Biosecurity in the
International Futures
Programme of the OECD
www.biosecuritycodes.org
David B. Sawaya
OECD International Futures Program
Matrahaza, Hungary
May 13, 2006
1
A Global Outreach
OECD Member Countries
Countries/Economies Engaged in Working
Relationships with the OECD
2
What is the International
Futures Programme?

Established in 1990

Provides the OECD with early warning of
emerging issues, pinpoints major
developments, and analyses key longterm concerns to help governments map
strategy
3
Risk Management in the
International Futures
Programme
4
A number of forces are modifying the
risk landscape
Driving forces
 Demography
– population growth, ageing, migration, urbanization

The Environment
– climate change and its impact on natural disasters and
infectious diseases

Technology
– connectedness, technological change

Socio-economic Developments
– concentration, income disparities, shifts in regulation
capacities
5
Major Recommendations
Research has led to a number of recommendations for
action:

Adopt a new policy approach to risk management.

Develop synergies between the public and the private sectors.

Inform and involve stakeholders and the general public.

Strengthen international co-operation.
Make better use of technological potential and enhance research
efforts.

6
Trends in Bioagent cases (20th century)
1990’s
1980’s
1970’s
1960’s
20th Century Total
Terrorist
Criminal
Other/
Uncertain
Total
19
40
94
153
3
6
0
9
3
2
3
8
0
1
0
1
27
56
97
180
Source: W. Seth Carus, “Working Paper: Bioterrorism and Biocrimes” (Center for Counter-proliferation Research,
National Defense University, Feb 2001 Revision of 1999)
7
Risk Issues For Biotechnologies
- Dual Use Technologies 
How do we maintain an open democratic society and
maintain security at the same time?
– How do we maintain scientific openness?

Can we even effectively control dual-use equipment,
materials, and information?

What measures need to be taken to assure the public
that the desired level of security has been achieved?
8
Conference on Responsible Stewardship of
the Life Sciences

Meeting in Frascati, Italy in September of 2004

55 participants from government, academia, industry,
public research organizations, scientific societies,
and the science publishing field

Discussion of how to achieve a balance between
scientific freedom and security concerns
9
What behaviour patterns for what
tools?

A spectrum of individual behaviour is the object of
oversight tools:
– Psychopathic, sociopathic, criminal (national laws, treaties)
– Negligent or thoughtless (laws, guidelines, principles)
– Right-minded professionals with a narrow view of the
consequences of their work (voluntary codes)
10
Creating Tools for Managing Oversight

Formal treaties, agreements or arms control
conventions among governments
– ex: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Consensus pacts among voluntary partners
to the agreement
– ex: Australia Group export control program (non-binding)
11
Tools for managing oversight

National Legislation
– ex: Japan’s Infectious Disease Law (2003), US Patriot Act
(2001), Singapore’s Biological Agents and Toxin Bill (2005)

Informal agreements among individuals or
non-state actors
– ex: Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct, Guidelines,
Principles
12
Codes of Conduct

Target Audience: scientific communities, research
funding agencies

Mechanism: raise awareness of problem, provide
guidance on professional best practice

Utility: one tool among others to address the issue of
dual-use
13
Why use Codes?

To raise individual scientists’ awareness of their
personal responsibilities

To ensure funding agencies and administrative
oversight bodies of common approaches to potential
problems

To reassure the public
14
What are the problems with Codes?

A sense of ownership by individuals (who drafted the
Code?)

What measures of enforcement do Codes have? If
none, how useful are they?

What sanctions are foreseen if code is not followed?
15
What should a Code look like?

Avoid national, regional or cultural preoccupations

It should be drafted with specific communities in mind

It should provide both professional standards and an
means to empower teams to act to enforce the Code
16
Frascati Conclusions

The impact of existing security systems on delivering
the twin goals of protecting science and the public in
an age of terrorism need to be further evaluated.

There is a need for a more transparent and better
informed debate to consolidate existing activities,
including through the provision of a more
comprehensive information resource.

Existing regulatory frameworks need to be bolstered
with self-regulation measures .
17
www.biosecuritycodes.org
Biosecuritycodes in French
Biosecuritycodes in Japanese
Biosafety vs. Biosecurity

Need to establish a common international
understanding of key terminology

In English the difference is often poorly
understood and the term biosecurity is
used in a number of different ways:
– for protection against non-native species in
Oceania
– as protection of livestock from infections in
rural communities
– the protection against the malicious misuse of
pathogens in the security community)
21
Biosafety vs. Biosecurity


Problem in translating the terms into other
languages:
– In many languages the distinction between
safety and security does not exist.
– This clearly represents a problem when
translating biosecurity and biosafety, and
may pose a serious problem when
attempting to compare legislation across
borders.
OECD’s network and non-member
connections to survey the ways in which the
two terms are translated into other languages
(inter alia – French, Italian, Spanish, Russian,
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, German)
22
Open Question:
Are Codes Effective?

There is very little no consensus as to the efficacy of
codes because evidence is scattered and poor

Post studies on the effectiveness of self regulatory
mechanisms, in the life sciences and other domains,
at curbing intentional and unintentional misuse of
resources.

A new web forum allowing users to discuss
experiences in implementing and using codes of
conduct and other voluntary regulatory agreements in
the life sciences and other areas.
23
Thank you
David.sawaya@oecd.org
24