Veto Players and Greek Politics
• Standard comparative classifications:
regime types (presidential, parlimentary,
semipresidential), party systems (twomultiparty)
• Veto players: individual or collective actors
whose agreement is necessary for a
change in the status quo
• Difference?
FIGURE II
Differences between regimes, party systems, and veto players
2 PARTY
SYSTEM
MULTIPARTY
SYSTEM
VETO PLAYERS
PRESIDENTIAL
REGIME
US
ITALY
PARLIAMENTARY
REGIME
UK
NORWAY
Add Greece,
and US defense policy
• Multiparty system parliamentary system
(Greece)
• Two party presidential system (US)
• Decisions are taken by single vps.
• Lack of policy stability
• Once we know their preferences, we know
the outcome
FIGURE II
Differences between regimes, party systems, and veto players
2 PARTY
SYSTEM
MULTIPARTY
SYSTEM
VETO PLAYERS
PRESIDENTIAL
REGIME
US
US (DEF)
ITALY
PARLIAMENTARY
REGIME
UK
GREECE
NORWAY
FIGURE 1.5
Winset of VPs A and C is contained within winset of VPs A and B
(B is absorbed)
SQ
E F
D
A
B
SQ’
C
Policy conclusions
• The larger the number of vps, the
more policy stability
• The larger their ideological distance,
the more policy stability
SELECTION OF A POLICY WITHIN THE CORE
BY FIRST MOVER (BUREAUCRACY OR JUDICIARY)
1
L1
J
J'
K
2
L2
K'
3
First mover outside core (J or K) selects
closest point inside core (J' or K');
First mover inside core (L1 or L2) selects
own ideal point.
Implications
• The larger the core, the more independent
the judiciary and the bureaucrats
• Difference between statutory
(bureaucracies and judiciary) and
constitutional interpretation (judiciary)
Effects of policy stability
GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY
(PARLIAMENTARISM)
GOVERNMENT FORMATION
TO REDUCE POLICY STABILITY
POLICY
STABILITY
BUREAUCRATIC
INDEPENDENCE
(BEHAVIORAL)
CUMBERSOME
BUREAUCRATIC LEGISLATION
JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
AS (ABSORBED) VETO PLAYERS
Main points of the talk
• 1. Greek political system has a single vp,
therefore lacks policy stability
• 2. Greece has 2 constitutional vps,
therefore has significant (?) constitutional
stability
• 3. There is no bureaucratic independence
• 4. There may be independence of
constitutional courts
1. Greece: a political system with a
single VP
We observe policy change only when
government changes preferences:
• PASOK’s economic policy
– 1981-1985, Arsenis: Public Investments
priority
– 1985-1987, Simitis: Consolidation priority
– 1987-1989 ,Tsovolas: Expansionary paradigm
Arsenis 1997 reform on
Education:
– In 1997 government votes the 2525/97 law
– For more than a year massive demonstrations
against the law
– In 13/01/1999 ND submits and loses a censure
vote against Arsenis
– In April 2000 Simitis wins the elections …and
replaces Arsenis with Efthymiou who designs
major changes in the 2525/97 law
2. Constitutional change with 2 vps
• Requirement: 3/5 (180) on the topic in
previous parliament for revision by next
parliament by simple majority (150).
• Otherwise 3/5 (180) in next parliament
• Result of this rule?
Constitutional design
• Final outcome can be A or B if both of
them vote for revision now (Parliament 0)
• Carte Blanche delegation to next winner
(Parliament 1)
• Implication?
• No decision in Parliament 0
3. Bureaucratic dependence
• In the summer of 2004, i.e. just a few months after New
Democracy came to power, law # 3260/2004 was
enacted. According to that law, the grade of general
director (genikos diefthintis) was abolished, while the
corresponding position (organiki monda) was maintained
(genikes diefthinseis). All high positioned public
employees holding the grade "A'" could apply to get that
position. The ones who at the time were serving as
general directors had the following choice: either to
resign and get the pension corresponding to the grade of
general director, or to accept being downgrader to
grade"A'", and then apply to the new post.
•
N Alivizatos (personal communication)
The applicants’ basic argument is that the 2004 law violated
article 103 of the Constitution, which guarantees the
inamovibility of public servants (isoviotita). It is precisely in view
of that constitutional guarantee that, after 1975, the removals
from the high posts of the civil service are not conducted in a
straightforward way but through laws, whose puported aim is to
"reorganize" the public service, seeking allegedly more efficiency
and merit. PaSoK did so with law 1232/1982, New Domocracy
with law 1892/1990 (although not so deeply), PaSoK did it again
with law 2190/1994, and New Democracy, for a second time,
with the above law 3260/2004.
N Alivizatos (personal communication)
Explanation
• 1. Spoil system
• 2. Policies produce outcomes with some random
error (depending on external conditions)
• Principal has preferences over outcomes, not
over policies.
• Bureaucrat knows outcomes that correspond to
different policies
• Principal prefers a bureaucrat that agrees on
outcomes.
4. Judiciary
• In the 80s (Alivizatos)
• In the 90s and later (Papaspyrou)
“The Fifth Section was established in 1991 (Act 1968 of 1991) with a
view to uniting the case law and providing more comprehensive
protection of pertinent environmental values. Since then, the section
has developed a dynamic constitutional jurisprudence and has
reshaped Greek environmental law. On the level of methodology, the
Section has rejected the old positivist view that treats constitutional
goals as directives with little normative force and has assumed the
task of specifying the measures needed for compliance with the
constitution.”
• In the 80s judiciary was dependent
• Throughout the 90s, in policy areas such as
environmental regulation, education, public sector hiring
procedures, and public procurement procedures, the
State Council has produced a series of decisions
opposing governmental executive decrees. It has
annulled them or claimed that specific executive decrees
violate constitutional provisions obliging the government
to modify them accordingly.
• Governments started using ministerial
decisions instead of presidential decrees.
(Alexopoulos in Rasch, Tsebelis)
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
Year
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
0
1975
Number
DIAGRAM 3: Exclusive Government Jurisdiction
7500
Executive Decrees
Ministerial Decisions
• However we observe examples where the State Council
blocked also ex post ministerial decision such as in the
case of the ministerial decision (ΥΑ Γ2/6953, ΦΕΚ 1057,
τ.Β΄ 1-12-97) for the reduction of the hours of teaching of
the course on the orthodox religion on secondary education
schools. The State Council obliged the minister to return to
the previous status with a new ministerial decision (YA
Γ2/4735/27-8-98).
• the same in the case of the ministerial decision (6495/97
(ΦΕΚ 975β/4-11-97) concerning the launch of
(Programmata Spoydwn Epiloghs) an adult education
program leading to a university level degree next to the
conventional way of obtaining such a degree in the
Greek education system. The State Council said that the
ministerial decision is unconstitutional and led the
government to issue additional legislation and later in
2000 the new minister Euthimiou abandoned the
program
Conclusions
• Greece is a country with a single vp; as a
result it has policy instability, and
bureaucracies are dependent on political
elites
• Constitutional change requires 2 vps; as a
result the Council of State can have
significant independence