HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER
HOUSING FINANCE
AT A GLANCE
A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK
December 2014
1
ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK
HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER STAFF
The Housing Finance Policy Center’s (HFPC) mission is to
produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public
policy, efficient markets, and access to economic
opportunity in the area of housing finance. At A Glance, a
monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers,
academics, journalists, and others interested in the
government’s role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of
this mission.
Laurie Goodman
Center Director
We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can
make At A Glance a more useful publication. Please email
any comments or questions to ataglance@urban.org.
Ellen Seidman
Senior Fellow
Jim Parrott
Senior Fellow
Sheryl Pardo
Associate Director of Communications
Jun Zhu
Senior Financial Methodologist
Wei Li
Senior Research Associate
Bing Bai
Research Associate I
Taz George
Research Assistant
Maia Woluchem
Research Assistant
Alison Rincon
Special Assistant to the Director
INTRODUCTION
A new measure of access to credit
While many have raised concerns about the overly
tight credit box in the post-crisis period, the existing
measures of credit availability leave much to be
desired in terms of transparency, historical accuracy,
and intuitiveness. To fill this gap, we recently
introduced the Housing Finance Policy Center’s Credit
Availability Index, which measures the ex-ante
probability of default. The index has fallen from 17.4
percent in the fourth quarter of 2007, to 8.5 percent in
the first quarter of 2009, to 5.7 percent at the end of
2013.
Address servicing costs to open the credit box
Both the FHFA and the FHA are implementing new
policies to encourage lenders to use the GSEs’ and
FHA’s full credit box. While the main focus so far has
been clarifying representations and warranties,
policymakers are turning to a different, critically
underappreciated driver of lender overlays: the high
and uncertain cost of servicing delinquent loans. These
costs include compensatory fees that lenders face
when liquidation timelines of non-performing GSE
loans exceed state-specific levels. In November, the
FHFA and GSEs announced new measures to curb the
likelihood of lenders facing these fees, including
extensions to many states’ timelines and a higher
threshold at which fees go into effect, the latter move
meaning many smaller lenders will no longer pay fees.
We applaud these actions, and expect to see more
efforts in the coming year focusing on the interplay
between servicing and lender overlays.
97 LTV lending at the GSEs is back
The FHFA and the GSEs released details of their new
97 LTV programs. Fannie Mae will offer two home
purchase options, only for first-time home buyers: one
through their standard program and another through
the income-limited My Community Mortgage
program. Freddie Mac’s one offering is run through
their Home Possible program and is not limited to first
time homebuyers, but does include income limitations.
Both Fannie and Freddie also have a “limited cash out”
refinance option. Our assessment is that this move is
an incremental step in expanding access to credit that
introduces minimal risk to the housing finance system.
We analyzed Fannie’s 97 LTV program through late
2013. It never exceeded 3 percent of their business
and exhibited similar default rates to 90-95 LTV loans.
Page 33 of this chartbook shows that for the standard
program, borrowers with 720 and higher FICOs will
find the GSE program is more cost effective. Those
with lower credit scores will gravitate toward FHA.
FHA suffered a setback in the implementation of their
Homeowners Armed with Knowledge program. This
program was designed to grant lower upfront and
annual mortgage insurance premiums to first-time
homebuyers who participated in housing counseling.
In a substantial hit to the program’s reach, a “rider” in
the omnibus spending measure passed by Congress on
December 13th explicitly prohibited needed
implementation funding.
Funding the Housing Trust Fund and Capital Magnet
Fund
FHFA directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lift the
suspension of funding the Housing Trust Fund (HTF)
and the Capital Magnet Fund (CMF), as required
under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008. With the GSEs profitable for the foreseeable
future, the FHFA argues, there is little justification for
the suspensions to continue. The HTF primarily
targets the production, preservation, or operation of
rental housing, with a focus on very low income
households. The CMF is a potential funding source for
community development financial institutions and
nonprofit developers to finance affordable housing
and economic development activities.
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
•
Value of US housing stock increases, driven by
growth in household equity (page 6)
•
Over a quarter of 2014 originations are via bank
portfolio channel (page 8)
•
Home prices must rise another 14.2 percent to reach
peak levels (page 17)
•
The GSE portfolio wind-down continues, but at a
slower pace (page 19)
•
GSE risk-sharing deals now cover a sizable amount of
Fannie and Freddie’s book of business (page 21)
•
HAMP activity is tapering significantly (page 26)
•
With the end of the Fed MBS purchase program, Fed
absorption of gross MBS supply is rapidly decreasing
(page 31)
CONTENTS
Overview
Market Size Overview
Value of the US Residential Housing Market
Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market
Private Label Securities
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities
6
6
7
7
Origination Volume and Composition
First Lien Origination Volume & Share
8
Mortgage Origination Product Type
Composition (All Originations & Purchase Originations Only)
9
Securitization Volume and Composition
Agency/Non-Agency Share of Residential MBS Issuance
Non-Agency MBS Issuance
Non-Agency Securitization 2.0
10
10
10
Agency Activity: Volumes and Purchase/Refi Composition
Agency Gross Issuance
Percent Refi at Issuance
11
11
State of the Market
Mortgage Origination Projections
Total Originations and Refinance Shares
Housing Starts and Home Sales
12
12
Originator Profitability
Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC)
13
Credit Availability for Purchase Loans
Borrower FICO Score at Origination Month
Combined LTV at Origination Month
Origination FICO and LTV by MSA
14
14
15
Housing Affordability
National Housing Affordability Over Time
Affordability Adjusted for MSA-Level DTI
16
16
Home Price Indices
National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth
Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAs
17
17
Negative Equity & Serious Delinquency
Negative Equity Share
Loans in Serious Delinquency
18
18
GSEs under Conservatorship
GSE Portfolio Wind-Down
Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio
Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio
19
19
CONTENTS
Effective Guarantee Fees & GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions
Effective Guarantee Fees
Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustment
GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions
20
20
21
Serious Delinquency Rates
Serious Delinquency Rates – Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac
Serious Delinquency Rates – Single-Family Loans & Multifamily GSE Loans
22
23
Refinance Activity
Total HARP Refinance Volume
HARP Refinances
24
24
GSE Loans: Potential Refinances
Loans Meeting HARP Pay History Requirements
25
Modification Activity
HAMP Activity
New HAMP Modifications
Cumulative HAMP Modifications
26
26
Modification by Type of Action and Bearer of Risk
Changes in Loan Terms for Modifications
Type of Modification Action by Investor and Product Type
27
27
Modifications and Liquidations
Loan Modifications and Liquidations (By Year & Cumulative)
28
Modification Redefault Rates by Bearer of the Risk
Redefault Rate after Modification (12 Months & 24 Months)
29
Agency Issuance
Agency Gross and Net Issuance
Agency Gross Issuance
Agency Net Issuance
30
30
Agency Gross Issuance & Fed Purchases
Monthly Gross Issuance
Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance
31
31
Mortgage Insurance Activity
MI Activity & Market Share
FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan
Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI
32
33
33
Related HFPC Work
Publications and Events
34
OVERVIEW
MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW
Fed Flow of Funds data from 2014 Q3 indicates a modest increase in the total value of the US residential 1-4 unit
housing market to $21.4 trillion from $21.2 trillion the previous quarter. Household equity drove most of this
increase, growing by $178 billion. With credit standards remaining tight, mortgage debt increased by just $15 billion,
though that was still the largest quarterly increase in the past two years. Agency MBS make up 56.8 percent of the
total mortgage market, private-label securities make up 7.3 percent, and unsecuritized first liens at the GSEs,
commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions make up 29.0 percent. Second liens comprise the remaining
6.9 percent.
Value of the US Housing Market
Debt, household mortgages
($ trillions)
Household equity
Total value
25
21.4
20
15
11.5
10
9.9
5
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Q3
Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and Urban Institute.
Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market
Agency MBS
Unsecuritized first liens
Private Label Securities
Second Liens
($ trillions)
6
5.6
5
4
Debt,
household
mortgages,
$9,833
3
2.9
2
1
0
2000
0.7
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Inside Mortgage Finance, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Unsecuritized first liens includes loans held by commercial banks, GSEs, savings institutions, and credit unions.
2013
2014
Q3
6
OVERVIEW
MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW
As of October 2014, debt in the private-label securitization market totaled $725 billion and was split among prime
(19.7 percent), Alt-A (43.7 percent), and subprime (36.5 percent) loans. As of November 2014, outstanding
securities in the agency market totaled $5.62 trillion and were 46.4 percent Fannie Mae, 27.4 percent Freddie Mac,
and 26.3 percent Ginnie Mae.
Private-Label Securities by Product Type
Alt-A
($ trillions)
Subprime
Prime
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.32
0.26
0.2
0
1999
0.14
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.
2014
October2014
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
Ginnie Mae
Total
($ trillions)
6
5.6
5
4
3
2.6
2
1.5
1
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
November 2014
7
OVERVIEW
ORIGINATION VOLUME
AND COMPOSITION
First Lien Origination Volume and Share
First lien originations through 2014 Q3 are far below their 2013 pace, totaling $850 billion. The share of bank portfolio
originations rose to nearly 27 percent, while the GSE share has dropped to 51 percent from 61 percent in 2013,
reflecting the curtailment of refinancing activity. FHA/VA originations account for another 21 percent, and the private
label origination share remains less than one percent.
Volume, $ trillions
GSE securitization
FHA/VA securitization
PLS securitization
Bank portfolio
$4.0
$3.5
$3.0
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$0.23
$1.0
$0.01
$0.18
$0.5
$0.43
$0.0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 2014 Q1-3
Share, percent
100%
90%
26.7%
80%
0.7%
70%
21.5%
60%
50%
40%
30%
51.1%
20%
10%
0%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Q1-3
8
OVERVIEW
MORTGAGE
ORIGINATION
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION
PRODUCT
PRODUCT TYPE
TYPE
Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) accounted for as much as 29 percent of all new originations during the peak of the
recent housing bubble in 2005 (top chart). They fell to a historic low of 1 percent in 2009, and have slowly grown to 6.5
percent of total originations as of September 2014, 52 percent higher than a year ago. Fifteen-year FRMs,
predominantly a refinance product, comprise 15.6 percent of new originations. If we exclude refinances (bottom chart),
the share of 30-year FRMs in September stood at 86 percent, 15-year FRMs at 6.2 percent, and ARMs at 6.5 percent.
All Originations
Fixed-rate 30-year mortgage
Fixed-rate 15-year mortgage
Adjustable-rate mortgage
Other
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
September 2014
Sources: CoreLogic Prime Servicing and Urban Institute.
Purchase Loans Only
Fixed-rate 30-year mortgage
Fixed-rate 15-year mortgage
Adjustable-rate mortgage
Other
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Sources: CoreLogic Prime Servicing and Urban Institute.
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
September 2014
9
OVERVIEW
SECURITIZATION VOLUME AND
COMPOSITION
Agency/Non-Agency Share of Residential MBS Issuance
100.00%
Non-agency single-family MBS
issuance has hovered at or below
Agency share
90.00%
3 percent of total issuance since
early 2011, and this share is even 80.00%
lower if re-REMICs are excluded.
The environment in 2014 has not 70.00%
been favorable for new non60.00%
agency deals, totaling $25.2
billion through November 2014,
50.00%
compared to $25.8 billion over
the same period in 2013.Over
40.00%
half of the new issuance this
Non-Agency share
30.00%
year, $14.2 billion, is scratch and
dent securitizations.
98%
20.00%
10.00%
2%
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
Note: Year-to-date figure as of November 2014.
Non-Agency MBS Issuance
($ billions)
Non-Agency Securitization
($ billions)
Re-REMICs and other
$1,200
$6
Scratch and dent
Alt A
$1,000
2014 YTD
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
0.00%
$5
Subprime
$800
$4
Prime
$400
$3,370
$14,240
$374
$2
$200
$5,804
$1
$0
0.972
$3
$600
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
Note: Monthly figures equal total non-agency MBS issuance
minus Re-REMIC issuance.
10
Nov-14
Sep-14
Jul-14
May-14
Mar-14
Jan-14
Nov-13
Sep-13
Jul-13
May-13
Jan-13
Mar-13
Nov-12
Sep-12
Jul-12
May-12
Jan-12
2014 Q1-3
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
Mar-12
$0
$-
OVERVIEW
AGENCY ACTIVITY:
VOLUMES AND PURCHASE/
REFI COMPOSITION
Agency issuance continues its decline, totaling $855.6 billion in the first eleven months of 2014, compared to $1.49
trillion for the same period a year ago. Annualizing production year to date, 2014 is on pace for total production of
$933.4 billion, much less than the $1.57 trillion in 2013. GSE refinances increased marginally in the second half of
2014 as mortgage rates edged down, and are now 53 percent for Fannie Mae and 47 percent for Freddie Mac. The
Ginnie Mae market has always been more purchase-driven, with refinance volume now at 28 percent.
Agency Gross Issuance
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
Ginnie Mae
($ trillions)
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$1.0
$0.29
$0.26
$0.5
$0.38
$0.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Year to date as of October 2014.
2014
Ann.
Percent Refi at Issuance
Freddie Mac
Percent refi
Fannie Mae
Ginnie Mae
Mortgage rate
Mortgage rate
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Based on at-issuance balance.
Nov-14
May-14
Nov-13
May-13
Nov-12
May-12
0.0%
Nov-11
1.0%
0%
May-11
10%
Nov-10
2.0%
May-10
20%
Nov-09
3.0%
May-09
30%
Nov-08
4.0%
May-08
40%
Nov-07
5.0%
May-07
6.0%
50%
Nov-06
60%
May-06
7.0%
Nov-05
70%
May-05
8.0%
Nov-04
80%
May-04
9.0%
Nov-03
90%
11
STATE OF THE MARKET
MORTGAGE ORIGINATION
PROJECTIONS
The sharp drop in mortgage originations in late 2013 and continuing through 2014, combined with a forecast for a
continued strengthening economy and hence higher interest rates, has led the GSEs and MBA to reduce origination
projections sharply. The refinance share in 2014 has hovered between 40 and 43 percent. Both Freddie and
Fannie forecast a sharp decline in the refinance share of the overall market in 2015, in Freddie's case to 23 percent,
while Fannie predicts a more modest but still substantial decline to 32 percent. As a result, Freddie and Fannie see
2015 originations lower than 2014 origination. The MBA forecasts a very modest drop in the refinance share from
43 percent in 2014 to 38 percent in 2015. This is accompanied by a small increase in 2015 origination activity. In all
three sets of forecasts, housing starts and home sales are expected to strengthen in 2015.
Total Originations and Refinance Shares
Period
2014 Q1
2014 Q2
2014 Q3
2014 Q4
2015 Q1
2015 Q2
2015 Q3
2015 Q4
FY 2011
FY 2012
FY 2013
FY 2014
FY 2015
Originations ($ billions)
Total, FNMA
Total, FHLMC
Total, MBA
estimate
estimate
estimate
240
250
247
301
320
297
294
350
300
288
280
278
232
280
266
281
350
328
277
270
318
254
200
272
1496
1492
1436
2154
2122
2044
1866
1925
1845
1123
1200
1122
1043
1100
1184
FNMA
estimate
49
38
36
40
41
30
28
30
66
72
60
40
32
Refi Share (%)
FHLMC
estimate
48
41
45
40
35
22
16
15
64
70
59
43
23
MBA
estimate
50
40
38
46
46
38
34
36
65
71
60
43
38
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market; column labels indicate source of
estimate. Forecasts include interest rates as well. The yearly averages for 2011, 2012, and 2013 were 4.5%, 3.7%, and 4.0%, respectively. The
three sources project an annual average rate of 4.2% for 2014. For 2015, their projections ranged from 4.3% to 4.8%.
Housing Starts and Homes Sales
Housing Starts, thousands
Home Sales. thousands
Year
Total, FNMA
estimate
Total,
FHLMC
estimate
Total,
MBA
estimate
Total, FNMA
estimate
Total,
FHLMC
estimate
Total,
MBA
estimate
Existing,
MBA
estimate
New,
MBA
Estimate
FY 2011
FY 2012
FY 2013
FY 2014
FY 2015
609
781
925
996
1170
610
780
920
1000
1200
612
783
930
994
1108
4566
5028
5519
5371
5661
4570
5030
5500
5350
5600
4501
5030
5505
5331
5655
4200
4661
5073
4889
5153
301
369
432
442
502
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market; column labels indicate source of estimate.
12
STATE OF THE MARKET
ORIGINATOR PROFITABILITY
When originator profitability is high, mortgage rates tend to be less responsive to the general level of interest
rates, as originators are capacity-constrained. When originator profitability is low, mortgage rates are far more
responsive to the general level of interest rates. As interest rates have risen from the lows in 2012, and fewer
borrowers find it economical to refinance, originator profitability is lower. Originator profitability is often
measured as the spread between the rate the borrower pays for the mortgage (the primary rate) and the yield on
the underlying mortgage-backed security in the secondary market (the secondary rate). However, with guarantee
fees up dramatically from 2011 levels, the so-called primary-secondary spread has become a very imperfect
measure to compare profitability across time.
The measure used here, Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC), is formulated and calculated by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It looks at the price at which the originator actually sells the mortgage into
the secondary market and adds the value of retained servicing (both base and excess servicing, net of g-fees) as
well as points paid by the borrower. In 2014, this measure has been in the narrow range of 2.04 to 2.31, and now
stands at 2.16.
Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs
Dollars per $100 loan
6
5
4
3
2.16
2
1
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
November 2014
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, updated monthly and available at this link:
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/2013/1113fust.html and Urban Institute.
Note: OPUC stands for "originator profits and unmeasured costs" as discussed in Fuster et al. (2013). The OPUC series is a monthly (4-week
moving) average.
13
STATE OF THE MARKET
CREDIT
CREDIT AVAILABILITY
AVAILABILITY FOR
FOR
PURCHASE LOANS
Access to credit has become extremely tight, especially for borrowers with low FICO scores. The mean and median
FICO scores on new originations have drifted up about 42 and 44 points over the last decade, respectively. The 10th
percentile of FICO scores, which represents the lower bound of creditworthiness needed to qualify for a mortgage,
stood at 662 as of September 2014. Prior to the housing crisis, this threshold held steady in the low 600s. LTV levels
at origination remain relatively high, averaging 85.2, which reflects the large number of FHA purchase originations.
Borrower FICO Score at Origination
FICO Score
90th percentile
Mean
Median
10th percentile
850
800
801
750
749
740
700
662
650
600
550
500
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Sources: CoreLogic Prime Servicing and Urban Institute.
Note: Purchase-only loans.
2013
2014
September 2014
Combined LTV at Origination
LTV
90th percentile
Mean
Median
10th percentile
110
100
100
90
89.7
85.2
80
70
66.7
60
50
40
30
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Sources: CoreLogic Prime Servicing and Urban Institute.
Note: Purchase-only loans.
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
September 2014
14
San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco CA
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA
Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley CA
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro OR-WA
San Diego-Carlsbad CA
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA
New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ
Newark NJ-PA
Nassau County-Suffolk County NY
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV
Boston MA
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia NC-SC
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade CA
Dallas-Plano-Irving TX
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL
St. Louis MO-IL
Pittsburgh PA
Columbus OH
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford FL
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX
Kansas City MO-KS
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall FL
Philadelphia PA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise NV
Fort Worth-Arlington TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels TX
Cincinnati OH-KY-IN
Detroit-Dearborn-Livonia MI
Cleveland-Elyria OH
STATE OF THE MARKET
CREDIT AVAILABILITY
AVAILABILITY FOR
FOR
CREDIT
PURCHASE LOANS
Credit has been tight for all borrowers with less-than-stellar credit scores, but there are significant variations across
MSAs. For example, the mean origination FICO for borrowers in San Francisco- Redwood City- South San Francisco,
CA is 770, while in Cleveland-Elyria OH it is 725. Across all MSAs, lower average FICO scores tend to be correlated
with high average LTVs, as these MSAs rely heavily on FHA/VA financing.
Origination FICO and LTV by MSA
Origination FICO
Mean origination FICO score
Mean origination LTV
Origination LTV
780
100
770
95
760
90
750
85
740
80
730
75
720
70
710
65
700
60
Sources: CoreLogic Prime Servicing as of September 2014 and Urban Institute.
Note: Purchase-only loans.
15
STATE OF THE MARKET
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
National Housing Affordability Over Time
$300
$280
$260
$240
$220
$200
$180
$160
$140
$120
$279,159
Credit
Bubble
$238,861
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
$205,000
2001
Sources: CoreLogic, US Census, Freddie Mac
and Urban Institute.
Note: The maximum affordable price is the
house price that a family can afford putting 20
percent down, with a monthly payment of 28
percent of median family income, at the
Freddie Mac prevailing rate for 30-year fixedrate mortgage, and property tax and insurance
at 1.75 percent of housing value.
Max affordable price
Housing Prices ($ thousands)
2000
Home prices are still very affordable
by historical standards, despite
increases over the last three years.
Even if interest rates rose to 6
percent, affordability would be at the
long-term historical average.
Median sales price
Max affordable price at 6.0% rate
September 2014
Affordability Adjusted for MSA-Level DTI
Ratio
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
16
Cleveland-Elyria OH
Columbus OH
Pittsburgh PA
Sources: CoreLogic, US Census, Freddie Mac and UI calculations based on NAR methodology.
Note: Index is calculated relative to home prices in 2000-03. A ratio above 1 indicates higher affordability in September 2014 than in
2000-03.
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise NV
Cincinnati OH-KY-IN
Kansas City MO-KS
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO
St. Louis MO-IL
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia NC-SC
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford FL
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade CA
Detroit-Dearborn-Livonia MI
Nassau County-Suffolk County NY
Fort Worth-Arlington TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels TX
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA
Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley CA
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD
Philadelphia PA
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ
Dallas-Plano-Irving TX
San Diego-Carlsbad CA
Newark NJ-PA
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall FL
Boston MA
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro OR-WA
New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ
San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco CA
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA
0.7
STATE OF THE MARKET
HOME PRICE INDICES
National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth
The strong year-over-year house price growth through 2013 has slowed somewhat in 2014, as indicated by both
the repeat-sales HPI from CoreLogic and hedonic index from Zillow.
Year-over-year growth rate
20%
15%
CoreLogic HPI
10%
5%
0%
6.4%
6.1%
Zillow HVI
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Sources: CoreLogic, Zillow, and Urban Institute.
2013
2014
October2014
Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAs
Despite rising 29.6 percent from the trough, national house prices still must grow 14.2 percent to reach pre-crisis
peak levels. At the MSA level, three of the top 15 MSAs have reached their peak HPI– Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; and
Denver, CO. Several MSAs particularly hard hit by the boom and bust– Phoenix, AZ, Riverside, CA, Orlando, FL
and Miami, FL– would need to rise more than 40 percent to return to peak levels.
HPI changes (%)
MSA
United States
New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA
Dallas-Plano-Irving TX
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD
San Diego-Carlsbad CA
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine CA
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford FL
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall FL
2000 to peak
Peak to
trough
Trough to
current
% Rise needed
to achieve
peak
99.0
115.7
181.6
65.3
40.8
159.8
44.4
126.3
194.5
38.3
74.0
94.2
36.2
128.7
148.7
162.5
148.0
204.4
-32.4
-20.0
-39.1
-36.5
-33.6
-33.3
-12.6
-52.8
-53.3
-13.7
-30.5
-31.9
-14.4
-25.5
-38.2
-36.8
-55.1
-52.8
29.6
18.7
44.3
24.4
38.4
28.1
32.0
48.9
48.7
26.7
26.3
36.4
34.9
9.4
37.6
38.7
41.3
48.4
14.2
5.3
13.7
26.5
8.8
17.1
-13.3
42.2
44.0
-8.5
14.0
7.6
-13.4
22.7
17.6
14.1
57.6
42.7
Sources: CoreLogic HPIs as of October 2014 and Urban Institute.
Note: This table includes the largest 15 Metropolitan areas by mortgage count.
17
STATE OF THE MARKET
NEGATIVE EQUITY & SERIOUS
DELINQUENCY
Negative Equity Share
With housing prices appreciating through the first half of 2014, residential properties in negative equity (LTV
greater than 100) as a share of all residential properties with a mortgage have dropped to 10.7 percent. Residential
properties in near negative equity (LTV between 95 and 100) comprise another 2.7 percent.
35%
30%
25%
Near or in negative
equity
20%
13.4%
15%
10%
Negative equity
10.7%
5%
2Q14
1Q14
4Q13
3Q13
2Q13
1Q13
4Q12
3Q12
2Q12
1Q12
4Q11
3Q11
2Q11
1Q11
4Q10
3Q10
2Q10
1Q10
4Q09
3Q09
0%
Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.
Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure
Serious delinquencies and foreclosures continue to decline with the housing recovery, but remain quite high
relative to the early 2000s. Loans 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure totaled 4.7 percent in the third quarter
of 2014, down from 5.7 percent for the same quarter a year earlier.
10%
9%
Percent of loans 90
days delinquent or in
foreclosure
Percent of loans in
foreclosure
8%
7%
6%
4.7%
5%
4%
Percent of loans 90
days delinquent
3%
2.4%
2%
2.3%
1%
3Q00
1Q01
3Q01
1Q02
3Q02
1Q03
3Q03
1Q04
3Q04
1Q05
3Q05
1Q06
3Q06
1Q07
3Q07
1Q08
3Q08
1Q09
3Q09
1Q10
3Q10
1Q11
3Q11
1Q12
3Q12
1Q13
3Q13
1Q14
3Q14
0%
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute.
18
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
GSE PORTFOLIO WIND-DOWN
Freddie and Fannie continue to shrink their portfolios, though at a slightly slower pace. Year-over-year, Fannie
has contracted by 13.6 percent, and Freddie Mac by 15.7 percent. As of August 2014, they were both below
their year-end 2014 portfolio cap. They are shrinking their less liquid assets (mortgage loans and non-agency
MBS) at close to the same pace that they are shrinking their entire portfolio.
Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition
Fannie MBS in portfolio
Non-FNMA agency MBS
Non-agency MBS
Mortgage loans
($ billions)
900
Current size: $436.3 billion
Current cap: $469.625 billion
Shrinkage year-over-year: 13.6%
Shrinkage in less-liquid assets yearover-year: 12.1%
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2012
2013
2014
October 2014
October 2014
Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition
FHLMC MBS in portfolio
Non-FHLMC agency MBS
Non-agency MBS
Mortgage loans
($ billions)
Current size: $4106.8 billion
Current cap: $469.625 billion
Shrinkage year-over-year: 15.7%
Shrinkage in less-liquid assets yearover-year: 17.6%
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
2011
2012
2013
2014
October 2014
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2012
2013
2014
October 2014
19
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FEES AND
GSE RISK-SHARING TRANSACTIONS
Effective Guarantee Fees
Fannie’s average charged g-fee on new single-family originations was 63.5 bps in Q3 2014, up slightly from 62.6 in
the previous quarter. This is a marked increase over 2012 (39.9 bps) and 2011 (28.8 bps), and has contributed to
the GSEs’ profits. Fannie’s 2014 loan-level price adjustments (LLPAs) are shown in the second table. The 25 bp
Adverse Market Delivery Charge has been added to these upfront numbers. The FHFA asked for input about the
level of g-fees and LLPAs in summer of this year.
70
63.5
60
Fannie Mae single-family effective gfee rate
50
Fannie Mae single-family average
charged g-fee on new acquisitions
Freddie Mac management and g-fee
rate
40
41.2
30
32.4
20
10
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mae and Urban
Institute.
Note: Freddie only reports the effective g-fee
on the entire book of business.
1Q09
2Q09
3Q09
4Q09
1Q10
2Q10
3Q10
4Q10
1Q11
2Q11
3Q11
4Q11
1Q12
2Q12
3Q12
4Q12
1Q13
2Q13
3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
2Q14
3Q14
0
Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)
LTV
Credit Score
≤60
> 740
0.00%
720 – 739
90.01 –
95
95.01 – 97
0.50%
0.50%
0.50%
0.75%
60.01 – 70 70.01 – 75 75.01 – 80 80.01 – 85 85.01 – 90
0.25%
0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
0.75%
0.75%
0.75%
700 – 719
0.00%
0.75%
1.00%
1.25%
1.25%
1.25%
1.25%
1.25%
680 – 699
0.25%
0.75%
1.50%
2.00%
1.75%
1.50%
1.50%
1.25%
660 – 679
0.25%
1.25%
2.25%
2.75%
3.00%
2.50%
2.50%
2.00%
640 – 659
0.75%
1.50%
2.75%
3.25%
3.50%
3.00%
3.00%
2.50%
620 – 639
0.75%
1.75%
3.25%
3.50%
3.50%
3.25%
< 620
0.75%
1.75%
3.25%
3.50%
0.50%
3.25%
0.50%
3.50%
3.25%
3.50%
3.50%
3.50%
Product Feature (Cumulative)
Investment Property
1.75%
1.75%
1.75%
3.00%
3.75%
N/A
N/A
N/A
2-unit property
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
N/A
N/A
N/A
3-4 unit property
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Condominiums
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.75%
0.75%
0.75%
0.75%
0.75%
Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.
Note: Adverse Market Delivery Charge (AMDC) of 0.250% has been added to the LLPA numbers in the matrix by LTV and credit
score. Freddie Mac charges very comparable LLPAs.
20
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
GSE RISK-SHARING
TRANSACTIONS
Freddie Mac – Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR)
Date
Transaction
Reference Pool Size ($ millions)
July 24, 2013
STACR Series 2013 - DN1
$22,584.40
November 12, 2013
STACR Series 2013 - DN2
$35,327.30
February 6, 2014
STACR Series 2014 - DN1
$32,076.80
April 2, 2014
STACR Series 2014 - DN2
$28,146.98
August 6, 2014
STACR Series 2014 - DN3
$19,746.23
August 6, 2014
STACR Series 2014 – HQ1
$9,974.68
September 10, 2014
STACR Series 2014 – HQ2
$33,434.43
October 23, 2014
STACR Series 2014 – DN4
$15,740.71
October 23, 2014
STACR Series 2014 – HQ3
$8,000.61
Freddie Mac Total Reference Collateral
$205,032.14
Percent of Freddie Mac’s Total Book of Business
13.3%
Fannie Mae – Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS)
Date
Transaction
Reference Pool Size ($ millions)
October 24, 2013
CAS 2013 – C01
$26,756.40
January 14, 2014
CAS 2014 – C01
$29,308.70
May 28, 2014
CAS 2014 – C02
$60,818.48
July 25, 2014
CAS 2014 – C03
$78,233.73
November 19, 2014
CAS 2014 – C04
$58,872.70
Fannie Mae Total Reference Collateral
$248,990.01
Percent of Fannie Mae’s Total Book of Business
9.5%
Details of Fannie Mae’s latest capital markets transaction, CAS 2014 – C04
Class
1A-H
Amount ($ millions)
Tranche Thickness (%)
CE (%)
Rating
Coupon
(1mL+)
$34,770.00
97
3
NR
--
1M-1, 1M-1H, Total
$340.5, $17.9, $358.4
1.0
2
M: Baa3 , D: BBB
195
1M-2, 1M-2H, Total
$578.5, $30.9, $609.4
1.7
.3
NR
490
$107.50
0.3
0
NR
--
1B-H
2A-H
$17,351.40
96.25
3.75
NR
--
2M-1, 2M-1H, Total
$205, $11.3, $216.3
1.2
2.55
M: Baa2, D: BBB (low)
210
2M-2, 2M-2H, Total
$325, $17.5, $342.5
1.9
0.65
NR
500
2B-H
Reference Pool Size
$117.20
$53,872.70
0.65
100
0
--
NR
--
---
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Note: Classes A-H, M-1H, M-2H, and B-H are reference tranches only. These classes are not issued or sold. The risk is retained by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. “CE” = credit enhancement. Under “Rating,” “F” = Fitch, “M” = Moody’s, “D” = DBRS.
21
SERIOUS
DELINQUENCY
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
SERIOUS
RATES
RATES ATDELINQUENCY
THE GSEs
Serious delinquency rates of GSE loans continue to decline as the legacy portfolio is resolved and the pristine, post2009 book of business exhibits very low default rates. As of October 2014, 1.92 percent of the Fannie portfolio and
1.91 percent of the Freddie portfolio were seriously delinquent, down from 2.48 percent for both Fannie and
Freddie in October 2013.
Serious Delinquency Rates–Fannie Mae
Single-family: Non-credit enhanced
Single-family: Credit enhanced
Single-family: Total
Percentage of total loans
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
3.56%
2%
1.92%
1.65%
0%
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
October 2014
Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.
Serious Delinquency Rates–Freddie Mac
Single-family: Non-credit enhanced
Single-family: Credit enhanced
Single-family: Total
PMI Credit Enhanced*
Percentage of total loans
10%
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2006
3.89%
2.69%
1.91%
1.77%
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
October 2014
Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Note*: Following a change in Freddie reporting in September 2014, we switched from reporting credit enhanced delinquency rates to PMI
credit enhanced delinquency rates.
22
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATES
Serious delinquencies for FHA and GSE single-family loans continue to decline, but remain high relative to 20052007. FHA delinquencies are declining from a higher relative starting point. GSE multifamily delinquencies have
declined to pre-crisis levels, though they did not reach problematic levels even in the worst years.
Serious Delinquency Rates–Single-Family Loans
FHA
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
10%
9%
8%
7%
6%
6.18%
5%
4%
3%
1.96%
2%
1%
3Q14
1Q14
3Q13
1Q13
3Q12
1Q12
3Q11
1Q11
3Q10
1Q10
3Q09
1Q09
3Q08
1Q08
3Q07
1Q07
3Q06
1Q06
3Q05
1Q05
0%
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MBA Delinquency Survey and Urban Institute.
Note: Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process.
Serious Delinquency Rates–Multifamily GSE Loans
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
Percentage of total loans
0.9%
0.8%
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.0%
2005
0.06%
0.03%
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
October 2014
Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.
Note: Multifamily serious delinquency rate is the unpaid balance of loans 60 days or more past due, divided by the total unpaid balance.
23
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
REFINANCE ACTIVITY
The Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) refinances have begun to slow. Two factors are responsible for
this: (1) higher interest rates, leaving fewer eligible loans where refinancing is economically advantageous (in-themoney), and (2) a considerable number of borrowers who have already refinanced. Nonetheless, HARP refinances
total 3.2 million since the Q2 2009 program inception, accounting for 16.2 percent of all GSE refinances in this
period.
Total HARP Refinance Volume
Fannie Mae
(thousands)
Freddie Mac
Total
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
14
9
20
0
Jun-12
5
Sep-12
Dec-12
Mar-13
Jun-13
Sep-13
Dec-13
Mar-14
Jun-14
Sep-14
HARP Refinances
September Year-to-date
2014
2014
Inception to
date
2013
2012
2011
Total refinances
138,510
1,104,642
19,976,893
4,081,911
4,750,530
3,229,066
Total HARP refinances
14,399
175,105
3,233,061
892,914
1,074,769
400,024
Share 80–105 LTV
74.7%
71.9%
69.9%
56.4%
56.4%
85.0%
Share 105–125 LTV
16.8%
17.4%
17.2%
22.4%
22.4%
15.0%
Share >125 LTV
8.5%
10.7%
12.9%
21.2%
21%
0%
All other streamlined
refinances
21,144
207,503
3,460,702
735,210
729,235
785,049
Sources: FHFA Refinance Report and Urban Institute.
24
GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP
GSE LOANS:
POTENTIAL REFINANCES
To qualify for HARP, a loan must be originated before the June 2009 cutoff date, have a marked-to-market loan-tovalue (MTM LTV) ratio above 80, and have no more than one delinquent payment in the past year and none in the
past six months. There are 824,430 eligible loans, but 44 percent are out-of-the-money because the closing cost
would exceed the long-term savings, leaving 464,594 loans where a HARP refinance is both permissible and
economically advantageous for the borrower. Loans below the LTV minimum but meeting all other HARP
requirements are eligible for GSE streamlined refinancing. Of the 6,828,437 loans in this category, 5,349,314 are
in-the-money.
More than two thirds of the GSE book of business that meets the pay history requirements was originated after the
June, 2009 cutoff date. FHFA Director Mel Watt announced in May 2014 that they are not planning to extend the
date, as too few borrowers (535,495 by our estimate) would benefit from the change.
Total loan count
26,858,770
Loans that do not meet pay history requirement
Loans that meet pay history requirement:
878,205
25,980,565
Pre-June 2009 origination
7,652,867
Post-June 2009 origination
18,327,698
Loans Meeting HARP Pay History Requirements
Pre-June 2009
LTV category
In-the-money
Out-of-the-money
Total
≤80
5,349,314
1,479,123
6,828,437
>80
464,594
359,836
824,430
Total
5,813,908
1,838,959
7,652,867
LTV category
In-the-money
Out-of-the-money
Total
≤80
2,609,307
12,996,314
15,605,621
>80
535,495
2,186,582
2,722,077
Total
3,144,802
15,182,896
18,327,698
Post-June 2009
Sources: CoreLogic Prime Servicing as of October 2014.
Note: Figures are scaled up from source data to account for data coverage of the GSE active loan market (based on MBS data from eMBS).
Shaded box indicates HARP-eligible loans that are in-the-money.
25
MODIFICATION ACTIVITY
HAMP ACTIVITY
In 2014 Q3, new HAMP activity declined in terms of trial and permanent mods relative to last year. New trial mods
have averaged just over 30,000 per quarter in 2014, compared to over 45,000 per quarter in 2013. Cumulative
permanent HAMP mods started now total over 1.4 million, and 961,700 of these are active permanent mods.
New HAMP Modifications
New Trial Mods Started
New Permanent Mods Started
New Active Permanent Mods Started
Number of mods
(thousands)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
33
50
30
0
3.2
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2014 Q3
Sources: U.S. Treasury Making Home Affordable and Urban Institute.
Cumulative HAMP Modifications
All Trials Mods Started
All Permanent mods started
Active Permanent Mods
Number of mods
(millions)
2.5
2.2
2
1.5
1.4
1
0.96
0.5
0
2009 Q1
2009 Q3
2010 Q1
2010 Q3
2011 Q1
2011 Q3
Sources: U.S. Treasury Making Home Affordable and Urban Institute.
2012 Q1
2012 Q3
2013 Q1
2013 Q3
2014 Q1
2014 Q3
26
MODIFICATION ACTIVITY
MODIFICATION BY TYPE OF
ACTION AND BEARER OF RISK
The share of principal reduction modifications peaked at 20 percent in December 2012 before dropping
dramatically to 5 percent in Q2 2014. This is to be expected, as increasing home prices have increased equity,
reducing the need for principal reduction and making such modifications less likely to be net-present-value
positive. Portfolio loans are the most likely candidates for principal reduction, followed by private investor loans,
because the GSEs and FHA/VA generally do not allow this type of modification.
Changes in Loan Terms for Modifications
Modification Quarter
13Q1
13Q2
13Q3
13Q4
14Q1
14Q2
One quarter
% change
One year
% change
Capitalization
79.3
81.6
83.5
87.7
74.3
59
-20.6
-27.7
Rate reduction
80.1
81.0
78.9
76.7
73.3
71.9
-1.9
-11.3
Rate freeze
3.7
5.2
5.5
7
6.5
7.1
8.7
36.9
Term extension
60.3
67.7
69.3
75.9
78
84
7.7
24.1
Principal reduction
15.2
12.2
13.6
10.5
8.1
5
-38.4
-58.8
Principal deferral
18.2
20.5
25.3
30.6
25.1
11.5
-54.1
-43.8
Not reported*
0.7
1.5
2.2
0.7
0.7
0.7
5.0
-52.1
Sources: OCC Mortgage Metrics Report for the Second Quarter of 2014 and Urban Institute.
Note: This table presents modifications of each type as a share of total modifications. Columns sum to over 100% because loans often receive
modifications with multiple features.
*Processing constraints at some servicers prevented them from reporting specific modified term(s).
Type of Modification Action by Investor and Product Type
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
Governmentguaranteed
Private
Investor
Portfolio
Overall
Capitalization
97.3%
96.6%
21.8%
91.0%
94.1%
59.0%
Rate reduction
52.1%
70.0%
78.0%
73.3%
72.1%
71.9%
Rate freeze
10.2%
5.7%
6.8%
4.1%
8.5%
7.1%
Term extension
93.0%
94.0%
96.6%
31.9%
59.2%
84.0%
Principal reduction
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
16.2%
25.5%
5.0%
Principal deferral
13.5%
18.5%
3.9%
23.1%
22.1%
11.5%
Not reported*
0.6%
0.2%
0.8%
1.2%
0.3%
0.7%
Sources: OCC Mortgage Metrics Report for the Second Quarter of 2014 and Urban Institute.
Note: This table presents modifications of each type as a share of total modifications. Columns sum to over 100% because loans often receive
modifications with multiple features.
*Processing constraints at some servicers prevented them from reporting specific modified term(s).
27
MODIFICATION ACTIVITY
MODIFICATIONS AND
LIQUIDATIONS
Total modifications (HAMP and proprietary) are now roughly equal to total liquidations. Hope Now reports show
7,270,681 borrowers have received a modification since Q3 2007, compared with 7,368,165 liquidations in the
same period. Both liquidation and modification activity are slowing significantly, and are on pace to end far below
their 2013 total. Only 34,047 modifications were completed in September 2014, a 50 percent reduction from the
monthly rate in early 2013.
Loan Modifications and Liquidations
Number of loans (thousands)
1,600
1,400
1,200
593.2
1,000
800
140.2
336.7
600
400
200
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Proprietary mods
Liquidations
0
2007 (Q3Q4)
HAMP mods
2014
(Ann.)
Sources: Hope Now Reports and
Urban Institute.
Note: Liquidations includes both
foreclosure sales and short sales.
Annualized figure based on data
from September 2014.
Cumulative Modifications and Liquidations
Number of loans (millions)
7.4
8
5.9
7
6
HAMP mods
5
Proprietary mods
4
Liquidations
1.4
3
2
1
Sources: Hope Now Reports and
Urban Institute.
Note: Liquidations includes both
foreclosure sales and short sales.
0
2007 (Q3Q4)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014 YTD
28
MODIFICATION ACTIVITY
MODIFICATION REDEFAULT
RATES BY BEARER OF THE RISK
Redefault rates on modified loans have come down dramatically from 2008 to 2013. For the period as a whole,
the steepest drops have been on private label modifications. More recently, there have been sharp declines in the
redefault rates on government-guaranteed modifications, although this product type still has higher redefault
rates than others.
Redefault Rate 12 Months after Modification
80%
70%
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
Government-guaranteed
Private
Redefault rate
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Portfolio Loans
10%
Overall
0%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Year of modification
Sources: OCC Mortgage Metrics Report for the Second Quarter of 2014 and Urban Institute.
Redefault Rate 24 Months after Modification
80%
70%
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
Government-guaranteed
Private
Portfolio loans
Overall
Redefault rate
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Year of modification
Sources: OCC Mortgage Metrics Report for the Second Quarter of 2014 and Urban Institute.
29
AGENCY ISSUANCE
AGENCY GROSS AND
NET ISSUANCE
With refinancing activity falling off with rising interest rates, newly issued agency securities (agency gross issuance)
have fallen off as well. Agency gross issuance through November totaled $856 billion, a 43 percent decline yearover-year. Net issuance, which excludes repayments, prepayments, and refinances on outstanding mortgages,
remains low and dominated by Ginnie Mae. This is unsurprising, given the increased role of FHA and VA since the
crisis.
Agency Gross Issuance
Agency Net Issuance
Issuance
Year
GSEs
Ginnie Mae
Total
Issuance
Year
GSEs
Ginnie Mae
Total
2000
$360.6
$102.2
$462.8
2000
$159.8
$29.3
$189.1
2001
$885.1
$171.5
$1,056.6
2001
$367.8
-$9.9
$357.9
2002
$1,238.9
$169.0
$1,407.9
2002
$357.6
-$51.2
$306.4
2003
$1,874.9
$213.1
$2,088.0
2003
$335.0
-$77.6
$257.4
2004
$872.6
$119.2
$991.9
2004
$83.3
-$40.1
$43.2
2005
$894.0
$81.4
$975.3
2005
$174.4
-$42.2
$132.1
2006
$853.0
$76.7
$929.7
2006
$313.6
$0.3
$313.8
2007
$1,066.2
$94.9
$1,161.1
2007
$514.7
$30.9
$545.5
2008
$911.4
$267.6
$1,179.0
2008
$314.3
$196.4
$510.7
2009
$1,280.0
$451.3
$1,731.3
2009
$249.5
$257.4
$506.8
2010
$1,003.5
$390.7
$1,394.3
2010
-$305.5
$198.2
-$107.3
2011
$879.3
$315.3
$1,194.7
2011
-$133.4
$149.4
$16.0
2012
$1,288.8
$405.0
$1,693.8
2012
-$46.5
$118.4
$71.9
2013
$1,176.6
$393.6
$1,570.1
2013
$66.5
$85.8
$152.3
2014 YTD
$586.1
$269.5
$855.6
2014 YTD
$18.6
$55.9
$74.5
%Change
year-over-year
-47.6%
-27.7%
-42.7%
%Change
year-over-year
-69.7%
-31.7%
-48.0%
2014 (Ann.)
$639.33
$294.02
$933.35
2014 (Ann.)
$20.30
$61.00
$81.30
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Dollar amounts are in billions.
Year-to-date figure as of November 2014.
Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.
Note: Dollar amounts are in billions.
Year-to-date figure as of November 2014.
30
AGENCY GROSS AND NET
AGENCY GROSS
ISSUANCE &
ISSUANCE
BY MONTH
FED PURCHASES
AGENCY ISSUANCE
Monthly Gross Issuance
While government and GSE
lending have dominated the
mortgage market since the crisis,
there has been a change in the
mix. The Ginnie Mae share
reached a peak of 28 percent of
total agency issuance in 2010,
declined to 25 percent in 2013,
and has since then risen to 32
percent in November 2014. The
recent increase in the Ginnie Mae
share reflects the decline in
refinance activity, as Ginnie Mae
is less impacted by this decline.
Fannie Mae
($ billions)
Freddie Mac
Ginnie Mae
250
200
150
100
50
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute.
November 2014
Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance
In 2013, the Fed absorbed nearly 50 percent of agency gross issuance. In Q1 2014, the Fed began to taper, but gross
issuance dropped even more, and Fed absorption reached 74 percent. In Q2 and Q3, gross issuance increased and
the Fed continued to taper, resulting in the Fed absorbing a lower percent of gross issuance. In October, the Fed
announced the end of its purchase program. However, buying will continue at a much reduced level, as the Fed is
likely to keep reinvesting funds from pay downs on mortgages and agency debentures into the mortgage market. In
November, total Fed purchase declined to $18.7 billion, yielding 23 percent Fed absorption of gross issuance, down
from October’s 27 percent.
Gross issuance
($ billions)
Total Fed purchases
250
200
150
100
50
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute.
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
November 2014
31
AGENCY ISSUANCE
MORTGAGE INSURANCE
ACTIVITY
MI Activity
Overall mortgage insurance activity experienced a second consecutive quarter of significant increase in Q3 2014,
reaching $123 billion. Private mortgage insurers lead the way, with a $10 billion quarterly increase and a jump in
market share to 44 percent (41 percent for 2014 overall). The FHA share dropped to 30.8 percent for the quarter,
and 34 percent for 2014 overall, despite an uptick in endorsements to $38 billion from $36 billion.
Total private primary MI
FHA
VA
Total
200
150
$123.0
100
$54.0
50
$38.0
0
1Q11
$31.1
2Q11
3Q11
4Q11
1Q12
2Q12
3Q12
4Q12
1Q13
2Q13
3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
2Q14
3Q14
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
MI Market Share
Total private primary MI
FHA
VA
24.7%
100%
90%
80%
34.0%
70%
60%
50%
40%
41.3%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Q1-3
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.
32
AGENCY ISSUANCE
MORTGAGE INSURANCE
ACTIVITY
The top table depicts the history of FHA mortgage insurance premiums since 2001. Annual premiums have more
than doubled since 2008, as FHA has worked to shore up its finances. The most recent change increased the
annual premium by 10 bps and kept the upfront premium at 1.75 percent. The bottom table compares FHA and
GSE execution. For a 97 LTV mortgage, borrowers with a FICO score below 720 will find FHA a more attractive
product, while those above 720 will find GSE execution with PMI to be more favorable.
FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan
Case number date
Upfront mortgage insurance premium
(UFMIP) paid
Annual mortgage insurance
premium (MIP)
1/1/2001 - 7/13/2008
7/14/2008 - 9/30/2008*
10/1/2008 - 4/4/2010
4/5/2010 - 10/3/2010
10/4/2010 - 4/17/2011
4/18/2011 - 4/8/2012
4/9/2012 - 6/10/2012
6/11/2012 - 3/31/2013a
4/1/2013 - presentb
150
175
175
225
100
100
175
175
175
50
55
55
55
90
115
125
125
135
Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.
Note: A typical purchase loan has an LTV over 95 and a loan term longer than 15 years. Mortgage insurance premiums are listed in basis points.
* For a short period the FHA used a risk based FICO/LTV matrix for MI. This table assumes the average FICO for 2008 purchase originations, ~630.
a
Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 150 bps.
b
Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to $625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 155 bps.
Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI
Assumptions
Property Value
Loan Amount
LTV
Base Rate
Conforming
FHA
FICO
FHA MI Premiums
FHA UFMIP
FHA MIP*
PMI
GSE AMDC & LLPA
PMI Annual MIP
Monthly Payment
FHA
PMI
PMI Advantage
$250,000
$242,500
97
4.29%
4.00%
620 - 639
640 - 659
660 - 679
680 - 699
700 - 719
720 - 739
740 - 759
760 +
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
1.75
1.35
3.25
1.48
2.50
1.48
2.00
1.48
1.25
1.31
1.25
1.31
0.75
1.10
0.50
1.10
0.50
1.05
$1,451
$1,592
($141)
$1,451
$1,570
($119)
$1,451
$1,555
($104)
$1,451
$1,499
($48)
$1,451
$1,499
($48)
$1,451
$1,442
$9
$1,451
$1,435
$16
$1,451
$1,425
$26
Sources: Genworth Mortgage Insurance, Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.
Note: Mortgage insurance premiums listed in percentage points. LLPA= Loan Level Price Adjustment, described in detail on page 20. Grey
shade indicates FHA monthly payment is more favorable, while blue indicates PMI is more favorable.
33
RELATED HFPC WORK
PUBLICATIONS AND EVENTS
Upcoming Events
Measuring Mortgage Credit Availability – January 6, 2015 at 12:00 PM
There is a widespread perception that mortgage credit has been exceptionally tight since at least 2009, but until
recently there have been no good measures of this. At this Lunchtime Data Talk, speakers from three different
organizations that have developed credit availability indices – CoreLogic, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and
the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center– will describe the methodology and utility of their measures.
Visit our events page to register.
Publications
Blog Posts
Servicing: An Underappreciated Constraint to Access to
Credit
Author: Laurie Goodman
Date: December 16, 2014
New measure shows mortgage denial rate is triple
traditional estimates
Authors: Wei Li and Laurie Goodman
Date: December 16, 2014
A Better Measure of Mortgage Application Denial Rates The biggest obstacle to a mortgage market recover that
Authors: Wei Li and Laurie Goodman
nobody is talking about
Date: December 2, 2014
Authors: Laurie Goodman and Taz George
Date: December 16, 2014
Measuring Mortgage Credit Availability Using Ex-Ante
Probability of Default
New credit availability measure shows product risk, not
Authors: Wei Li and Laurie Goodman
borrower risk, fueled the housing crisis
Date: November 18, 2014
Authors: Wei Li and Laurie Goodman
Date: December 9, 2014
Measuring Mortgage Credit Accessibility
Authors: Wei Li, Laurie Goodman, Ellen Seidman, Jim
Risk sharing deals support reduction in Freddie and
Parrott, Jun Zhu, and Bing Bai
Fannie guarantee fees
Date: November 3, 2014
Author: Laurie Goodman
Date: December 3, 2014
Comment Letter on the CFPB’s HMDA mortgage
data proposal
Three trends that signal hard times for renters in 2015
Authors: Ellen Seidman, Laurie Goodman, Wei Li
Author: Ellen Seidman
Jim Parrott, Kathryn L.S. Pettit, Carlos Martin,
Date: November 18, 2014
and Peter Tatian
Date: October 22, 2014
The 15-year mortgage is not a silver bullet for lowincome borrowers
Assessing the Proposed Housing Goals
Author: Ellen Seidman, Laurie Goodman, and Jun Zhu
Authors: Jim Parrott, Laurie Goodman, Wei Li
Date: November 13, 2014
Ellen Seidman, and Jun Zhu
Date: October 22, 2014
Uncertainty ahead for housing finance reform with
Republican surge
A New View of the Housing Boom and Bust
Author: Zach McDade and Sheryl Pardo
Authors: Bing Bai and Taz George
Date: November 5, 2014
Date: September 17, 2014
Why the Government Sponsored Enterprises’ support
Charting the Course to a Single Security
of low-down payment loans again is no big deal
Authors: Laurie Goodman and Lewis Ranieri
Author: Taz George, Laurie Goodman, and Jun Zhu
Date: September 3, 2014
Date: November 4, 2014
34
Copyright © December 2014. The Urban Institute. All rights reserved. Permission is granted for reproduction of this file, with attribution to
the Urban Institute.
The Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research and educational organization that examines the social, economic, and
governance problems facing the nation. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its
trustees, or its funders. The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center (HFPC) was launched with generous support at the leadership
level from the Citi Foundation and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional support was provided by The Ford Foundation
and The Open Society Foundations.
Ongoing support for HFPC is also provided by the Housing Finance Council, a group of firms and individuals supporting high-quality
independent research that informs evidence-based policy development. Funds raised through the Council provide flexible resources, allowing
HFPC to anticipate and respond to emerging policy issues with timely analysis. This funding supports HFPC’s research, outreach and
engagement, and general operating activities. Funders do not determine research findings or influence scholars’ conclusions. Scholars are
independent and empowered to share their evidence-based views and recommendations shaped by research. The Urban Institute does not
take positions on issues.
35