Microcosms of Democracy? A Study of the Internal Governance
of International NGOs in Kenya
VANESSA LISTON
Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Correspondence Address: Vanessa Liston, [Department of Political Science, Trinity College, University of
Dublin, Ireland], listonv@tcd.ie
ABSTRACT
An assumption prevails within the international development community that direct
exposure to democracy within civil society is a necessary condition for democratic political culture
and hence democratic consolidation. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
considered key players in providing this direct exposure through the associational opportunities
they provide and the democratic values they espouse. Yet, there is little empirical research on the
internal governance of these organizations. Have they the potential to act as ‘schools of
democracy’ as postulated by de Tocqueville? Or do their governance structures reflect patterns of
domination within the societies in which they are embedded? This paper presents the internal
governance structures of 36 international NGOs in Kenya. Survey results show that the majority of
NGOs occupy authoritarian or mid-range positions on a democracy/authoritarianism scale. This
has wide implications for the democratic socialization possibilities of NGOs as well as the
development paradigm in general.
KEY WORDS:
[NGOs, internal governance, democracy, political culture, Kenya]
Introduction
The international development community has high expectations for the role of civil
society organizations in the development of democratic political cultures 1 in Africa. Since
Putnam’s seminal work Making Democracy Work (1993), which demonstrates a link
between political culture and the effectiveness of democratic institutions, development aid
has focused on ‘strengthening civil society’ both for its democratic functions, as well as its
potential role in cultivating the norms, attitudes, psychological orientations and behaviors
congruent with democracy. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
regarded as particularly potent catalysts of political culture because of their perceived
closeness to the poor, their participatory methods, the democratic values they espouse, their
capacity for local institution building, and their influence on public policy. Yet, despite a
wide literature on the democratization effects of NGOs in general, a gap exists in the
literature on their role in political socialization. Are they, as agents of the democratic
reform process, themselves democratic? Do they have the potential to act as agents of
political socialization by acting as microcosms of democracy?
Political socialization is defined as a process which “affect[s] a person’s tendency
to support or reject the system as a whole, [and] shape[s] his determination to engage in
political activity” (Heater, 1974, p.108 quoted in Warleigh, 2001). While the significance
of family, education and environment for political socialization is well established,
experiences of authority are also argued to have an effect on political attitudes and
Microcosms of Democracy
2
behavior, most notably those in associations or the workplace. A wide literature is
dedicated to the proposition that through direct exposure to democracy in the workplace
citizens acquire the values, attitudes, and political efficacy that are congruent with
democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1998; Pateman, 1970, 1980; Elden, 1981;
Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Greenberg, Leon & Kelley, 1996; but see Adman,
2008). Another literature expounds the significance of political culture for political
development and stability (Inglehart, 1988, 1990, 1997; Harrison, 1992; Booth & Richard,
1996; Harrison & Huntington, 2000; Osabu-Kle, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).2
Yet, despite a broad concern with political culture reform, and a recently emerged
interest in the internal governance of NGOs, there is little research that explores their interrelationship. The general question persists: do international NGOs from established
democracies that are operational in African countries demonstrate democratic values and
practices, or are the values and authority structures of the host country reproduced in the
governance structures of these organizations? It is to this general question that this research
contributes.
Most studies on the political role of NGOs3 focus on their role in pluralizing the
political space (Bratton, 1989; Siliman & Nobel, 1998; Hadenius & Uggla, 1996),
mobilizing and agitating for democratic reform (Diamond, 2003), contributing to
democratic transitions (Fisher, 1998), influencing public policy (Mably, 2006), or acting as
a global political force (Baogang & Murphy, 2007; Brown, Khagram, Moore & Frumkin,
2000; Nelson, 2002). Other authors focus on issues of accountability and public legitimacy
(Brett, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Fox & Brown, 1998; Lewis, 2001; Edwards &
Fowler, 2002). Those limited number of studies that provide empirical data on internal
governance do so within the context of good governance and financial accountability
(Gauri & Galef, 2005; Barr, Fafchamps & Owens, 2005). There are no empirical studies of
which I am aware that examine the internal governance structures of international NGOs
from a political culture perspective.
To address this issue, I investigate the internal governance structures of
international NGOs, specifically those that are operational in relief and development. The
argument for studying international NGOs is twofold. First, they have established
organizational structures that provide a broader range of indicators for measuring
democratic governance than smaller less established organizations. Second, they form a
“very powerful organizational category affecting civil society globally” (Tvedt, 2002,
p.366) so that implications of their governance structures locally can be generalized to an
extent beyond the single case study. The data for the study come from a survey conducted
among employees of 36 international NGOs in Nairobi between September 2005 and
February 2006. I selected employees as opposed to NGO beneficiaries because they are
engaged on a daily basis on all aspects of their NGO’s operations over a long period and
are thus a source of reliable observable indicators of internal governance.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section sets out the terminology used in
the discussion. Section two provides an overview of background to international NGOs and
democracy in Kenya. Section three puts forward the theoretical arguments regarding
internal democracy and outlines the literature on NGOs in this respect. Section four
presents the methodology for measuring internal governance as set out by Ecsktein and
Gurr (1975). Section five presents the results and findings, which include data on
descriptive characteristics of the employee sample and aggregate measures of the internal
governance of the NGOs. Implications of the findings are outlined in the conclusion.
Terminology: Unknotting NGOs and Civil Society
Microcosms of Democracy
3
Discussion of the political effects of NGOs in the literature usually takes place within the
context of civil society, which is defined by CIVICUS as “the arena, outside of the family,
the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests” (2007, p.
15). Within this general arena, civil society organizations (CSOs) are defined as “the wide
array of nongovernmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public
life and express the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethnical,
cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 2005,
p. 3). NGOs are differentiated from CSOs by being legally constituted, professionalized,
non-profit organizations that provide services to beneficiaries who are not members of the
organization in areas such as economic and social development, human rights, welfare, and
emergency relief, or who advocate on their behalf.
Within this broad definition the NGO landscape is highly heterogeneous. It is
comprised of organizations that are differentiated by their mission, funding bases,
organizational capacity, geopolitical base (North or South), size, program areas, ideology
and whether they are membership based (Atack, 1999). For this study I define local NGOs
as those whose headquarters are local and who have, at the most, a national level of
organization and geographical focus. These organizations are usually established and
developed by an indigenous staff, and sometimes have a membership base. I define
international NGOs as those who have their headquarters outside of Kenya, in established
democracies, and who have registered as international with the National Council of NGOs
in Kenya. They are typically characterized by high level of resources and can mediate
across conflict lines.
International NGOs and Democracy in Kenya
In 2005 there were 150 international NGOs registered with the National Council of NGOs
in Kenya, engaged in a broad range of relief, welfare and development activities. Despite
their operational focus, these organizations have long been associated with democratization
partly due to the normative ideology surrounding the sector but also to the empowerment
and democratic processes they claim to engage in aid projects. However, a brief
examination of their role in Kenya shows their contribution to key political reforms to be
somewhat overstated. During the Moi regime, the majority of international NGOs did not
engage the government on democratization or human rights. Key political developments
such as repeal of the single-party rule in 1991 were generated by domestic pressures, led by
individual activists, political parties and Kenyan organizations with deep constituency roots,
supported at key points by bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors (Press, 2006; Ottaway &
Carothers, 2000). Kanyinga attributes the low profile of NGOs to a narrow perspective of
development. He claims, “NGOs have tended to promote ‘development’ in the narrow
sense, rather than democratization, and have systematically sought to ‘fit in’ with the sociopolitical structures which define and reproduce it” (Kanyinga, 1995, p. 118). The only
notable exceptions during this time were the Law Society of Kenya, the Green Belt
Movement and the National Council of Churches of Kenya.
However, the potential of international NGOs to influence political development
was significantly curtailed by a climate of suspicion and oppression. NGOs were seen by
Moi as agitators challenging the imperialism of the state and engaging in “subversive”
activities (Ndegwa, 1996). Their threat led to an attempt by the Moi regime to control, coopt or disband all civil society organizations, and political activity was severely restricted.
In 1992 the national NGOs, Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU) and Maendeleo
Ya Wanawake were co-opted by the government (Matanga, 2000). In 1994, the leader of
the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, a German NGO, was expelled for alleged subversive
Microcosms of Democracy
4
activities including supporting the opposition (Matanga, 2000). In 1999 local
environmental activists protesting over development of the Karuga Forest were arrested in
violent confrontations with developers.
The main significant resistance act from the wider NGO community during the Moi
regime occurred when the government introduced the 1990 NGO Co-ordination Act, aimed
at controlling and monitoring their activities. Lobbying by NGOs together with support
from donors and oppositional groups resulted in the legislation being repealed. Repression
continued, but despite the hostile environment some prominent NGOs were politically
visible. Action Aid was directly involved in the constitution review process begun in 1996
and ran a succession of campaigns on workers’ rights, which led to some policy reforms.4
Those international NGOs in the development field worked politically at a grassroots level
pursuing a transformative agenda based on Freirean ideas on empowerment of the poor
combined with the creation of opportunities to participate (Lewis, 2001).
This approach continued until the election of the NARC regime and Kibaki as
president in 2002, which brought with it an expansion of democratic space5. Since that time
international NGOs have become more vocal in the democratization process. They are
actively engaged in the constitutional review process, advocacy and lobbying as well as
policy change. Political efforts also include participation in the national civic education
program, citizen mobilization and building the capacity of local institutions to monitor the
effectiveness and relevance of government policies. In the aftermath of the 2007 postelection violence, international NGOs have been active in supporting justice and
reconciliation initiatives by Kenyan organizations as well as providing a range of welfare
and recovery services.
However, the “vibrancy” of Kenyan civil society and improvements in Kenya’s
democratic indicators belie a counter-impact of international NGOs and donors on the
project of democratic state building. Hearn (1998) argues that, as conduits for donor
influence, international NGOs have impacted both the political discourse and structures of
power in Kenyan society. She demonstrates how NGOs in Kenya have become central to
donors such as USAID in restructuring relations between Kenyan society, state, and
external actors, a phenomenon she refers to as the “NGO-ization” of Kenya.
The funding structure of the aid enterprise is also problematic for effective political
and developmental assistance in Kenya. Funding dependencies of NGOs impact their
autonomy and lead to risks of co-optation, self-censorship or deviations from their mission
(Barrow & Jennings, 2001; Ndegwa, 1996; Hudock, 1999; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). This
is particularly relevant in the context of Kenya where van Rooy notes how the donor sector
in Kenya has evolved into an “alternative state” (1999, p. 161) with similar resources and
authority. Such influence has the potential to undermine the state-building project (Clark,
1991; Tembo, 2001) particularly as NGOs take over the role of the state in key areas. The
impact of funding is also clear where, with the recent reduction in international aid, local
NGOs are reporting encroachment by international NGOs who are better able to compete
for international funds. The consequence is the closing of indigenous NGOs and the
penetration of international NGOs into areas for which they have little expertise or
indigenous knowledge (Menocal & Rogerson, 2006).
Further to these findings, international NGOs in Kenya are affected by the general
issues affecting the sector worldwide and which are argued to undermine their legitimacy
and effectiveness. These include among others a lack of “downward accountability” to the
constituents whose interests NGOs purport to represent (Kilby, 2006);
a new
“managerialism” culture that imposes demands on NGOs that mitigate against input and
ideas from Southern NGOs or their clients (Townsend, Porter & Mawdsley, 2002); and
disillusionment with their effectiveness and performance in development (Lewis & Opoku-
Microcosms of Democracy
5
Mensah, 2006). In the latter respect, a recent report by Wamugo and Pedersen (2007),
expounds weaknesses in Kenyan civil society organizations and international NGOs that
have affected the ability of both to bring about structural change to the political system. In
the case of Kenyan NGOs, these weaknesses are the result of a migration of leaders to the
political and public sectors after the 2002 elections, poor corporate internal governance and
political-ethnic divisions. The core weaknesses of international NGOs are disorganization;
being insufficiently representative of development NGOs during discussions on the Paris
Declaration for Aid Effectiveness; and demonstrating inefficient communication and
responsibilities between international networks and CSOs in the North and South.
The critical literature on international NGOs continues to grow and has resulted in a
period of self-reflection by the sector with a particular focus on its political and
developmental role vis-à-vis domestic actors. Of direct relevance to new approaches to
political and development assistance is the environment of opportunity for NGOs. With
evidence re-emerging from numerous studies on the significance of political culture in the
consolidation of democratic states (Huntington and Harrison, 2002), and the claims
regarding internal democracy for accountability and public legitimacy, NGOs have a
fruitful line of inquiry to pursue on their role in this aspect of political development.
The Case for Internal Democracy
Defining the Concept
Democracy is a contested concept, and there is wide debate over its definition, meaning
and frameworks for measurement. For the purposes of this study, I use the definition put
forward by Eckstein and Gurr (1975). “Democracy is defined as the presence of institutions
and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about policies and leaders
as well as constraint on the exercise of power by the Chief Executive [and the guarantee of
civil liberties].”6 Internal democracy then is defined as the extent to which an organization
meets these criteria. In this respect, an organization is considered internally democratic
where there are constraints on the power of the Chief Executive; where an employee can
participate in decisions affecting his work or organization policy without fear of sanctions;
and where he can influence choice of the governing body. For example, Family Health
International elects their CEO, or has the position appointed by a board of elected officials;
individuals in the organization contest for senior positions; and there are opportunities for
participation in the management of the workplace. It is therefore classified as democratic.
Christian Mission Aid, on the other hand, has an appointed head; limited opportunities for
contestation of office or participation in management affairs; and a highly directive
management style. As a result it is classified as authoritarian.
Micro-democracy and Political Culture
The claim for the effect of micro-experiences of democracy on political culture originates
in the works of Rousseau and J.S. Mill and most significantly in the study of De
Tocqueville of the US (1835). In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville argued that a
participatory culture among US citizens was a key factor in explaining the stability of the
democratic state as voluntary organizations act as a learning environment for democratic
attitudes and behaviors. He thus postulated that the best way to learn democracy was by
practicing it.
Microcosms of Democracy
6
This proposition on micro-democratic sub-structures led to the formulation of a general
theory of democratic stability by Harry Eckstein (1966) in congruence theory. This theory
states that involvement in sub-national organizations that have democratic authority
structures is a necessary condition for a democratic civic culture because authority patterns
in society tend towards congruence. Where social units are incongruent, for example,
authoritarian associations within a democratic society, strain or cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957) will be felt by individuals caused by conflicting demands. To alleviate
this dissonance, individuals are motivated to either distance themselves from the dissonant
authority unit or change its structure. The greater the number of democratic sub-structures
in society, the more likely dissonance will be felt by individuals experiencing
authoritarianism. The drive for congruence with democratic substructures creates a
dynamic for transmission of democratic values and behavior, thus contributing to a
democratic political culture. Eckstein draws on evidence from Norway to argue that the
most stable systems are those where all authority patterns in society, both governmental
and non-governmental, are congruent.
Almond and Verba (1963) also reason that micro-democracy should matter for
democratic stability because, they argue, individuals generalize from their experiences in
the non-political sphere to politics in general. This generalizing forms the link between the
individual and the state and, together with the need for congruence in authority patterns,
underpins the importance of democratic substructures in society. They provide survey data
that demonstrate a correlation between the extent to which individuals believed or felt they
were able to participate in non-political authority structures, and the “transfer” or
“generalization” of this belief to the political sphere itself. They specifically relate
opportunities to participate at work to democratic political orientations (Almond & Verba,
1963, p. 294).
From a normative perspective, Carol Pateman (1970) states that democratic structures
and practices within the work place lead to higher levels of empowerment and political
efficacy among workers. Conversely, an undemocratic authority structure socializes
workers into passivity and political apathy. Elden (1981) provides empirical evidence to
support Pateman’s theory. He finds that “Democratisation at work is clearly linked to
politically relevant variables beyond the organisation” (Elden, 1981, pp. 50-51). Other
authors such as Hyland (1995) and Dahl (1989) also argue in support of democratization of
the workplace. Ian Shapiro (1999) has made the strongest case for pursuing democratic
congruence in all areas of social life. He argues for democracy to be based on the principle
of anti-domination.
However authors such as Halpin (2006) are critical of the arguments in favor of internal
democracy. He argues that organizations that are based on solidarity rather than
representation do not need internal democratic methods. Nancy Rosenblum (1994, 1999)
critiques the theory from the perspective of constitutive democratic theory and questions
how authority pattern congruence forms democratic character and communal attachment.
She states that empirical work on congruence between family, home and schools has failed
to prove any impact on democratic values or behavior outside of these contexts. She states,
“… the logic of congruence does not come automatically equipped with a social or
psychological dynamic to explain why dispositions cultivated in one association can be
expected to be stable and transmitted to other spheres” (1998, p. 38). Rosenblum (2002)
also critiques Shapiro’s view of democracy “all-the-way down” and notes that even if the
internal governance structures of associations are undemocratic, small acts of political
activity can have a democratizing effect by building political efficacy among members.
Notwithstanding arguments from the critical literature, much of the enthusiasm for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is based on the assumption that such organizations are
Microcosms of Democracy
7
democratic and act as seedbeds for democratic citizens. In Charles Reilly’s words, NGOs
are “real world academies for democracy” acting as training grounds for democratic
citizenship (Reilly, 1995 quoted in Boulding, 2006). Claus Offe and Ulrich Preus state that
“a civilized democratic polity” should be based on a continuous process of micro-political
learning within the organizations of civil society (White, 2004).
Reality Check
However, despite these expectations a wide literature on NGOs in general points to their
limited ability to impact democratization because they are not internally democratic
(Bebbington & Thiele, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Warleigh (2001) and McLaverty
(2002) find that NGOs in general are characterized by elitist governance structures that are
not open to supporters playing a role in shaping policies, campaigns or strategies (see also
Kilby, 2006). Ndgewa (1996) points to how the personalized politics characteristic of many
African regimes is reproduced within the governance structures of NGOs, as well as other
opposition pressure groups of civil society, professional associations and churches.
Edwards and Hulme (1996) state that the failure of many NGOs to democratize their own
structures makes them less effective in political reform processes and poses a problem for
downward accountability.
Based on the claims of congruence theory and the literature on workplace
democracy, a range of contemporary scholars are calling for internal democracy in civil
society organizations. Dicklitch (1998) and Diamond (1999) argued that CSOs (which
includes international NGOs) will only contribute to long-term and sustainable democratic
change if they can build a culture of democracy from the ground up. This, they can only
achieve if they practice internal democracy, and in doing so, provide direct exposure to
democracy at a micro-level for the citizen. Yet there are few studies that examine the
constitution of these organizations, though recent literature has called for it. Diamond
(1999, p. 342) states:
An organization may be able to represent group interests, check the power of the state,
and perform many other democratic functions even if it is not internally democratic. But
if, in its own patterns of governance, it perpetuates norms that penalize dissent, exalt the
leader over the group, and cloak the exercise of power, one thing it will not do is build a
culture of democracy.
In the context of such claims an empirical study on the internal governance of
international NGOs is overdue.
Methodology
In examining the internal governance of NGOs I use Eckstein and Gurr’s (1975) Authority
Pattern methodology. This methodology and its theoretical framework are central to the
“civic culture” school of thought and form the basis of the Polity Series data set, one of the
most widely used measures of democracy in the literature (Davenport & Armstrong, 2002).
Indeed, Eckstein & Gurr’s authority pattern methodology is the only system in the
literature that allows for comparison of authority at both social unit level and state level. It
identifies 12 dimensions on which authority exists within an organization or the state, along
progressively differentiated social relations. These are categorized in two ways: 1) the kind
of institutional authority embodied in formal rules and procedures, and 2) the degree of
influence perceived by individuals within the organization.
Microcosms of Democracy
8
1) Institutional Authority
“Authority Kind” measures the institutional characteristics of the organization and the
extent to which there are institutions and procedures through which citizens can express
preferences about policies and leaders. It also measures the degree of constraint on the
exercise of power by the Chief Executive. In this context autocracy is defined as the
suppression of competitive political participation and the exercise of power by the Chief
Executive with few institutional constraints.
2) Degree of Influence
“Authority Degree” estimates the dimensions of influence perceived by the individual.
Dimensions of influence are defined by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) in terms of direction and
distance of relations between super-ordinates and subordinates. They are conceptualized as
follows: Directiveness, Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance. Directiveness
refers to the extent to which activities in a social unit are subject to directives rather than
being at the discretion of members. Participation refers to the diversity and extent of
subordinates’ attempts to influence the making and implementation of decisions about what
is to be done in and by the organization. Responsiveness refers to the extent to which
senior management decisions and actions take into account, and act on, the preferences of
their subordinates. Compliance is defined as the extent to which subordinates are disposed
to abide by senior’s directives and the extent to which they do so in practice. Compliance
ranges from submission, to indifference, to insubordination. An outline of the questions
(summarized) and scoring method is available in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
Work Empowerment
I also include an extra and separate variable for work empowerment. I define work
empowerment as a process whereby an individual feels they have the capacity and
responsibility to successfully execute their tasks and influence the goals of their
organization. I compiled the variable from six survey items which captured responses on
five-point Likert scales. The questions inquired whether respondents felt: empowered
through their work; power in shaping the development of the organization; and power in
contributing to the strategies/policies of the organization. They also inquired whether
respondents felt: achievement in their work; had control over their tasks; were valued by
the organization; and whether they had responsive managers.
Sample
I drew the sample of NGOs for investigation from the 2005 National Council of NGO
directory. This is the only annual data source of registered NGOs in Kenya. I used
purposive sampling to select those NGOs that had a sufficiently large organizational
structure that could reliably provide a range of governance indicators. From a total of 2,246
organizations, I invited 170 international NGOs to participate in the study. Thirty-six
NGOs agreed. I requested these organizations to provide a minimum of 5 respondents from
management and non-management positions. In total 159 respondents participated. While
23.11% of all NGOs state their location as Nairobi, the study sampled 7.13% of this
population. The surveys were administered in either English or Kiswahili according to the
preference of the respondent. Subsequent to the fieldwork I conducted an Internet based
Microcosms of Democracy
9
review of the policy statements of these NGOs. I categorized the NGOs by types of aid
intervention (relief or development) and the presence of a religious basis.
Findings
Data Overview
Analysis of the data shows the typical respondent to be female, educated, with an average
monthly income of more than KES 25,0007. Of the sample, 45.22% are male and 54.78%
are female. The age range is 23 to 64 years with a mean age of 36 years (SD 8.08) 8. The
majority of respondents are from the Kikuyu tribe (36.2%), followed by Luhya (18.4%),
Luo (17.8%), Akamba (11.2%), and Other (16.4%). The national distribution of these tribes
is: Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Akamba (11%), and Other (40%). The
preponderance of Kikuyu is noteworthy given their traditional domination of political and
social spheres. In respect to democratization I note Bratton’s comments, “Ethnic
heterogeneity in leadership and staffing is as relevant to maintaining legitimacy in civic
organizations as in the African state itself” (Bratton, 1989, p. 427). Murunga notes this
demographic within CSOs and the domination of particular ethnic groups and states, “this
dominance means that the issues they raise are likely to be seen as imbued with Kikuyu
interests plus a sprinkling of Kamba, Luo, Luhya etc. interests” (Murunga, 2000, p. 10).
In 59.1% of cases participants have a university education, 38.4% secondary school
or middle level college9, and 2.5% have primary education level. This is the inverse of
education distribution throughout the Kenyan population. The majority are Protestant
(62.26%), and 29.56% are Catholic. The sample comprises management and nonmanagement levels within each NGO. 42.48% of the sample occupies management
positions and 57.52% non-management positions. The mean length of service is 4.25 years
(SD 4) with a range of 1 to 20.5 years. Among NGO employees the importance of ethnic
identity is high with 32% reporting ethnic identity to be very important. This compares
with the general Kenyan population as shown in Table 1.
<<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >>
How Are NGOs Governed? Findings on Authority Patterns
I classified the thirty-six NGOs according to their authority pattern on a 100-point scale
ranging from authoritarian to democratic (-/+50), based on Eckstein’s authority pattern
classification. This required averaging the responses of individuals within the NGOs to
questions on the following authority dimensions: Executive Recruitment and Dimensions
of Influence: Responsiveness, Participation, Sanctions, and Directiveness, as discussed
previously. Overall results show a high level of variation between the authority patterns of
NGOs with scores ranging from -1.8 to 36 on the authority scale. Figure 1 presents a
density histogram of this variability with NGOs ranked in order of increasing levels of
democracy.
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE >>
The aggregate of all authority dimensions measured are graphically presented in
Figure 2. To enable comparison between NGOs I used a coding system - those scoring
under 10 were coded as authoritarian; those over 17.5 as democratic; and a mid-range was
Microcosms of Democracy 10
retained for those scoring between 10 and 17. Only 12 NGOs score higher than 17.5. An
examination of the results by variance plots provides a clear view of the extent of variation
across authority levels among NGOs. The three categories are indicated by Y-lines in
Figure 2. These results are presented in detail and in tabular form in Table A.1 of the
Appendix.
Examination of the detailed scores shows consistency between dimensions for each
NGO in most cases. There are exceptions, particularly among those NGOs that achieve
higher scores. For example, Farm Africa (M 23.98 SD 3.46) scores weakly on authority
kind, based on measures of executive recruitment and authority (M .66 SD 2.08), yet highly
on participation (M 10 SD 2.64). On the contrary Salvation Army (M 7 SD 4.10) and
Concern (M 9.6 SD 10.92) score highly on authority kind (M. 3.17 SD 0.98, M 2.8 SD 2.77
respectively), yet low on internal participation (M 0.0 SD 5.06, M 2.2 SD 7.19). Oxfam,
while scoring an overall 20 (SD 11.16), is highly directive (M -.75 SD 3.4), as is
Intrahealth (M -.6 SD 3.36). On the other hand, Habitat falls into the authoritarian space
with one of the lowest authority kind scores (M -4 SD 0), yet it scores higher than the
population mean (M 6.22 SD 3.42) for participation. These exceptions highlight the
different dimensions that NGOs must consider in establishing internal democratic
governance structure. Nonetheless, overall, the aggregate score is a representative picture
of all authority dimensions within each NGO.
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE >>
A comparison of scores between management and non-management shows that
non-management respondents perceive their organization to be less democratic than
management in terms of the five authority pattern dimensions. An analysis of summary
statistics on the key authority dimensions and work empowerment by management and
non-management in Table 2 and Table 3 shows the largest differences in means between
participation, authority kind (executive recruitment) and work empowerment. Nonmanagement respondents feel less empowered and participate less than management. Nonmanagement respondents also feel that their work is more micro-managed and directed
than do management.
<<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>>
<<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>>
Policy Differences
A study of the relationship between policy statements and internal governance shows a lack
of congruence. For example, CARE International’s Fortalece project in Peru states as its
main objectives: “To promote the development of the management capacity of local public
and private institutions. To strengthen mechanisms for participatory agreement and
citizenship participation in management, promoting its institutionalization” (CARE, 2007).
It also aims to “generate new participatory ways to manage development local processes”.
Yet, scores for democratization of management within CARE itself are 11.8, just within the
mid-range category. In comparison, Acdivoca, which states on its website “We are
committed to the empowerment of all employees and to a rewarding quality of life in the
workplace,” scores 21.5 (SD 6.35).
Microcosms of Democracy 11
Interestingly, policy area emerges as a predictor of organizational governance.
Those NGOs that have a religious origin or policy basis do not have democratic
governance structures. NGOs that are engaged in service delivery or relief are, generally,
located within the authoritarian space. Only those NGOs that engage at a grassroots level
with self-help participatory and democratic principles demonstrate congruence with their
own internal governance structures. Overall, the self-help organizations have a greater
tendency towards democratic governance.
Figure 3 categorizes the NGOs according to statements on their websites on the
mission of their organization10. Organizations focused mainly on humanitarian assistance
or service provision these are classified as Service. Those within both development and
humanitarian aid with religious policy foci are classified as Religious. Those with specific
focus on long-term community development through self-help assistance are classified as
Development – Self-Help. This is a broad categorization but it is sufficient for the current
purposes and provides an overall view of the relationship between authority patterns and
program types.
<<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE>>
The notable exceptions within the self-help category are SOS, Concern Worldwide
and Concern Universal. In these cases, there are discrepancies between their policy
statements and levels of internal democracy. Concern Universal’s website states, “Concern
Universal works in a spirit of co-operation and partnership with local communities and
partners”. It asserts, “We value the different strengths of our partners, and believe that
working together as equals helps us all to be more effective” (Concern Universal, 2009).
Yet, the internal governance structure of Concern Universal is located just within the
midrange space with an overall score of 10 (SD 15.09). Concern Worldwide maintains in
its policy statement that its mission to assist the extremely poor is achieved by
“empowerment and the realization of the potential of those with whom we work” and
“participation by the extremely poor people in the making of decisions which affect them”
(Concern, 2009). Yet, Concern does not demonstrate congruence between their principles
of beneficiary empowerment and their internal governance structures. Concern has an
overall score of 9.6 (SD 10.92), with only 2.2 (SD 7.19) for participation.
Democratic Values of NGO Employees
Of particular interest are the findings on the political attitudes of the NGOs’ employees.
Respondents were presented with a list of 13 minority categories and were asked to
indicate whether they felt members of these categories were inferior, equal or superior.
Overall, only 19.8% of respondents reported that all individuals were equal. As shown in
Table 4, 61.15% of respondents regard homosexuals as inferiors and 34.39% and 58%,
respectively, reported the same attitude to atheists and criminals. On the other hand, there
is a marked feeling that the wealthy, the educated, priests and those with sports talents are
superior.
<<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE>>
Conclusion
Further research is needed to ascertain whether the data presented here are reflective of
authority patterns across these NGOs worldwide and the spectrum of international NGOs in
Microcosms of Democracy 12
general. This is important because, although limited in scope, the results of this study
clearly challenge assumptions surrounding the democratic credentials of international
NGOs in Kenya. Democratic internal governance structures are on the whole in the
minority. Even those that score highest on the democratic scale are, in some cases,
authoritarian along some dimensions of authority. These variations in internal democracy
among international NGOs have implications for their assumed role in fostering democracy.
As Van Rooy states, “The slipperiest part of the debate is the difference between norms
(the values inherent in the idea of civil society) and the forms (the organizational
incarnation of those values)” (1998, p. 198).
From an operational perspective, a lack of internal democracy calls into question
issues of accountability of these organizations. If representation and participation for
employees is low, on what basis can these organizations claim to represent the interests of
beneficiary communities? If they can, by what measures can they justify the incongruence
between their internal standards and those demanded of beneficiary communities in the
administration of aid projects? Second, if international NGOs do not practice internal
democracy, then the theory that they are active agents of democratic socialization is also
called into question. On what basis can international NGOs promote a democratic political
culture in Kenya if they themselves do not operate democratically? Third, to what extent
can these NGOs actively engage the Kenyan state on democratic development when the
moral basis on which their legitimacy is partly dependent is undermined by their internal
practices?
Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of the current paper. Its aim has
been more modest, to highlight a gap between the normative assumptions regarding
international non-governmental organizations in Kenya and reality. This gap can be
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, findings suggest that NGOs need to become
internally democratic in order to fulfill their role as legitimate and positive agents in
development and democratization processes. Internal democracy would provide a learning
ground for democratic attitudes and procedures; lead to mechanisms for greater internal
accountability on actions and policy; and may be extended externally to improve
accountability to stakeholders.
On the other hand, findings may be interpreted as a demonstration of congruence
between the authority structures of international NGOs in Kenya and those of the sociopolitical context in which they are embedded. This interpretation eludes the normative
assumptions and determinism of the former and opens research avenues on the complex
relationship between international NGOs and their relationship with political culture.
In either respect, it is clear that a fruitful line of inquiry on the political role of
international NGOs lies in understanding the political ‘reality’ in which they are embedded
and of which they are a part. Such a research agenda, as Tvedt (1998) argues should
eschew normative instrumentalism and better reflect the empirical realities of the world of
NGOs (quoted in Lewis & Opoku-Mensah, 2006). This research agenda can begin by
leaving normative assumptions aside and acknowledging that the international section of
Kenyan civil society is not the “bastion of democracy” it is assumed to be (Murunga, 2000,
p. 8).
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the assistance given by Robert Kuloba, Wycliffe Dimba, Gabriel
Mukanga and Milcah Asamba in the collection of survey data. I also extend a sincere
thanks to the NGOs and their staff who made this article possible by participating in the
research. Sincere thanks to two anonymous referees whose comments and criticisms were
Microcosms of Democracy 13
invaluable in improving this paper. The study was supported with financial assistance from
the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
Microcosms of Democracy 14
Notes
Political culture is defined as a widely shared set of “cognitions, perceptions, evaluations, attitudes and
behavioural predispositions that permit the members of that polity to order and interpret political
institutions and processes and their own relationships with such institutions and processes.” (Ann L.
Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius, quoted in Almond and Verba 1989, p. 340)
2
For dissenting views on the role of political culture see Seligson and Booth (1993) and Whitefield and
Evans (1999).
3
See Mercer (2002) for a review of the literature on NGOs, civil society and democratization.
4
Action Aid formed an alliance of 12 organizations, held workshops and developed a draft Charter of
Basic Rights, all the points of which were included in the Draft Constitution. As a result of their Sugar
Campaign for Change (SUCAM), a Sugar Bill was adopted in 2002 to regulate the sugar industry, which
included greater participation of ordinary farmers on the board and payment within 30 days.
5
In its 2007 report, The Freedom House rated Kenya as Partly Free. Press freedom increased from 24.8 in
2002 to 30.3 in 2006 (Reporters Without Borders, 2006) and respect for civil rights rose from 5 to 8
between 2000 and 2006 (Index of African Governance, 2008).
6
For purposes of this study, civil liberties are omitted as a characteristic of democracy in a work place
organization.
7
100.00 KES = 0.997 EUR (1 February 2009).
8
SD refers to standard deviation and M refers to Mean.
9 Middle-level colleges are two or three year colleges that offer qualifications at certificate, Diploma and
Higher National Diploma levels. Examples include, Teacher Training colleges (TTCs), Kenya Medical
Training colleges (KMTC), Kenya Polytechnic, and Eldoret polytechnic.
10
Dorcas Aid, Plan and PRDA are omitted from this list as responses do not include non-management
representation.
1
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Appendix
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