公司理財研討
MA0A0204 王詩婷
MA0A0205 許睿烜
497A0009 陳欣妤
497A0080 林佩津
1.6
Framing effects
框架效應
In this text the word frame is synonymous for description.
Therefore a decision frame means the description of the decision
task.
A manager is vulnerable to a framing effect when his or her
decisions are easily influenced by the manner in which the
setting for the decision task is framed.
在本文中框架為說明的代名詞。
因此決定框架意味著決策任務的說明。
當設置決策任務，管理者容易受到框架作用時，框架效應
容易影響他或她的決定。
Framing is a critical aspect of prospect theory, the approach that Kahneman
and Tversky developed to describe how people make decisions involving risk
and uncertainty. The Nobel committee singled out prospect theory when
announcing the award to Kahneman.
Prospect theory feature two notable framing phenomena with similar sounding
names: loss aversion and aversion to a sure loss. In order to illustrate both
effects, consider the history of Merck discussed in the nearby box, one of the
best-known pharmaceutical firms in the world.
框架是一個重要的前景理論，Kahneman和Tversky來描述
人們如何作出決定，涉及風險和不確定性的方法。諾貝爾
委員會宣布Kahneman得獎時，選出前景理論。
前景理論具有兩個值得注意的框架現象有相似又誇大其辭
的名稱：規避肯定損失與規避損失。為了說明這兩種影響
，審議討論了默克公司的歷史，世界上最知名的製藥公司
卡尼曼的前景理論有兩大定律：
（1）人們在面臨獲得時，往往小心翼翼，不願冒風險；
而在面對損失時，人人都變成了冒險家。
（2）人們對損失和獲得的敏感程度是不同的，損失的痛
苦要遠遠大於獲得的快樂。
(討論默克公司歷史)
Behavioral Pitfalls
行為陷阱
In 1994 Judy Lewent, the chief financial officer of
pharmaceutical firm Merck & Co., was one of the most
respected CFOs in the United States. That year the Harvard
Business Review published an interview with her , which they
entitled “Scientific Management at Merck: An Interview with CFO
Judy Lewent.” However, in 2004, CFO magazine ran an article
entitled “What Will Judy Do? ” asking whether she would be able
to keep her job. What happened?
1994年，製藥公司Merck公司的財務長Judy Lewent，在
美國是最受人尊敬的首席財務長之一。
這一年，哈佛商業評論發表採訪她，他們題名為“科學
管理默克與首席財務官Judy Lewent訪談。
” 不過，在2004年，CFO雜誌刊登了一篇題為“ Judy將
做什麼？
”問她是否會能夠繼續她的工作。
發生了什麼事？
The short answer to the last question is that in September 2004
Merck recalled its blockbuster drug Vioxx, a drug that had
contributed 8.7 percent of the firm’s global revenues that year. The
log answer is more complicated and requires a short history of the
firm.
簡短的回答了最後一個問題是，在2004年9月，Merck公
司撤銷暢銷藥物Vioxx，那一年，這個藥物貢獻了該公司
的全球營業收入的8.7％。
日誌答案更是複雜，需要公司簡史。
Vioxx(偉克適)—關節炎及急性疼痛治療藥物
According to Fortune magazine’s annual reputation survey, Merck
was one of America’s most admired companies.
In fact, for the seven straight years between 1986 and 1992,
Merck ranked as America’s most admired company.
Merck gained its exalted status by producing a series of
blockbuster drugs, such as Vasotec for the treatment of blood
pressure, Prinivil for cardiac medication, Pepcid and Prilosec for
ulcers, and Mevacor to lower cholesterol.
根據財富雜誌的年度聲譽調查，Merck公司是美國最受尊
敬的公司之一。
事實上，在1986年至1992年之間連續7年，公司名列為美
國最受尊敬的公司。
Merck公司獲得崇高地位是靠生產一系列的暢銷藥物，
例如Vasotec是治療高血壓、Prinivil是心臟的藥物，
Pepcid 和 Prilosec是潰瘍，Mevacor是降低膽固醇。
The year 1999 was auspicious for Merck.
That year the five drugs mentioned Merck $4.38 billion in U.S.
sales and royalties, at a time when its total net sales were $32.7
billion.
At the same time, there were dark financial clouds on the horizon.
Pharmaceutical products typically receive patent protection for a
period of 17 years. By the end of 2001, all five of the major drugs
mentioned were due to go off patent.
在1999 年，對默克公司是吉祥的。
這一年，Merck公司提到五種藥物在美國的銷售和專利權
是4.38億美元，此時總淨銷售額為32.7億美元。
同時，醫藥產品通常會收到為期17年的專利權保護。
到2001年底，所有提到的五種主要藥物專利權到期結束
。
The pharmaceutical industry is also regulated.
In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
must approve all new drugs as being safe and effective.
To establish safety and efficacy, pharmaceutical firms collect date
for submission to the FDA, using clinical trials to test new drugs in
small samples involving both animals and people.
製藥行業也受管制。
在美國，食品和藥物管理局（FDA）新藥物必須核准是安
全且有效的。
為了建立安全性和有效性，製藥公司呈交給FDA最新的蒐
集，使用臨床試驗來測試新藥物須涉及動物和人作小樣本
。
In May 1999, the FDA approved Vioxx to treat pain. However, it
asked Merck to conduct a new large postapproval trial in order to
extend its study of the side effect profile of Vioxx in respect to
stomach ulcers.
The issue was important, in that existing painkillers that were
already on the market, such as aspirin and naproxen (for
example, Aleve), caused stomach irritation. Merck’s earlier studies
showed that Vioxx did not irritate people’s stomachs.
1999 年 5 月，FDA批准Vioxx藥物來治療疼痛。
然而，它要求默克公司進行一個新的大型postapproval
試驗，是為了延長Vioxx藥物在胃潰瘍方面副作用的研究
。
這個問題很重要，在市場上現有的止痛藥，如aspirin和
naproxen（例如，Aleve），會引起胃的刺激。
Because aspirin reduces blood clotting, it reduces the incidence of
heart attacks and stokes.
Vioxx does not, a fact of which Merck’s scientists and executives
were well aware.
因為aspirin可降低血液凝固，它可以減少心髒病發作和
中風的發病率。
事實上，Merck公司的科學家和管理人員心知肚明Vioxx
並不行。
Surprisingly, Merck’s postapproval study appeared to show that
Vioxx actually caused heart attacks and strokes. However, the
firm’s executives resisted that interpretation and invested heavily
in promoting the drug.
Then, in September 2004 a new separate Merck study of colon
polyps also found that Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes.
Merck’s managers belatedly recalled the drug and prepared for
the lawsuits to come.
出人意料的是，Merck公司的postapproval研究似乎顯示
出Vioxx實際上會引起心臟病發作和中風。
然而，公司的高層主管抵制這種解釋，並投入鉅資促進藥
物。
然後，2004 年 9 月，Merck公司的研究也找到一個新獨
立的大腸息肉，Vioxx會引起心髒病發作和中風。
Merck公司的經理姍姍來遲地撤銷了藥物，並準備來訴訟
。
Sources: Anna Wilde Mathews and Barbara Martinez,”E-Mails
Suggest Early Vioxx Worries—AS Evidence of Heart Risk Rose,
Merck Officials Played Hardball; One Internal Message: ’Dodge!’”
The Wall Street Journal, November 2,2004; “Scientific
Management at Merck: An Interview with CFO Judy Lewent,”
Harvard Business Review, Jan-Fed, 1994; Kate O’Sullivan, “What
Will Judy Do?” CFO Magazine, December 3, 2004.
資料來源：Anna Wilde Mathews和Barbara Martinez, 電
子郵件顯示早期Vioxx的擔憂¬—心髒病發作的危險證據，
Merck公司官員態度強硬；一個內部消息:
’Dodge!’” 華爾街日報十一月2,2004；“Merck公司的科學
管理: 與首席財務官Judy Lewent訪談” 哈佛商業評論，12月，1994；Kate O’Sullivan, " Judy將做什麼？"CFO雜
誌，2004 年 12 月 3 日。
CONCEPT PREVIEW Question 1.1
Loss Aversion
規避損失
Imagine a 50-50 risk where you lose $50 if a coin toss comes up tails,
but win a different amount if a coin toss turns up heads. What is the
lowest amount you would have to win and yet still accept the risk?
For example, if you accepted the 50-50 risk between winning $500 and
losing $50, would you still be willing to accept the risk if it was between
winning $250 and losing $50? If you answer yes, would you still be
willing to accept the risk if it was between winning $125 and losing $50?
In other words, think about how low your win would have to be before
you were indifferent between accepting and rejecting the opportunity to
face the risk.
想像一下，一個50％的風險，如果拋硬幣的反面，失去
50元，但如果擲硬幣正面朝上可贏得不同的金額。將贏多
少是能接受的最低金額風險？
例如，如果你接受贏得500元和輸掉 50元之間，接受此風
險。如果是贏得250元和輸掉50元之間呢，仍然願意接受
此風險？如果回答是，那如果是贏得125元和輸掉50元之
間，仍然願意接受此風險？換句話說，想想贏的將比之前
低，在面臨的風險，接受和拒絕之間不感興趣。
Most people make choices about risky alternatives by weighing potential
gains against potential losses, adjusting for the odds.
In a 50-50 situation, the odds attached to gain and loss are the same.
Therefore, someone who rejects the risk in Concept Preview Question
1.1 when the gain is $50 attaches greater weight to the $50 loss than
the $50 gain. The average response to Concept Preview Question 1.1 is
$125. This response suggests that people experience the loss of $50
two and half times (=125/50) as acutely as a $50 gain. Psychologists
refer o this phenomenon as loss aversion.
大多數人作出有關風險的選擇，著重潛在的利益非潛在的
損失，之間賠率進行調整。
在 50-50 的情況，損益的賠率是相同的。
因此，有人拒絕風險概念預覽題目1.1，人們在對同樣大
小概率的選擇的時候，相對於獲得往往更加看重損失 。
一般回應1.1概念預覽問題是125元。
這種反應表明， 人們體驗損失50元的兩倍半和獲利50元
是一樣的敏銳。心理學家稱這種現象為規避損失。
Loss aversion leads people to behave in risk-averse fashion when
facing alternatives that feature the possibility of both gain and
loss. Some people are prone to treating repeated risks over time
the same way as they treat one-shot deals, thereby behaving
unduly conservatively.
This phenomenon is known as narrow framing.
在規避風險的方式表現，具有增益和損失的可能性時。
有些人隨著時間的推移容易以同樣的方式處理重複的風險，
因為他們以同樣的方式處理一次性的交易，從而表現過於
保守。
這種現象被稱為狹窄的框架。
Loss Aversion Can Cause Debt
Aversion
規避損失導致債務規避
Traditional textbooks in corporate finance teach that debt can be
used to shield investors from corporate taxes.
Yet many firms appear to take on less debt than textbook theory
suggests, thereby leaving tax shield dollars on the table.
傳統的公司財務教科書上，教債務可以用於保護投資者的
所得稅。
但是，許多公司採取比教科書理論還少的債務建議，從而
留下稅盾。
As an example, consider Merck’s debt policy. Has Merck been
averse to debt? Exhibit 1.4 displays the time paths of three
variables between 1983 and 2003, Merck’s ratio of total debt to
total assets, its ratio of long-term debt to equity, and its return on
equity (ROE).
例如，考慮默克公司的債務政策。
默克對債務是反感?
圖表1.4顯示1983年和2003年間，三個變量的時間路徑，
默克公司的資產負債率、長期負債比率，股東權益報酬率
。
Exhibit 1.4 shows that Merck’s total debt has typically been low,
below 20 percent of its assets during the 20-year period 1983
through 2003.
These ratios are based on book values, meaning Merck’s financial
statements. Financial textbooks suggest that decisions about debt
be made using market values rather than debt values.
In this regard, the market value of Merck’s equity averaged six
times the book value of its equity during the period. Therefore, in
market terms Merck’s debt was a much lower fraction of its assets
than shown in Exhibit 1.4.
圖表1.4顯示，默克公司的債務總額通常偏低，其資產在1983
年至2003年的20年期間低於20％。
這些比率是根據默克公司財務報表的帳面價值。金融教科書建
議對債務的決策使用的市場價值，而不是債務價值。
在此期間，默克公司的股權市場價值是其股權帳面價值平均的
6倍。因此，在市場方面，默克公司的債務比其資產低得多，
如圖表1.4所示。
In the traditional approach to debt policy, managers balance the benefits
of additional tax shields against the costs of possible future financial
distress stemming from excessive debt.
Firms such as Merck have significant intangible assets stemming from
research and development. Those assets largely reside in the brains of
its scientists and managers.
As a result, Merck’s executives would have to be concerned that the
firm’s scientists and managers might react to financial distress by
leaving the firm, taking with them a large portion of the firm’s intangible
assets. A concern about losing intangible assets might reasonably lead
the firm to shy away from taking on too much debt.
債務政策的傳統方法，管理者平衡附加稅盾，抵禦對未來可能出現
的財務危機所引起過多財務成本。
如默克公司的研究和發展產生重大的無形資產。這些資產主要是駐
留在科學家和管理者的大腦。
因此，默克公司的高層不得不關注，該公司的科學家和管理者可能
會離開公司反應出其財務困境，與企業大部份的無形資產。擔心失
去無形資產的關注可能合理的使公司迴避許多債務。
Such a concern is not hypothetical. After Merck withdrew Vioxx from the
market, the price of its stock fell by more than a third over the next two
months.
That drop made Merck a strong takeover candidate, and its directors
began to worry about talented managers leaving the firm.
In response, Merck filed a new compensation plan for top executives
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The new plan featured
one-time severance payments of up to triple executives’ salary and
bonus, along with other perquisites like health benefits, should Merck be
acquired and the executives lose their jobs.
這不是假定的。默克公司從市場撤回Vioxx後，其股票價格在未來
兩個月內下跌了三分之一以上。
股價下降，一個強大的候選公司收購默克公司，其董事開始擔心管
理人才離開公司。
默克公司提出一個新的賠償計劃給高層管理人員與證券交易委員會
（SEC）。默克公司被收購，高層失去工作，新計劃獨具特色，一
次性遣散費支付三倍的工資和獎金給高層，連同其他額外補貼，如
保健福利。
This change in compensation suggests that there are alternatives to
addressing brain drain besides the assumption of lower debt. Moreover,
it is important to ask whether in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s
the risk of distress was reasonable or instead was overblown.
Between 1988 and 2001, Merck had a high tax bill, held a large amount
in cash, and had several blockbuster drugs.
Its high cash holdings (10 to 20 percent of sales) and blockbuster drugs
with many years remaining of patent protection provided for low risk as
far as bankruptcy was concerned.
這補償的變化表明，除了降低債務承擔也解決人才流失，
此外，重要的是80年代末和90年代，困厄的風險是合理
的或被誇大的。
默克公司在1988年和2001年之間，有一個高稅收的法案
，持有大量現金，並有幾個暢銷藥物。
其高現金持有量（銷量的10％至20％）和暢銷藥物剩餘
多年的專利保護，就破產而言降低風險。
By taking on more debt in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Merck
could have reduced a tax bill that amounted to roughly 60 percent
of its cash holdings. Yet Merck systematically lowered its debt
ratio between 1988 and 1996. Was there some credible risk of
bankruptcy that its managers perceived but investors did not? Or
was the motivation for its debt policy more psychological?
1980年代末至1990年代初期，默克公司通過取得更多的
債務可能減少其現金持有大約60%的稅收，默克在1988
年至1996年間有系統的降低其資產負債率，有一些可信
的風險使其管理者認為會破產，但投資者不認為。
或者，其債務政策有較多的心理動機嗎？
One possibility is simply that Merck’s managers chose a debt
policy that was overly conservative because they were loss
averse.
In general, loss aversion leads managers to be reluctant to issue
debt, even when issuing more debt would produce positive
financing side effects for shareholders.
Psychologically, the potential losses stemming from financial
distress can loom larger than the potential gains stemming from
tax shields.
其可能性是，默克公司的管理者因為規避損失，選擇債務
政策過於保守。
在一般情況下，損失規避導致管理者不願意發行債券，即
使發行更多的債務，將產生積極為股東融資的副作用。
在心理上，金融危機帶來的潛在損失籠罩大於稅盾帶來的
潛在收益。
Concept Preview Question 1.2
Aversion to a Sure Loss
規避一個肯定損失
Imagine that you have lost $74 and face a choice. You can accept
the loss of $74, or face a risky alternative.
If you accept the risky alternative, there is a 75 percent chance
that your loss will be $100, and a 25 percent chance that your loss
will be $0. Which alternative would you choose, the sure loss of $
74 or the risk?
試想一下，你已經失去了$ 74，並面臨著一個選擇。
你可以接受74美元的損失，或面臨風險替代。
如果你接受風險替代，有75％的機會，你的損失將是100
元，25％的機會，你的損失將是$ 0。
你會選擇哪一種，74美元的肯定損失或風險？
Most answer Concept Preview Question 1.2 by choosing the risky
alternative.
They do so in spite of the fact that the odds are against them, but
they choose risk hoping to beat the odds, thereby breaking even.
Such a person is said to be averse to a sure loss.
問題1.2大多數的答案是風險替代。
他們這樣做，儘管對他們的賠率是事實，但他們選擇擊敗
風險，希望甚至從而打破。
這樣的人，據說是肯定規避損失。
Hoping to Beat the Odds in Drug Sales
希望打敗藥品銷售的可能性
In 1999, the executives at Merck were watching the clock tick down, as
five of their most successful products were due to go off patent in 2000
and 2001. One possible scenario was that the firm would be unable to
find new products to replace the lost profits from the ones going off
patent. Merck continued to be one of America’s most admired
companies throughout the 1990s, a state of affairs to which its
executives had become accustomed. It is plausible to suggest that if the
firm’s profits declined, these executives would have difficulty adjusting
psychologically from their days of past glory. As a result, they might
have used past profitability as a reference point and framed the lower
forecasted profit situation as a loss relative to that reference point.
在1999年，默克公司的經理們看著時鐘刻度，由於在
2000年和2001年的專利是他們最成功的產品。可能的情
形是該公司無法找到新產品以彌補從事專利的損失。在整
個90年代，默克公司仍然是美國最受尊敬的公司之一，其
經理們變得習慣公司的事務。這是合理的建議，如果公司
的利潤下降，這些經理們從過去輝煌的日子將會有困難的
心理調整。因此，他們有可能參考過去的盈利能力和架構
，作為損失相對較低的預測盈利狀況。
After the FDA approved Vioxx in May 1999, Merck’s executives
were hoping that its sales would help them to avoid entering the
domain of psychological losses, meaning lower profits. However,
the results from its postapproval clinical study, code named
VIGOR (for Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research),
indicating that Vioxx might actually cause heart attacks and
strokes, presented the executives with a dilemma involving two
alternatives.
在1999年5月，FDA(美國食品及藥品管理局)核准Vioxx(
偉克適-關節炎及急性疼痛治療藥物)，默克公司的經理們
希望其銷售額將幫助他們避免進入地區心理虧損，這意味
著更低的利潤。
然而，從臨床研究批准後，代碼的結果命名活力（Vioxx
的胃腸道的研究成果），這表明Vioxx的實際上可能導致
心髒病發作和中風，經理提出了兩個方案以解決此困難。
The first alternative was to promote Vioxx for a small market,
namely people who needed pain relief, whose sensitive stomachs
did not tolerate drugs like aspirin and naproxen, and who were not
prone to heart problems. This alternative was akin to accepting a
sure loss (meaning, lower profits). The second alternative was to
try and beat the odds, hoping that the negative findings from
VIGOR would not carry over to the general population. The
second alternative involved promoting Vioxx as a general
painkiller for the whole market, downplaying the cardiac side
effect profile, and hoping for blockbuster sales.
第一種選擇是促進Vioxx藥物小型市場就是需要緩解疼痛
，其敏感的胃，不容忍藥物如阿斯匹林，萘普生，不容易
出現心臟問題的人。本項選擇是類似於接受一定的損失（
意思是利潤較低）。
第二種選擇是試圖擊敗的可能性希望活力的負面結果不會
結轉到一般人群。作為整個市場的一般止痛藥Vioxx藥物
涉及第二個替代的推動淡化心臟的副作用，希望一鳴驚人
的銷售。
People who view themselves in the domain of losses are much
more prone to accept risks than people who view themselves in
the domain of gains. Because of the looming patent expiration on
its older drugs, Merck executives felt the pressure to make Vioxx a
major success. They chose the risky alternative.
人們查看自己虧損地區比人們查看的利益地區更傾向於接
受風險。
因為迫在眉睫的老藥專利到期，默克公司的主管感到了壓
力，作出Vioxx藥物一個重大的成功。
他們選擇了風險的替代。
Researchers at Stanford University, Harvard University, and the
Cleveland Clinic wrote scientific articles that raised concerns about
Vioxx’s safety. Merck challenged these concerns and continued to
promote Vioxx as safe. In February 2001, the FDA issued a letter to
Merck’s CEO at the time, Ray Gilmartin, chastising the firm for
deceptive promotional practices. In August 2004, a researcher from the
FDA’s drug-safety office presented date that showed that higher doses
of Vioxx correlated with a tripled risk of a heart attack of sudden cardiac
death. Merck responded by issuing a press release reiterating its
confidence in the safety and efficacy of its drug.
在斯坦福大學，哈佛大學，克利夫蘭診所的研究人員撰寫
科學文章，提出了有關Vioxx藥物的安全性的關注。默克
挑戰這些問題，並繼續推動Vioxx藥物安全。
2001年2月，FDA發布的時間在默克公司的行政總裁的信
雷吉爾馬丁欺騙性的宣傳手法懲戒公司。 2004年8月從
FDA的藥物安全辦公室提交的日期，表明高劑量的Vioxx
藥物三倍的心源性猝死的心髒病發作的風險與相關研究員
。默克公司作出回應，發出新聞稿，重申其在其藥物的安
全性和有效性的信心。
Between 2000 and 2004, twenty-eight million people took Vioxx.
After Merck finally withdrew Vioxx from the market, the British
medical journal The Lancet wrote that the firm should have made
that decision several years earlier. In December 2004, the best
estimates were that the lawsuits against Merck would total $18
billion.
2000年和2004年間二十八個萬人參加了Vioxx藥物。
之後默克公司Vioxx藥物最終退出市場“英國醫學雜誌”柳葉刀“雜誌
寫道，該公司應於幾年前作出這一項決定。
2004年12月，最好的估計是對默克公司的訴訟將達到180億美元。
In February 2005, by a vote of 17 to 15, members of an FDA
advisory panel recommended that Vioxx was safe enough to be
sold in the United States, as long as its package label carried
strict warnings about the risk of heart attacks and strokes. The
vote led Merck to inform the FDA that it was considering
requesting permission to reintroduce Vioxx.
2005年2月17日至15日，FDA的諮詢建議，Vioxx的是足
夠的安全，將在美國出售，只要其包裝標籤進行嚴格的心
髒病發作和中風的風險警告面板的成員進行表決。
表決帶領默克公司告知FDA，它正考慮請求的權限，為恢
復Vioxx的。
In August 2005, a Texas jury rendered its verdict on the first of the
Vioxx trials, finding Merck liable for the death of 59-year-old
marathon runner Robert Ernst who had taken the drug. The jury
award of $253 million jolted Merck executives, and Merck’s
market capitalization fell by 7.7 percent after the announcement of
the jury’s verdict.
2005年8月得克薩斯州陪審團作出的判決，在第一Vioxx
藥物審判，發現默克公司59歲的馬拉松選手羅伯特•
恩斯特曾採取藥物的死亡承擔責任。
253萬美元的評委會獎震驚默克公司主管，陪審團的裁決
公佈後，默克公司的市值下跌了7.7％。
Jury members indicated that they were particularly
troubled that Merck executives had knowledge of
Vioxx’s negative side- effect profile before they placed
the drug on the market, but took actions to conceal that
knowledge from the public.
陪審團成員表示，他們特別不安的是，默克公司管理人
員在藥物上市前，就知道Vioxx有不好的副作用，但他們
對大眾隱瞞這些資訊。
Although Texas law requires the amount of the actual
award to be much less than $253 million, and Merck
planned to appeal the verdict, the outcome of the trial
set an important precedent for the remaining Vioxx suits,
which numbered 4,200 at the time.
雖然美國德州法律要求實際的裁定額低於2億5千3百萬美
元，默克公司有計劃的對判決結果提出上訴，當時編號
4,200的審判結果對其餘Vioxx的訴訟是重要的。
On August 22, 2005, The Wall Street Journal reported
that after the verdict was announced, analysts’ estimate
of the value of Merck’s legal liability increased to $30
billion, raising questions about Merck’s long-term ability
to survive.
在2005年8月22日，”華爾街日報”報導判決結果宣佈後，
分析師估計默克公司法定的責任價值增加300億美元，對
默克公司的長期生存的能力提出質疑。