The New Stability in U.S.-China Relations: Causes and Consequences
David Shambaugh
In 2003 the relationship between the United States and China is widely judged to be in its best
condition since the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. This situation is both striking and unexpected, given that the
administration of George W. Bush inherited a volatile relationship with deep suspicions in each society and
government of the other, it came to office identifying China as America’s “strategic competitor,” and it soon
experienced the tense EP-3 surveillance plane incident of April 2001. Even in the wake of the September
11th 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and the resulting Sino-American cooperation in the war
against international terrorism, various analysts opined that the new entente would be temporary convergence
limited in scope and duration, that a fundamental strategic transformation in the relationship had not
occurred, and that any newfound harmony would likely be undercut by a combination of domestic politics,
strategic suspicion, and clash of national interests.1 Yet, two years later, the relationship between the United
States and People’s Republic of China seems remarkably stable, cooperative, and productive. Both the
atmospherics and substance of the relationship suggest that a real corner has been turned and that the
improved relationship can endure for some time to come.
No analysts or observers predicted this state of affairs. How and why did the turnabout occur?
How stable and strong is the new relationship? Can it endure? What will be the principal challenges to
sustaining it? What lessons can be drawn from this period that might serve as a guide to future relations?
This chapter addresses these questions and concludes that, unless there is a new crisis over Taiwan, the
current positive and cooperative state of relations can be expected to endure for the foreseeable future.
Causal Factors
I believe three sets of factors helped contribute to the new stability in Sino-American relations: (a)
China’s strategic reassessment; (b) the Bush administration’s policy towards China; and (c) changed agendas
within and between both countries. Let us consider these in turn.
China’s Strategic Reassessment
It is always difficult for foreign scholars and analysts to “read the tea leaves” in deciphering policies
and events in China. It is often easier to see the consequences of an important decision taken by the
Chinese government than to identify its precipitating causes and influences.
Such is the case with China’s policy towards the United States since the Bush administration
assumed office. While the details remain far from clear, it seems evident that China drastically altered its
overall approach to the United States beginning in the winter-spring of 2001. From that time until the
See, for example, David M. Lampton, “Small Mercies: China and America After 9/11,” The National Interest
(Winter 2001-2002), pp. 106-113; Aaron Friedberg, “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,”
Survival (Spring 2002), pp. 33-50; Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations,
1989-2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 417.
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present (the EP-3 crisis notwithstanding), China’s America policy has been much less rhetorically critical and
confrontational, and tangible cooperation has been pursued with Washington in many policy areas.
During this period of time, China’s media and specialist publications in international relations have
been notably restrained when discussing American foreign policy. Chinese publications have refrained from
criticizing U.S. actions that, in the past, would have warranted an outburst of invective, e.g. military attacks
on other countries, strengthened security ties with China’s neighbors and deployment of U.S. forces around
China’s periphery, increased arms sales to Taiwan, etc. The relative silence in China’s rhetorical posture is
particularly striking, as it has come during a period when U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic behavior have
arguably reached a new high and are being denounced in many countries (including allies). The restraint
reflects both the conscious decision by the Chinese leadership to lower the rhetorical temperature as well as
the continued government control of main media that report on international affairs in China. To be sure,
there has been some criticism in these outlets (and considerably more in internet chat rooms)—but it has
been noticeably toned down since the summer of 2001.
Not only has China been rhetorically restrained, Beijing has also demonstrated a desire to get along
with the new Bush administration. It has said and done the right things. Former President Jiang Zemin and
other officials were quick to express official condolences to the American government and people following
9/11, and this was mirrored at a private level in China.2
While 9/11 was certainly a key point in the transformation of the Sino-American relations, it is the
principal argument of this chapter that the improvement in relations began well prior to September 11th, and
that there was already momentum in the improved relationship before the attacks and post-9/11 cooperation
in counter-terrorism. I detect evidence that both governments sought an improvement in relations and began
this process in the spring of 2001—prior to, but certainly in the wake of, the April EP-3 crisis.
On China’s part, a variety of indicators suggest that there was a conscious strategy to stabilize and
improve relations with the new Bush administration. Some Chinese interlocutors have also indicated that a
comprehensive review of China’s foreign policy was undertaken during November-December 2000.3 As
election chads were being counted in Florida, with the outcome of the presidential election still in doubt, the
Chinese government and think tank experts held a three-week retreat at a special conference facility in the
western hills of Beijing, to undertake a comprehensive assessment of China’s foreign policy in anticipation of
the new administration taking office in Washington, D.C. Perhaps the key conclusion of the conclave was
that the United States was central to virtually every major national interest and goal of China. Chinese
officials and analysts judged that there had been far too much volatility in the relationship over the previous
2
During a visit to China one month after September 11 th, I encountered numerous examples of sympathy conveyed
by friends, colleagues, and average citizens. One taxi driver refused to charge the fare when he learned that his
passengers were American.
3
Interviews with international affairs specialists in Beijing and Washington during spring and summer of 2001.
2
decade that was not conducive to these interests and goals, and that there was an opportunity to stabilize and
improve relations with a new American administration. While the conferees were skeptical of George W.
Bush’s campaign rhetoric about China being a “strategic competitor,” nonetheless there was optimism that,
once in office, his position would moderate.4
When the Bush administration assumed office in January 2001, China chose to send two sets of highlevel emissaries to the United States to feel out the new administration on its approach to China, Taiwan,
and other issues. The first set of emissaries was three former ambassadors from China to the United States,
which visited the U.S. in January 2001. Their first stop was Houston, Texas, as they believed that the best
way to influence George Bush Jr. was via George Bush Sr. The delegation also made a concerted effort to
meet with other pro-Beijing mainstream members of the Republican Party foreign policy establishment—
such as Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, and Brent Scowcroft—in an effort to influence the new
administration. In their meetings with the new administration in Washington, however, the delegation did
not necessarily leave a good impression—as they adopted a somewhat confrontational stance and lectured
their senior interlocutors on Taiwan and other issues. As a result, meetings with the National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage were cut short.5 Beijing next
dispatched its foreign policy czar Qian Qichen in March. This visit went much better, as Qian struck a far
more accommodating stance, while American officials assured Qian of the continuing U.S. commitment to
the “One China” policy and the three joint communiqués. In addition these two sets of senior envoys,
China’s outgoing ambassador, Li Zhaoxing (now Foreign Minister), engaged in a series of quiet dialogues
with Secretary of State Powell and other officials. These were continued by Li’s successor Yang Jiechi, who
was selected for the ambassadorial post not only because of his seniority in the diplomatic service, but also
because of his personal closeness to the Bush family.
While the Chinese side remained suspicious of the new Bush administration, given the large number of
officials who were known for their pro-Taiwan and anti-China inclinations prior to assuming office, a new
realism began to take hold in each government that pragmatic cooperation was possible. For its part, the
new Bush administration began an internal assessment of its own China policy (see below). This view
persisted until the EP-3 event in April, which badly strained relations, but following the resolution of that
crisis, both governments immediately returned to the understandings and format reached earlier in the
spring.
In the immediate aftermath of the EP-3 crisis both governments agreed to an intensified set of exchanges
between officials of the two foreign ministries during the summer of 2001. First, State Department Director
of Policy Planning Richard Haass was dispatched to Beijing in June for discrete but wide-ranging
discussions. This was followed by James Kelly (Assistant Secretary for East Asian & Pacific Affairs), John
4
At the time of the conference the outcome of the election was still in doubt.
5
Discussion with U.S. Government official, March 7, Washington, D.C.
3
Bolton (Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs), and Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage. The capstone to the flurry of diplomacy was Secretary of State Powell’s own visit to
Beijing in late-July. All of this was to set the stage of President Bush’s own visit to Shanghai for the APEC
Summit in October, where the president would have his first bilateral with President Jiang Zemin.
Prior to visiting Beijing, Powell attended the annual Asian Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi,
Vietnam. There he met with his counterpart Tang Jiaxuan (with whom he had previously had a number of
telephone conversations). Tang went out of his way to offer Powell an unprecedented and important
assurance: that China had no desire to “push the United States out of Asia.” Tang reiterated this to Powell
when they met again in Beijing and apparently went further than his assurances in Hanoi, telling Powell,
“[China] welcomes the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region as a stabilizing factor.”6 These
statements were both unprecedented and important, as it had become an operative assumption of many in
the new administration (particularly among Republican Party security strategists) that China’s principal
strategic goal was to evict the U.S. from East Asia in order to extend its own regional hegemony. Prior to
assuming office as President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice evinced this prevalent view
among Republican strategists in an important article in Foreign Affairs: “China resents the role of the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a ‘status-quo’ power, but one that would like
to alter Asia’s strategic balance in its own favor.”7 Secretary of State Powell and other senior U.S. officials
took Tang’s statements to mean that China did not oppose U.S. military bases and alliances in the region,
although this was not specifically stated.
Thus, with these exchanges, the Sino-American relationship clearly had begun to improve and
stabilize prior to the events of 9/11. Once that tragedy transpired, the train had already left the station and
was gaining momentum. 9/11 did indeed offer further opportunity for improvement in ties, which was
seized by both sides, but the basic entente had been in evidence since May 2001. Indeed, had the EP-3 crisis
not occurred, the pattern evidenced after May would likely have begun two months earlier.
Why did China strike such an accommodating pose vis-à-vis the United States in the early months
of the Bush administration? Several considerations are likely. First and foremost, the Chinese government
was preoccupied principally with internal affairs. Maintaining economic growth, managing the leadership
succession under way between the 16th Party Congress (November 2002) and the National People’s
Congress (March 2003), and implementing China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) all
assumed very high priority for leaders in Beijing. Second, China probably concluded that it had nothing to
gain—and a great deal to lose—by constantly haggling with and confronting the United States. Third, China
concluded that its Taiwan policy was working fairly well and that time was on its side. Fourth, after 9/11,
China recognized that the United States was preoccupied elsewhere in the world and that the “China threat”
6
Press Conference by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, July 29, 2001.
7
Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2000), p. 56.
4
had disappeared from the attention of the American media, politicians, and foreign policy community. Fifth,
Chinese leaders seem to have concluded that all of its principal goals—from economic growth to WTO
accession to regional security to Taiwan—all required a stable and functional relationship with the United
States. Finally, Beijing seems to have concluded that there was a growing coincidence of views with
Washington over a range of international and regional issues (see below). Taken together, these factors likely
account for the Chinese Government’s “softer line” and more accommodating posture towards the United
States.
America’s (Not So) New China Policy
As China adjusted its policy towards the United States, so too did the new Bush administration. As
noted above, it came into office having been critical of the Clinton administration’s China policy, of China
itself, and had promised to change the tenor and substance of U.S. relations with both Beijing and Taipei.
Yet the new administration quickly adopted a China policy framework not dissimilar from that of the
previous six administrations.
While there are officials in the Bush administration either wary of, or opposed to, overly close ties
with China, a consensus seems to have emerged early in the administration that China had to be engaged and
not ignored, confronted, or contained. Secretary of State Powell, National Security Advisor Rice, and the
President himself were key in forging this consensus. Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of State
Armitage, both of whom had been openly supportive of Taiwan and skeptical of close U.S.-China ties prior
to coming to office, also joined the consensus coalition. China was, in Rice’s characterization, a “major
power” (like Russia) with which the United States had important equities and national security interests. This
mandated as much engagement and cooperation as possible. The rationale behind the shift in tone and
policy (from the campaign) was not dissimilar from the strategic logic that had guided the China policies of
the six previous administrations: a China that is positively engaged with the world, and not withdrawn into a
nationalistic cocoon, is conducive to stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region and to realizing
American national security objectives.
Yet the administration also believed strongly that its approach to China had to emphasize larger
regional considerations, and that the United States should place much higher priority on regional actors than
China. A central tenet of the Republican critique of the Clinton administration’s China policy was that it
placed inordinate emphasis on dealing with Beijing, to the neglect of close allies and partners elsewhere in
Asia. This critique was disingenuous, but it is true that during Clinton’s second term a high priority in U.S.
Asia policy was placed on building ties with China.
This critique did not originate with the current Bush administration. It was presaged by the second
Reagan administration and was conceptualized in that earlier era by key officials now in high positions in the
Bush administration, particularly Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage. Both men have had significant experience in Asia, but none specifically with China. For
both, China is viewed through a broader Asian prism.
5
Wolfowitz and Armitage have played dominant roles in conceptualizing the Bush administration’s
broad Asia strategy. In their view, America’s China policy should be embedded in a broader Asia policy,
rather than vice versa. This basic conceptualization is not tantamount to a policy of containing China,
although it does have the effect of strengthening America’s strategic and military ties around China’s
periphery (which, to many in China, constitutes a form of neo-containment).
While there is no existing public document that describes it, the “Armitage/Wolfowitz" vision for
China and Asia policy involves the following core elements:8

Emphasize Japan. America’s entire relationship in the Asia-Pacific region is anchored to the U.S.Japan alliance—an alliance that, in Armitage’s view, needs substantial strengthening and redefining
so that it bears a closer resemblance to the U.S.-U.K. alliance (an unrealistic desire, since Japan does
not seek such a relationship);

Stress and strengthen America’s other four regional alliances (South Korea, Thailand, the
Philippines, Australia) and security partnerships (especially Singapore);

Work to build security ties with Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and possibly Vietnam.

Greatly enhance U.S. political, commercial, and military relations with India;

Build ties security partnerships with Central Asian states (this was true prior to 9/11 and has
become actualized since then);

Rebuild relations with Pakistan and help prevent Islamabad from becoming a failed state that
encourages and exports terrorism;

Strengthen political and military ties with Taiwan;

Maintain a robust forward military presence throughout Asia.
In the “Armitage/Wolfowitz Vision,” China must be dealt with as amicably as possible, but very
much within this broader strategic context. This vision is apparently shared by Vice President Cheney,
National Security Advisor Rice, Secretary of State Powell, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick—
while Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and some others in the Pentagon have a much more hawkish view of
China. This “vision” and these actors that have helped forge a consensus and policy coalition toward Asia
and China policy in the Bush administration.
The Altered Agenda
If the improved U.S.-China relationship resulted from the active strategies of both governments,
political circumstances and practical policy requirements have also contributed to its improvement. The two
This section is drawn from my article “Sino-American Relations Since September 11: Can the New Stability
Last?” Current History (September 2002), p. 246
8
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nation's cooperation in the war on global terrorism has been an important contextual factor. In the
aftermath of 9/11, China offered tangible assistance to the United States in a number of important areas:9

Helping to draft and pass two key resolutions in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly;

Supporting, in principle, the coalition attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Beijing’s vote
on Resolution 1368 marked the first time that China had voted in favor of—rather than its usual
practice of abstention—authorizing the international use of force);

Working behind the scenes with Pakistan to persuade the Musharraf government to support the
war against the Taliban regime;

Sharing intelligence with the U.S. on al-Qaeda and the Taliban;

Initiating a series of exchanges with the U.S. in counter-terrorism, leading to a practical working
relationship in this field;

Sealing China’s short border with Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters from
migrating into Xinjiang province;

Inspecting bank accounts in Hong Kong and China for any links to terrorist groups;

Offering aid for Afghan refugee resettlement in Pakistan, and some reconstruction aid in
Afghanistan.
However, there were other steps in support of the United States that China was not prepared to
undertake. For example, China did not offer military over-flight or basing rights—as did every nation
surrounding Afghanistan (except Iran). China attributed this restraint to longstanding sensitivities regarding
sovereignty. Perhaps so, but other nations overcame such sensitivities and rose to the occasion when
necessary. Nor did China commit any military forces to the multinational force in Afghanistan. To some
observers, China’s reluctance to become militarily engaged in the Afghan conflict tarnished its otherwise
positive record in the war against terrorism, though it is unclear whether the U.S. sought more active
Chinese involvement. China nonetheless failed to grasp the opportunity to contribute to the post-conflict
reconstruction of Afghanistan. While China pledged $150 million in reconstruction aid, the PRC has chosen
not to become involved in training the new Afghan army or police forces, nor has it sent engineers,
construction workers, and equipment to help in the rebuilding of the country. China’s sending of civilian
police to East Timor proved an effective contribution to the maintenance of security and nation-building
there. China could—and should—contribute in these tangible ways, as a concrete expression of its
international responsibilities as a major world power and member of the U.N. Security Council.
Despite these insufficiencies in China’s role in Afghanistan, Beijing helped in other areas noted
above, and has been a positive member of the international coalition against terrorism. Its efforts have been
appreciated and applauded by the United States Government.
9
Ibid.
7
Beyond the war on terrorism, China and the United States have identified similar mutual interests
and policies on a range of crucial security issues:

China insisted on Iraq’s strict compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions mandating its
complete disarmament and destruction of WMD. China chaired the Security Council’s November 8
vote, and voted in favor of Resolution 1441.

China opposes the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, supports a nuclear weaponsfree Korean peninsula, seeks a peaceful resolution of the issue, and is working actively and closely
with the United States and other concerned nations toward these ends.

China opposes the proliferation of nuclear technology for other than peaceful means, as well as the
transfer of missiles, their components, and other means of delivery of WMD. In the fall of 2002,
China for the first time promulgated detailed lists to control the export of these items, as well as
those that can facilitate the manufacture of chemical and biological agents.

China and the United States continue to work together in a range of non-conventional security
issues: fighting organized crime, narcotics trafficking, the smuggling of humans, light weapons,
piracy, etc. The two have also signed and begun to implement bilateral agreements in law
enforcement, maritime security, economic security, and environmental security.

The two nations have resumed a limited range of military exchanges. These include high-level
strategic dialogues, confidence building measures, and defense educational exchanges.

Both governments have professed a desire to work together to ensure regional stability in Northeast
Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.

As China is now a net oil importer and increasingly dependent of imports that flow through the sealanes from the Persian Gulf, it has an increasing stake in the U.S. Navy’s efforts to keep these
strategic arteries open and unencumbered.
In all of these areas, China and the United States share an increasing coincidence of national
security interests. As former President Jiang Zemin stated at the press conference following his October
2002 meeting with President Bush, “Despite the differences of one type or another between China and the
U.S., our two countries have more rather than less common interests, and the prospect of cooperation
between us has become broader rather than narrower.”10 Since coming to office President Bush has visited
China twice, has held three summit meetings with former President Jiang, has met three times with new
President and Communist Party chief Hu Jintao and has invited Hu to visit the United States in his new
capacity in early 2004.
Can the New Stability Last?
Although the Sino-American relationship has experienced newfound stability, there always remains
one central potential problem: Taiwan.
10
Press Conference with President George W. Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, October 25, 2002.
8
So far, the Bush administration has been able to achieve what many previous administrations have
been unable to do: have strong and stable relations with Beijing and Taipei simultaneously. It has been able
to do so by pursuing relations with each on independent tracks, rather than worrying about what a move
towards one will do to the other. By proceeding to stabilize relations with the PRC first, the administration
gained latitude to subsequently strengthen its ties with Taiwan. Ultimately, however, there is a linkage
between the two policy tracks. In particular, in my view, the Bush administration risks a confrontation and
potential deterioration in relations with China if it continues to upgrade military relations and to sell
increased amounts of advanced weapons to Taiwan, and continues permitting senior Taiwan officials to visit
the United States. Also risky is the fact that the Taiwan government continues to probe the possibility of a
visit by President Chen Shui-bian to Washington, and some members of Congress are interested in inviting
him to address a joint session. Such a visit would be a profound affront to China and would likely trigger a
major political crisis in Sino-American relations.
The U.S. also risks a major deterioration in bilateral relations if it proceeds to further link the Taiwan
and American militaries in “joint” ways: i.e., through integrated communications systems, integrated
command and control, integrated intelligence, joint force planning, joint logistics, joint training, or joint
exercises. Any or all of these acts would, in the eyes of Beijing, reconstitute the military alliance with Taiwan
that the U.S. terminated in 1979, as a condition for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC.
It is one thing to sell weapons to Taiwan—which Beijing does not like but has to tolerate—but it is quite
another to integrate the two militaries.
The arms buildup on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is also dangerous and destabilizing. An actionreaction arms race dynamic has developed in the last few years—with Beijing buying specific weapons from
Russia to counter those sold by the United States to Taiwan, while the U.S. selects weapons for sale to the
island specifically designed to counter those sold by Russia to China. This escalatory dynamic is both costly
and risky.
While the Taiwan issue has real potential to upset the current stasis in Sino-American relations, the
current stability is reason for cautious optimism. There will also be other irritants, including human rights
and trade, but these issues should be manageable. Neither country needs or seeks a deterioration of relations
or a return to the roller coaster of the 1990s. Indeed, both are otherwise preoccupied. The United States
and China have much that bind their two nations together and there are tangible reasons why both
governments have worked to stabilize their relations over the past two years. With nearly $120 billion in
two-way trade and burgeoning U.S. investment in China, each is of enormous economic importance to the
other: China is now America’s fourth largest trading partner, while the U.S. is the third largest for China.
Lessons Learned
These factors and chain of events suggest several conclusions and lessons to be learned about
factors that contribute to a stable and productive U.S.-China relationship:
9
1. The current positive relations between the United States and China were not precipitated solely by
9/11 and cooperation in the war on terrorism. While such cooperation has helped to energize the
relationship, factors internal to each nation were the primary source of improved relations. Thus, although
there has been an increasing convergence of strategic interests on the part of both leaderships, the
rapprochement cannot be satisfactorily explained by this factor alone. A variety of economic and political
factors exert a strong underlying influence to forge strong and stable relations, and this situation seems likely
to persist.
2. Despite the role of internal factors, the Sino-American relationship functions best when there is
an international basis to it. That is, when the two governments share an essentially common agenda in their
respective foreign policies, and are able to coordinate and reinforce each other in the international arena.
3. The relationship also works best when the two governments recognize, and do not infringe upon,
the core interests of each other. For the United States, this means that China does not challenge in word or
deed the primary U.S. position in global and Asian regional affairs, and does not threaten or use force against
Taiwan. For China, this means that the United States does not challenge or seek to undermine the position
of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, and that the U.S. maintains verbal and practical fidelity to the “one
China” policy with respect to Taiwan. It is also important that the U.S. Government show appropriate
respect for China and its leaders.
4. Constancy in strategy and active management of bilateral relations matter a great deal. Broadly
institutionalized and regular contact between leaders and bureaucracies in both systems is essential. Discreet
consultations between the two governments are important—both before actions are taken (particularly by
the U.S.), and subsequent debriefings following such high-level meetings with important third parties.
5. Mishandling the Taiwan issue can result in catastrophe. Both sides must tread carefully with full
cognizance of the other’s bottom lines and “redlines,” and both must exhibit sensitivity to the other’s
interests and domestic pressures.
The full potential of stable, productive relations can only be tapped in the absence of major tensions
or confrontation between the two nations. It is not preordained that the United States and China become
adversaries. If wisely managed by both sides, and respecting—rather than provoking—the key sensitivities
of the other, then the new stability in Sino-American relations seems likely to endure for some time.
10