CSC 774 Advanced Network Security Enhancing Source-Location Privacy in Sensor Brian Rogers

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Computer Science

CSC 774 Advanced Network Security

Enhancing Source-Location Privacy in Sensor

Network Routing (ICDCS ’05)

Brian Rogers

Nov. 21, 2005

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Introduction and Motivation

• Major challenge to deployment of sensor networks is privacy

• Two types of privacy

– Content-oriented privacy (e.g. packet data)

– Contextual privacy (e.g. source location of packet)

• Important use of future sensor network applications is asset monitoring

– Source-location privacy is critical

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Example Scenario

source

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Outline

• Panda-Hunter Game

• Formal & Simulation Models

• Baseline Routing

• Routing with Fake Sources

Phantom Routing

• Privacy for Mobile Sources

• Conclusions & Future Work

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Panda-Hunter Game

• Once panda is detected, source periodically sends data to sink through multi-hop routing

• Assume single panda, source, and sink

• Attacker:

– Non-malicious

– Device-Rich

– Resource-Rich

– Informed

• Privacy cautious routing technique prevents hunter from locating source

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Formal Model

• Asset monitoring network: sixtuple (

N, S, A, R, H, M)

N = set of sensor nodes

– S = network sink

– A = asset being monitored

R = routing policy of sensors to protect asset

H = hunter with movement rules M to capture asset

• Two privacy metrics for a routing strategy

R

– Φ = safety period of an R given M

L = capture likelihood of R given M

• Network performance

– Energy Consumption (# messages sent)

– Delivery Quality (avg. msg. latency, delivery ratio)

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Simulation Model

N = 10,000 nodes

• Panda appears at random location, and closest sensor periodically sends packets to the sink

• Simulation ends if hunter gets close to panda

(i.e. within Δ hops) or hunter fails to catch panda within a threshold time

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Baseline Routing Techniques

• Two most popular routing techniques for sensor networks

– Flood-based Routing

• Source node forwards packets to all neighbors

• When a neighbor receives a packet, if it has not already seen this packet, it forwards the packet to all its neighbors with probability P forward

– Single-path (Shortest-path) Routing

• Initial configuration phase sets up lists at sensor nodes so each node knows which neighbor is on the shortest path to the sink

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Patient Adversary Model

• Hunter starts at sink

• When hunter hears a message, it moves to the message’s immediate sender

• Process repeats until hunter reaches source

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Baseline Routing Performance

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Baseline Routing Performance (2)

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Routing with Fake Sources

• Flooding and single-path routing have poor source-privacy:

– Add fake sources to inject fake packets

– Lead hunter away from real source

• Two Issues

– How to choose the fake source?

– How often to inject fake packets?

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Routing with Fake Sources (2)

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Routing with Fake Sources (3)

• Fake sources still not enough

• Smarter Adversary can detect zigzag pattern

• Pick one of the two directions and follow to the source

• If this is not the real source, backtrack to reach the other source

Fake messaging increases energy cost for little increase in source-location privacy

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Phantom Routing

• Problem with baseline and fake messaging techniques:

– Sources provide a fixed route so adversary can trace each route

• Goal of phantom routing:

– Direct hunter away from source to phantom source

• Two Phases

– Random walk : direct msg. to phantom source

– Flooding/single-path routing: direct msg. to sink

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Phantom Routing (2)

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Phantom Routing (3)

• Random Walk Phase

– Source-location privacy depends on phantom source being far from real source after h walk

• True Random Walk hops

– Not good: Message tends to hover around real source

– Proof in paper using central limit theorem

• Directed Random Walk

– Sector-based: Each node knows east/west

– Hop-based: Each node knows toward/away from source

– Pick one direction randomly and each node during random walk sends the msg. to another node in that direction

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Phantom Routing (4)

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Phantom Routing (5)

• New adversary: Cautious Adversary Model

– Since hunter may be stranded far from true source and not hear any messages for some time

– If no message heard for some time interval, backtrack one step and wait again

• Results worse for cautious adversary, so it is better for hunter to be patient and wait for messages to arrive

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Privacy for Mobile Sources

• How does source location privacy change if asset is mobile (e.g. panda walks around)

• Tests using a simple movement pattern:

• α: governs direction

• δ: stay time at each location

• d : distance of each movement

T: reporting interval

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Privacy for Mobile Sources

• Impact of panda’s velocity

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Privacy for Mobile Sources

• Impact of hunter’s hearing range

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Conclusions & Future Work

• Conclusions

– Flooding and single-path routing have poor source location privacy

– Phantom routing can be used with either routing protocol to greatly enhance privacy at a small cost of communication overhead

• Future Work

– Authors: Investigate stronger adversarial models and multiple asset tracking scenarios

– Multiple hunters: Could they collude to find panda faster

– Multiple sinks: Sensors transmit to randomly chosen sink

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