THE AFRICAN DIASPORA AND HOMELAND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Prof. John O. Oucho
Marie Curie Chair
Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations
School of Health and Social Studies
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
J.O.Oucho@warwick.ac.uk
Paper for Theme 4: Transnational Organisations in Post-conflict Reconstruction
CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN TRANSNATIONAL AND RETURN MIGRATION
IN THE CONTEXT OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
University of Warwick, United Kingdom
29-30 June 2009
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INTRODUCTION
Any analysis of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) must of necessity recognise how
conflict erupted and what it left in its wake. In sub-Saharan Africa, this position can
best be captured in the Van Gennip’s (2005: 57) statement that:
Triggering sustainable development in the wake of war itself obviously poses a daunting range
of intellectual, political, economic, social and cultural challenges. Violent conflict inflicts
appalling visible and invisible damage on developing societies. Vital economic infrastructure
is ruined, state institutions often collapse, mistrust of the state soars, schooling is disrupted,
refugees flood into cities, fear replaces confidence, skilled workers flee and war profiteers
with a vested interest in conflict lurk in the shadows prepared to resurrect the very tensions
that allowed them to flourish economically and politically at the expense of the society as a
whole.
As the dust settles on the conflict scene in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), there is a surge
in post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) which has involved the African diaspora in
different countries. Nkurunziza (2008: 1) aptly observes that:
The African continent’s image as a war-prone region with bleak economic prospect is
changing…as most of the conflicts that raged in the 1980s and 1990s have (sic) ended. For the
first time in 50 years, there are currently more cases of post-conflict than conflict countries
(www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge/30754226-EN-2.4.3NKURUNZIZA-TUNIS.PDF).
Much as post-conflict reconstruction has involved individuals remitting funds mainly
to sustain household economies, it has also engaged the attention of groups or
organisations targeting homeland communities and investment opportunities as well.
Analysts of the diaspora’s participation in homeland development have concentrated
on issues that seldom recognise the nature and scope, causes and consequences of the
involvement of the African diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction as SSA consigns
its violent past to the dustbin of a chequered post-colonial history. This positive
development deserves analysis as African transnational and return migration gain
prominence at a time that the (developed) “fortress” North and the major African
countries of destination have intensified immigration-control measures. Moreover,
victims of the violent past seem to embrace both transnationalism and return as
“sweet home” becomes even more reassuring as the place to be after their sojourns.
It has become fashionable in recent times to hold conferences on the roles of African
diaspora and transnational migration in homeland development including post-conflict
reconstruction. For instance, on 7-8 November 2008, the University of Calgary,
Canada held the Transnational Citizenship and the African Conference, consisting of
five main sessions and a round table on fostering global citizenship in the context of
transnationalism. The five sessions were: the new age of transantionalism from the
perspective of long-distance nationalism, civil society and development; democracy,
transnationalism and political belonging; transnationalism in Canada and Europe in
terms of citizenship, multi-culturalism and social movements; African formations,
identities and mobilisation encompassing cultural production, gender-class dynamics
and rethinking “home”; and mobilisation of the for socio-economic development,
capacity building at “home” and post-conflict reconstruction (University of Calgary,
2008). At the behest of the Rockefeller Foundation, a conference was held in Mexico
in February 2007, culminating in the publication of Castles and Wise’s (2008) edited
1
book, Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South. The present
conference addresses African translational and return migration not only from a
North-South perspective, but also with comparative insights from Latin America.
This paper seeks to analyse the participation of the African diaspora in homeland
post-conflict reconstruction (HPCR). It begins by considering inter-linkages of
diaspora, transnationalism and post-conflict reconstruction, among other things
defining these terms. Thereafter, the paper analyses the role of the diaspora in postconflict reconstruction of selected SSA countries which underwent various types of
conflict. The fourth section of the paper examines some of the challenges facing, and
opportunities for, the diapsora in their contribution to post-conflict reconstruction.
Finally, the paper concludes by considering the way forward for better engagement of
the diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction in various spheres of development,
including improvements considered necessary in political economic, social and
cultural spheres to enable SSA benefit from the virtues of globalisation.
DIASPORA-TRANSNATIONALISM-PCR INTER-LINKAGES
Contemporary literature on migration and development often dwells on the diasporaconflict or diaspora-PCR so much that the two concepts are presumed to be clear
when in fact they are sometimes misinterpreted. Therefore, it is important from the
outset to define the concepts “diaspora”, “transnationalism”, “conflict” and “postconflict reconstruction” that now occupy a central place in the burgeoning literature
and that are used numerous times in this paper.
Origins, Definitions and Characterisation of the African Diaspora
Alpers (2001:5, quoted in Blakewell, 2008: 5-6) reports that the term “African
diaspora” was first used in 1965 at the International Congress of African History held
at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania when George Shepperson drew two
important parallels of the dispersal of Africans caused by slavery and imperialism to
the experience of the Jews. Shepperson underlined the movement of slaves to Europe
before the Atlantic and Islamic slave trade and the dispersal of Africans inside their
continent as a result of slave trade and imperialism respectively.
Definitions and characterisation of diaspora vary by disciplines and by the diaspora’s
expectations on the one hand, and the identified homeland on the other. A worldrenowned diaspora scholar provides a taxonomy of consisting of nine features: (i)
dispersed (often traumatic) from the homeland; (ii) self-exiles in search of work, trade
or colonial ambitions; (iii) a collective memory and myth concerning the homeland;
(iv) an idealisation of the homeland; (v) a return movement; (vi) a strong ethnic group
consciousness sustained over a period of time; (vii) an uneasy relationship with the
“host” society; (viii) a sense of solidarity with co-members of the in other states; and
(ix) the possibility of a positive experience in the host country (Cohen, 1997: 180).
Safran (1991, cited in the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, 2006: 9)
identifies four main characteristics of a diaspora as dispersal to two or more locations
related to an original territory; collective mythology of homeland shared by the group
and transmitted through generations to come; idealisation of return to the homeland;
and ongoing relationship with the homeland. These characteristics relate to different
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significant diasporas that have dominated the diaspora discourse, such as the Jewish,
Irish, Chinese and Indian.1 Ionescu (2006) provides the most detailed analysis of
diasporas as development partners for both countries of origin and countries of
destination; the term “diaspora” conveys a collective dimension: as a community, a
group or even as an organised network and association sharing common interests (see
Table1). Conceding that there is no single accepted definition of the term “diaspora”,
Ionescu (2006: 13) broadly defines it as “members of ethnic and national
communities, who have left, but maintain links with, their homelands.”
Table 1 Typology of diaspora initiatives with SSA examples
SSA examples
Nigerian, Ghanaian and Senegalese entrepreneurs
Sierra Leonean Diasporas Council with representatives in countries of
destination
Professional networks
Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association
(ENAHPA), Ethiopians’ Action for Health, Education and Development
(AHEAD), Ethiopians’ Association for Higher Education and
Development (AHEAD), Ghanaian Doctors and Dentists Association
(GDDA) in the UK, Association of Nigerian Physicians in Americas,
South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA)
Scientific networks
African Scientific and Academic Network (ASAN), African Women
Scientific Academic Network (ASN)1, Ethiopian Knowledge and
Technology Transfer Society (EKKTS)
Skills Capacity
Directory of African Development Management Professionals, African
Foundation for Development (AFFORD), African Axis (AFAX)
Community Initiatives
Many African Hometown (including ethnic) Associations in diaspora by
nationals of different SSA countries
Migration and development Association Migrations Solidarités & Exchanges pour le Développement
associations
(AMSED) in France
Gender and development
Many SSA women-only diaspora associations in the UK and France
Umbrella organisations
Many national and ethnic associations of African diaspora
Diaspora networking
Zimbabwean diaspora’s online discussion groups and newspapers,
Ghanaians Abroad
Co-development initiatives Developed between France on the one hand and Senegalese, Malian and
Comorian diasporas on the other, Dutch-African diaspora organisations,
AfroNeth Foundation (platform for African diaspora organisations
Finances
Somalis Xawilaad, microfinance institutions
Notes: 1Rejects the term “brain drain” and adopts “brain mismanagement” and rejects “African
diaspora”, stating that Africa is where Africans are
Type of initiative
Business networks
Chambers of Commerce
Source: Drawn from Dina Ionescu (2006), box 4, pp. 27-30.
Different countries have adopted different interpretations of diasporas.2 Key issues
defining modern diasporas now hinge on time (short-term versus long-time migrants),
1
Brubaker (2005: 3) proposes other putative diasporas, described as dixie, yankee, white, conservative,
gay, deaf, queer, redneck, digital, fundamentalist, terrorist , etc. Curiously, the taxanomy excludes the
“African diaspora”, which the African Union (AU) recognises as its sixth region alongside northern,
western, middle (central), eastern and southern Africa.
2
Ionescu (2006: 13) states that different countries refer to their diasporas as: variously referring to
them as “nationals abroad”, “permanent immigrants”, “citizen if (X)” origin living abroad”, “nonresident of (X) origin”, “expatriates”, “transnational citizen”, etc. The UK House of Commons (Sixth
Report of Session 2003-4, Volume 1, quoted in Ionescu (2006:13) refers to diasporas as “international
migrants who, although dispersed from their homelands, remain in some way part of their community
of origin”.
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place of birth, which defines successive generations of diaspora, citizenship which
could be at origin or destinations or dual, and identity and belonging (pp.13-14).
With advances in the cyberspace, virtual diasporas are becoming increasingly
important in, in lieu of physical return for, homeland development. While some
virtual diasporas contribute positively to PCR, others have become networks that
facilitate transnational terrorist and criminal activity, financing wars in home
countries and cultivating divisive as well as fragmenting nationalism through online
communication (Nautilus Institute Information Tools). Laguerre (.n.d.) states that>
By virtual diaspora, we mean the use of cyberspace by immigrants or descendants of an
immigrant group for the purpose of participating or engaging in online interactional
transactions… with members of the diasporic group living in the same foreign country or in
other countries, with individuals or entities in the homeland, or with non-members of the
group in the hostland and elsewhere. No virtual diaspora can be sustained without real life
diasporas and in this sense it is not a separate entity, but rather a pole of a continuum.
The African diaspora has been defined through different epochs underlining varying
standpoints. It is not only often misunderstood, but is also too complex to interpret
without exploring its nature, dimensions and changing configuration. Indeed, the
notion that the African diaspora is homogeneous is both simplistic and unrealistic
given both temporal and spatial dimensions of African emigration to the rest of the
world. To the Old World of Asia went a large slave traffic which analysts have been
unable to account for successfully, and to the New World was a much larger traffic of
slaves who settled Latin America and the Caribbean, currently the largest African
diaspora but with more remote links to Africa than their counterparts in the United
States. Then a new wave of the African diaspora came with independence. As Africa
looked to the developed North for educational opportunities for its citizens to attain
higher qualifications and skilled training necessary for the continent’s development in
the wake of colonialism, huge numbers of Africans remained overseas, some of them
becoming yet another category of diaspora. Still another category consists of those
who relocated overseas as workers, refugees and asylum seekers or winners of the US
“green card” and similar opportunities. The first-generation immigrants’ children and
grandchildren augmented the numbers as younger generations of Africans who had
migrated overseas for higher education, work and security from repressive African
regimes that have left in their wake untold political and economic crises.
African migrants are part of the diaspora who may be temporary in the countries of
destination, may join the existing diaspora to stay permanently or may be
transnational whenever they engage in circular migration. Ideally, they satisfy India’s
definition of its diaspora as comprising Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) who hold Indian
passports and reside abroad indefinitely and People of Indian Origin (PIOs) who
consist of foreign citizens of Indian origin or descent, implying that “diasporas” can
be a broader concept than “migrants” (Ionescu, 2006: 14-5). The African Union (AU)
provides a broad definition:
The African diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent,
irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the
development of the continent and the building of the African Union.
Whether the African diaspora would be willing to participate in homeland
development is open to question as it depends on the homeland situation and
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circumstances which compelled particular members of the diaspora community to
leave it. Moreover, African countries’ nationals of European and Asian stock might
not be as committed to the African homeland as their counterparts of African stock,
and might be more amenable to becoming citizens of the countries of destination
thereby curtailing their African roots.
In this paper, the term diaspora is used generically to denote people of African
descent residing outside Africa or in countries other than their own within Africa as
citizens and permanent or temporary residents engaging in circulation as well as
transnational lifestyles. Different categories of the diaspora play roles by committing
their skills and knowledge to homeland development and by sending remittances
which stimulate development and influence poverty reduction. Drawing from the
available evidence, the paper analyses the diaspora involved in post-conflict
reconstruction of SSA countries where conflict had been occasioned by various
circumstances, among them a spate of military coups which triggered strife, genocide
and civil war, generating refugees who, still hopeful of return, became committed to
homeland development; Mohan (2002, quoted in Mercer et al. (2008: 53-4) provides
a threefold classification of diasporas’ involvement in as many brands of
development: in the diaspora, denoting the benefits accruing to the country of
destination locality due to the presence of international migrants; through the diaspora
as a result of additional benefits experienced in the country of destination as a
consequence of the ongoing transnational connections among groups; and by the
diaspora bringing benefits to their countries of origin. Without the first two
categories, it is inconceivable that the diaspora would participate in meaningful postconflict reconstruction.
Transnationalism
The study of transnationalism, like that of diaspora, is not confined to anyone
discipline as anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, geographers and other
scholars of world development/international relations analyse it from their respective
disciplinary perspectives. Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 3) identify four main
contemporary transnational flows, namely the globalisation of capitalism with its
destabilising effects on developing countries; technological revolution in terms of
transportation and communication; global political transformations, in particular
decolonisation and universal human rights; and the expansion of social networks that
enhance transnational migration, economic organisation and politics. The key
developmental issues underpinned here include, globalisation, political evaluation,
technological advances facilitating physical as well as virtual movement and
international migration. The authors consider the nation-state under siege, that is,
weakened “from above” by transnational capital, global media and emergent supranational political institutions, and “from below” as it faces decentralising “local”
resistance of the informal economy, ethnic nationalism and grassroots activism; thus
“from above” these developments bring market rationality and liberalism and “from
below” they create new liberatory practices and spaces, such as transnational
migration and its attendant cultural hybridity (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998: 3). In
Faist’s (2000: 12-3) three-generations typology, transnationalism corresponds to the
third generation of migration theories which recognise migration practices connecting
both countries of origin and of destination, considering migration not as singular
journeys but an integral part of migrants’ lives blurring the distinction between origins
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and destinations. Thus the burgeoning transnational literature shifts migration away
from linear models “to circular, fluctuating and dynamic ties built by movements
across borders making conceptualisations of multiple ‘heres’ and ‘theres’ possible as
opposed to origin and destination” (Sirkeci, 2009:4). In that schema, transnational
migration renders irrelevant the origin-destination dichotomy.
Transition from Conflict to Post-conflict Reconstruction
The term “conflict” is itself complex and is defined differently in scholarship,
particularly in sociological and political science literature. The Oxford Encyclopaedic
Dictionary (p. 306) defines conflict as “a state of opposition or hostilities… a fight or
struggle [or] …the clashing of opposed principles”. Its variants include hostility,
insecurity, antagonism and competition or willingness to exert influence and inflict
harm or damage; the fluidity of the concept explains why its origins are manifold, its
causes varied and efforts to manage, resolve and find enduring solutions for it elusive
(Oucho, 2002: 10).
In the trail of conflict are complex problems which the post-conflict government tries
to resolve in cooperation with development partners and other well-wishers, and in
which diasporas tend to be heavily involved. Post-conflict reconstruction is therefore
a rebirth for some SSA nation-states, a new beginning for others and a completely
new, unfamiliar moment for nation-states that, since independence, have never
enjoyed peace. PCR bears features of peace, justice and reconciliation where their
opposite numbers had reigned, and is a process which unfolds at different paces in
equally different settings. A country’s nationals involved in PCR include those in the
homeland vis-à-vis the diaspora, former perpetrators of violence and their victims, excombatants turned peace-setters and those who, though never part of the foregoing,
feel obliged to change fortunes in their homeland. Their involvement encompasses
compassion, patriotism and in some cases commercial interests to reap the most from
an evolving situation of normalcy. Essentially, the post-conflict stage tries to realise
three difficult tasks, or three “res”, namely reconstruction, reintegration and
reconciliation (Sørensen, 1998), themselves important components of what could be a
protracted process.
In SSA, conflict took different forms. First, in the vast majority of countries, coup
d'état took place, leaving in its wake counter-overthrows of government, civil war,
ethnic or even clan-based conflict. The exceptions are Senegal in Western African,
Cameroun in Central Africa, Tanzania and Kenya (though a brief take-over occurred
in August 1982) in Eastern Africa and Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia and
South Africa in Southern Africa. Second, ethnic tensions sparked ethnic wars in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Rwanda. Indeed, ethnicity has been a consistent
trigger of conflict in virtually all SSA countries, causing internally displaced persons
(IDPs) as well as refugees (Oucho, 1997). There seems to be a five-fold typology of
post-conflict SSA countries: (a) post-genocide/indiscriminate murder countries
comprising Burundi and Rwanda, as well as the two killing-fields of Liberia and
Sierra Leone; (b) post-civil war Mozambique and Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda
and Sudan; (c) post-military rule countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea and Guinea Bissau; (d) post-apartheid South
Africa and Namibia; and (e) the two failed states of Somalia and Zimbabwe.
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Inter-linkages
Smith and Stares’ (2007) book, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers of PeaceWreckers? sheds light on different regions, in respect of SSA examining Eritrean
diaspora (Koser, 2007). Smith (2007: 5) posits that as different parts of the same
diaspora can and do have different interests defined by class, gender, generation,
occupation or religion, they are rarely constituted by a single factor other than the
broadest connections to specific homeland. Reviewing the book, a fervent scholar of
diaspora makes three propositions: (i) shifts in the global opportunity structure will
either accommodate diasporic interventions or inhibit them, (ii) the contours of
diasporic politics will vary according to whether the diaspora is stateless or statelinked and (iii) leaders of diasporas may be imbedded in dominant state structures or
may seek to remain free of state influence (Cohen, 2008). This categorisation suggests
that the involvement of diasporas in post-conflict reconstruction varies considerably
and eludes generalisation. Conceptualisation and research on transnationalism at the
University of Oxford, courtesy of the ESRC funding, sought to explore three types of
in new approaches to migration, namely “comparative diasporas” (Armenians,
Hungarians, Soviet Jews and Aussiedler or returned ethnic Germans in Germany);
“transversal migration”, personified by the expansion of transnational Chinese
migration circuits; and “refugees and asylum-seekers”, represented by the role of
exiles in Eritrean and Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction (Vertovec, 1999). The
study clearly left out “brain drain” and “brain circulation” which have become
extremely significant components of the new African diaspora.
In the Oxford study, Vertovec (1999) considers five strands of transnationalism as: (i)
“social morphology”, conceived by sociologists and anthropologists a social
formation spanning borders, involving networks and social organisations; (ii) “type of
consciousness”, especially within cultural studies, with s in the age of cyberspace held
together or recreated through the mind, cultural artefacts and shared imagination; (iii)
“mode of cultural reproduction” often described in terms such as syncretism,
creolisation, bricolage, cultural translation and hybridity – expressed among other
things through fashion, music, film and visual arts; (iv) “avenue of capital” which
many economists and geographers view in the form of transnational corporations
(TNCs) or globe-spanning structures or networks; and (v) “site of political
engagement” actualised largely through publishing and communications technologies
and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) – International Red Cross
and Red Crescent (IRCRC) and United Nations agencies. Integration of diasporas in
home-country development strategies can limit the costs of emigration and mitigate
brain drain; improve the skills of emigrants abroad, which would be utilised on return;
have a beneficial trickle-down effect for home countries; incorporate diaspora inputs
in endogenous growth projects, to add value to the national economy; and include
diasporas in existing development strategies (Ionescu, 2006: 21-4).
THE AFRICAN DIASPORA AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
Given the diversity, orientation and challenges facing, as well as opportunities for, the
African diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction, it is prudent to provide but samples
of such engagement. In a briefing document, Mohamoud (2006: 4) identifies four
critical areas through which the interact with homeland dynamics of policy interest,
namely remittance and conflict in the homeland, political involvement in the
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homeland, civic-oriented involvement in the homeland and lobbying in the host
country. Flores and Nooruddin (2006, quoting Collier et al., 2003) contend that
governments have a triple challenge in post-conflict-reconstruction: reconstruction of
physical capital destroyed during the conflict, diverting the citizens’ efforts away
from unproductive activities brought about by conflict toward productive one that
would reinvigorate human capital growth and reasserting citizens’ property rights;
Korf, 2005). In doing all these, governments in SSA expect the diaspora to make their
due contributions to their motherland. The diaspora no doubt constitute “social
capital”, features of which include “social organisation such as networks, norms, and
trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation of mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993:
36), or “some aspect of social structure that enables the achievement of certain ends
that would not be attainable in its absence” (Coleman, 1990), including the sociopolitical environment.
Interested Parties
Organisations
Diaspora organisations have mushroomed over the last decade or so, serving the
interests of members both in the countries of destination and their homelands. The
website on African diaspora in Europe holds vital information on 38 African
organisations.3 They range from pan-African to national, student to borough-centred
organisations or associations with commitments to activities in countries of
destination vis-à-vis countries of origin. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the
African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) has identified wide-ranging
developmental organisations that are engaged in a variety of activities: hometown
associations, ethnic associations, alumni associations, religious associations,
professional associations, development NGOs, investment groups, political groups,
national development groups, welfare/refugee groups, supplementary schools, and
virtual organisations. Their activities include community-to-community transfers,
identity building/awareness raising, lobbying in current home on issues relating to
ancestral home, trade with and investment in ancestral home, transfers of intangible
resources, support for development on a more ‘professional’ basis, payment of taxes
in ancestral home (AFFORD, 2000, quoted in Mohan and Zack-Williams, 2002).
These organisations lend credence to the importance of diasporic connections in
countries identified with as homelands. They are run by a variety of diaspora groups
with divergent orientations, interests and aspirations for homeland development.
Through organisations it is possible to entrench the role of African virtual diaspora in
PCR provided the IT environment improves in SSA. In some IT well-served SSA
countries, virtual diasporas hold much promise and should be integrated in homeland
development as is already happening sporadically in the entertainment industry,
services and business enterprises Zachary, n.d.).
Gender and Women
The place of gender, and particularly of women, is becoming increasingly important
in post-conflict reconstruction. It has been recognised that, during conflict, women
3
For details, see http://library.stanford.edu/deps/ssrg/africa/african-/african--europe.htm; downloaded
on 12/06/2009.
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who fight, kill and lead both peace and development programmes do so because they
are exceptional in leadership roles (Rehn and Shirleaf, 2002, quoted in Handrahan,
2004: 432). Greenberg and Zuckerman (2009: 6-4) argue that attention to gender
relations recognises the role of conflict on socially-determined roles, responsibilities
and access to power and resources, and that women may be proxies for understanding
people who are poor, cynical, disenfranchised, vulnerable and at grassroots level. In
Rwanda, some PCR programmes have included laudable women-focused approaches,
with a women’s NGO umbrella organisation, the Pro-Femmes Twese-Hamwe training
its members in leadership (p.6). In Eritrea, women have poor access to credit because,
as ex-combatants living much of their lives in the bush, they had never handled
money (Greenberg and Zuckerman, 2009: 6-13) and those who had access tended to
develop micro-enterprises in urban areas rather than taking government or village
allotted land (Kibreab, 2003, quoted in op.cit); the ex-combatant women who played a
substantial role in the war were later granted the ACORD “Barefoot Bankers” credit
programme (de Watteville, 2002, quoted in Greenberg and Zuckerman, 2009: 6-15).
In Angola, PCR programmes would have achieved more equitable and sustainable
results if they had targeted women who followed soldiers to perform non-military
services as carriers, cooks, forced sexual partners and combatants (Greenberg et al.,
1997, quoted in Greenberg and Zuckerman, 2009: 6-16). Although post-conflict
reconstruction witnessed women’s increasing contribution, it engendered inequality
among women and still rendered women subordinate to men.
However, Schoeman and Naude (2007: 2) caution about the tendency to view women
as homogeneous, citing the case of post-conflict Rwanda where women are
categorised as “old caseload returnees” (Tutsi exiles from the 1959 conflict), “new
caseload returnees” (Hutu refugees who fled during and after the 1994 genocide) and
“rescapes” (Tutsi survivors of the genocide). These categories of women certainly
respond differently to Rwanda’s PCR which has involved an increasing share of
women in all spheres of development.
Selected National Diasporas in Western Africa
This sub-region has witnessed some of the most protracted conflict situations which
impelled population in different countries. The cases of Ghana (with the most difficult
period in 1979-1992), Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrate the nature and extent of PCR
by their respective diasporas.
Ghanaian Diaspora
With the overthrow of the founding President Kwame Nkrumah in 1965, Ghana
entered the most depressing scenarios in its post-colonial history until the multi-party
elections in 1992. The country’s huge diaspora runs through successive generations
and resides in different world regions. Its diaspora operates through Ghanaian
Pentecostal churches and ethnic associations (Akyeampong, 2000:208, quoted in
Higazi, 2005: 13). Since the 1980s, the Ghanaian diaspora is known for its spatial
spread in different parts of the world, residing in large numbers in the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Hong Kong and Taiwan; by the
mid-1990s, there were 20,000 Ghanaians in Toronto alone, 14,000 in Italy and 15,000
in the Netherlands (Van Dijk, quoted in Akyeampong, 2000: 208). The Ghanaian
Pentecostal church has succeeded in establishing international branches (Van Dijk,
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quoted in Akyeampong, 2000: 208-9) and those in the Netherlands assist illegal
Ghanaians to secure legal status; the church, appropriately substituting for kinship and
family networks (p. 209). With dual citizenship now in full force in Ghana, the new
Ghanaian Dutch definitely participate in their homeland’s PCR.
The Asante associations in the United States which sustain the traditional Asante
political system of installing chiefs, kings and queen mothers, function as cultural and
benevolent associations (Akyeampong, 2000: 210). From the United Kingdom,
Ghanaian ethnic associations make contributions to their ancestral homes for projects
through financial and material support (Higazi, 2005: 14). Henry and Mohan (2003:
611) found that bonds, obligations and reciprocity constitute the “ties that bind” for
the Ghanaian diaspora in Milton Keynes in the United Kingdom that engages in
developing homes. Both the Association of Ghanaians in Milton Keynes (AGMK)
and the Ghanaian Union (GU) organise activities for their members. These
associations were politically active, closely linked to opposition forces to help redress
their past political persecution which had caused their flight from Ghana. As if that
were all, the spirited engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora with the Ghana
government has earned them dual citizenship and voting rights from their countries of
residence. Ghanaians abroad, working closely with their diplomatic missions, have
had several home-based activities aimed at stimulating the country’s development. In
2001, the “Homecoming Summit for Ghanaians Living Abroad” broke new ground
for organised visits by the diaspora to their homeland for a variety of activities
including exploring development opportunities.
Nigerian Diaspora
Nigeria has perhaps the biggest diaspora worldwide given that it is Africa’s most
populous country with well-educated nationals and a history of successive military
regimes which triggered large-scale voluntary emigration. Nigeria’s many diaspora
organisations have made efforts to conduct skill audits in Europe, the Americas and
other African countries with large concentrations of Nigerians; hold an annual summit
of the Nigerian diaspora in the Federal capital of Abuja to transfer expertise in
technology, in agro-business, IT and so on; and a group of Nigerian doctors in the
United States has been setting up state-of-the-art hospitals in selected locations in the
country (Adepoju, 2008: 34). Although Nigeria’s economy was not seriously
destroyed by successive military regimes before the country re-embarked on the path
of multi-party democracy in the late 1990s, its diaspora has utilised its inventiveness
to transplant into the country all that development signifies in the developed North.
Not even Nigerian beneficiaries of the US green card ever abandoned their country
before it adopted a dual citizenship policy. Perhaps this is why Nigeria’s Dual
Citizenship Act ensures that the birthright citizenship of either a Nigerian or nonNigerian is not lost on the acquisition of a foreign or Nigerian citizenship.4 Long
before such developments, Nigerians in diaspora were some of the few SSA
diasporas, since the colonial period, to initiate the formation of Home Improvement
Unions The Latin American equivalent of “Home Town Association), which both
served it in the countries of destination and carried out homeland development
projects.5
A Ghanaian, Boateng (2008), decries the shortcomings of Ghana’s Dual Citizenship Act which falls of
Nigeria’s and which, he thinks, the Ghana government should redress.
5
The website Motherland Nigeria holds details of different Nigerian Organisations. (See
(http://www.motherlandnigeria.com/organizations.html; downloaded on 24/06/09).
4
10
Historically and in recent times, the Nigerian diaspora has been an integral part of the
political process in their homeland. This goes back to the prominent nationalist
leaders such as the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (known in
his days as “Zik of Africa) who led the country’s decolonisation struggle. In
contemporary times, Nigerian politics has been influenced by the diaspora voices with
powerful intellectual and financial might. Whether without, during and after conflict,
the Nigerian diaspora has been in the forefront of events in its homeland.
Liberian Diaspora
After the volcano of ethnic hatred between Creoles and natives in Liberia exploded at
the turn of the 1990s, the country underwent one of the most vicious ethnic killings
and maiming in sub-Saharan Africa.6 Among the features of Liberia’s “New Deal”
are cultivation of democracy, the rule of law, accountability by elected and appointed
leaders and decentralisation from political and economic standpoints (Sirleaf, 2004).
The Liberian diaspora’s effective political involvement in the post-Charles Taylor
rehabilitation and democratisation led to a contest of the presidency by two strongest
candidates (an exiled intellectual versus an overseas-based world-famous footballer),
with the country electing Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as Africa’s first female president.
Sierra Leonean
Next door is Sierra Leone which witnessed the most outrageous act inhuman
treatment of innocent citizens, including the perpetrators of violence maiming of ablebodied people by chopping off either their hands or legs. Like its neighbour, Liberia,
the Creoles – descendants of retuned slaves – considered themselves superior to
native Sierra Leoneans; a feud between the two groups had spanned successive
generations and, with Liberia on fire, it was the turn of Sierra Leone to feel the
pressure of the native majority.
The decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone left an indelible mark of devastation of a
mineral-rich country that once was one of Western Africa’s most vibrant economies,
causing emigration followed by sustainable post-conflict return (Maconachie et al.,
2006). The Kono Development Union (KDU) in the United Kingdom has been
collaborating with the Kono District Development Association (KDDA) to promote
the twining and partnership of London’s Southwark Borough; so have been several
“old boy” associations in the UK that are committed to help their former schools
(Kent, 2005: 5-6), an undertaking which the “face book” on the Internet has enhanced.
Other Sierra Leonean diaspora organisations include the African Community
Empowerment, “The Young Shall Grow”, Women Empowerment and International
Networking (WEIN) and the International Association of Sierra Leoneans Abroad
(INASLA) with membership beyond the United Kingdom (Kent, 2005: 6).
Emulating South Africa post-apartheid healing, Sierra Leone established the Justice,
Peace and Reconciliation Commission (Rodella, 2003) which concluded that bad
governance, endemic corruption and denial of basic rights were the main triggers of
conflict in the country (International Crisis Group, 2004: 8). That the country is back
6
Liberia goes on record as the first SSA country once ruled by a President now accused of crime
against humanity in his country as well as Sierra Leone, and is currently standing trial by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, the Netherlands.
11
on the democratic path underscores the role of the diaspora in influencing homeland
politics.
Diaspora in the conflict-devastated Great Lakes Region
The Great Lakes region has remained the epicentre of conflict since the independence of
respective countries therein: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and
Rwanda. DRC has been a theatre of civil war since independence and the carving out of
Burundi and Rwanda out of the Belgian colonially administered Ruanda-Urundi landed
the two countries in incessant civil warfare since 1959.
Burundian Diaspora
Burundi is one of the few SSA countries which grant dual citizenship to its nationals
which has been in force since 2005. In Burundi, PCR has involved the Mutualité des
Grands Lacs (MGL), founded by three members of the Burundian diaspora in
December 2001 as a non-profit organisation on the one hand “to support and promote
projects of young migrants, to sensitise people to the emigration process and to
promote cultural activities”, and on the other to resolve problems of remitting money
and making in-kind transfers back home (de Bruyn and Wets (2006: 43). A few years
after its inception, MGL created a co-operative known as the Coopérative de la
Burundaise (CODIBU) which, together with Mutualité d’Epargne et de Crédit
(MUTEC), opened an account in a Belgian bank and in Burundaise de Financement
(SBF) in Burundi to facilitate members’ remittances. With CODIBU Agence Plus
established in 2004, members were able to send material to Burundi at a much lower
cost. In the Netherlands, Burundians established another foundation, Réseau des
Organisations Paysannes au Burundi (ROPABU) for a similar undertaking (p.44).
On a visit to drum support among the Burundian in Europe, Banque de Crédit de
Bujumbura helped create Mobilisation de l’Epargne auprés des Burundais de
l’Etranger in 2005. The Communaute Burundaise de Belgique (Burundi Community
in Belgium) funds small-scale projects in Burundi (p. 45). All these efforts bolster
PCR in Burundi.
Rwanda: the classical PCR case in SSA
Rwanda provides a classical case of PCR viewed through a multi-dimensional lookingglass. The establishment of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) by Rwandan Tutsi
refugees in Uganda, who re-entered the country to topple the Hutu government in Kigali
which had instigated the Rwandan genocide (Otunnu, 1999; Salehyan et al., 2006), set the
stage for PCR that came in the wake of the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan Diaspora
Global Network (RDGN), though based in South Africa, is heavily involved in its
country’s economic, social and cultural development issues (de Bruyn and Wets, 2005:
54), including the construction of houses (p.62). Indeed Rwanda goes on record as one of
the SSA countries to create the Department for the Diaspora in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation in 2001 to mobilise the diaspora for the development of Rwanda,
gather information about it, set up a database and provide information about the situation
in the country. Subsequently, the Rwanda Diaspora Global Convention met in December
2001 and December 2005 both to determine how best the diaspora could be involved in
their country’s socio-economic development and to identify how the government could
support the actions of the diaspora (p. 60). Such an overture was a rarity then but was
subsequently embraced by Ghana and many more SSA countries.
12
Rwanda is currently a shining example of how repatriated and returned refugees have
succeeded in rebuilding a country that had never before witnessed peace and which had
been thought to be on the path of a failed state. Rwandan testimonies are held in the
country’s cultural sociology which has become a source of increased tourist attraction to
the country.
Ugandan Diaspora: East Africa’s Oddity
Uganda, unlike its two neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania, is the only East African country
to have undergone military rule (Idi Amin’s repressive regime of 1971-1979), followed
by a brief return to civilian government, which civil war soon swept out before uneasy
peace settled in since 1986. Rebels still occupy northern part of the country and some
regions are not comfortably in government hands. With Amin expelling huge numbers of
Asian nationals in 1972, Uganda has an Asian diaspora which the current country’s
president since 1986 has been wooing, without much success, to return and invest in their
country.
The country has benefited immensely from its diaspora within and outside of Africa. In
December 2008, Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) and the business community in
Uganda organised a Diaspora Investment Summit, “Back to My Roots - Uganda My
Home 2”, to explore possibilities of its investing in the country (UNBPA, 2008). The
Presidential Standards Task Force has been leading a crusade to have the skilled
Ugandan diaspora return to the country for short periods, the government providing
them with free round trip air tickets, board and lodge, free tour of the country and
other fringe benefits. In the conflict-ridden northern Uganda, the local diaspora started
Kacoke Madit (KM or Luo for a “big meeting") initiative as a means of raising
awareness about the conflict and finding a viable means of bringing the conflict to an
end (Poblicks, 2002). These are important contributions of the Ugandan diaspora to
PCR.
The Horn of Africa
Ethiopian Diaspora: Commitment to education, skills and health
Ethiopian revolution, beginning with the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974
which ushered in a military regime with Ethiopian and Eritrean forces later defeating
Mengitsu Haile Mariam in 1991, culminated both in the emergence of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the independence of Eritrea in 1993. Yet the two
neighbours soon went to war to settle their old scores, with their diasporas both funding
the inter-state war and contributing to PCR. Ethiopian diaspora is in virtually all regions
of the world, the vast majority in the United States and Canada and huge numbers in
different European countries.
The Forum International for Ethiopians Living in Diaspora (FIELD) is one of the most
active organisations involved in their country’s PCR. In January 2005, FIELD held a
conference to interrogate the “Potential Within: Is the Ethiopian a Response to the
Nation’s Brain Drain?” Its final report FIELD (2005) vehemently states that the diaspora
was an inevitable potential and explored how best it could be harnessed. Two Ethiopian
organisations share the acronym AHEAD: one is the Association for Higher Education
and Development (AHEAD), which contributes toward the improvement of education
in Ethiopia by exploring, soliciting, acquiring and delivering educational materials to
Ethiopian universities and colleges; the other is Action for Health, Education and
Development (AHEAD), a UK-based charity initiating and supporting projects aimed
13
at combating poverty and inequalities in health, education and development in
Ethiopia, particularly in the Gujii Zone of the country. There are numerous Ethiopian
diaspora organisations elsewhere with exceptionally strong commitment to homeland
development. Later, in an appeal to the Ethiopian diaspora, Mathza (2005) underlined
the motives of a group concerned with various aspects of development in the country,
namely loss of wealth and power, obsession to rule, opposition to land and ethnic
policies and vengeance as well as envy.7
Eritrean Diaspora: A source of government revenue
After independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea became a state with a development
relying more heavily on its diaspora than in most SSA states. When its diaspora refused to
return home after independence, Eritrea imposed on them a “healing tax”, particularly to
meet the cost of Ethio-Eritrean war; the diaspora’s remittances also bolstered household
economy (Van Hear, 2003). This “compulsory remittance scheme” became a source, on
the one hand, of pride and, on the other, of disdain. Eritrea’s independence struggle
coincided with the rise of the Internet which has facilitated networks among homeland
and diaspora Eritreans, through the formation of national institutions and political
culture, for instance Bernal (2006: 162).8 Through the Selam Peace-building Network
(SPN) in Toronto Canada, Tezare et al. (2006) analyse the role of the Eritrean
diaspora in peace-building and development in a project called University for Peace
(UPEACE). The work traces Eritreans from the time they arrived in Canada in the late
1970s to early 1980s and establishes their involvement at community level, in peace
and peace-building, in understanding and resolving conflict (Tezare et al. (2006: 1223).
Unlike most African diasporas, the Eritrean diaspora comprises mainly forced (as
opposed to voluntary) migrants, a trait which fosters its unity over many issues and
one generally supportive of Eritrean government (Koser, 2007: 251). Individual and
community activities of Eritrean diaspora can be collapsed into four categories:
economic in terms of remittances; political, with the diaspora taking part in the
drafting of the country’s constitution and in the electoral process emanating from it;
social, through, inter alia, the website DEHAI: the Eritrean Community Online
Network; and cultural in terms of cultural festival involving the diaspora and their
homeland compatriots, “cultural lessons” in the form of language training and Eritrean
history and culture (Koser, 2007: 244-249). It would appear that Eritrean diaspora’s
resolve to engage in post-conflict reconstruction is founded on the country’s threedecades (1961-1991) of independence struggle and its patriotism reflected in its generous
funding of Eritrea in the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000.
Diaspora’s hand in Somalia: The case of a failed state
The Somalia case is unique because, while conflict still rages, the country has
cultivated a culture of dependence on its diaspora’s remittances which sustain
household and communal development, and meet the needs of different warring
factions in Somalia as well. The country’s diaspora has attracted sustained research in
7
For details, see: http://www.hmbasha.net/Apeal2Ethio.htm; downloaded on 02/05/2007.
Eritrean cyberspace, www.dehai.org, Tigrinya for “voice” or “news”, contains a cyberspace-based
survey of homeland and Eritreans on the operation and formation of public spheres, ways in which
Eritreans were connected through a socio-political worldwide web, how they used digital
communications to create a new kind of public sphere for political discussion and the relationship of
the diaspora’s activities in cyberspace to Eritrea’s media, democracy and public sphere (Bernal, 2006:
162).
8
14
the countries hosting Somali refugees within and outside of Africa. In Denmark, for
instance, there have been at least 50 Somali associations, constituting more than onethird of African associations in the country. Somcan &UK Cooperative Associations
is an umbrella organisation that promotes collective return to Somaliland (the vibrant
but unrecognised part of the Somali Republic) and has purchased land and established
electricity in the country (Kleist, 2009: 2-3), and provided health and education
services back home (p. 5). Clearly, these are welcome developments in a failed state
that survives outside the circuit of the international community.
The system of xawilaad has been perfected by the Somali diaspora to sustain
livelihoods of homeland compatriots as well as Somali refugees in refugee camps
(Horst, 2002).9 Although the system facilitates remittances without money having to
go through Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs), the remittances cause tensions
and growing inequality between receiving and non-receiving households. The Somali
diaspora is on the one hand an asset for peacemaking and on the other a facilitator of
sustained war in Somalia. Many Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya
receive remittances from the diaspora in Europe, Australia and the United States for
their survival and to deal with contingency situations (Horst, 2002). The Somali case
has to be understood against the country’s four decades of political and violent
conflict (Gundel, 2003: 234). Apparently, the Somali diaspora has resigned to the
view that it is not necessary for their country to have a government in place for any
development to take place.
Southern Africa
This sub-region has several countries which have been ravaged by civil war, apartheid
and misrule that forced citizens to flee as refugees and asylum seekers or migrants
seeking employment opportunities or taking to family reunification.
Mozambique
Mozambique emerges as a country with a vibrant economy following cessation of
conflicts between former long-term opponents, Mozambique Liberation Front or
Fente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Resistencia Nacional
Mocambicana (RENAMO, during the 1970s and 1980s. Had it not been for several
flooding episodes, Mozambique’s economy would be the fastest growing in the entire
SSA. The country’s diaspora in South Africa, Portugal and other Lusophone countries
have stimulated PCR, subsequently luring South Africa to develop the Maputo and
Beira corridors for programmed development. With its stable leadership which grew
from diaspora groups, Mozambique is a beacon of democracy and economic vibrancy
that are rarely experienced in much of SSA.
Zimbabwean Diaspora: the source of household survival
Zimbabwe, formerly one Southern Africa’s economic powerhouses, is a failed state
following the government’s inhuman treatment of its nationals. Zimbabweans have
been forced to flee both as refugees to the neighbouring SADC neighbours and as
brain drain to the same countries and to the United Kingdom (Tevera and Zinyama,
This is an informal system of transfer by which money or goods are transferred to remitters’ families
and kinsmen through emissaries based on trust. Subsequently, xawilaad companies mushroomed to
engage in big businesses.
9
15
2002).10 The country’s home-based citizens have been surviving, albeit precariously,
on emigrants’ translational and diasporic links, in particular financial remittances,
food and other household requirements. About 80 per cent of Zimbabweans and 68
per cent in South Africa remitting money back home in the early 2000s primarily to
support family members and secondarily to build houses (Bloch, 2005: 65-6).11
The Zimbabwean diaspora also maintains links through internet discussion groups,
political activities, contributions to charities, business associations and donations to
community organisations (p. 72). Unfortunately, the decade-long difficult conditions
in Zimbabwe have not provided opportunities for serious reconstruction of the
destroyed Zimbabwean economy.12 It has been noted that “Zimbabweans
abroad…have become very much embedded in the Zimbabwe crisis and all efforts
designed to find a solution to the crisis cannot afford to exclude them”,
acknowledging that the country’s diaspora had historically played an important in
influencing both the political and economic course of the country (Muzondidya
(2008: 1, 4). A number of Zimbabwe newspapers –The Zimbabwean, online ZW
News and Zimonline, Zimbabwe Situation and NewZimbabwe.com feature news items
on the country, thus, shaping Zimbabweans’ perceptions and attitudes toward events
back home (p. 11).
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Post-conflict reconstruction poses challenges that are far beyond the capacity of the
diasporas, however well-meaning they might be. The developed countries, INGOs
and NGOs place a premium on providing assistance to SSA governments and their
development partners on PCR in a variety of undertakings. Van Gennip (2005)
cautions that:
finding resources for post-conflict reconstruction and development obviously poses a critical
challenge…the strategic interests of large western donor countries ultimately determine the
level of aid…in Africa where the level of forces and resources dispatched into conflict and
post-conflict settings are far less than, for example, in the Balkans.
There is no “one size-fits- all” framework for PCR as conflicts differ in duration,
intensity and scope of destruction and the degree to which they affect different classes
of people. Rugumamu and Gbla (2003) amplify this, stating that:
Whereas conflicts in Uganda and Sierra Leone were products of state failure due to predatory
or ineffectual governance, the erosion of the Rwandan state was a product of ethnic-cumregional conflict and the Mozambican state’s failure was due to ideological conflicts.
Homeland Incentives for Diasporas
10
James Muzondidya (2008) provides more categories of Zimbabwean, namely asylum seekers,
political refugees, skilled expatriates, students, semi-skilled and unskilled labour migrants and
undocumented/illegal migrants.
11
In another study, the proportions are 24.7 percent of Zimbabweans in the UK and 22.7 per cent in
South Africa (see Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006: 14).
12
Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister in the unholy coalition government has been on visits to the developed
North in June 2009 to drum up support for the country’s economic reconstruction, a feat the latter are
as much sympathetic as they are cautious to gratify.
16
Some challenges revolve around incentives for engaging the diaspora in homeland
development programmes, which Ionescu (2006: 34-39) identifies as programmatic
responses, institutional arrangements, incentives, facilitated free movement, the right
to buy land and property and portable as well as social rights. It has become
fashionable for African diasporas to hold diaspora annual days in their home
countries, examples of these including Ethiopian and Ghanaian diasporas.
Institutional arrangements have seen stress of “(X) diaspora abroad”, for instance,
Ghanaians Abroad, the Kenya Community Abroad; as well as Ethiopian and
Senegalese diaspora organisations and so on. Another institutional arrangement is the
creation of diaspora-handling offices in home countries: the General Directorate for
Ethiopian Expatriates, the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad (Ionescu, 2006: 37) and
similar arrangements in many more SSA countries. Incentives for engaging the
diaspora in homeland development include dual citizenship, facilitating free
movement by granting visa-free entry for nationals who are no longer citizens in their
countries of origin (e.g. special IDs for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin), the right
to buy land and other property (as in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau,
Mozambique and Sao Tomé &Principe) and portable and transferable social rights in
terms of bilateral social security system between countries of destination and origin
for labour migrants (Ionescu, 2006: 39). SSA countries are gambling with these and
many more incentives, albeit in the absence of sound research among or about their
diasporas to inform the policy environment.
The Diaspora as a Multiple Capital
Ionescu’s (2006: 40-52) draws attention to diasporas as manifold capital: human,
financial and entrepreneurial, social, affective and local. Clearly, this framework is
more comprehensive than that of SSA countries who regard their diasporas solely as
sources of financial remittances. Diasporas who improve their education, training,
skills and knowledge in the countries of destination are considered human capital,
which is why they are considered “brain drain” in their countries of origin. 13 In
transnational migration, they are “transnationals” or “circular migrants” who tend to
vie between their countries of origin and several destinations. Developments such as
the African Experts and Diasporas database and Africa-Recruit, the South African
Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), the African Expert Diasporas Database Nigeria,
Kenya’s Educationist and Medical Practitioners Abroad Database (pp.41-2) came in
the wake of failed Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)
and the IOM-initiated Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN). In their place,
the IOM has introduced the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) to facilitate
periodic return of skilled African nationals to the region for project-tied assignments.
Financial and entrepreneurial capital includes foreign direct investment (FDI), trade,
remittances, savings, start-up or business investments, purchase of real estate and
humanitarian support (Ionescu, 2006: 44). SSA’s national newspapers, central bank
accounts and other sources of information are awash with how diaspora remittances
how exceeded overseas development assistance (ODA) or foreign aid and stimulate
investment in home countries. Yet one curious question remains: impeccable
accounting for their proper utilisation in the recipient households, communities and
Surprisingly, while skilled SSA nationals leave the region as “brain drain”, a large number ends up
being “brain waste” in the countries of destination; this is an issue crying for research for a better
understanding of the working situation in the development North.
13
17
countries.14 Examples of finance and business facilitation programmes include
specific tax exemption on vehicles, personal belongings and investment goods to
returnees and investors in Ethiopia; a special agency for investments of Ghanaians
Abroad, Senegalese diaspora entrepreneurship programme targeting some productive
sectors, special services for migrants by Banque de l’Habitat Sénégal, the Africa
Recruit Investment Forum in 2004 and the African Diaspora Investment Forum
organised by Axis in 2006 (p. 47-8).
The OECD, 2001, quoted in Ionescu, 2006: 48) considers social capital “networks
together with shared norms, values and understanding that facilitate cooperation
within and among groups”. It is in the light of this that the AU considers the “African
diaspora” its sixth region” (p. 49); but, regrettably, one the AU scarcely understands
its form, complexity, capacity and aspirations. Challenges in the home countries lie in
diasporas’ lack of confidence in the poor homeland institutions and insufficient
guarantees by SSA governments which could attract their investment and full
deployment of entrepreneurial capacity.
Affective capital is postulated to bind diasporas to their countries of origin (Ionescu,
2006: 50-1). Yet it may no longer obtain in situations where transnationalism is taking
a stronger grip pg African emigrants and where the emigrants’ countries of origin
continue to give them lip service.
As “local capital”, diasporas are often inclined to make investments at the local level,
usually in the region or locality of origin where they still have family ties and are
familiar with the local context. Against this realisation, the Italian government, since
2003, has been collaborating with the Ghanaian and Senegalese governments through
MIDA programmes (Ionescu, 2006: 51). Yet a grey area exists of either a lukewarm
relationship or nasty rivalry between the diaspora and their homeland compatriots.
The assumption that post-conflict reconstruction is a man’s affair is grossly flawed. It
needs to reconsider the existing framework to include a move from previous/existing
to new paradigms: from gender-blind accounts to gender-sensitive analysis, from
universality and homogeneity to specificity and diversity and from victimised women
to female actors (Sørensen, 1998: 64-68). Involvement of women in PCR in Burundi,
Rwanda and Mozambique are exemplary, underlining their commitment to shoulder
roles that are typically men’s and rehabilitating conditions as well as reconciling
adversaries or enemies faster than envisioned.
Engagement of donors (development partners) with the African diaspora is an
necessary condition for homeland development. Newland and Erin (2004:29-36)
suggest that such engagement could include human capital programmes such as
MIDA and “virtual diaspora” programmes, community development activities
involving so-called “Home Town Associations”, research, building capacity in
diaspora communities (through co-development, for instance) and reflections on
policy matters including Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These are issues
14
The World Bank announced a consultancy on Household Survey of African Migration Project to
investigate the impact of remittances in migrants’ countries of origin. Unfortunately, the bid was won
by non-African institutions that might not break the strong “cultural wall” standing in the way of their
enquiries given the sensitivity of remittances among recipients.
18
that homeland governments rarely pay attention to, but they deserve serious discourse
in an effort to explore the potential contribution of their national diasporas.
CONCLUSION
This paper has underscored two contrasting roles of the African diaspora in postconflict construction in their homeland: a negative role with continued funding of
conflict which it perpetuates, or a positive role where cessation of conflict has given
room for the three “res” (reconstruction, reintegration and reconciliation) and PCR.
Except for Somalia where conflict persists, most SSA countries have witnessed the
positive role of their diasporas in PCR.
The African diaspora is in fact a variegated group of several diasporas of different
countries and even from anyone SSA country. Moreover, African diasporas represent
different types of voluntary and forced as well as irregular emigrants, about which
their countries of origin know little. Relative to diasporas of non-conflict SSA
countries, virtually all diasporas of post-conflict countries have a strong commitment
to post-conflict reconstruction activities. The cases of Rwanda, Eritrea and Ethiopia
attest to this fact.
The African diaspora is a resource in the PCR process. It is resourced in terms of
finances, exposure, skills, knowledge and perception of the form the PCR endeavour
should take. Yet the efforts of the African diasporas are frustrated in their homelands
where governments remain sceptical and the homeland compatriots are less receptive
of the diasporas’ poise for PCR. Clearly, these are voids that must of necessity be
filled for the African diaspora to have a softer landing-pad back home and to become
more committed to post-conflict reconstruction.
Several case studies analysed in this paper underline both similarities of PCR
activities in which diasporas take part and differences occasioned by peculiar
homeland situations. They provide impetus for further research among different
categories of diaspora to generate information that would inform policy, giving rise to
policy reviews and reformulation, as well as PCR programme design/redesign. It is
inadvisable for African governments, individually or in the AU commitments, to
formulate PCR policies and programmes with the African diaspora in mind, but
without engaging with it at all stages of the whole process. There is a dire need for
further research to explore African diaspora’s size, geographical location,
characteristics, capabilities and inclination toward homeland development to feed into
policy which in turn should generate meaningful diaspora-engaging programmes.
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