, the Northeast Asia
Economic Forum (HQ: Hawaii, chairman: CHO Lee-jay ) was set up as an
International NGO.
Although the term “Japan Sea Rim” is still used in the names of institutions and academic associations, for instance the Association for Japan
Sea Rim Studies and the Research Institute for the Japan Sea Rim
(Niigata University), it is gradually being displaced by “Northeast Asia”.
For example, Niigata Prefecture and City, which have Japan’s main
port serving Russia and North Korea, led the way in setting up the
Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA) with ten other
prefectures in 1992. ERINA is Japan’s main center for study of the
Northeast Asia Economy and has raised the level of relevant research.
2)
KIM Young-ho, the eminent Korean economist, argues that there are two currents in the
movement for a “Japan Sea Rim Economic Area”. The first aims at peaceful cooperation
based on a reappraisal of history and at the creation of an economic area based on the horizontal division of production. The second aims to establish a logistical response to economic friction with the US and Europe, that is, the re-creation of the “Greater East Asia
Co-prosperity Sphere” (Kim and Twu 1991).
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Curiously, ERINA’s Japanese name is Economic Research Institute for
Japan Sea Rim.
Shimane Prefecture has also promoted the initiative for a “Japan Sea
Rim Economic Area,” but since the International Symposium for Japan
Sea Rim Cooperation held in 1992, it has used the term “North East Asia
Region.” Shimane Prefecture University, established in 2000, has an
Institute for North East Asian Research.
In 1993, Kyoto Prefecture and Maizuru City set up the Japan Sea
Rim Academic Forum,3) which has not yet changed its name, but tends to
use “Northeast Asia” in the name of symposia and so on.
Toyama Prefecture held a Governors’ Summit of the Japan Sea Rim in
1992 but since the second summit in 1993 it has used the term “Northeast
Asia” rather than Japan Sea Rim; it set up “The Association of North East
Asia Regional Governments” in 1998.
Although the initiative for a “Japan Sea Rim Economic Area” has
unintentionally contributed to the revival of “Northeast Asia” and
although the cities involved do exercise influence on cooperation in
Northeast Asia, if this cooperation had been limited to inter-city level, the
concept of Northeast Asia would not have become so popular in Japan.
Sakata (2001) pointed out that many of the initiatives for a “Japan Sea
Rim Economic Area” were too idealistic and philosophical, neglecting the
specificity of Northeast Asian countries, especially their peripheral position in the world economic system.
The second and third movements were thus necessary conditions for
the Northeast Asia “boom”.
Ⅲ. THE NORTH KOREA PROBLEM AND SECURITY IN NORTHEAST
ASIA: THE SECOND MOVEMENT IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA “BOOM”
1. The North Korea Problem since the 1990s
Amid the worldwide collapse of socialist states, North Korea
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: DPRK) began in the 1990s to seek
a change in its diplomatic relations with the US. The US however
required a halt to nuclear development as the prerequisite condition of
normal diplomatic relations. As a bargaining tactic, North Korea declared
3)
The author of the present article is a member of the Forum.
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its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). By early
1994, tensions had mounted over international inspection of North Korea’s
nuclear sites. In 1994, the US and North Korea reached agreement that
North Korea would shut down its nuclear reactors and expel UN monitors, while the US would transfer light-water reactor technology and supply heavy oil in the meantime. Some time after the agreement, on July 8,
1994, the founder of the North Korean state, president KIM Il-sung, died
and was succeeded by his son KIM Jong-il. Following protracted negotiations over the country’s suspected atomic weapons, an agreement was
reached in June 1995.
As a result of floods and the historical failure of the national agricultural policy, famine struck the nation’s estimated 24 million inhabitants in
1998 and 1999. Two years of floods were followed by severe droughts in
1997 and 1998, causing devastating crop failures. Because of the lack of
fuel and machinery parts and weather conditions conducive to parasites,
only 10% of North Korea’s rice fields could be worked. Under these circumstances, KIM Jong-il revised the constitution and was elected Chairman of
the National Defense Commission; a position accorded the nation’s “highest administrative authority” in 1998.
In September 1998, North Korea launched a test missile over Japan,
claiming it was simply a scientific satellite. This launch caused alarm in
Japan, and much of the rest of the world, as to North Korea’s intentions
regarding reentry into the nuclear arms race. The incident also caused a
profound changed in Japanese public opinion on defense, as it was the
first time since WWII that the nation had experienced real military fear of
a foreign country.
In 1999, North Korea agreed to allow the United States to conduct
inspections of a suspected nuclear development site, Kumchangri, which
North Korea admitted had been devised for “a sensitive military purpose.”
In exchange, the U.S. would increase food aid and initiate a program to
introduce potato production.
In the fall of 1999, North Korea had begun to recover from four years
of severe famine. Tensions with South Korea eased dramatically in June
2000, when South Korea’s president, K IM Dae-jung, met with North
Korea’s President KIM Jong-il in Pyongyang. The summit marked the first
ever meeting of the two countries’ leaders.
But in January 2002, George W. BUSH, president of the US, described
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Table 1 Pyongyang Declaration Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National
Defense Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.
Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic
and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past
between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental
interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.
1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this
Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations, and
decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002.
Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding
problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving
the normalization.
2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and
expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology
Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization
by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest
rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a
period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such
financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting
private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that
they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the
normalization talks.
Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized
both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their
nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they
would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks.
Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents
in Japan and the issue of cultural property.
3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern
related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take
appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.
4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and
strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia.
Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon
mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized.
Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean
Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed
the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned.
The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would
further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.
Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security.
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Prime Minister of Japan
Junichiro Koizumi
Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission
Kim Jong-Il
September 17, 2002
Pyongyang
(Provisional Translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)
North Korea as part of an “axis of evil.” Such open hostility marked a dramatic shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea from the CLINTON administration’s engagement policy.
In spite of the antagonistic BUSH policy, KOIZUMI Junichiro, prime
minister of Japan, promoted the normalizing of diplomatic relations
between Japan and North Korea. In September 2002, KOIZUMI visited
Pyongyang, and Japan and North Korea announced the “Pyongyang
Declaration.” The North Korean government unexpectedly acknowledged
that it had abducted about a dozen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and
1980s for the purpose of training North Korean spies.
In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it had violated the 1994
agreement freezing its nuclear-weapons program and had in fact been
developing nuclear bombs.
In response to this “pendulum diplomacy” (Shigemura, 2000) of North
Korea, leaders of both conservative and liberal opinion in Japan have
voiced a wide range of opinions. North Korea has become one of the
hottest topics in Japanese politics, journalism and academic research.
2. “Northeast Asian Common House”
Against this background, WADA Haruki and KANG Sang-jung proposed
a vision for a new Northeast Asian order which they named “Tohoku Ajia
Kyodo no Ie” [Northeast Asian Common House].4), 5)
4)
MORISHIMA Michio, an internationally renowned economist, has proposed a Northeast
Asian Community (NEAC) in Morishima (2000) and elsewhere, and his proposals have
had a great impact on Japanese academics. HARA Yonosuke, a Tokyo University professor
and a major researcher of the East Asian economy, was inspired by Morishima’s book and
wrote Hara (2002), which also had great influence on Japanese academics. Morishima
(2000) also influenced WADA and KANG, but because the Japanese version is entitled
“Higashiajia Kyodotai” [East Asia Community], it did not contribute to the revival of the
term “Northeast Asia” in Japan.
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WADA, emeritus professor of Tokyo University, is a well-known scholar
on Russian and Korean history, author of path-breaking works on the
Korean War, Japan-Korea relations, and the development of North Korea.
As an influential opinion leader, he is now a key figure in the Japanese
movement to normalize relations with North Korea and serves as the secretary general of the Association for the Normalizing of Japan-North
Korea Relations, an organization including both liberals and conservatives
and headed by MURAYAMA Tomiichi, former prime minister in a coalition
administration between the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan),
SDP (Social Democratic Party) and New Party Sakigake.
It was WADA who called for the establishment of a “Northeast Asian
Common House for Humanity” (“Tohoku Ajia Jinrui Kyosei no Ie” in
Japanese) in 1990 and for a “Northeast Asian Common House” (“Tohoku
Ajia Kyodo no Ie” in Japanese) in 1995. He welcomes the Japan-2002
North Korea Summit and Pyongyang Declaration of KOIZUMI and KIM
Jong-il and the subsequent Six-Party Talks on North Korean Issues. He
comments:
A six-sided conference meant a conference involving North and South
Korea, the US, China, Japan and Russia. The Japan-North Korea Summit
and the Pyongyang Declaration presented the first occasion for Japan to
raise the banner of a new regionalism since it turned its back on regionalism following the miserable end of the Greater East Asian idea and
immersed itself in Japan-US bilateralism (Wada, 2003a)
He also praised the inauguration speech of South Korean President
ROH Moo-Hyun on February 25 2003 and the initiative “Toward a Peaceful
and Prosperous Northeast Asia” proposed by President ROH.6) At the same
time, however, he insists that priority be given to peace, and above all to
5)
6)
WADA, KANG and figures close to them use the term “Tohokuajia” [East-north Asia] rather
than “Hokutoajia” [Northeast Asia] because, as they claim, the former term reflects the
standard usage of Japanese, Chinese and Korean while the latter is an anomaly resulting
from a direct translation of the English. In the present article, however, as there is no
such English term as “East-north,” both “Tohokuajia” and “Hokutoajia” are translated as
“Northeast Asia”. This translation does not imply support for “Hokutoajia” and rejection of
“Tohokuajia.”
The ROH Moo-hyun administration of South Korea released its “New Initiative on Peace
and Prosperity in Northeast Asia” and implemented “the Rules of the Presidential
Committee on a Northeast Asian Business Hub” (Presidential Decree No. 17955) in 2003,
<http://www.nabh.go.kr/warp/en/introduction/history/>. Regarding this Initiative, see
Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Business Hub, 2003.
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the abandonment of nuclear weaponry by North Korea, and asserts the
effectiveness of the Six-Party Talks. He comments further:
President ROH Moo-Hyun’s design was to begin with the building of
an economic community and leave till last the security community.
But, as the president himself said, a systematic framework for the
establishment of peace on the Korean peninsula is necessary. It is the
top priority. The first step is to have North Korea abandon its plans
for nuclear development. North Korea wants negotiations with the
US, but it is already doubtful whether a stable framework can be
reached in negotiations between the US and North Korea. Would it
not be better to draw up an agreement between the six countries,
under which Japan and North and South Korea pledge not to construct nuclear weapons while the US, Russia, and China pledge nonuse of such weapons in this region? It is also desirable for a treaty on
peace on the Korean peninsula to be drawn up between the four countries that were parties to the Korean War, and for Russia and Japan
then to issue statements supporting it (Wada, 2003a).
KANG, a Tokyo University professor, is an oversea Korean born and
brought up in Japan and is a well-known scholar on European modernism
and Japanese nationalism, overseas Koreans and Japanese politics.
Through his frequent contribution to television programs and journals, he
is one of the most influential current liberals. He too is a key figure in the
Japanese movement to normalize relations with North Korea.
Like WADA, KANG has praised the Six-Party Talks on North Korean
Issues and places emphasis on their historical meanings. That is, historically the Korea peninsula has been the hot and cold “battlefield” of four
powerful countries, China, Russia, the US and Japan. Therefore, establishing a stable and peaceful Northeast Asia Security System with a
peaceful Korean peninsula at its core has a historical meaning. In the
development of the relevant framework, he asserts that a “unified,” “nonnuclear” and “permanently neutral” Korean peninsula should be the core
of a Collective Security System for Northeast Asia. A special role is given
to the network of overseas Koreans in China, Russia and Japan (Kang,
2001).
To avoid misunderstanding of the political background to the North
Korea problem, it should be pointed out that there is a curious twist to
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Japan’s North Korea policy. The present prime minister of Japan,
KOIZUMI, is at the same time the president of the LDP, which is the governing party of Japan, and, contrary to its name, a conservative party. The
assertions of WADA and KANG are close to those of the opposition party
under the 1955 regime.
KOIZUMI, as a “theatrical politician,” tends to use political means to
garner popular support for his administration. Despite their historical
meaning, he regards the Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002 and 2004
and the Pyongyang Declaration as a kind of personal “performance.” Some
conservative politicians have supported him out of interest in potential
economic development as a result of normalization.
Many Japanese, including both conservatives and liberals, have
praised the results of the summit conference, but the political results are
not so simple to assess.
On the conservative side, many politicians have on the one hand
praised the results obtained in the form of KIM Jong-il’s admission of
responsibility for the abductions and the return of five abductees, but criticize KOIZUMI with the claim that the Japan-North Korea Normalization
Talks are premature while the abduction issue remains unresolved and
the development of nuclear weapons continues. A good number of conservative politicians and journalists are pressurizing the Japanese government to prioritize the cessation of nuclear weapons development and especially the solution of the abduction problem ahead of normalization of
diplomatic relations.
For the liberal side, including social democracy and communism, the
Japan-North Korea Summit of 2002 had both positive and negative
effects. The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration contains many points
which reflect the demands of liberals but, at the same time, the admission
of abduction by KIM Jong-il proved a shock to some liberals, especially
politicians close to the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan
(Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai: Chosen Soren) who had denied the fact of
the abduction. The SDP, for example, which had a friendly relationship
with Chosen Soren and North Korea, denied the fact of the abduction
many times. Although the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) broke off its
friendly relationship with Chosen Soren and North Korea in 1968, it was
criticized for promoting the movement for “return” to North Korea in the
1950s before the break.
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Previously, in the policy area of North and South Korean issues,
Japanese liberals had stressed compensation for Japanese colonialism in
the period from 1910 to 1945, and above all for the forced migration to
Japan, forced labor in Japan, and the exploitation of comfort women. But
with the fading of the memory of WWII among the Japanese, the fact of
the abduction, which is an infringement of the human rights and the sovereignty of Japan, has weakened the validity of this approach.
The “Northeast Asia Common House” initiative has the potential to
replace the past-oriented policy on North Korea which is the traditional
approach of Japanese liberals with a future-oriented policy, thus transcending the limitations of the traditional liberal approach and gaining
acceptability among conservatives, who are reluctant to support compensation for colonialism and other actions.
The “Northeast Asia Common House” has thus become the new
approach to North Korea for Japanese liberals. At the same time, this
approach is more acceptable to conservatives who wish to cooperate with
liberals on the North Korea problem.
3. Northeast Asia” in the Policies of Political and Research Bodies in Japan
(1) Social Democratic Party (SDP)
The Social Democratic Party (known in English as the Japan Socialist
Party (JSP) until February 1991 and then as the Social Democratic Party
of Japan until January 1996) was originally formed in November 1945
through the merger of various prewar proletarian parties. Following its
reunion in 1955, it became the most influential opposition party to the
LDP. The relationship between the JSP and the Workers Party of Korea
(WPK), which is the governing party of North Korea, started in 1963, and,
after the break in relations between the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)
and the WPK in 1968, the JSP played the main mediating role between
Japan and North Korea. In 1986, the SDP abandoned the platform adopted in 1955 and switched to a policy line similar to that of the social democratic parties of Western Europe. In addition to this policy line change, the
1980s saw a broadening of the movement for normalization of relations
with North Korea to include the LDP and part of the Komei Party, accompanied however by a tendency to avoid criticism of acts of terrorism and
abduction by North Korea. The enlargement of the movement led to a joint
statement by the WPK, LDP and SDP in 1990, but the SDP kept its spe-
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cial status as a friend of the WPK. In June 1994, a new coalition of the
SDP, LDP, and Sakigake came to power. The SDP Chairman MURAYAMA
Tomiichi became Japan’s prime minister and the SDP extensively overhauled its basic platform in September 1994. Since however Japan-North
Korea talks on the normalization of relations had been interrupted since
1992 because of the abduction issue, the MURAYAMA administration made
little contribution to normalization. Since the fall of the coalition administration and the transfer of more than half of its parliamentarians to the
Democratic Party of Japan, the political influence of the SDP has weakened. Moreover, the acknowledgement by North Korea of its acts of abduction has seriously damaged the SDP.
It was against this background that DOI Takako, ex-chairman of the
SDP, proposed the “Creation of a Comprehensive Security System in
Northeast Asia” on August 14, 2000, and the “Creation of a Non-nuclear
Area in Northeast Asia.” SDP leaders are currently exchanging opinions
on these proposals with political leaders of other countries.
(2) Japanese Communist Party (JCP)
The Japanese Communist Party was formed in 1922 as the Japanese
branch of Comintern, which was then the center of the international communism movement led by Russia. In the 1950s, the JCP actively supported the movement for “return” to North Korea organized by the International
Red Cross and other bodies. The JCP and the WPK initiated relations at
the end of the 1950s and maintained a friendly relationship due to their
similar policy of independence from the Soviet Union until 1968. FUWA
Tetsuzo, JCP Central Committee Chair, wrote two major changes took
place in North Korea in that year. One was the inception of the personality cult of President KIM Il-sung. The other was the threat of an armed
attack on South Korea under the slogan “Southward Advance”. The JCP
sent a delegation to warn against this policy, which led to a break in relations between the two parties. Subsequently, the JCP publicly criticized
North Korean terrorism in Rangoon (now renamed Yangon) in 1983 and
HASHIMOTO Atsushi, JCP Representative, raised the abduction issue for
the first time in the Japanese Congress in March 1988. After the Taepo
Dong missile launch in the autumn of 1998, the JCP changed its attitude
to North Korea. The JCP proposed ending the blame game and opening a
channel for talks to avoid disastrous consequences. The JCP now proposes
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that the following three objectives be pursued: firstly, the prevention of
war or conflict in the Korean peninsula; secondly, the resolution of the
abduction issue; and thirdly, the settling by Japan of the ‘legacy of the
past’. In connection, it is relevant for the purposes of the present discussion that FUWA has commented:
“This objective is very important to Japan. If war or conflict breaks
out, it will directly affect and even damage Japan as well as affect
East Asia and the world. This is why we call for the resolution of the
North Korea questions as part of efforts to achieve peace and stability
in Northeast Asia” (Fuwa, 2004: 2).
(3) The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was founded in 1998 under the
leadership of KAN Naoto and HATOYAMA Yukio with the aim of forming a
party which could achieve power under a two-party system like that of the
US or UK. Against the background of the end of the Cold War in the world
and the end of the 1955 political order in Japan, this strategy succeeded in
attracting both conservative and liberal politicians and, under a singleseat electoral district system, made the DPJ the second biggest party next
to the LDP.
While some DPJ parliamentarians, especially those who joined from
the SDP, support the Japan-North Korea normalization of relations and
are members of the Group of Parliamentarians for Friendly Japan-DPRK
Relations (“Nitcho Yuko Giin Renmei”: abbreviated in Japanese to “Nitcho
Yuko Giren”),7) other, or sometimes even the same, DPJ parliamentarians
support the movement to resolve the abduction issue and are leading
members of the Group of Parliamentarians Committed to Gaining the
Return of Japanese Citizens Abducted by North Korea (“Kitachosen ni
Rachi sareta Nipponjin wo Soki ni Kyushutsu surutameni Kodosuru Giin
Renmei,” abbreviated to “Rachi Giren”). For the DPJ as a party, the resolution of the problems of abduction and nuclear weapons development
takes priority over the normalization of relations and the party is relatively critical of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. It is notable nevertheless that the DPJ has suggested the creation of a “Northeast Asia
7)
For a list of members, see the homepage of “Nitcho Yuko Giren.”
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Forum” to promote an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation in
Northeast Asia.8)
(4) The National Movement for Normalization of Japan-DPRK
Relations (“Nitcho Kokko Sokushin Kokumin Kyokai”)
As mentioned above, this organization is headed by M URAYAMA
Tomiichi, ex-chairman of the SDP and ex-prime minister of the LDP-SDPSakigake coalition administration. WADA Haruki is the secretary general
of this organization. Although the influence of the SDP is reflected in its
leading members and its policy, this organization includes some conservatives among its most prominent members .
A declaration by the organization states: “Normalization of JapanDPRK relations and economic assistance to the DPRK from Japan, linked
with North-South cooperation in the Korean peninsula, should build the
basis for peace in Northeast Asia, and is in the interest of all the countries
and people of our region” <http://www5d.biglobe.ne.jp/~tosikenn/kyokai1.html>.
(5) The National Institute for Research Advancement（NIRA）
The great role of the National Institute for Research Advancement
(NIRA) in policy-making on Northeast Asia cannot be underestimated.
NIRA is an independent policy research body established on the initiative
of leading figures from Japan’s industrial, academic and labor communities. The Institute was founded in 1974 under the National Institute for
Research Advancement Act and is funded through an endowment made
up of capital contributions and donations from both the public and private
sectors. NIRA has taken great interest in the North Korea issue and published many reports on this theme. NIRA lays stress on the environment
and energy problems of Northeast Asia. In 2003, it announced a “Grand
Design for Northeast Asia” which it presented as the solution to the
region’s environment and energy problems (the NIRA Working Group on a
Grand Design for Northeast Asia 2003, NIRA Working Group on
Environment-oriented Utilization of Energy in Northeast Asia, 2004).
The NIRA Working Group on a Grand Design for Northeast Asia
(2003) stated that cooperation between Japan and Northeast Asia is
expected to deepen for seven reasons.
(8)
See the Manifesto of the DPJ on North Korea problems, available at <http://www.dpj.or.
jp/seisaku/sogo/manifesto/index/08_01.html> (Japanese only)
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Energy: the development and utilization of natural gas in Northeast
Asia would contribute to decreasing the dependence on Middle Eastern oil.
Environment: decreasing Chinese dependence on coal for energy, which is
one of the reasons for global warming and acid rain in Japan, would contribute to the improvement of the Japanese environment. Economic
Community: an Economic Community in Northeast Asia like NAFTA or
the EU would contribute to the economic development of Japan. Security:
in Northeast Asia, which has in the past often been the battlefield of wars
involving Japan, a cooperative security system is more effective than a collective security system such as NATO. Multi-tier and multilateral cooperation: in Northeast Asia, multi-tier cooperation, that is, cooperation by
companies, local governments and citizens, is developing. Cooperation
between Japan, China and South Korea: cooperation between Japan, the
second largest economy in the world, China, the most populated country
in the world, and South Korea would contribute to the economic development of Northeast Asia, Initiative for comprehensive economic partnership: the initiative for comprehensive economic partnership suggested by
the Japanese government in January 2002 for Southeast Asia should be
applied to Northeast Asia (The NIRA Working Group on a Grand Design
for Northeast Asia, 2003: 54-55).
The NIRA Working Group on a Grand Design for Northeast Asia
(2003) proposed the creation of a “corridor” through “physical Integration,”
that is, the integration of the transportation network, natural gas pipeline
network, electric power network, and telecommunications network and a
corridor of international tourism in Northeast Asia (Ibid., 151-98). This
proposal presented a new aspect to the North Korea problem, because
without a network in North Korea, this “corridor” or “physical Integration”
would be incomplete.
Ⅳ. T HE R OLE OF C HINA , S OUTH K OREA AND J APAN IN THE
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF EAST ASIA – THE THIRD MOVEMENT
IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA “BOOM”
1. The role of China, South Korea and Japan in the economic
integration of East Asia
The first movement in the Northeast Asia “boom,” that is, the movement from the “Japan Sea Rim” to “Northeast Asia,” played a major role
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in the revival of “Northeast Asia” in the 1980s. However, as it was focused
mainly on inter-city and inter-regional cooperation or major projects in the
area such as the Tumen River Development by the UNDP, the Japanese
government gave it low priority on the political agenda.
The KOIZUMI government instead gave the top priority to the second
movement in the Northeast Asia “boom.” This meant that in practice that
priority was given to North Korea and the security aspect as the initiative
for a “Northeast Asia Common House,” despite its name, effectively concerns the Korean peninsula.
third movement in the Northeast Asia “boom” arose from the movement
for economic integration of East Asia. This movement stresses economic
cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea and has become an
essential part of the Northeast Asia “boom.”
2. Changes in the Trade and FDI Policies of the Japan, China
and South Korea Governments
Although Japan, China and South Korea have a dominant economic
presence in East Asia, the three countries pursued a multilateral policy on
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) for a long time and had been
reluctant to establish bilateral or regional policies.
However, in addition to the increase in inner-regional trade and
investment, three events urged the three countries to change their policy.
First, the shock of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 was enough for
governments in East Asia to change their attitudes to regional cooperation
and integration. The 1997 crisis was a “capital balance crisis” (Yoshitomi
2003a, 2003b), that is, the main factor in the crisis was the hot capital
inflow and outflow, which caused a currency and financial crisis (“twin crisis”). In the recovery process from the crisis, various type of cooperation
were suggested and implemented (Asian Development Bank, 2004). The
Japanese government proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund
(AMF) in June 1997, that is, one month after the tumble of the Thai baht.
This initiative was withdrawn because of the opposition of the US, but in
November 1997, 14 East Asian countries, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Asia Development Bank (ADB)
concluded the “Manila Framework” aimed at the stabilization of Asian
currency and financial markets. In March 1998, the Japanese government
announced the “New Miyazawa Initiative” which offered US$30 billion for
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economic reform in Asia. In 2000, ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea
agreed the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which promoted a web of bilateral
swapping agreements in Asia. Although the cooperation following the
1997 crisis focused mainly on the field of currency and finance and was
not limited to Northeast Asia, it changed the attitudes of East Asian governments to regional economic cooperation.
The second factor forcing the three countries to change their policies
was the failures and delays of the WTO Doha Round and the ensuing
worldwide movement to promote FTAs. This meant that the three countries effectively lost Most Favored Nation (MFN) status outside the worldwide FTA and RTA network and had to promote the creation of FTAs to
effectively recover that status. For example, before the conclusion of the
Japan-Mexico FTA in 2004, exports from Japan to Mexico were subject to
an average 16% customs levy, so that when Mexico concluded the North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 with the US and Canada
and an FTA with the European Union (EU) in 2000, the competitiveness
of Japanese companies declined sharply. The lack of an FTA was estimated by the Ministry of Economy and industry of Japan to have caused a
financial loss of 400 billion yen (around US$3.6 billion) and the loss of
around 30 thousand jobs (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 12, 2002).
The third factor was China’s accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001 – 15 years after its application for “restoration” to the General Agreement for Trade and Tariff (GATT) – and the
accession in early 2002 of Taiwan – to give it its correct title the
Independent Customs Area of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu – which
for political considerations had had to wait for China’s accession.
As a result, all the major countries and regions of East Asia have
become WTO members, establishing a basic multilateral framework for
trade and also partly for investment9) in the region. Whereas before their
accession to the WTO, China and Taiwan had been forced to give priority
to multilateral frameworks, now, although China has a backlog of multilateral agreements and Taiwan is subject to political limitations, they can
(9)
Although the WTO is the main international organization involved in foreign trade, at the
same time, it is concerned with FDI in connection with Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs), Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), etc. EPAs, such as
those between Japan and Singapore and Japan and Mexico, include articles relating to
investment policy in general.
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pursue FTAs as their main agenda.
Japan, China and South Korea have now altered their trade and FDI
policy to promote free trade agreements (FTA), or economic partnership
agreements (EPA) as an advanced form of the latter, and regional trade
agreements (RTA) in East Asia.
3. From “East Asia” to “Northeast Asia” (Japan, China and South Korea)
In the movement for East Asian economic cooperation or integration,
the framework of ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and South Korea) has so far
proved the most effective framework. ASEAN has played a key role in the
economic integration of East Asia by mediating between its three main
countries, Japan, China and South Korea, in the same way as Benelux did
between Germany and France in the process of formation of the European
Community (EC).
The pioneer of an FTA in Asia is Singapore, which seeks to become
the hub of such an arrangement, and its present prime minister, GOH
Chok Tong, once made a relevant proposal to OBUCHI, the then prime minister of Japan. Inspired by Singapore, Asian countries actively pursued
the creation of an FTA and RTA and in 2000 proposed to ASEAN and
Japan a joint study into the creation of an FTA. ASEAN subsequently created the “ASEAN+3” framework, but since the Japanese government had
at the time not shifted from its traditional multilateralism stance, it reacted negatively. The Chinese government in contrast proposed a study into
the creation of an FTA between ASEAN and China and in November 2001
agreed to the conclusion of such an FTA within ten years. This had enough
impact on the Japanese government to alter its trade policy and in
January 2002, KOIZUMI, prime minister of Japan, set forth the “Initiative
for Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN.” In
November 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announced the
“Japanese Strategy for FTA,” which declared that the Japanese government would use the FTA as a political and economic bargaining card. This
represented a formal change in Japanese trade and investment policy from
multilateralism to a mixed bilateral-regional-multilateral policy.
The Japanese government concluded an EPA with Singapore in 200210)
and agreed the basic content of an EPA with Mexico in March 2004.11)
10)
11)
See: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/singapore/jsepa.html>.
See: JOINT PRESS STATEMENT on The Agreement between Japan and the United
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Currently, the ASEAN+3 framework, in which the three countries are
simple observers, places various restrictions on their taking an active
stance on FTAs. The three governments have however agreed to talks and
research on cooperation between their countries to design a new framework for economic integration in East Asia. Research institutes in the
three countries have begun joint research and published relevant results
(Urata and Abe 2003, Abe and Urata 2003). The central role in this joint
research has been played by NIRA in Japan, the Korean Institute for
International Economic Policy (KIEP)12) and the Development Research
Center of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (DRC).
The research, which analyzed foreign trade and foreign direct investment relations between the three countries, showed that not only do
Japanese companies invest in South Korea and China, but that South
Korean companies are also increasingly investing in China, above all
Shandong and Liaoning Provinces, in order to lower labor costs and capture the Chinese market. It indicated that, as well as a trade agreement,
the three countries therefore also required an investment agreement. In
March 2002, Japan and South Korea concluded such an agreement which
stipulated that, from the permission stage, neither party should discriminate against companies from the other party nation but should accord
them national treatment, and that less favorable treatment should not be
given to third parties.
It is understandable that, in connection with this movement, “Japan,
China and South Korea” should be used much more often than the seldom
encountered “Northeast Asia,” which includes the Russian Far East,
North Korea and Mongolia. This is because the movement concerns economic cooperation between the three major countries of Northeast Asia,
which is absent from the second movement and has become the essential
element of the Northeast Asia “boom.”
Mexican States for the Strengthening of Economic Partnership available at <http://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/joint0403.html.>
(12) KIEP also has a research group on North Korea. The Institute of International Relations
and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University, hosted an international joint symposium with
KIEP on North Korea at Ritsumeikan University on June 11,12, 2004
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CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the recent Northeast Asia “boom” is not a unitary
phenomenon but the combination of three movements. The objects, methods and main arenas of the three movements are different, so that the
boom is a kind of mosaic rather than a unified movement. Nevertheless,
similarities can still be identified in all three. Generally speaking, the
three movements recognize that cooperation in Northeast Asia has decisive importance for peace and prosperity in all Northeast Asian countries
and regions, and especially in Japan; and that, at the same time,
Northeast Asia should be not a closed community but closely linked to
Southeast Asia and other regions.
Summing up the three movements, we can conclude as follows.
Cooperation in Northeast Asia has decisive importance for peace and
prosperity in all Northeast Asian countries and regions, but especially in
Japan. At the same time, Northeast Asia should be not a closed community but closely linked to Southeast Asia and other regions. Cooperation in
Northeast Asia must be reviewed from both a political and an economic
perspective. Politically, engagement with North Korea is at the core of
existing problems, but it goes without saying that other problems need to
be properly settled, for example those relating to Takeshima/Dokdo; the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and associated natural resources; the
Chishima/Kuril Islands; compensation for the past use of forced labor and
comfort women; school textbooks; and the Yasukuni Shrine. Economically,
cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea is, due to their economic scale, at the core of existing issues, but this is not to say that
peripheral countries and regions of Northeast Asia can be neglected or
undervalued in this context; those who live in the peripheral areas of
Northeast Asia have their own right to prosper, and peripheral areas often
play the key role in a specific field, for example, transport, energy, the
environment, agriculture, or fishery, or in specific inter-city and interregional relationships.
A comprehensive approach to cooperation in Northeast Asia is thus
required which brings the three movements together.
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