Wichita State University Libraries SOAR: Shocker Open Access Repository
advertisement
Wichita State University Libraries SOAR: Shocker Open Access Repository Robert Feleppa Philosophy Emics, Etics, and Social Objectivity Robert Feleppa Wichita State University, robert.feleppa@wichita.edu __________________________________________________________________ Recommended citation Feleppa, Robert. 1986. Emics, Etics, and Social Objectivity. Current Anthropology, 27(3), pp. 243-255. This paper is posted in Shocker Open Access Repository http://soar.wichita.edu/dspace/handle/10057/3457 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 27, No. 3, June 1986 ( 1986 by The Wenner-GrenFoundationforAnthropological Research,all rightsreserved0011-320418612703-0003$2 00 Emics, Etics, and Social Objectivity byRobertFeleppa THAT ETHNOCENTRISM is incompatiblewith objectivity, anthropologists tryto purgetheirmethodologies of elementsthat will yield imposed conceptionsinstead of the culturalitemsit is theirostensibletask to discover. Consequently,emphasisis oftenput on formsof qualitativeanalysis designedto revealsubjectconceptions,feelings,motives,etc., so as to avoid thesuppressionofculture-specific particularities that can result from effortsto subsume social phenomena underscientific law. Advocatesof"emic"analysisseek a form of understanding thatis, to some extent,like thatwhichsubjects have ofthemselvesand theirworld.Inquirerviewpoints, theyargue,mustbe circumscribed in efforts to discoverother viewpointsembodied in diverseculturalbackgrounds.They are thuswaryof excessiverelianceon "etic" analysis-given, roughly,in termsof inquirers'importedconceptions. The typicalattitudeunderlyingemic analysisis Weberian: emicsshouldcomplementetics,theidea beingthatanthropology seeks to unifyemic perspectivesinto a systematic,comparativetheoryofculturebased in largeparton etictheoretical notions.Yet some view emicsand eticsas innatelyconflicting and emphasizeone to theexclusionoftheother:someminimize or ignoreemicanalysisin thebeliefthatit inhibitsthedevelopment of a systematicculturetheory,while otherswillingly sacrificetheory for emic understandingof the culturally specific. is attracThe idea thatemics and etics are complementary thatextremists see is notwithout tive,but theincompatibility basis. Moreover,I shall arguethatit is impossibleto "purify" even the emic componentof all formsof imposition.While sympathetic to efforts to combineeticsand emics,I thinkthat to be attainable the aims of emic analysis must be reconsidered.It is particularlyimportantthat we confrontW. V. Quine's idea of the indeterminacy of translation,whichlends strongsupportto etic extremismby showinghow pervasive IN THE BELIEF imposition is. Reconcilingobserverinterestsand objectivityis a matterof long-standing controversy in social theoryand is by no means limitedto theetics/emics problem.Its solutionrestslargelyon the resolutionof centralproblemsin anthropology concerning the natureof cultureand the methodologicalcharacterof the discipline.Moreover,itpresupposessolutionsto stillmoregeneral problemsofmeaning,reference, truth,and rationality (see Bernstein1983 on the confluenceof diverseliteratures on imposition/objectivity issues). Ratherthantake thisall on here,I will tailormy discussionto relevantspecifics. Ethnographyand ethnologyrequireadequate conceptsand unitsof analysis,and theproblemof unitidentification ranges fromthevery"culture-bearing unit"itself(Naroll 1964:283)on down. For some, anthropology's comparativeaims motivate emic analysis. Kay (1970:23) argues that "one has to isolate comparableunits beforeone can engage in reasonablecomparison. Hence the emphasis in ethnoscienceon emics, so called, theanalysisofa culturalsystemor subsystemin itsown termsas a preconditionto the comparisonof different systems."But thisconcerncutsbothways. If intercultural variation is manifestin unitsof comparison,statisticaland other comparativeresultsmay be compromised,thusgivingreason to avoid use of emiclydefinednotions. We should expect the foundationalnature of emics/etics questionsto issue in theincommensurability problemofwhich Thomas Kuhn has warnedus. Thus I will sortout somevariationsin usage of"etic"and "emic"and thekeypointsofdispute thatunderliethem.I do not attemptto give a comprehensive surveyoftheliterature(indeed,save forHarris'scontroversial 1976work,noneseemsto exist[Fisherand Werner1978:197]). Nor do I intendto beg anyoftheincommensurability questions raised by Kuhn (who, as I thinkBernstein[1983:84]correctly argues,does not intendto cut offrationaldiscussionin interparadigmaticcontroversies). ETICS AND EMICS ROBERTFELEPPAis AssistantProfessorof Philosophyat Wichita StateUniversity (Wichita,Kans. 67208, U.S.A.). Bornin 1946,he was educated at H. H. Lehman College, City Universityof New York (B.A., 1973)and at WashingtonUniversity, St. Louis (M.A., 1977; Ph.D., 1978).He has been a visitingassistantprofessor at the ofMinnesota-Morris.His researchinterests are thephiUniversity losophyof social science and of language and social and political philosophy.His publicationsinclude"HermeneuticInterpretation and Scientific Truth"(PhilosophyoftheSocial Sciences 11:53-64), "Translationas Rule-governedBehaviour"(PhilosophyoftheSocial Sciences 12:1-31), "Kuhn, Popper,and the NormativeProblem of Demarcation,"in Philosophyof Science and the Occult, edited by PatrickGrim (Albany: State Universityof New York Press, 1982), and "On ReproducingSocial Reality: A Reply to Harrison"(Philosophyof the Social Sciences 16[1]). The present paper was submittedin finalform14 VIII 85. Vol. 27 * No. 3 * June 1986 In the sense derivedby Pike fromthe phonetic-phonemic distinction,emicanalysisis simplya methodofdetermining symbolic significance by elicitationto determinecomplementarity and contrast.The idea is thatjust as phonemescan be determined by systematically varyingphoneticfeaturesof an expressionin conjunctionwithqueriesto subjectsregardingresultantchangesin meaning,so the definingcriteriaforsome thingcan be determinedby systematicqueryingto reveal the propertiesthat cannot be removedfromit withoutchanging the meaningof the expressiondesignatingit. Etic notions,on theotherhand, involveonlytheinterpreter's importedconceptual apparatus, just as recognitionof phoneticcontrastsinvolves only the conceptionsand measuringtechniquesof the 243 phonologist.Phonemiccontrastis describedusinga phonetic metalanguage,and this,some contend,bears out the general interdependenceof emics and etics (Frake 1962:76; Goodenough 1964:37). However, thismethodologicalconceptionof the contrastis notpredominant.For one thing,emic analysishas ramifiedin a varietyof ways, notablyin the widelyemployedmethodof componentialanalysisand in the frameanalysesemployedin viewedbysomeas entailedby ethnoscience.Also, a distinction themethodological contrasthas cometo defineit,namely,that valid, emicswiththe eticsis boundup withthecross-culturally culturallyspecific.Further,emicanalysishas cometo be identifiedin termsof the adoptionof subjects'viewpointsby anthropologists(see, e.g., Goodenough 1970:109-10; Harris 1968:571; Frake 1962:76; Keesing 1972:303). These latter sensesof the contrasthave becomelargelydivorcedfromthat specificto the phonologicalmodel. Emic analysisis typically emphasizedby inquirerswho view themselvesas part of the Boasian traditionin anthropology, guidedbyconcernsto avoid excessivelymoldinginquiryin termsof preconceived,"Western" notions.Thus Boas (1943:311) remarksthat"if it is our seriouspurpose to understandthe thoughtsof a people, the whole analysisof experiencemustbe based on theirconcepts, notours." In Pike's (1964:55) own terms,"theemicanalysisof theemic unitsof humanbehaviormustanalyzethatbehavior in that in reference to themannerin whichnativeparticipants behavior react to their own behavior and to the behavior of their colleagues." As Kay (1970:23) argues, "The very provenienceof the emic/eticdistinction,namelyphonology, shouldmake clear thatthe guidingspiritof an emic approach so is to ridoneselfofpreconceptions about universalstructures that the data may be analyzed objectivelyto reveal the true universalstructures." At times"emic" is applied to the social phenomenathemselvesratherthanthemethodsfortheiranalysisand therefore equated with "untranslatable"(e.g., Triandis 1976:229-30). hingeson accuHowever,thetypicalview is thatethnography rate descriptionof emic phenomena.That is, while cultural is typicallynotuniversallyshared,itis regardedas significance potentially,and necessarily,sharable. Adoptionofthesubject'spointofview is sometimestakento mean the actual sharingof particularconceptsand rules by inquirerand subject-as is manifest,forinstance,in Goodenough'seffortsin his studyof the Trukese to use what he takes to be the fundamental"emic primitive"of the corporation (whichconcepthe claims combineselementsof property ownershipand kinshipin ways specificto theirculture).He stressescomplementarity, arguingthatemic notions,once incorporatedin theethnographic descriptiveapparatusforsome culture,becomepartof an "etic kit"usable by otherinquirers (1951; 1970:esp.70-72, 108-12; cf.Oliver 1955). Exactlywhat concept sharing entails is not clear; at times Goodenough speaks as iftherewere conceptualidentitybetweenhis ethnographic termsand Trukese terms,while at othertimes he "in terms descriptions speaks moreguardedly,e.g., ofdefining ofwhatevercriteriaenabled me to distinguish amongtheentitlementsand transactionsin a mannerconsistentwiththedistinctionsthe people of Truk seemedto be making"(1970:79, myemphasis).This may explainhow it is thathe stressesthe values of emic/etic analysisand theneed to generateresultsin componentialanalysisthathave "cognitivevalidity"or "psychologicalreality"while nonethelessviewingthe components of kinship as etic (and perhaps lacking source-language counterparts).These conceptsenable inquirersto use sourcelanguagetermscorrectly-i.e., as the subjectsdo. in many There are also significant mentalisticcommitments emic-oriented methodologies(not manifestin earlieremic approaches, as Burling [1969] and Durbin [1972] point out). Goodenough'sworkexhibitsthese,thoughagain claimsto analyze cultureconstruedas "theformof thingsthatpeople have 244 in mind,theirmodelsforperceiving,relating,and otherwise interpreting them"alternatewithmoreguardedaims, e.g., to probe"what,forlack of a betterterm,we mustcall theminds ofourfellowmen"(1964:36,39). Also, theunconsciousas well as theconsciousmindis emphasizedin ethnoscienceand other Boasian approaches. This is manifestperhaps in Goodenough'sreferenceto componentialconceptsforwhich there are no source-languageanalogues and is clearerin the work of other writers.For instance, Fisher and Werner (1978: 200) cite the phonologicalrootsof the etics/emics distinction to arguethatjust as "the phonemicattitude"is detectable"in the unguarded speech judgments of naive speakers who have a completecontrolof theirlanguagein a practicalsense but have no rationalizedconsciouslysystematicknowledgeof it," so emicsmustgo beyondwhat subjectssay or consciously think (cf. Sapir 1949:47). Indeed, for all his admonitions againstimposition,Boas, in emphasizingthefundamental role oflinguisticstructurein cultureand in notingtheunconscious nature of the laws governingspeech behavior in primitive societies,laid thegroundwork foremphasison theunconscious by others-notablySapir, whomFisherand Wernercitehere. However, otheremic focal pointshave emerged,some in reactionto the formalismand mentalismof earlierethnoscience-the concernbeingthattheseelementsmightreintroduce theveryimpositionproblemsaboutwhichBoas, Sapir,Whorf, and othersworriedand whoseavoidanceseemedone ofthekey motivationsforemic analysisin the firstplace. For example, Frake (1977) warnsabout thedangersof excessiverigorin the "elicitingframes"used in recentfieldwork.He views these oftenelaboratequestionsetsas blindinginquirersto thesocial contextthat gives significanceto questionsand answers,as well as encouraging"platonistic"attribution ofalien,rigidformal structureto social realitiesthat are less structuredand morefluid.He favorsa moreflexibledramaturgicalanalysis which minimizesthe importof predeterminedstructurein questionframesand supplantsemphasison elicitationor proddingwithconcernsto find"query-rich settings"whichgenerate emiclysignificant questionsets and unitsof contextspecification(cf. Geertz1976). Similarconcernsmotivateproponents of morerecentlyflourishing schoolsof sociolinguistics and symbolic anthropology. (Indeed, Frake and othershave developed strongmisgivingsabout the very employmentof the terms "etic" and "emic": Geertz[1976], forexample,opts to define the contrastas "experience-near" and "experience-distant.") Some of these difficulties are discussedby Watson (1981), who criticizesetic psychological-conflict models, which he himselfhas employed,forrelyingon alien psychoanalytic categoriesand emphasizingunconsciousmotivationin a way that led himto overlooktheconsciousand positivestrategiesofhis (Guajiro) subjectsin adaptingto urbanlife.His eticmodel,he argues(pp. 453, 458), depictedthemas "helplessor incompetent," passively and "automatically"reactingto conditions definedin (etic)termsthatwerealien to them.His latermodel reveals,he claims,thatwhathe earliertookto be simplya poor of the city(Maracaibo) insteadreflected understanding differingloci ofidentification, namely,thevariousneighborhoods in whichtheylived. Also, he contendsthatemicanalysisshowed himthepositiveaspectsoftheirtribalbackgroundin providing stabilizingreferencepoints, while his earliermodel showed the backgroundonly as obstructiveto adaptation. His emic methodologyanalyzes "spontaneouslyrecalledpersonaldata" providedin his subjects' answers "to open-endedquestions thatdid not call foran organizationof a responsebeyondthe subject's immediateand authenticinterestsand orientation" (p. 465). Anotherimportantpointof dispute,and the one thatis my primaryconcernhere,is themethodological roleofemicanalysis-something whichis centralto the controversy surroundingtheworkofMarvinHarris.Harrispropoundsa materialist strategythat emphasizeseconomicand biologicalfactorsand CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY features stifling reactsto whathe perceivesas thetheoretically of "idealistic"approaches. He is as criticalof consciousas of unconsciousmentalisms,and thus manyof his criticismsare as theyare at ethnoscience. aimed as much at structuralism Also, whilemuchof his concernis withthe ontologicalstatus of mental entities(conscious or unconscious)and the epistemologicalbarrierstheirprivacyengenders,his main objecto make translationand emicconceptuse tionsconcernefforts (Thus it is thathe groups aspectsofethnography. fundamental such as Hymesunderthebroad "idealist"rubric sociolinguists as well.) He reliesminimallyon emicdata, oftenusingthemin (roughlyin Marx's sense) measuringlevels of "mystification" in the cultures he studies (1968:chaps. 16-18, 20; 1976; 1979:chaps.1 [esp. pp. 32-45], 7, 9). Divergencesof usage abound in this controversy.Harris wishesto divorcethe emic fromthe mentaland thus defines the emics/etics contrastin termsof the "locus of reality"of conceptsand claims. Emic notionsare thoseabout whichthe subject is the final arbiterand which are such as must be determined by elicitation; etic notions are ones whose is dictatedby the inquirer.If elicitationindiappropriateness cates thata subject employsa termthattranslatesinto some or metalanguageexpression,thatexpressionis target-language emic.Thus he objectsto Goodenough'sidea thatemicconcepts feedtheetickit,becomingeticsimplybecause theyare or may be cross-culturally instantiated.Notionsthatare real forsubjects, he contends,are emiceven iftheyrecurcross-culturally. He also insists,in distinctcontrastto Fisherand Werner,that vehicles.Withsuch emicnotionshave explicitsource-language ofmisuseof variationsgo frequentchargesand countercharges "emics"and "etics"(Harris 1976: 343; 1979:39-45; Fisherand Werner1978:200;Goodenough1970:113-14). Feleppa: EMICS, ETICS, AND OBJECTIVITY These latterpointsare emphasizedbyanotherculturalmaterialist,Marano (1982), who arguesthatthewindigo(or witiko) psychosis-an inexplicablecravingby membersof certainAlgonkiantribesforhuman flesh-results froma confusionof certainetic psychologicalcategories,such as "obsessivecannibalisticcompulsion,"with the windigo concept. Manifest strategies,he argues, also here,and paralleledin structuralist is a tendencyto ignoredata and "to overpowera verypoorly known Witiko phenomenonwith our own intellectualcreations" (pp. 394-95). Thus concernswith impositionof the familiarseemto motivatemembersofbothidealistand materialist camps. Watson, evidentlyan "idealist"(despitethe fact thathe citesHarrisin his initialdiscussionofeticsand emics), views the drawbacks of psychoanalyticcategorizationas an argumentin favorof emics over etics (and one would expect Frake to be in agreementon this), while Marano perceives themas bolsteringan etic orientation. of In contrast,Fisher and Wernersee Harris's restriction emics to consciouscognitionas intimatelyrelatedto his tendescriptivist dencyto tie idealistemics to the antitheoretical traditiontheyreject(1978:200;cf. Kay 1970:23-24). They add that Harris's effortsto oppose etics and emics-by in effect equatingthe latterwith"the confused"-preventsthemfrom productivecomplements(1978:203-4; cf. being theoretically Harris 1975:160-61; 1968:578).Moreover,theyview Harris's ofsubject own aim ofmeasuringthefunctionand mystification ideologiesas compromisedby his excessiveconcernwithpredictionof behavior(p. 204). In a relatedvein, Kay (1970:2829), in explicitcontrastto Harris,stressesthepredictivepower successfulstatisticalstudy ofethnoscience, citinga predictively of decisionmakingand residenceby Geoghegan(1969). However,Harris,in bothhis 1968 (whichthesecriticsaddress)and IMPOSITION AND PRAGMATIC CRITERIA his 1979 work, stressesthe need foretic unitshere to avoid OF ADEQUACY variationsin units, unwantedinterpersonaland intercultural orpointingto the unitsof residencestudies(e.g., community The main issue is Harris'semphaticdenial thatemics should ganization,familyorganization,maritalresidence)as particuintendforit (1979:32; play thecentralrolethatethnoscientists confusions(1979:49). larlyproneto emic/etic cf. 41): heremaystemonlyfromHarris's Some ofthedisagreement refusalto allow an emicnotionto becomean eticone simplyin The testof theadequacyof eticaccountsis simplytheirabilityto theories aboutthecausesofsociocul- virtueof its cross-cultural scientifically productive generate instantiation.However, his critics thatare Rather thanemploy concepts turaldifferences andsimilarities. are concernedwith the foundationalemphasishe gives etics from thenativepointof andappropriate real,meaningful, necessarily (whichFisherand Wernerview as tantamountto the"emicsof from scientific andrulesderived is freetousealiencategories view,theobserver observers"[p. 202n]),and the veryappeal he makes thedatalanguageofscience. hereto pragmaticconsiderationsmay be the deepersourceof tension In keepingwith the spiritof this passage, Harris criticizes the problemstheyperceive.There seems a significant betweenefforts to predictin termsof observercategoriesand idealistemicson pragmaticgrounds,citinga rangeofwhat he desiresto reveal culturalcontent.Fisher and Wernerthemtendencies,e.g., takesto be innateatheoreticand antitheoretic in criticizingHarris,but selves stresstheoreticalproductivity theintroduction ofinflexibility bylimitingtheanalyst'sfundof partlyin termsof cognitiveyield. theymeasureproductivity basic organizingprinciples,the trivializationof research,and the confusionof etic and emic categories.This latterflaw,he They worrythatHarris may leave us withouta warrantable effortsat quantita- account of subject beliefsand conceptions(1978:205-8). In argues, leads to failureof ethnoscientific a wholesale,ethnocentric tive analysis,to compromiseof inquirers'criticalperspectives theirview, Harris'seticsperpetrates impositionof the conceptionsof Westernscience which obacceptance of subject accounts, and to throughunreflective scuresratherthan reveals social reality(p. 204n). impositionon subjects,underthe guise of emic categories,of However, if the impositionimplicitin Harris's pragmatic what are reallyalien, etic notions.These pointsare salientin his critiquesof cognitivistand structuralist emphasison the appeals is theproblem,it is notone thatidealistseasilyescape. Althoughsome may view emic analysis(givenits presupposiunconscious.1 imposition, tionof accuratetranslation)as freeof interpreter ifit presumesthat for is the basis this faith especially unclear, emicsin termsof contras1 Harrisis also criticizedfornot defining it is possible to mirrorthe semantic-culturalsubstratum. tive relationshipswithin the cultural-linguisticcontext (Durbin 1972:385;cf.Harris 1976:341-42).But hisstresson theepistemological Fisherand Werner(1978:201) quote Campbell (1975:1120)as follows: "All scientificknowing is indirect, presumptive, thrustof Pike's work, viz., on who is the finaljudge of appropriateness,ratherthan on the contrastivemethoditselffitsinto general at best.The language corroborated obliquelyand incompletely trends,alreadynoted,in theliterature.He is also criticized,indeed,for of scienceis subjective,provincial,approximative,and metaofemicsdoes not sailingtoo close to theidealistwind,as his definition phoric,neverthelanguageofrealityitself."However,a quesconformto Bloomfield'sbehavioristphonemicsand relatednoncognimaybe operativehere,one that tionablenotionof"objectivity" tivenotionsofemics(Burling1969:826n).However,I thinktheterms has been criticizedby manyauthorsfromHegel to Kuhn and bestilluminatemykeyconcerns controversy oftheidealist/materialist Gadamer. here. Vol. 27 - No. 3 * June 1986 245 In particular,this citationis reminiscentof what Rudner (1973:126-27) calls the "reproductivefallacy,"assumingthat "thefunctionofscienceis to reproducereality"-a fallacypresupposed, he contends,by thinkers(he here criticizesPeter in thefactthat"science Winch)who see intrinsicshortcomings distortsthroughabstractionfrom physical reality"(cf. his 1966: chap. 4 and Winch 1958). CharacterizingWinch's view-in termsthat make clear its kinshipto some of the viewsI discussedearlier-as that"theonlyway in whichsuch a social scienceinvestigation can achieveunderstanding is via the adoptionby the social scientistof the teleologyof the observed,"Rudnerarguesthatthisis to insistthatsocial inquiry give "a reproductionof the conditionit investigates."Citing Einstein(froma similarcontext)to theeffectthata soup recipe need not taste like soup, he argues that Winch places social inquirersin an untenable position analogous to that of a meteorologist whose accounts of tornadoesmustactuallyre- blocks in multiplesof ounces." He asks how it could be that in theircapacityas linguistictools do not "kin terminologies similarly'fit'the realitytheyare used to describe." Related are problemsforCaws's pragmaticrenderingof structuralism raisedby Hanson (1976), who sees thefollowingabsurdimplicationsin Caws's view: (1) kinshipsystemsmightpossessproperties,such as a skewingeffectin cross-cousinterms,that identicalbut unanalyzedsystemsdid not;(2) misdescribedsystems would possess structurestheydid not reallyhave; and (3) analyticmodels would exist prior to the structuresthey described.He argues(p.324) thatinquirersdo notconferstructuresbut giveformulations ofstructures-whichhave "objecofusage bynativespeakers"and tiveexistencein theregularity existpriorto formulation by inquirers.(His emphasison the attitude behaviorallevel relatesalso to a ratherunsympathetic towardmentalismand towardtheemic focusof ethnoscience; see Hanson and Martin 1973:205-6.) 1963:207).Why mustsocial descriptionsreproducewhat they describewhen othertypes(scientificor otherwise)need not? Rudnerexplicitlychallengesonlytheidea thatreproductive understanding is necessaryforadequate social description, but he leaves one withdoubtsas to its verypossibility.It may be wiserto seek a notionof emics thatacknowledgesthe role of observerinterests,and, indeed, a numberof anthropologists have pursuedthisline of reasoning. One such line of argumentis affordedby thefactthatemic analysishas not always been tied to mentalisticaims. For instance,Burling(1964) counselscontinueduse ofcomponential ofadeanalysiswithoutmaking"cognitivevalidity"a criterion quacy; instead he prefersthat componentialconstructsbe grantedfictionalstatus, as existingin inquirers'heads only. Others have applied pragmaticcriteriain redefiningrather than rejectingcognitivistaims. In a recentdiscussionof relativism and comparativismin psychologicalanthropology, Kiefer(1977:107) argues (in notable contrastto Winch) that determinations of similarityand differencein cross-cultural conceptidentification, as well as criteriaof explanatoryadequacy, are dependenton observerinterestsand not"given"in social phenomena.Similarsentimentsemergein a reviewof anthropological studiesof cognitionby Ember(1977), who arguesforcomparativism overdescriptivism on relatedgrounds. These reviewerspreferto replaceempiricallypriormetaphysical thesessupportingbothviewpoints-to theeffectthatculturesare or are notuniquein certainrespects-by moreempiricallyopen ones. A similarpragmatismwithregardto structuralist analysisis offered byCaws (1974),who contendsthatinquirers'"explanatorymodels"need notbe identicalwiththoseoftheirsubjects, arguing,indeed,that"it is thescientist'srepresentational (i.e., to accountforthe explanatory)model,thetheoryhe constructs data and theirinterrelation, on thatconfersobjectivestructure thesystem."He highlights "confer,"claimingthat"itwould be quite accurate to say that until the explanatorymodel was constructedthe systemhad no objectivestructure" (p. 7). Arguingthatdirectionalrelationssuchas "northof" are objective mattersoffacteven thoughtheydo notexistuntila directional gridis imposedon nature,he contendsthatsimilarlythetranslationof source-languagestringsas "northof" producessomethingobjectivelyattributableto subjects-and likewise,generally, for social relations. Similarly,Wallace (1970:152) counsels "that kinshipterminologies may only be reckoning devices, like systemsof weightsand measures,whose utility dependsmoreon internalcoherencethanon theirfitwiththe social system." There are, however,notable objectionsto theseattitudes. Brown(1974a:429)takesWallace to task,arguing:"Systemsof weightsand measures,like all tools,are designedto meetcertain requirements extraneousto theirown internallogic. One would not . . . weighlettersinifractionsof tons,norconcrete THE INDETERMINACY produce them (1973:127-28; 246 cf. Dennett 1978:191; White OF TRANSLATION underdetermiFisherand Werner(1978:207) see a significant theoryby observation,quotingPopper nationof ethnographic (1961:423)to the effectthat"almosteverystatementwe make transcendsexperience. . . we are theorizingall the time." They view this as indicatinga weakness in Harris's emphasison efforts to delveinto(perhaps predictability and as necessitating unconscious)cognition.However, it seemsthattheymustacof the anthropoloknowledgethe similarunderdetermination gist'stheoryof the "conceptualmodels"of social subjectsthat moves Goodenough(1964:36) to remarkthatbeyondobservationalstrategies,one "dependslargelyon theaestheticcriteria to which scientistsand mathematicianscustomarilyreferby the term'elegance.' " Yet theseelementsexacerbateconcernsthatimpositionwill compromiseobjectivity.Goodenough'srelianceon formalcriteriagivesfactors"internal"to theanthropological community a constitutive But whyis thisvariinfluenceon ethnography. etyofimpositionany moreacceptablethanothers?Emic analystsrest a lot on translation-but can it reliablyprovidea checkagainst"excessive"appeal to thoseinterests? Thereis a deep tensionhere(a speciesofwhatKuhncalls the "essentialtension"betweenscience'simpositionofstructure on realityand its aim to reveal objectivetruthabout it, but the differentia of thisspeciesfromnaturalscienceare significant). It is best considered,I believe,in termsof Quine's idea of the indeterminacy of translation(1960: chap. 2; cf. 1970b,1981a). This is but one of several attacks by Quine and otherson traditionaland recenttheoriesofmeaning,but it is of particular interestherein thatit comprisesan extendedanthropological example designedto show translation'sontologicallimits-limits whichstemfromthefailureofobservationalone to reveal meaningand culture. At theheartofthisaccountis thefollowingwidelydiscussed If it is compatiblewithbehavioralevidence,a linillustration: guist will be correctin translatinga source-languageterm concretecount-noun gavagai as the Englishreceptor-language "rabbit"on thebasis of theequivalenceofstimulusconditions foraffirmation and denial ofthesentencesGavagai and "Lo, a rabbit." However, nothingin this behavioral evidence preof divergentgrammarsto source-languagecludes attribution speakerswhich producetranslationsof gavagai as a concrete ofthese an abstractterm,etc.; onlythefamiliarity mass-term, grammaticalnotions(or, what amountsto thesame thing,the of a physical-objectontology)to the ethnographic familiarity audience supportsthe choice. But thusmaximizingthefamiliarityof the subjects' conceptualscheme (withinevidential constraints), Quine (1960:72) argues,givesno basis forclaims to having discoveredhow theyrefer,forto do thisis to "impute our sense of linguisticanalogyunverifiably to the native mind." CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Actually,thisexampleonlyestablishestheindeterminacy (or what Quine calls the "inscrutability") of termreferenceand termsense,but it gives a good idea of thepatternof themore generalargument(againstsentencemeaning).Quine's general pointis that behavioralevidence (even all possiblesuch evidence) leaves linguistsroom for choice among translation manuals.Reason dictatesthatlinguistssettleforthosetranslationmanualsthatseem to workand make forthemostelegant system.One measure of a manual's formaladequacy is its givingtranslationsthat facilitatea manual user's activities, somethingwhich would seem well served by, among other things,employinggrammaticalnotionswhich are as familiar to the user as possible, providedthis does not conflictwith some otherimportantdesideratumsuch as its systematictaxonomizationof linguisticdata. Anotherimportantcriterionof adequacyis thatthemanualtranslatesubjectsas believingtrue what is obvious-the so-calledprincipleof charity.Yet while thereis no good reason to attributeodd thoughempirically adequate grammars,ontologies,beliefs,etc., to the ethnographicsubject,thus maximizingagreementbetweensubject and manual user does not, Quine contends,establishthatthe chosenmanual,as opposedto one ofitsempirically equivalent rivals,expressesthe truthof the matter.The selectionprocedureinvolvesall mannerof projectionsof what is (say, grammatically)familiarto the linguistor to the receptor-languagespeaker. (Quine's main concern is with the familiarityand charityprinciples,ratherthanthesimplicity principle,though see Quine 1961.) The "homewardthrust,"as Quine calls it, of translators' extra-empirical criteriaofvalidationprecludesobjectiverecoveryofthemeaningofsource-language expressions by theirreceptor-language counterparts. In the presentcontext,the point is that quality-identificationsthatdependon translationcannotbe legitimateitemsfor description, whetherformal,quantitative,or otherwise.Emic phenomenaare generallyuntranslatable-where"translation" involvesthe factualrecoveryof meaningand not simplythe facilitationof intercultural interaction.(I say "generally"because Quine does allow fora relativelysmallset ofempirically determinatetranslations.)Typically, meanings and natural synonymy relationsare not properobjects of scientific study. From these reflectionsQuine draws ratherdrastic conseanquences for emic (and, generally,linguistic-oriented) thropology:Except for limitedcases in which observational translationalclaimsare criteriaserveas a basis fortranslation, not warrantablyassertableas true-however reasonablethe criteriafor theirselection-and this indeterminacy compromisestheacceptabilityofanyfurther ethnographic hypotheses that reston them.At one pointQuine quite explicitlydraws this dire anthropologicalconclusion, comfortingthe anwiththesuggestionthat"muchcan be determined thropologist by leavinglanguage alone and observingnon-verbalcustoms and taboos and artifacts,"while limitingthe role of determinatelinguisticdata to providing,perhaps,"a generaland undirectedmeasureof[linguistic]remotenessin thesheerdifficulty of intertranslation" (Quine 1970a:16). This is a ratherheavilyetic view of things,and it is somewhat ironicthat Kay (1970:19) opens one of the defensesof idealistemics we have been consideringby quotingQuine as follows:"The familiarmaterialobjects may not be all thatis real, but theyare admirableexamples." Kay sees in Quine's toleranceof the possibilitythatotherthingsmay existbeside Drawphysicalobjectsan admissionofsemanticdeterminacy. ing the parallel that"the informant's mostcarefulstatements about thenatureof his worldmay not be all theethnographic data, but theyare admirableexamples,"Kay articulatesthe "to discoversome part of followingaim forethnosemantics: the systemof meaningsby whichpeople organizethe world. The goal is the raw cognitionifyou will, but since the major realizationof this cognitionis in the words people speak, semanticsis consideredan integralpart of ethnography"(cf. Vol. 27 *No. 3 *June 1986 Feleppa: EMICS, ETICS, AND OBJECTIVITY Quine 1960:3). Yet Kay emphasizeshere as the basis forethnosciencea pointwhich Quine's various attackson meaning aim to refute;Quine's view is that thereis no underlying semanticfactof thematterto reveal in thestudyof "raw cognition." Contraryto Kay's assumptionof the "psychicunityof mankind"(p. 26) and to Goodenough'sbeliefin theexistenceof subjectmentalmodelsfororganizingexperienceand behavior, Quine sees radical interpersonal variabilityin underlying cognitivestructure, likeningtheconditioning ofindividualsto linguisticuniformity to the shapingof hedges to similarforms. Externaluniformity belies diversityin twigstructure, just as in verbal behavior belies interpersonally uniformity variant learninghistories(Quine 1960:8). Kay and Goodenoughembrace what Quine calls the "museummyth"that thereis in some sense a subsistingrealmof meaningsor ideas thatserves to accountforthefactsofnaturalsynonymy (a thesisto which, indeed, even Harris's emic notionsand strategiessuccumb). And Quine's strategyforshowingthisinvolvesdemonstrating the generalabsence of factualsynonymy relationswhose descriptionwould call forthe positingof meanings. Indeed, it seems to be preciselythe favoredpositionthat Quine gives, as in the remarkcited by Kay, to physicalobjects-or, better,to the physicalsciences as embodyingthe ultimateparametersof belief-that createsthe problemfor translation.Like any empiricalsystematization, translation manuals are underdetermined by theirdata. However, their in a significantsense goes beyond that underdetermination of physicaltheories:different, indeed mutuallyincompatible, translationmanuals can be applied, and hencedifferent belief systemscan be attributed,to some source-languagecommunity,but no discrimination can be made betweenthemanuals on thebasis ofanythingthatphysicaltheorycan say about the arrangementsof microparticlesand other bodies. Translational underdetermination is additional to physicalunderdetermination, but since physicaltheoryis an "ultimateparameter," this takes translationoutside its bounds. There can be factual differences about meaning(or anythingelse) only if there are differencesin physical macro- or microstructure. Thus translationis morethan underdetermined, it is indeterminate:it has no factsto describe.Translatorscan (ofcourse) produce"right"answers,but theygenerallycannotwarrantably say thattheyare true(see Quine 1981a:23; 1981b:98). The common thread of pragmatism notwithstanding, Quine's accountis at odds withpragmatically definedemicsadding to the burdens already imposed by criticssuch as Brown. However, even Brown'sWittgensteinian analysis(see his 1974b, 1976) succumbsto Quine's critique,and even the fictionalism of Burlingis renderedproblematicin thatQuine views the "hocus-pocus"statusof semanticreference as eroding ethnography. IS EMIC ANALYSIS POSSIBLE? Is Quine's indeterminacy thesiscogent?Does it have the full consequencesforlinguisticand cognitiveanthropology thathe claims it has? The firstof thesequestionsis a matterof longstandingcontroversy, and it would be well beyondthescopeof thisessay to tryto resolveit. One centralpointof contention has been whetherQuine succeeds in demonstrating a significant differencebetween the underdetermination of physical theoryby data (whichhe claimsdoes notentailindeterminacy of truth)and indeterminacy of translation.I doubt that he does, since it seems to me that his thesisthat physicsis an ultimateparameterdoes notsufficeto establishindeterminacy. His physicalistthesisamounts,it seems,onlyto theclaim that "nothinghappensin theworld. . withoutsomeredistribution of microphysicalstates,"that is, that thereis factualchange 247 tive,forinstance,in thegenesisand developmentofgrammars and legal codes. (My exemplarsofcodification are presentedin Lewis's [1969] game-theoretic analysis of conventionand in Goodman's[1973]and Rawls's [1971]accounts,respectively, of inductiveand ethicalnorms.)I considertranslationsprescriptive insofaras the patternsof theirjustificationare codificational.That is, muchas dictionariescull rulesofusage, grammar, etc., fromantecedentpracticein the hope of facilitating communicationand otheractivitiesinvolvingthe use of that language, a translationmanual primarilyserves to facilitate coordinationof intercultural activitiesand to expeditesocial inquiryinsofaras it is a special sortof codification thatserves similaraims,onlynow acrossthreefairlydistinctcommunities: the source and receptorcommunitiesand the communityof social inquirers.Enhancedcommunication and relatedinteraction are achieved in both cases. Receptor-language-speakers are enabled to complywith source-languageconventionsin virtueof theircompliancewith the dictatesof a translation manual. The cruxof the difference is this:Translationsare justified insofaras theyremainin what Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium"with an ongoingand changingset of linguisticbehaviors. The rules govern linguisticbehavior, yet sufficiently broad or significantchanges in usage in the source-or the receptor-language community(whetherthroughconsciouseffortsat redefinition or neologismor throughmore unguided linguisticvariation)can forcemodification of the rules. Linguisticrules (includingtranslationalones) typicallyare not measured by theircorrectdescriptionof linguisticbehavior and forthat reason are best not viewed as hypotheses.Also, TRANSLATION AS CODIFICATION translations sharewithrules,and notwithdescriptivehypotheses, the importantlogical featureof being violable without The problemQuine sees foranthropology lies in the factthat " beingtherebyabridged(as opposedto themererefutability-inhe views translationalcorrelationsas "fallen hypotheses. principleone mightdemandofscientific They purportto have warrantedtruthvalue but generallydo hypotheses). This loginotbecause thereis nothingforthemto describe.Theirfailure cal difference parallelstheimportantdifference in themanner in which rules as opposed to hypothesesare validated, and to be premisesforexplanationand predictioneliminatesthem, and any derivativeclaims, fromlegitimatescientificinquiry. thusI am inclinedto treattranslationalcorrelationsas themselves rules, even thoughtheycan be statedas easily in deYet whilefailureofX to do A can mean thatX simplyfails,it can also mean that X's functionis not to do A at all, and I scriptiveas in prescriptive form. believethe latteroptionapplies to translation.That is, much Codificationimprovesthe functioning of an existingset of conventionsbyincreasingthedegreeto whichtheexpectations as Rudnerasks why social inquirymustreproducereality,I of speakersare enhancedand optimalcoordinationequilibria shall ask whytranslationmustdescribeit. achieved.Usersare rationallyjustifiedin followinga manual's formonlyone Hypotheses,laws, and observationstatements translationalprescriptions onlyiftheyare reasonablysurethat component,which I shall call the "descriptive"one, of scientifictheories.There are also rules of inferenceand hywill conformto certainconventions source-language-speakers (whetherexplicitlyacknowledgedor not) in such a way as to which pothesisacceptance,as well as theoreticaldefinitions, fulfilltheirexpectations.The importantdifference make up the "prescriptive"componentof theories;2and alis thatthe conventionsthat source-language-speakers thoughtheadequacy oftheseelementsstillhingesin largepart followare clearly on the empiricalsuccess of theories,theyare not "confirmed" notthetranslationalrulesthatmanual usersfollow.Assuming forthesake ofargumentthatthesourcecommunity in thewaysthatdescriptiveitemsare. Theirrelationship to the has a fairly I suggestthatwe well-codified observationalbasis fortheoriesis different. language(and thereis no reasonto insiston this), what speakersfollowis the codifiedrules of linguisticusage mightbenefitfromconsidering corthekinshipoftranslational relationsto theseprescriptive elementsbyregardingindetermi- of that language. The translationmanual allows receptorlanguage-speakersoptimallyto conformto source-language nacy problemsas indicatingnot thattranslationsfail in a descriptivefunctionbutthattheirproperfunctionis prescriptive. rules and reap all the practicalbenefitsthereofwithoutconI believewe thusavail translationand emicanalysisofa place sciouslyfollowingthoserules. Thus translationalcodification in a scientific is a morecomplexaffair,but otherwisethebasic dynamicsare anthropology (cf. Feleppa 1982). The importantdistinguishingfeatureis that prescriptive thesame. Whileitis responsiveto earlierestablishedpractices, claimsare validatedby a processof codification,significantly themanual'sstructure is partlydictatedbywhatfacilitatesthe distinctfromtheprocessoftheoreticalconfirmation varioustasks of manual users-it does not evidentlydescribe and operapreexisting semanticisomorphisms. As Quine concurs,theexistenceofsuch things,construedas naturalobjectsor relations 2 My roughgroupingof theoreticaldefinitions withrulesof accepexistingbeneaththe behavioralsurface,is unsubstantiated. tance as "prescriptive" overlooksthe factthatthe formerbut not the The prescriptive characterof translationis also reflected in latteroccurat thesame logicallevel as law statements in explanation. (Rules of acceptancereferto explanatoryinferences, whiledefinitions theanthropological role:Successful community's ethnographic are partsof such inferences.)However,I thinkthatthisis permissible translationalso facilitatesthe anthropologist's effortsto "get givenmystresson relationsbetweenclaims and theirevidentialsupalong" in professional-community activitiesoftheoryconstrucport.Also, I don't thinkthatI fall preyto criticisms(raised,e.g., in Stich and Nisbett 1980) regarding the groundingof reflective- tion.Inquirersbringto thefielda bodyoflinguisticand other theoreticalnotionsthathave alreadymetwithsuccessand for equilibriumaccountsof ethicaland rationalnormsin theintuitionsof thatreasonare rationallypreferable.That is, theyoperatewith competentpractitioners. only if thereis physicalchange (1981a:23). The consequent case against translationstems,he claims, fromthe fact that two rival translationmanuals can be "physicallyequivalent," i.e., "both manuals are compatiblewith all the same distributions of states and relations over elementaryparticles" (1981b:98). But, it seems to me, physicalequivalenceentails thatthereis no factualbasis forthechoicebetweenthemanuals onlyifit can be shownthatthereare changesin thetranslations dictatedby eithermanual individuallywithoutcorrespondingphysicalchanges. But the radical-translation case seems to concern only differencein interpretations. What physicallybaseless change has been shown to occur within eithermanual? What forcedoes the claim thatfactualchange presupposesphysicalchangehave fortranslation? I believethatthereis reasonto see a difference thatconfersa special epistemicstatuson translationalclaims. My main concern,however,is thatthisfeaturenotforceus to excludethem fromempiricalinquirybut simplycause us to recast their justificatory role, and I would maintainthis even if Quine's physicalistthesiswereshownto be adequate to establishindeterminacy. It is overthesecondquestionthatI wantto emphasize mydisagreement withQuine. I shallofferanotheraccount of the originof indeterminacy, one which has closerkinship than Quine's to the worriesof Sapir, Boas, and Whorf,and, moreimportant,an alternativeaccountof the importof indeterminacy.What I say will not hinge on displacingQuine's main argumentsforindeterminacy. 248 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Feleppa: EMICS, ETICS, AND OBJECTIVITY a set of criteriaof adequacy which dictatesthat, withinthe constraintsof empiricaladequacy, familiargrammaticalconexpressedin theidiomof another.I shall applythisaccountto ceptsare to be used. This importedschemecomprisesthebasic controversy. elementsof theoryconstruction, and some degreeof general some of the particularsof the etics/emics Emic analysissurelyinvolvesthe demand that (1) the ethagreementon themis essentialfortheoretical success.Yet such nographerdevelop (or learn)anothersymbolsystem,different conceptsand criteriaare the productsof codification: theyare fromthosefamiliarto anthropologists or to receptor-languagesubjectto revision,in thelightofongoingpractice,and can be speakers,in order to account for the significanceof sourcealteredor violated at any time, withoutabridgmentof proentitieswhich ceduralrules.Linguistsare obligedto adhereto such conven- language expressionsor of any extralinguistic are construedsymbolically bysource-language-speakers. But it tionsowingto the practicalgains thatstemfromfulfilling the also typicallyinvolvesmorethanthis:forone thing,it is usuexpectationsand facilitatingthe work of otherswho seek to ally taken to entail that (2) the symbolsystems,meanings, understandand incorporatetheirresults. rules, etc., of the source culturethus recoveredbe "really" The importantpointis thatit is neithersurprisingnor perplexingthatreceptor-language or anthropological-community thoseof theculture'smembers.Further,as we have seen, it is practiceshave a structuralimpact on a translationmanual, said to entailthat(3) theseverysource-culture notionsbe somesince its purposeis now seen to involve"blending"receptor- how employedby theethnographer in explanation.My view is language conventionswithsource-languageones. Also, being that 1 is a reasonabledemand but 2 and 3, even thoughthey prescriptive does notmake translationa special case, and thus reston legitimateconcernsfordescriptiveaccuracy,are not. this alone provides no basis for any contrastbetween the These two demandsare besteschewedunlessit can be shown scientific and the emic: we need not accept the consequences thattheycan be fulfilled, and myaccountprovidesno basis for Quine draws forlinguistic-oriented consideringsuccess in translationsuch a demonstration. Peranthropology. Thoughthe statusoftranslations as rulesmayprovidea basis forfollowing haps some basis forbeliefin the "psychicunity"of mankind Quine in denyingthemtruthvalue, theystillhave an empiric- can be found,but I do not thinkit is providedsimplyby our ally legitimaterole, akin to that of technicaldefinitions success in communicationand translation.Rejecting3 is not and rulesof inference.They are amongthe dictatesof what ought tantamountto rejectingemicanalysisifwe define"emicanalyto be done in orderto conductsocial inquiry,althoughthey sis" in purelymethodologicaltermsof the use by inquirersof are, in effect,partdirectivesand parta sortof instrument transexpressionsthatservealso as correctreceptor-language for data gathering.The factthat,as partsofcodifications, lationsof source-languageexpressions.(Perhapsa similaractheyare on occasion measuredby the compliancewiththemof actual countcan be givenof"implicit"emicnotions,butI willnottry behaviors(at thosetimeswhen we are inclinedto amend the to deal with that difficultproblemhere.) In addition,emic rule ratherthan simplyregardthe noncompliantbehavioras fromno specialconceptualproblems analysisso definedsuffers deviant)and thefactthattheirvalidationinvolvesdetermining that could providean a prioribasis forthinkingthat it will rulesthatto a greatdegreedo accord withactual subjectbestifletheorizingor that it has no place in the accountingof haviorcan lead one to thinkthattranslationsare descriptions facts.Thereis a place in scientific forthetranslaanthropology of something(existingor subsisting"within"the source lantionson whichemicanalysisis based. (I shallnotpresenta case forthe necessityof extensive,or even limited,emic analysis.) guageor "between"it and thereceptorlanguage).But theyare For all his mentalisticremarks,Goodenough'sinitialdefininot,and theyneed not be viewed as performing a descriptive tion of cultureis not as committal:it simplymakes learning functionin anthropologicaltheory. And recognizingthis makespossibletheavoidance ofa numberofneedlessperplex- languageand culturea matteroflearningrulesthatenable one itiesconcerningtranslationaland ethnographic to behave in ways acceptable to native speakers (1964:36; objectivity. That thereis a definitive 1970:101,110-11). Of courseGoodenoughintendsto say more answerto thequestion"Whatdoes thanthis:his reasonsforemphasizinggettingalong stemfrom thesubjectmean?" Quine does notcall intoquestion.Rather, a beliefthatsomethingis overlookedin ethnographies he challengesthe idea thatthereis a definitiveanswerto the which aim onlyto describeobjectivefact,and he views learningto question"What does the subject really(or in fact) mean?" I share both attitudes,but ratherthan see indeterminacy get along as the key to maintaininga referential connection as betweenan ethnographyand the mentalrealm of cultureit undermining the key translationalpremisesof linguisticethdescribes(see, e.g., his 1970:110-11). However, the statusof nographyI view translationsas answeringquestionsabout the analyticframeworkfor posing and answeringfactual quesschemerecoveryas an emiccriterion ofadequacy is challenged tions.3There is no answerto the questionwhetheremic units by the problems delineated above (and, indeed, some of are reallyemic,but neitheris therereasonto denythema place Goodenough'sown formulations of his mentalisticthesesare in scientific anthropology. guarded). Also challengedis the idea that cultureis a set of mentalitems.What cultureis depends on what adequate anthropologicalschemessay it is: implicitin thisdefinition may WHITHER EMICS? be the very exclusion of materialistviewpointsthat Harris decries. I hope to relievesome of the"essentialtension"betweenpragPerhaps we can say that simply enabling conformity to matism,withits implicitcommitment source-culture standardsof appropriatenessis enough. There to imposition,and obis significant convergencebetweenmyview and Burling'sthat jectivityby eliminatingthe expectationthat the meaningfor all one can hope foris somethingthatenablesmanual usersto onlyone partyto thecoordinativeeffort oftranslationmustbe get along with the source-culture's members,as well as with the membersof the anthropologicalcommunity,who place theirown demands on the translationmanual's and ethnog3 The adequacy oftranslationalrulesstillhingeson compliancewith raphy'scharacter.However, I thinkI eliminatethe appearthemofcertainstatesofaffairs-even thoughas prescriptions theycan be violatedwithoutbeingabridged.Codifications stillanswer,in their ance that a significantconcessionhas been made: what we way, to what Quine calls the "tribunalof sense experience."Thus in have is not "hocus-pocus"but a varietyof a perfectly respectreferring to frameworkquestionshere, I do not mean to subscribe able mode oftheoryformulation. If it is asked whyone should eitherto thelogical-positivist thesisthatframework choicesare purely botherto add Goodenough'scriterionof social conformity, if pragmatic(see Carnap 1950) or to theidea thatsome beliefs(so-called not to achieve his mentalisticaims, I believe otherpotential analyticones) are truein virtueof meaningonly-views thatQuine advantagescan be cited,such as enrichment of the empirical (1976a) sees as bound up withthesemanticassumptionsthathis indeterminacythesisattacks. base and the productionof warrantedand interesting results Vol. 27 * No. 3 * June 1986 249 nototherwiseattainable.As forFrake'sand Watson'sconcerns withcontext,I believewhat I proposeat least partlycaptures theirconcernthatthesourcesociety'spracticeshave structural and on the impact on the questionsasked by ethnographers theoriesthat result. We cannot "escape" impositionof the familiar,even with the most ardent effortto understand distincsource-culture remarksand contexts.But an important tion remains,I think,betweenanalyticframeworkssuch as proceduresare highlyselective frames,whose predetermined ofdata types,and analyticstrategiesthatinvolvemoreflexibilto culturalcontext.What Watson ityin adaptingframeworks discoveredthroughhis emic strategieswas that his subjects' withempiricalwarrant,in ways behaviorwas interpretable, thatprovidea plausible accountof the resourcesavailable to theGuajiroin adaptingto urbanlife-discoveriesnotpossible, model.The ofa psychoanalytic perhaps,withintheconstraints characterof his methodologicalassumptionsand prescriptive Watson was able to distranslationalbase notwithstanding, cover thingsthat were not simplythe logical entailmentsof in termsof thesechoices. Theoreticalfruitfulness-measured questions-is thepotentialvirtestableanswersto interesting tue. There are other frameworks,importablefrom one's "Western"background,that can be used to give satisfying accounts, but the special characterof translation-particularly, the differentcompliance relationshipinvolved in the as opposedto hypotheses-precludes validationoftranslations inquirerand subourhavingempiricalwarrantforidentifying ject frameworks. itcreatesa structure, Translationdoes notreflectpreexisting structure.And while thisstructureis causally connected,via its ties to observation,to source-languagestructure,observer have a constitutive interests and receptor-language community impact on it, since translationmust serve those interests. what transforms Translation,like otherformsof codification, it touches. But this alone entailsno "descriptivedistortion," fordescripsince what occursis the creationof a framework tion. (Moreover,these structuresare not of the problematic criticizes.) varietywhichDavidson [1973]rightly "underlying" Thus I agreewithHarristhatetic analysisdoes notdepend on emic analysis, particularlywhere freedomfromall "inis sought.Both etic and emic analysis interference" terpreter and whilethismayspeak, on occasion, dependon fruitfulness, in favorofemicanalysis,it mayfavor"purelyetic"analysisin othercontexts.It is a pragmaticallyorientedpluralismthatI advocate. All the schemesused to accountforculturalbehavior are in an importantsense "those of the subjects"-and whilesome schemes,theemicones, place additionaldemands upon themselvesto employexpressionsthatadequatelytranslate source-languageexpressions,thisconferson themno special identityrelationto source-languageschemes. While my rejectionof the idea thatthe teleologyof the observedmustbe adoptedbyinquirersor thatsocial inquirymust be extensivelyconcernedwithcognitionechoes Harris'scomplaintsabout theexclusionaryattitudeof idealiststowardmaterialistparadigms,I do notsharehisevidentskepticismabout thepotentialyieldofcognitiveapproaches.I see no reasonthat pragmaticdefensesare notequallyapplicable,at least in principle, to the idealistdisciplines-as Ember, Kiefer,and (in a morefictionalist vein) Burlingcontend.And iftheseare feasible, thenthereis no reasonto thinkpragmatismwill necessarily count against using emic units in quantitativeanalysis. Moreover,notionsof "psychologicalreality"have themselves come underpragmaticreconstrualof late (see, e.g., Bresnan to say, solelyon the 1978:58-59), and this makes it difficult basis of the considerationsadduced here,thattheyare inherentlyflawed.In questioningGoodenough'smentalism,I challenge the criteriahe offersforvalidatinghis claims. I do not of elementsof, say, cognitive denythatsystematicunification psychology,psycholinguistics,and cognitive anthropology 250 mightvalidatebeliefsabout psychologicalreality(see also Wallace 1965, Romneyand D'Andrade 1964). But what of the antipragmaticcriticismsof Hanson and Brown? Is thereno check on the impositionsinquirerscan make? Don't thepracticesof subjectssomehowserveto define theselimits?I believethatmyaccountofthingsgoessomeway towardmeetingthese objections.I agree, as one reasonably implicitin thebehavshould,thatthereis antecedentstructure ior of ethnographicsubjects,i.e., conventionalbehaviorpatterns(regardlessof theirdegree of codificationor reflective which are properobjects grasp by source-language-speakers) ofdescription.But in orderto establishdescriptivehypotheses, certaintranslational, mustperform I claim,theanthropologist prescriptivetheorytasks in the processof establishingwhat Caws (1974:9) calls the "boundaryconditionsof his work." Many of theseboundaryconditionsare fairlywell established, beforethe particularfieldworkis done, by professionaltraining. Yet it is also the case, as Caws puts it, that "insidethe becomes,as the physicalscienboundaries[theethnographer] ofthestructure tistdoes not,a participantin thedetermination he studies."Caws continues(pp. 9-10; cf. 1976): And thisis because the structurewas, in the firstplace, a productof mindslikehisown, and will continuein beingonlyifsustainedbysuch minds;by takingit as an objectofinquiryhe has lenthis own beingto who seek to understandit can reasonablybe it; futureinvestigators expectedto take noteof his conclusionsas an integralpartofthedata fortheirown work. A societyis, in the last analysis,nothingexcept whatis said and thoughtabout it,bythosewho observeitas well as by thosewho composeit. With all this I agree, and I take it to be sustainedby the analysisI have given.(Caws does notseemto view translation in the minimalway I do, but this divergenceis not critical.) Once translationof, say, directiontermsis successfullydone (as measured, say, by navigational success), genuine facts about the sourcesociety'sviews of navigation-such as their direction-may be uncovered.There means of deteremining in theprojecand interest-relativity maybe somearbitrariness tionof certainconcepts,but facts"not of the inquirer'smaksubing" are derivablefromthe behaviorof theethnographic jects. And the objectiveloss is no morethanthatinvolvedin in physics(i.e., noneat all). At thislevel, theoreticaldefinition surely,factuallydeterminateerroris possible.As forthe prescriptivelevel, here too error is perfectlypossible. (The and descriptivetheoryshould similarities betweencodification notbe overlooked;see n.3.) Shoulda broadchangein theusage of the termtranslatedas "seaward" occur in the sourcelanguage, this musthave an impact on the translationmanual, whereasoccasional deviationswould not forcethis. Similarly usage and shiftsin importantare changes in target-language theoreticalparadigm.For muchthesame reasons,thedangers unitsof comparisoncan of etic/emiccontrasts'compromising be metwithmethodologicalcare and rigor. The resultantexplanatorymodel or accountcannotbe said structures (whether to succeedor failin revealingor mirroring theybe consciousor unconscious,public or private).A good deal of the structureof one's explanationcan be dictatedby "internal"constraints,while still sayingthingspertinent,in made at translation,to the descriptionof virtueof the efforts the sourceculture.Thus Caws's contentionthatthe structure the anthropologistderives is also "conferred"is compatible ofbehaviorexistprior withHanson's claim thatthestructures to translation-thoughI would preferto say thatit is patterns The dispute ofpracticethatprecedetranslationalcodification. thatsocial is resolvedifone dropsthe"natural"presupposition scientistsdescribe the componentsand relationsof abstract in doinglinguisticanalysessuch semantic(or social) structures as translation,kinshiptypologies,etc. Under my reconstruchave the"constitutive" tion,it is clearerwhyinquirerinterests CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY effectCaws claims theydo on the resultingsystem.(Indeed, whileHanson objectsvigorouslyto thisview, he may well be quite sympatheticto my relatedthesis. Hanson and Martin [1973:205]remark:"Analyticrules. .. are toolsor codes which enable one to select properbehaviourin particularcircumstances."They rejectthe idea thatan emic, or what theycall "internal,"understanding can be expressedby any set of ethnographicinscriptions,thoughit can be achieved by an inquirerwho becomesadept at gettingalong. What differences thereare between theirview and mine lie in theirevident allegianceto Ryle'sordinary-language philosophy,whichis in certainkey respectsat odds with Quinean indeterminacythoughmyreconstruction may softensome of the contrasts.) In summary,mymain contentions are these:(1) Translation is distinctfrom descriptionin virtue of being subject to codificational patternsofjustification.(2) It thusexpressesno factsbutcan have a place in theframework offactexpression. (3) Emic unitsofanalysis,whosedetermination hingesdirectly on translation,cannotwarrantablybe shown reallyor factually to exist or subsistin the minds or discourseof sourcelanguage-speakers,but (4) theytoo can have a place in the framework of scientific, descriptiveanthropology. This is not to say thatthe questionof redefining "emics"is fullyanswered. I have expressedvarious caveats about the limitationsof myproposedsolutions,and I shouldindicatein closingwhat tasksI thinkremain.Pivotalhereis a morethorough analysisof what talkingabout cultureentails,since we have seen severalauthorscall foremic analysisto providefor referentialties between ethnographicdescriptionand culture-ties perceivedas missing,say, in Harris'sconcernwith thedescription and predictionofbehavior.However,theinterdependence of culture concepts and particulartheoretical paradigmsentails, I think, dealing with this matteron a paradigm-by-paradigm basis-something whichis clearlybeyondmy presentscope. Not to dodge thisimportantissue altogether,I offerthe followingconsiderations:Anthropology has as an importantaim the revelationof feasibleways of organizingexperienceand the social world that are different fromthose with which we are familiar.And emic analysis would seemsuitedto thisaim. Moreover,it is hardto see how one can findgood reasonto ruleoutthefulland variedrangeof "emic" or "emic/etic"approacheswithoutlookingat themin detail. Earlier I remarked(actually turninga well-known phraseof Quine's) thatwhat a cultureis is what an adequate accountsays it is, and I see no wholesaleway of judgingthe adequacy of all theseapproaches.(Of course,we cannotmake this point too glibly,since we have seen questionsof what measures"adequacy" so intimatelytied to centralpoints of etic/emiccontroversy.)But unless some generic, intrinsic foremic analysisis revealed,promotinga pluralism difficulty ofmodelsseems,as I remarkedearlier,thepreferablerouteto take-if demonstrableexplanatoryor heuristicgains result. Comments Feleppa: EMICS, ETICS, AND OBJECTIVITY he appears bothto rejectand to accept Quine's indeterminacy thesis.This last pointis explained,perhaps,by the factthat Feleppa agreeswithQuine thatmostutterancesabout meaningand reference lack truthvalues butdisagreeswithwhathe (erroneously)takes to be Quine's explanationfor this (i.e., Quine's physicalism).Accordingto Feleppa, such utterances lack truthvalues because, contraryto appearances,theyare prescriptive and not descriptive.If thisis Feleppa's position, then it is puzzlingwhy "it is particularlyimportantthat we confrontW. V. Quine's idea of the indeterminacy of translation," especiallysincehe correctly claimslaterthathisresponse to the etic/emiccontroversy"will not hinge on displacing Quine's main argumentsforindeterminacy." Why, then,include all this on Quine's controversialviews regardinginscrutability, and underdetermination? indeterminacy, Feleppa arguesfor"a pragmatically orientedpluralism"accordingto which"all the schemesused to accountforcultural behaviorare in an importantsense'thoseofthesubjects'-and whilesome schemes,theemic ones, place additionaldemands upon themselvesto employexpressionsthatadequatelytranslate source-languageexpressions,thisconfersno special identityrelationon source-languageschemes."He defines" 'emic analysis'in purelymethodological termsoftheuse byinquirers of expressionsthat serve also as correctreceptor-language translations ofsource-language of expressions."The stringency this"additionaldemand"dependson how theword"correct"is to be understoodin Feleppa's definitionof "emic analysis." Does "correct"mean intensionallysynonymous,or does it merelymeanpragmatically justified?Feleppa does notsay,but we may assume fromotherthingshe says that his intended meaningis closerto the latterthan to the former.But, if so, thenhis notionofemicanalysisis a wolfin sheep'sclothing,for whatis thedifference betweensuch nominally"emic"analysis and eticanalysis?Afterall, bothkindsofanalysisimposealien structures on the culture/language beingstudied. Feleppa circumventsthistypeof criticismby claimingthat translationrelationsbetweensource-and receptor-languages are notdescriptive;rather,theyare, he insists,prescriptive. If so, thentheapparentconflict betweeneticand emicanalysesis an illusion:yes,bothkindsof analysisimposestructure on the source-language,but neitherkind is descriptiveof sourcelanguage users' beliefs.Furthermore, both kinds of analyses are justified"codificationally." But it is just thisdistinction betweenjustification by empirical confirmation and justification by codification, justification ofhypothesesand justification ofrules,thatneedsclarifying in Feleppa's account.If Duhemian-Quineanholismis true-if it is truethat any individualsentenceof a theorymay be held true come what may because it is theoriesas wholes rather thanindividualsentenceswhichconfront thetribunalofsense experience-it is useless to insist,as Feleppa does, that the characteristicdifferencebetweenthe two is that hypotheses to experienceare refutedbut rulescontraryto behavcontrary ior remainunabridged.One is remindedhere,too, of Quine's (1976b)discussionof legislativeand discursivepostulation. by ROGER F. GIBSON, JR. Departmentof Philosophy, WashingtonUniversity,St. Louis, Mo. 63130, U.S.A. 5 XI 85 The first Feleppa's centraltopic is the etic/emiccontroversy. few pages of his discussionreveal just how muddied these watersare. It is regrettable, thathe muddiesthem therefore, stillfurtherby introducingQuine's thesesof inscrutability of reference and indeterminacy oftranslation.First,he misidentifies the "origin"of Quine's indeterminacy thesis as Quine's commitment to physicalism;second,he erroneously concludes thatQuine does notsucceedin differentiating indeterminacy of translationfromunderdetermination of physicaltheory;third, Vol. 27 * No. 3 * June1986 by PAUL A. ROTH Department of Philosophy, Universityof Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo. 63121, U.S.A. 7 XI 85 How is one to knowwhetheror notputativelyemiccategories are genuinelysuch?Feleppa's claimis thattheprocessoftranslationprecludesansweringthisquestionin a wayfullysatisfactoryto those partialto emics. Translationrequiresa holistic approach; translationrules must be "in place" beforemost conversationcan proceed.But once discourseis possible,what could establishthat this is due to emic analysisand not, for 251 example, to propitiousimposition?However, Feleppa concludes onlythat an emic analysispurifiedof all impositionis impossible. Yet Feleppa's remarkthat"we cannot'escape' impositionof thefamiliar"cuts deeperthanhe appreciates,and its implicationsforthe methodologicaldisputeare moreradical thanhe acknowledges.Translation,as he notes,"createsa structure"; given this fact, however,it followsthat interpretation must proceedvia an accommodationofthebehaviorand utterances of othersto a structure.Anynotionof meaningas some additional free-floating product to which we mightalso adjust translation provesempirically empty.(For a fullQuineananalysisof the indeterminacy thesis,see Gibson 1982:64-95.) I suggestthat the true importof Quine's analysisfor the controversy whichFeleppa surveysis, in fact,to revealit as a pseudoproblem.(This was the positivists'termforproblems forwhichno empiricalevidencecouldexistbywhichto resolve them.)As urgedabove, all cases of translationare mattersof imposition,forhow are we to understandanyone-ourselves or strangers-exceptin termsof categoriesthatmake sense to use or are extensionsof some thatdo? In cases of "successful" translationthereis no empiricaldistinctionbetweenalleged impositionand purportedinsight(details of my views are foundin Roth 1985). But surely,someone mightprotest,fieldworkreveals the existenceof people with views verydifferent fromour own, and we certainlycan, and sometimesdo, learn to understand (and perhapsaccept)previouslyalien perspectives.My replyis thatunderstanding just meansthatwe have incorporated alien utterancesand behaviorsintocategoriescomprehensible to us; again, thereis no distinguishing herebetweenimpositionand discovery.We cannotreasonablyassume thatthe acquisition ofnew perspectivesinvolvescompleteabandonmentoftheantecedently familiar,fortheold notionsprovidetheonlygeneral frameworkforunderstandingthat we possess. It is this perfamilpetual epistemologicaldependenceon the antecedently iar whichmakesit pointlessto attemptto distinguish between impositionof the familiarand a liftingof the culturalveil. How, then,to do justice to the genuineconcernsregarding culturaldifferences which underliethe pseudoproblemposed by theemic/etic controversy? Followinga suggestionby Rorty (1982: 198),I would arguethatthechoiceofmethodology (e.g., interchoosingbetweena vocabularywhichattemptsto reflect estingvariationsin behaviorand a vocabularythatwill help predictwhatthesehumanobjectswilldo) is a moraland pragmaticone. If we divestourselvesof artificially rigidnotionsof what it means to constructan explanation(whichis so often tiedto beingable to predict)and an equallyuntenablefantasy that translationdiscoversratherthan creates what we call meaning,thenthe investigationof human behaviorcan proceed unencumberedby the sortof pseudoproblemrepresented by the emic/etic debate. byANNE SALMOND DepartmentofAnthropology, UniversityofAuckland,Private Bag, Auckland,New Zealand. 9 XII 85 Feleppa begins by recallingthe distinctiondrawn in some modes of anthropologicalinquirybetween"etic" and "emic" analysis:roughly,accountsbased on inquirer'sand subjects' conceptions.Most anthropologicalresearchis intercultural, however,and all requiresdialogue. In practice,bothsubjects' and inquirer'snotionsof the worldare on call in anthropological exchanges.The difference betweeneticsand emicsrestsin attitudesof theoreticalprivilege:in etics, inquirer'sinterests and conceptionsare cast as preeminentin analysis, and in emics, subjects'interestsand patternsof practiceare held in focus.Yet even in etics,subjects'answers(in speech or other formsofpractice)to theanthropologist's questionsare material to the project of explanation,and even in emics, the an252 thropologist's questionsand projectofunderstanding are material to the way thatconversationsand analysisproceed. Quine's idea of the "indeterminacy of translation"rightly draws attentionto the difficulty of claimingcross-linguistic retrievalof semanticfact,but to say that translatorscannot ascribetruthto theirtranslations does nothelp anthropologists much.Many of us are so struckby theinterpretive difficulties ofour craftthatwe do notmake suchtruthclaimsin anycase and are moreinterested in betteror worse,ratherthantrueor false,translations.I take it thatthisis partof Feleppa's point whenhe says, "Much as Rudnerasks whysocial inquirymust reproducereality,I shallask whytranslation mustdescribeit." He goes on to argue that while anthropologicaltranslation inevitablyinvolvesinterpretive interestsfromboththe source and receptorcommunities, facts"notoftheinquirer'smaking" are derivablefromthe practiceof ethnographicsubjects,and erroris possible;and in all of thisI agree withhim. What he does notsay, however,is how successand errorin translation can be demonstrated,just how translationconventionsand descriptionlanguages differin anthropology, and what happens ifnotionsof truthin thetwo communities are differently described. The literatureof ethnoscienceand componentialanalysis suggeststhat some expressionsare more readilytranslatable thanothers,at least in thesensethat"gettingalong"in kinship and botanical,zoological,and colourascriptionsis terminology morereadilytestedthan, say, notionsof cosmology,ideas of trust,or, in Maori, forinstance,conceptionsof tapu, mana, hau, and therest.Partofthetroubleis thatinterpretive charity workstwoways and thatsubjectcommunities, just likephilosophers,are inclinedto translateothersas "believingtruewhat is obvious." Their notionsof both truthand what is obvious maydiffersomewhatfromours,however,and errors(now no simple notion) in more subtle and difficultareas of crossculturaldiscoursemay take the anthropologist yearsto grasp. Perhapsone needs to learn a good deal about "gettingalong," beforeit is possibleto enterintoexchangeswheresomesortsof errorcan be discovered.Then thereis thepossibilityofdivergenceofinterpretive interests: perhapstheinquirer'signorance or erroron certainmatterssuits the source communityvery well. By the end of thisarticle,Feleppa has redefined emicsas a projectin codificationand translationwhich goes along with the scientificestablishmentof intercultural fact. I am interestedbut notwhollyconvinced."Emics" and "etics"are useful thumbnail-sketch termsfordifferent interpretive attitudes,but I don'tfindtheman adequate base fordelineatinganthropological theory.The questionof"adequate" accountsin anthropology,too, will need a morestringent and comprehensive analysis of"gettingalong"in thepracticeofbothsourceand receptor communities(and the possible contradictionsbetweenthese two attempts)than emic anthropology has so farbeen able to offer. Reply by ROBERT FELEPPA Wichita,Kans., U.S.A. 15 I 86 GibsonwonderswhyI claimthatQuine's indeterminacy thesis oughtto be confronted.Let me reviewthe reasons. The main relevanceof Quine to thiscontroversy lies in two points:(1) he raises seriouschallengesto thosewho would tie thesuccessofemicanalysisto thesuccessofrecoveryofunderlyingmeaningcomponents;(2) he raises equally seriousdifficultiesforthosewho would take a pragmaticturnin assessing anthropological methodology, iftheybelieveemicanalysis will hold up under such a shift.Even were I to disagreeenCURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY tirelywithQuine's position,it would be ofvalue to draw it out in thisanthropological setting,especiallygiventhecharacterof Quine's own radical translationarguments.However, I am (a reapartlyin agreementwithQuine, partlyin disagreement sonable state of affairs,thoughGibson suggestsotherwisein the his thirdobjection),and I thus endeavor to reconstruct way. thesisin what I take to be a clearerand morefruitful to separatethequestion Gibsonis also botheredby myeffort fromthe of the soundness of argumentsfor indeterminacy questionofitsconsequences.I am motivatedto do thisoutofa beliefthatthe finalverdicton Quine's accountof the rootsof indeterminacy is far frombeing in. The literatureis full of divergentaccountsof what Quine is up to, of attemptedrevisions,etc., and it seems to me that if theseunresolvedquestionscan be circumvented, so muchthebetter.It is theconsequences of Quine's thesis in which I am mainlyinterested. Also, it is importantto note that many philosophersdo not shareGibson's convictionthatQuine has succeededin differoftranslationand underdetermination entiatingindeterminacy ofphysicaltheory.Gibsonhimselfseemsto thinkthattheheart of the indeterminacythesis lies in the demonstrationthat "thereis no sense to the questionof any one translationbeing the uniquelycorrectone" (1982:69). However, barringsome further specification of the standardsof "unique" correctness, the indeterminacy thesis has no force,for physicaltheories seem to admit of alternativescompatible with equivalent bodies of evidenceas well. This is a problemoflong standing in theliterature thesis(for"classic"stateon theindeterminacy ments,see Rorty1972 and Chomsky1968). And it is here,it seemsto me, thatQuine's physicalismis ofcentralrelevance:I don't maintainthat this alone constitutesthe originof the thesis (and I apologize if the necessaryincompletenessand compressionof myremarksin thisconnectioncreatesthisimpression).Rather,it is one of its componentpremises,serving to differentiate of rightanswers the importof the multiplicity forphysicsas opposed to translationby givingreasonto rule out relianceon criteriaof selectionin translationthat could playno partin thewarrantingofbeliefsabout physicalmacroand microstates. He also is concernedthatI do not adequatelydifferentiate emicfrometic analysis.I am notentirelysurewhat thethrust of thisobjectionis. The two typesare usuallyeasy enoughto distinguishfrom each other. If his worry is that I don't sufficiently explainwhyemicanalysisoughtto be done,I must point out that it was not my intentionto do so. The main burden of the discussion of the indeterminacy thesis is to undercutcertainconsiderations, derivablefromthethesis,that of emic analysis.I aim mightbe offeredagainstthefeasibility not to answerthe question(whichcannotbe done in a single essay)but to keep it open, leavingit to be addressedin pragterms. maticand, largely,intraparadigmatic As forhis concernsabout the usefulnessof the codification/ let me say thefollowing:First,I do not description distinction, claim that "utterances[about meaning and reference]lack truthvalues because, contraryto appearances,theyare prescriptiveand not descriptive."I make no claim about an about whichI have a underlying linguisticform(an enterprise skepticismsimilarto Quine's [1960:157-61]); rather,I offera way ofregimenting translationalclaimsforthepurposeofgiving a philosophicallyless problematicaccount of translation and culturaldescription.Secondly,I see no reason DuhemQuine holism should have the consequencesGibson claims. One can holisticallyconstruecodificational endeavors(indeed, I think one ought to) and yet delineate differencesin the and descripjustificational patternsthatapplyto codificational tive "wholes"-or, better,in the justificationalpatternsthat respectively characterizeour interrelated prescriptive and descriptivebeliefs. Roth may createtheimpressionthatthereis moredisagreement between our positionsthan actually exists. This may Vol. 27 *No. 3 *June 1986 Feleppa: EMICS, ETICS, AND OBJECTIVITY whichI shall ofmyintentions, resultfroma misunderstanding tryhereto clarify. Part of the problem,I think,is that Roth may be more argumentsthanI am. He satisfiedwithQuine's indeterminacy accepts that Quine presentssubstantiallyall the premises (thoughhe is not always needed to establishindeterminacy satisfiedwith the various ways Quine presentshis case) and cuts. suggeststhat I do not see how deeply indeterminacy However, as much as I draw on Quine, I expressdissatisfacis tionwitha keyelementin his thesis,and unlessthedifficulty resolvedthethesis,to mymind,does notcut at all. The problem, about which I make only suggestiveremarks,lies in Quine's appeal to physicsas an ultimateparameterin the determinationof the possible totalityof facts. Interestingly, Rorty(1982:201),in the essay Roth citesin supportinghis efcontrasts,raises of methodological redefinition fortsat fruitful similarconcerns: aboutintentional therecanbe no"factofthematter" Quine... thinks without suchstatescanbe attributed becausedifferent statesofaffairs particles.. . . But surelyall that to theelementary makinga difference shows is thatone particularvocabulary. . . is not such irreducibility withcertainexplananda fordoingcertainthings goingto be helpful (e.g.,peopleandcultures). At anyrate,as I note,even ifQuine's or someotheraccountof provesviable, I believethereconthebasis forindeterminacy its consestructionwill still serve to modifyconstructively quences foranthropology. aside, it providesa comThe cogencyof myreconstruction (in, e.g., his 1985)to restate modioussettingforRoth'sefforts ethnographicdivergencein terms of competingtranslation he elsewhereacknowledges(1986). schemes-a compatibility However, these harsh consequencesit seems to me are ones Roth musttake accountof. In arguing,as he does in his 1985 work,fora pluralisticview of the consequencesof indeterminacy,he places himselfclearlyin the camp of thosewho wish on to recast methodologicalcontroversiesand commitments pragmatic as opposed to metaphysicalgrounds-a group against which I set Quine. Why are we to trustany ethnotranslational graphicdescriptionif it restson indeterminate premises?I offerone way of dealing with this problem,one which arises initiallyfromgeneralconsiderationsabout the characterofthetranslacoordinative,prescriptive particularly tionalenterprise. Also, his remarkshereleave unclearjust what he takes the controversyto involve. Even if we agree that a emics/etics numberof key metaphysicaland epistemologicalpresupposiare not cogent,thisis not to relegate tionsof the controversy the entirecontroversyto the status of a pseudoproblem.I intendedto show certainaspects of it to be pseudoproblems and believe I am in substantialagreementwith Roth on this issuesremain: "emic/etic" point.However,I believesignificant stillask themselveswhethertheyshouldtryto Anthropologists translatesubject notionsinto termsusable for ethnographic shouldbe directedto or how muchoftheirefforts description, this, or just how systematicallycentral emic conceptions should be. They also wonder how much of theireffortsat "emic" analysisshouldbe aimed at theunconsciousas well as theconsciousmind-and thetensionsexpressedin thediscussions of Frake, Watson, and Marano seem to have a point, And even given acceptance of some formof indeterminacy. even if impositionin the absolutesense is incoherent,we still need to make sense of its otherforms-e.g., takinginformant reportstoo ingenuously,overlookingdata that may produce attitudesand prodifferent impressionsand moreconstructive gramsof action. Now, in all fairnessto Roth, I believe he is generally answerable agreeableto theidea thatthereremainsignificantly 253 codification, it is because it faresbetterwhenotherproblems, questionsregardingemic analysis.He argues(1985) thatthe(I such as those Quine adduces, are beforeus. Rules can have would say ratherheavilyemic)orientationof PeterWinchcan a legitimatefunctionin theorieswithoutbeing eithertrue be justified,in prettymuchWinch'sown terms(thoughgiven or false.I do notbelievethesame can as easilybe said forhymore of a pragmaticemphasisby Roth), forits morallysenpotheses. sitizingus to otherpossibleways of organizingexperience. in Roth's account can be What I foundmost enlightening put as follows:A criticmightrespondto Roth's pragmatized Winchby saying,"We mightwell findnew ways to categorize results ourexperience,ones thatproducemorallypraiseworthy forourselves,forour dealings with the societywe describe, BERNSTEIN, R. 1933. Beyond objectivismand relativism:Science, and yetwonderwhetherwe have said anythingtrueabout its hermeneutics, and praxis. Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania cultureor whetherwe have distortedit in some fundamental Press. BOAS,F. 1943. Recentanthropology. way." In response,Roth putstheburdenon thecriticto show Science 98:311-14, 334-37. BRESNAN, JOAN. 1978. "A realistictransformational grammar,"in what theempiricalor practicalimportofthistalk about unreLinguistictheoryand psychologicalreality.Edited by M. Halle, J. coveredtruthcan be. If it arisesfroma beliefthatthepointof Bresnan,and G. A. Miller,pp. 1-59. Cambridge:M.I.T. Press. culturaldescriptionis to reveal the stuctureof an underlying BROWN, C. H. 1974a. Psychological,semantic,and structural aspects mentalor propositionalrealm,thenit mustbe recognizedthat of AmericanEnglish kinshipterms.AmericanEthnologist1:415beliefin such thingsis not easy to justify. 36. 1974b. Wittgensteinian I am encouragedthatSalmondfindsmysketchof prescriplinguistics.The Hague: Mouton. 1976. Semantic components,meaning, and use in ethnotive translationalmethodologygenerallyacceptable. For the semantics.PhilosophyofScience 43:378-95. mostpart,I see herobjectionsas displayingfargreaterexperiBURLING, R. 1964. Cognitionand componentialanalysis:God's truth suggestiveof ence with fieldtranslationand as insightfully or hocus-pocus?AmericanAnthropologist 66:20-28. pointsI mustdevelop further.The intentionof myessay was 1969. Linguisticsand ethnographicdescription.American to theincoronlyto removecertainphilosophicalimpediments Anthropologist 71:817-27. porationof translationalresultsin emic (and, forthatmatter, CAMPBELL, D. T. 1975. On theconflictsbetweenbiologicaland social evolutionand betweenpsychologyand moral tradition.American etic) methodologies.(And thoughI believe Salmond does not Psychologist30:1103-26. that intendto suggestotherwise,I thinkit worthreiterating CARNAP, R. 1950. Empiricism,semantics,and ontology.Revue InterQuine's indeterminacythesis, as it stands, presentsserious nationalede Philosophie 11:20-40. philosophicalobstacles to even the "hocus-pocus"view of CAWS,P. 1974. Operational,representational, and explanatorymodels. AmericanAnthropologist translationto whichshe seems to subscribe.) 76:1-10. . 1976. The ontologyof social structure:A replyto Hanson. I am somewhatpuzzled by her claim thatI do not say how AmericanAnthropologist 78:325-27. If thisis successand errorin translationcan be demonstrated. CHOMSKY, N. 1968. "Quine's empiricalassumptions,"in Wordsand only to call fora more detailed accountingof how behavior objections:Essays on the workof W. V. Quine. Edited by J. Hinmayor maynotcomplywiththevariousrulesthatspringfrom tikkaand D. Davidson. Dordrecht:Reidel. thecomplexcoordinationproblemI delineate,thenI am in full DAVIDSON, D. On the veryidea of a conceptualscheme.Proceedings of the 70th Meeting of the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation, agreement.Such accountingis an essential part of the inpp. 5-20. studyof criteriaof adequacy forwhichI call traparadigmatic in thelatterpartofmyessay. I do, however,speak, in general DENNETT, D. C. 1978. Brainstorms:Philosophical essays on mind and psychology.Cambridge:M.I.T. Press. termsat least, to the matterof how erroris detectable.My DURBIN, MRIDULA A. 1972. Linguisticmodelsin anthropology. Anin at is aimed, part, translationas codification characterizing nual Review ofAnthropology 1:383-410. capturingthe idea thatviolationsof translationalrules,or of EMBER, C. R. 1977. Cross-cultural cognitivestudies.AnnualReview ofAnthropology 6:35-56. the expectationsthey produce, do not have quite the same FELEPPA, R. 1982. Translationas rule-governed behavior.Philosophy logical or methodologicalconsequences as obtain in the of the Social Sciences 12:1-31. disconfirmation of descriptivehypotheses.As I remark,transFISHER, L. E., and 0. WERNER. 1978. Explainingexplanation:Tenlationspossess,withrules,thelogicalfeatureofbeingviolable sion in American anthropology.Journal of AnthropologicalRewithouttherebybeing abridged (a distinctionwhich itself search34:194-218. needs moreextendedformulationto establishclear contrasts FRAKE, C. 0. 1962. "The ethnographic studyofcognitivesystems,"in and human behavior. Edited by T. Gladwin and Anthropology withprobabilisticlaws). This naturallyleads to the question, W. C. Sturtevant,pp. 72-93. Washington,D.C.: Anthropological however,ofwhendeviationis nottolerableand a rulemustbe Societyof Washington. amendedor replaced.Yet althougha precisegeneralstatement . 1977. Plyingframescan be dangerous:Some reflections on of conditionsunderwhichrulesare clearlyviolatedis impossin cognitiveanthropology. methodology QuarterlyNewsletterofthe ible, reflectionon more typicalcases of codification(say, of InstituteforComparativeHuman Development,Rockefeller Univerillustrative sity 1(3):1-7. legal, logical, or ethical practice)yieldssufficient instances,e.g., laws being modifiedowing to grossnoncom- GEERTZ, C. 1976. "From the native'spointof view: On thenatureof anthropologicalunderstanding,"in Meaning in anthropology. of scientific practicegivplianceor philosophicalcodifications Edited by K. H. Basso and H. A. Selby.Albuquerque:University of ing way in lightof the regularfailureof respectablescientific New Mexico Press. practiceto conformto them. Similarlyfortranslation:in its GEOGHEGAN, W. H. 1969. Decision-makingand residenceon Tagtaquick to condemna rule earlystages inquirersare rightfully bon Island. Universityof California,Berkeley,Language-Behavior ResearchLaboratory,WorkingPaper 17. fornoncomplianceand less so inclinedas theinteformulation gratedtranslationmanual meets with more success, though GIBSON, ROGER F. 1982. The philosophyof W. V. Quine. Tampa: Universityof South Florida Press. [PAR] usage counsels to shiftsin source-language requiredsensitivity GOODENOUGH, W. 1951. Property, on Truk.Yale kin,and community against regardingeven well-establishedrules as beyond reUniversityPublicationsin Anthropology 46. proach. . 1956. Residencerules.Southwestern JournalofAnthropology In readingthis,one mightbe struckby theclose similarities 12:22-37. . 1964. "Culturalanthropology and linguistics," in Languagein ofmyprescriptive accountto theordinarydescriptiveaccount cultureand society.Edited by D. Hymes, pp. 36-39. New York: thattakes translationsto be genuinehypotheses.Despite my Harper and Row. I welcomethissimilarefforts to contrastrulesand hypotheses, . 1970. Descriptionand comparisonin culturalanthropology. ity: the account of errordetectiondoes not change all that Chicago: Aldine. muchon myreconstrual.If it is asked, then,whyone oughtto GOODMAN, N. 1973. 3d edition. Fact, fiction, and forecast. Inbother to shiftto a philosophicalorientationthat stresses dianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill. ReferencesCited 254 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY F. A. 1976. Models and social reality:An alternativeto Caws. AmericanAnthropologist 78:323-25. HANSON, F. A., and R. MARTIN. 1973. The problemofothercultures. Philosophyofthe Social Sciences 3:191-208. HARRIS, M. 1968. The rise of anthropologicaltheory.New York: Crowell. 1975. 2d edition.Culture,people,nature.New York: Crowell. 1976. Historyand significanceof the emic-eticdistinction. AnnualReview ofAnthropology 5:329-50. . 1979. Culturalmaterialism:The struggle for a science ofculture.New York: Random House. KAY, P. 1970. Some theoreticalimplicationsof ethnographic semantics. AmericanAnthropological AssociationBulletin3(3, pt. 2):1931. KEESING, R. 1972. Paradigmslost:The new ethnography and thenew linguistics.Southwestern JournalofAnthropology 28:299-332. KIEFER, C. 1977. Psychologicalanthropology. AnnualReview ofAnthropology 6:103-19. LEWIS, DAVID K. 1969. Convention:A philosophicalstudy. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. MARANO, L. 1982. Windigopsychosis:The anatomyof an emic-etic confusion.CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 23:385-412. NAROLL, R. 1964. On ethnic unit classification.CURRENT ANHANSON, THROPOLOGY 5:283-312. D. 1955. A Solomon Island society. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. PIKE, K. 1954. Languagein relationto a unifiedtheory ofthestructure of human behavior. Pt. 1. Glendale, Calif.: SummerInstituteof Linguistics. . 1964. "Towards a theoryofthestructure ofhumanbehavior," in Languagein cultureand society.Edited byD. Hymes,pp. 54-6 1. New York: Harper and Row. QUINE, W. V. 0. 1960. Wordand object. Cambridge:M.I.T. Press. . 1961. "The problemof meaningin linguistics,"in From a logical point of view, 2d editionrevised,pp. 47-64. New York: Harper and Row. 1970a. Philosophical progress in language theory. Metaphilosophy1:2-19. . 1970b.On thereasonsforindeterminacy of translation. Journal ofPhilosophy67:179-83. . 1976a. "On Carnap's views on ontology,"in The ways of paradoxand otheressays,revisedand enlargededition,pp. 203-11. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. . 1976b."Carnap and logicaltruth,"in The waysofparadoxand otheressays,revisedand enlargededition,pp. 118-21. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress. [RFG] OLIVER, Vol. 27 * No. 3 * June 1986 Feleppa: EMICS, ETICS, AND OBJECTIVITY . 1981a. "Things and theirplace in theories,"in Theoriesand things,pp. 1-23. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. . 1981b. "Goodman's ways of worldmaking,"in Theoriesand things,pp. 96-99. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. RAWLS,J. 1971. A theoryofjustice. Cambridge:Harvard University Press. ROMNEY,A. K., and R. G. D'ANDRADE. 1964. "Cognitiveaspectsof Englishkinterms,"in Transcultural studiesin cognition.Edited by A. K. Romneyand R. G. D'Andrade, pp. 146-70. AmericanAnthropologist 66(3, Pt. 2). RORTY, R. 1972. Indeterminacy of translationand of truth.Synthese 23:443-62. . 1982. "Method, social science, and social hope," in Consequences of pragmatism(Essays: 1972-1980), pp. 191-210. Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress. [PAR] ROTH,P. 1985. Resolvingthe Rationalitdtstreit. ArchivesEuropeennes de Sociologie 26:142-57. [PAR] . 1986. Pseudo-problemsin social science. Philosophyof the Social Sciences. In press. RUDNER,R. 1966. Philosophyof social science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. . 1973. Some essays at objectivity.Philosophical Exchange 1:115-35. SAPIR,E. 1949. "The psychologicalrealityof phonemes,"in Selected writingsofEdward Sapir. Edited by D. Mandelbaum,pp. 46-60. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress. STICH, S. P., and R. E. NISBETT. 1980. Justification and thepsychologyof humanreasoning.PhilosophyofScience 47:188-202. TRIANDIS,H. C. 1976. "Approachestowardminimizing translation," in Translation:Applicationand research.Edited by R. W. Brislin, pp. 229-44. New York: Wiley. WALLACE, A. F. C. 1965. "The problemof psychological validityof componentialanalysis," in Formal semanticanalysis. Edited by E. A. Hammel, pp. 229-48. AmericanAnthropologist 67(5), suppl. . 1970. "A relationalanalysisofAmericankinshipterminology: An example of relationsbetweenprocess and structurein cognition," in Cognition:A multipleview. Edited by P. L. Garvin, pp. 145-53. New York: SpartanBooks. WATSON,L. C. 1981. "Etic" and "emic" perspectiveson Guajiro urbanization.UrbanLife 9:441-68. WHITE, M. 1963. Toward reunion in philosophy. New York: Atheneum. WINCH,P. 1958. The idea ofa social scienceand itsrelationtophilosophy.London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul. 255
