Liberalization, Flexibility and Employment Relations
Change in Southern European Telecoms since the
1990s
11 September 2012
IBSSPP/ J.E.Cairnes Business School
Seminar NUI Galway
Dr. Andreas Kornelakis
Lecturer in HR Management
a.kornelakis@sussex.ac.uk
1
Plan of Presentation
l  Background/Introduction
l  Research
Design
l  Liberalisation
in IT & GR Telecoms
l  Flexibility in IT & GR Telecoms
l  Wage
Bargaining: Divergent Trajectories
l  Concluding Remarks
2
Background and Introduction
l
Convergence to Anglo-Saxon model of industrial relations is
not borne out (Wallerstein et al, 1997; Ferner & Hyman, 1998;
Thelen, 2009)
l
Wage Bargaining Centralization remains more or less stable
across Europe (EC Industrial Relations in Europe 2010)
l
Instead, case evidence of different trajectories of change
(Crouch, 2000; Ferner & Hyman, 1998; Traxler, 1995):
l
Research Question: How do we explain divergent trajectories
of change in wage bargaining, despite similar pressures ?
3
Research Design: ‘Most similar systems’ comparison
l  Similar
Sectors
Cases: Italian & Greek Telecoms
–  Common Pressures/Challenges
–  ‘Mediterranean model’ of capitalism
l  Divergent
Outcomes
–  Centralisation of Wage Bargaining in Italian
telecoms
–  Decentralised Bargaining in Greek telecoms
l  Why?
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Liberalisation of Italian Telecoms
l
Telecom Italia born in 1994 (merger btw SIP,
Telespazio, Italcable, SIRM, Iritel) IRI owned
since the 1960s
l
Privatised in 1997, three hostile takeovers
thereafter, now owned by Spanish Telefonica &
Italian banks
l
Market Opened up in 1998 according to EU
requirements
5
The Erosion of Telecom Italia Market Share
(retail revenue)
New entrants (fixed telephony operators): Albacom
(now BT Italia), Infostrada (now Wind), Teletu (now
Vodafone)
6
Liberalisation of Greek Telecoms
l  OTE
(Greek telecoms operator) stateowned since 1950s
l  Privatisation
(shares issuing) started in 1996
and was completed in 2008 with a takeover
by Deutsche Telekom
l  Market
Opened up in 2001 (EU exception)
7
The Erosion of Hellenic Telecom(OTE) Market
Share (retail revenue)
New fixed telephony operators: Tellas (now Wind),
Hellas Online (now strategic alliance with Vodafone);
Forthnet (currently in merger negotiations with Wind)
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The Search for Flexibility in Italian Telecoms
l
Revised job descriptions (in response to changes in
technology); flatter job classifications
l
Downsizing of ex-monopoly operators (early retirement,
voluntary exit, part-time work); lower wages for new
entrants (work-entry contracts) in Telecom Italia
l
Flexibility for core employees: annualised hours, parttime; teleworking; on-call work.
l
Flexibility for peripheral employees: immense growth of
precarious (freelance) work contracts (co.co.pro)
9
The Search for Flexibility in Greek Telecoms
l
Performance-based pay systems for marketing staff
(sales) and technical staff (network speed)
l
Downsizing of ex-monopoly operators (early
retirement, voluntary exit); abolishing job security
(tenure) for new recruits
l
Flexibility for peripheral employees: immense growth
of spurious self-employment (project-based) contracts
(blokaki) Precariousness also for highly skilled
engineers
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Centralization of Bargaining in IT Telecoms (I)
l
CGIL, CISL, UIL strategy of centralization since
mid-1990s; Telecom Italia unions transformed into
sectoral federations (SLC, FISTEL, UILCOM);
National Strikes for single contract
l
1996: Intersind (IRI employer association) absorbed
by Confindustria, and transformed into network
services employer association
l
1998: Tripartite Accord, includes commitment on
fair competition’ in liberalized network services
l
2000: First Agreement for Telecoms Sector between
peak-level unions and Confindustria; low common
standards and negotiated flexibility
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Centralization of Bargaining in IT Telecoms (II)
l
1998-2002: Confederal unionists go ‘on the ground’ and
organise workers in new firms; firm-level workers able to
speak with a single voice via ‘RSUs’
l
2002: Confindustria establishes ASSTEL, including all
telecoms/IT companies; Lucrative compromise: getting
the best of both worlds common standards at sector
level and flexibility at firm-level
l
2005-6: Unions forge a labour-state coalition & put
pressure to resisting call-centre firms to abide by
agreement; extend coverage of national contract & press
for transformation of spurious self employment into
regular open-ended contracts (even if part-time); call
centre firms join ASSTEL
l
2005-2009: centralisation of bargaining solidifies
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Wage Bargaining in Italian Telecoms
Mid 1990s
Late 2010s
Unions Single
Voice
Labour-State
Coalition
• Liberalization
Centralization
Coverage
• Flexibility
Employer
Associability
Decentralized
Bargaining
13
Decentralized Bargaining in Greek Telecoms (I)
l
Mid-90s: OTE company union strategy to resist
privatization & liberalization; no plan for sectoral
contract; Strikes and protest against independent
regulator & government because national
champion loses market share’ => (implicit unionmanagement alliance)
l
1995: SEPE trade association (OTE & big mobile
telecoms); no legal competence to negotiate
agreements; 2003: SATPE association created by
small telephone operators => small/lg firms divide
l
2003-2008: Company unions established bottomup in WIND, Vodafone, Forthnet despite antiunion management; no assistance from OME-OTE;
they negotiate rudimentary firm-level agreements to
specify wages; but very suspicious/if not hostile to
OME-OTE unionists
14
Decentralized Bargaining in Greek Telecoms (II)
l
2005-6: OME-OTE union convinces right-wing
government to get compensation for internal
restructuring; extremely generous severance package
€1.6 billion for 5,000 senior employees who get early
retirement (up to 8 years earlier) => some of them
become OTE sub-contractors after retiring
l
Small union (SMT) requests centralisation from
SEPE => request is of course rejected
l
2006-9: OTE Exclusivist strategy: call-centre union
wants to be affiliated with OME-OTE, but OTE are
excluding call-centre employees on the basis that
they do not have full-time permanent contracts
15
Wage Bargaining in Greek Telecoms
Mid 1990s
Late 2010s
Unions Single
Voice
Labour-State
Coalition
• Liberalization
Centralization
Coverage
• Flexibility
Employer
Associability
Decentralized
Bargaining
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Concluding Remarks
l  Despite
common pressures from Liberalisation,
no simple convergence => path dependence
l  Domestic actors’ critical role for shaping wage
setting institutions
l  Do
these insights hold in the context of the
current Eurozone crisis?
l  Domestic actors (unions, employers) vs.
International actors (IMF, EU)? Multi-level
games?
17
Thank you!
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