The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing
by Gal Luft
Middle East Quarterly Vol.10, No.1 (Winter 2003)
http://www.meforum.org/article/515
Israelis dislike the term "assassination policy." They would rather use another term—
"extrajudicial punishment," "selective targeting," or "long-range hot pursuit"—to describe the
pillar of their counterterrorism doctrine. But semantics do not change the fact that since the
1970s, dozens of terrorists have been assassinated by Israel's security forces, and in the two years
of the Aqsa intifada, there have been at least eighty additional cases of Israel gunning down or
blowing up Palestinian militants involved in the planning and execution of terror attacks.
Many critics view this mode of operation as operationally senseless and illegal. It is deemed to
be operationally senseless because assassinating Palestinian militants only brings harsh
retaliatory action, resulting in even more Israeli casualties. They regard it as illegal, since it
infringes on the sovereignty of foreign political entities and because it gives the security services
discretion to decide on the killing of certain individuals without due process. Most important,
claim the critics, there is no compelling evidence the killings are effective in reducing the terror
menace.
This is exactly where they have it wrong. True, terror persists despite the assassinations, and the
policy does have shortcomings. What is less apparent is the profound cumulative effect of
targeted killing on terrorist organizations. Constant elimination of their leaders leaves terrorist
organizations in a state of confusion and disarray. Those next in line for succession take a long
time to step into their predecessors' shoes. They know that by choosing to take the lead, they add
their names to Israel's target list, where life is Hobbesian: nasty, brutish, and short.
Fighting terror is like fighting car accidents: one can count the casualties but not those whose
lives were spared by prevention. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Israelis go about their lives
without knowing that they are unhurt because their murderers met their fate before they got the
chance to carry out their diabolical missions. This silent multitude is the testament to the policy's
success.
Chronicle of Targeting
Israel has traditionally resorted to assassination as a reaction to mounting waves of Palestinian
terror activity. The first wave of terrorism occurred in the 1970s with a series of airliner
hijackings, attacks on Israeli targets abroad (including the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at
the 1972 Munich Olympics), and cross-border infiltrations of terrorists from Lebanon. This
initial wave resulted in heavy casualties, demoralizing Israeli society. Since the infrastructure of
Palestinian terror groups was located mainly in host Arab countries, all of them in a state of war
with Israel, extradition or other forms of coordinated legal action against the terrorists were not
options. The only way to retaliate against them was by targeting the perpetrators and the
masterminds.
The long arm of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the General Security Service (GSS), and the
Mossad often reached and surprised terrorists in the most remote locations. In one attack, in
April 1973, Israeli commandos led by Ehud Barak—who dressed as a woman—landed in Beirut
and killed senior members of the Fatah movement including Yasir Arafat's deputy Yusuf Najjar
and the Fatah spokesman Kamal Nasir. Israel also stood, allegedly, behind the 1979 explosion in
Beirut that killed Hasan ‘Ali Salamah, founder of Fatah's elite Force 17. Another spectacular
operation took place a decade later in April 1988 when an Israeli commando force under the
command of today's IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya‘alon landed in Tunis and killed the head of the
Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) military branch, the second in seniority in the
organization, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). Apart from settling the score with Abu Jihad, who
was responsible for many bloody terror attacks, Israel sought to weaken the PLO leadership,
believing that such a blow would help quell the intifada that had erupted five months earlier. The
attempt to influence strategic developments by means of an isolated military strike failed, and the
intifada continued for another five years.[1]
The signing of the 1993 Oslo agreement changed Israel's approach to the PLO from an adversary
to a peace partner. Consequently, Israel ceased military action against PLO activists and
unofficially pardoned those known as terrorists in the pre-Oslo era. Nevertheless, the targeting of
members of terror organizations opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, such as Hamas
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued with even greater intensity. In October 1995,
following a series of suicide attacks which claimed the lives of dozens of Israelis, Mossad agents
shot and killed the head of the PIJ, Fathi Shiqaqi, in Malta. Three months later, Hamas member
Yahya ‘Ayyash, also known as "The Engineer," who masterminded suicide attacks in which fifty
Israelis died and 340 were wounded, took his last phone call when a booby-trapped cellular
phone exploded in his hands.
In addition to targeting Palestinian terrorists, Israel also used the assassination policy in its war
against the Shi‘ite movements Hizbullah and Amal in southern Lebanon. Hizbullah is one of the
most secretive and intricate guerrilla movements in existence. The discreet and small makeup of
its military branch—only a few hundred strong—made penetration of its ranks difficult.
Nevertheless, over the eighteen years of its occupation of south Lebanon, Israel succeeded in
targeting several key military leaders of Hizbullah and Amal. The most significant operation
took place in February 1992 when Israeli helicopters fired missiles at the car of Hizbullah's
leader, ‘Abbas Musawi, killing him and members of his entourage. Amal's operations officer,
Hussam al-Amin, was killed in a similar way in August 1998.
With the outbreak of the Aqsa intifada in September 2000 and the release from Palestinian jail of
some eighty Hamas and PIJ prisoners—all serving sentences for their involvement in terror
attacks—the Palestinian Authority (PA) abdicated its responsibility to fight and prevent
terrorism. To make things worse, the Tanzim, the armed militia of Arafat's Fatah movement,
took a leading role in the armed struggle against Israel, involving itself in hundreds of shooting
and suicide attacks against Israeli civilian targets. In the absence of security cooperation with the
Palestinian security services, Israel stood alone against a mounting wave of terror. In the twelve
months that followed, there were at least forty cases of assassinations of middle- and high-level
Palestinian activists. Nineteen of them belonged to Hamas, nine to the PIJ, twelve to the Tanzim
and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and two to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP).
The first took place on November 9, 2000, near the West Bank town of Bethlehem, when an
Israeli Apache helicopter fired a laser-guided rocket at the vehicle of a Tanzim leader, Husayn
‘Abayat, killing him and wounding his deputy. The same mode of operation was repeated on
February 13, 2001, against Mas‘ud ‘Iyyad, a Force 17 officer trying to establish a Hizbullah cell
in the Gaza Strip, and against PIJ activist Muhammad ‘Abd al-‘Al, who according to the IDF
was responsible for terrorist acts and was on his way to carry out two major attacks.
The use of attack helicopters to intercept terrorists in Palestinian-controlled territories—or "Area
A" as it appears in the Oslo agreements—proved to be precise and effective. The main downside
of helicopter attacks was that such operations did not allow Israel any deniability. For this
reason, Israel claimed responsibility for all helicopter assassinations while remaining mute in
most cases in which activists were gunned down in the middle of the street or by long-range
sniper bullet. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon explained:
Sometimes we will announce what we did, sometimes we will not announce what we did. We
don't always have to announce it.[2]
And indeed, there have been several cases of activists being killed when the car they drove
mysteriously blew up. In another incident, on April 5, 2001, a member of the PIJ who learned
from ‘Ayyash's mistake in using a cellular phone, was killed when the phone booth he regularly
used blew up. There were also other unexplained accidents. Israel never claimed responsibility
for these killings, but the sophisticated technology involved, such as unmanned aerial vehicles,
surveillance, and voice recognition devices, left little doubt that its hand was at work.
Then, on July 22, 2002, in what was referred to by Sharon as "one of our greatest successes,"
Israel ascended another rung in the ladder of escalation, using a one-ton bomb dropped from an
F-16 fighter jet to kill Salah Shihada, the leader and founder of Hamas' military wing of ‘Izz adDin al-Qassam in Gaza. Shihada was one of the most senior activists to be targeted since the
outbreak of the intifada. The organization under him was responsible for fifty-two attacks on
Israeli targets, killing a total of 220 Israeli non-combatants and sixteen soldiers. Despite that, the
assassination drew heavy criticism by the international community when the bomb killed fifteen
civilians, including nine children.
The Debate
It was not Shihada's killing but one prior, that of a West Bank dentist, Thabit Thabit, on
December 31, 2000, which sparked the debate both in Israel and abroad regarding the morality,
legality, and effectiveness of assassinations. There was something about Thabit's resume that
made people suspect that he was somewhat less than the classic profile of a terrorist who merited
the death penalty.
Perhaps it was his age, forty-nine; his record as a human rights activist; his job as director
general of the Palestinian health ministry; or his wide social circle of friends in the ranks of
Israel's Peace Now movement, all of whom attested that he was a staunch supporter of the peace
process. The IDF fought back, deploying its chief of operations, Giora Eiland, to explain in a 60
Minutes interview that "Dr. Thabit was, in fact, Dr. Hyde," and that behind the mask of a peaceloving dentist lurked a dangerous Fatah activist involved in many terrorist activities. The General
Security Service released information obtained in the interrogation of a Palestinian suspect,
showing that Thabit had been a regional commander with authority over units of Palestinian
gunmen in the Tulkarem area.[3] Thabit's wife petitioned the Israeli high court of justice to order
the government to stop its policy of assassinations. The unprecedented petition presented the
Israeli judicial system with the controversial question of whether the assassination policy is in
accordance with the law of nations.
On its face, international law prohibits assassinations both in times of peace and in times of war.
Furthermore, infringement on the sovereignty of other nations, especially by the imposition of
extrajudicial punishment on their citizens, is a gross violation of international law. But the law
also specifies that countries should not allow their territory to be a safe haven for terrorists who
might bring harm to another country, since terrorists are considered to be common enemies of
humankind, and that sovereign countries should prosecute them regardless of their agendas.[4]
In Israel's case, the situation is far more complicated. The PA has not been declared a state, and,
therefore from a legal point of view, is not bound by the set of norms, rules, and treaties with
which most states comply. But those few treaties signed by the PA—the Oslo and Cairo
agreements and the Wye River and Sharm al-Sheikh memoranda—underscored the Palestinian
responsibility to fight terrorism using its twelve-branch security apparatus, created and assisted
by Israel and U.S. Central Intelligence (CIA) to do just that. The PA has not only failed to do so,
it has released terrorists from prison and supplied them with arms and funding. Furthermore, in
many cases in which Israel gave the PA solid information about terrorist attacks in the making,
the PA, instead of arresting the perpetrators, informed them that Israel knew of their plans.[5] In
a legal opinion, Israeli attorney general Elyakim Rubinstein wrote:
The laws of combat which are part of international law, permit injuring, during a period of
warlike operations, someone who has been positively identified as a person who is working to
carry out fatal attacks against Israeli targets, those people are enemies who are fighting against
Israel, with all that implies, while committing fatal terror attacks and intending to commit
additional attacks—all without any countermeasures by the PA.[6]
This argument gained little sympathy abroad. Even Israel's closest ally, the United States,
expressed its discontent with the practice. The official position of the Bush administration as
conveyed by both White House and State Department spokesmen has been that "Israel needs to
understand that targeted killings of Palestinians don't end the violence, but are only inflaming an
already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm."[7] But if the United States
showed signs of irritation in public, Israel's war against terror was received with understanding
behind the scenes. Departing from the administration's position, Vice President Dick Cheney
said in a television interview that he believed the policy of targeted killings could be justified:
If you've got an organization that has plotted or is plotting some kind of suicide bomber attack,
for example, and they have evidence of who it is and where they're located, I think there's some
justification in their trying to protect themselves by preempting.[8]
Administration officials rushed to explain that they had "a consistent view" of Israeli targeted
attacks, and that the "administration at all levels deplores the violence there and that includes the
targeted attacks."[9]
But Israel was never deterred by Washington's expressed reservations. Matan Vilnai, Israeli
science minister, responded in the summer of 2001 to U.S. criticism of the targeted killings:
I would like to see how the Americans would react if a car packed with explosives blew up in the
middle of Manhattan.[10]
Two months later, not a car, but two jetliners blew up in lower Manhattan and with them all the
reservations and inhibitions Americans had regarding their own fight against terrorism. A
Newsweek poll taken three months after September 11 showed that nearly two-thirds of
Americans polled approved of giving U.S. military and intelligence agencies the power to
assassinate terrorist leaders in the Middle East; 57 percent approved of expanding targeted
killings to Africa and Asia; and 54 percent thought assassinations should be carried out in
Europe as well.[11] And indeed, the war in Afghanistan prompted the United States to make
attempts on the lives of al-Qa‘ida activists as well as rejectionist Afghan leaders.[12] A U.S.
missile also killed Yemen's top al-Qa‘ida commander. Additionally, it has also been reported that
President Bush gave the CIA and U.S. special forces authority to use "lethal force" to kill the
Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein.[13]
Although Israel has gained more sympathy abroad for its tactic since September 11, not all
Israelis are entirely convinced that the method is worth pursuing. Critics of the "selective
targeting" policy point out its self-destructive aspect. After each targeting, the Palestinians
promise—and in most cases deliver—a hard and painful response. Assassination victims are
automatically hailed as martyrs, and vengeful Palestinian admirers of the deceased volunteer to
take his place. Following ‘Ayyash's death, Arafat publicly proclaimed him a martyr and a hero;
streets in Palestinian cities were named after him; and a wave of suicide bombings resulted in
fifty-nine dead and 250 wounded Israelis. Following the January 2001 assassination of the Fatah
leader in Tulkarem, Ra'd Karmi, the Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed
responsibility for attacks that took the lives of fifty-seven Israelis. Hizbullah is also a vindictive
organization. ‘Abbas Musawi's killing was soon followed by the bombing of the Israeli embassy
in Argentina. The price was heavy: twenty-nine killed and 242 wounded.
Another drawback: assassinations of key political and military activists may invite similar
attempts on the lives of Israeli leaders. The death of Abu-‘Ali Mustafa, secretary-general of the
PFLP, assassinated in August 2001, prompted the killing two months later of Israeli minister of
tourism Rehavam Ze'evi. Following the killing of Salah Shihada, a Palestinian militant group,
the Popular Army Front–Return Battalions, responded by releasing a hit list of twenty prominent
Israeli officials, with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the top.[14] Targeting Palestinian militants
has put at risk thousands of IDF officers and their families who may become targets of
Palestinian retaliatory action. This threat is not taken lightly in the IDF. For the first time in
Israel's history, Israeli generals now have bodyguards assigned to them.
However, many Israelis dismiss the argument that the killing feeds a vicious cycle of death and
violence that might not be to Israel's benefit. They believe there is no causality between Israel's
actions and the Palestinians' decision to embrace terror. "Islamic Jihad and others do not need
excuses to carry out attacks," said Israel's former deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh, "since
in any case they are constantly trying to harm Israelis."[15]
What is less obvious to the critics is the number of attacks that have been thwarted through the
masterminds' removal. "Ticking bomb," a well-known term in counterterrorism jargon, refers to
a terrorist or a group of terrorists in the process of launching an attack. Killing the perpetrator or
his dispatcher stops the clock. The Karmi assassination was undertaken to prevent him from
carrying out his plans, which included the assassination of a prominent Israeli. ‘Umar Sa‘adah,
the head of the Hamas military wing in Bethlehem, killed in July 2001, was planning a major
attack at the closing ceremony of the Maccabiah Games, the Jewish olympics. [16] At the time of
his assassination, Salah Shihada was in the process of organizing a "mega-attack" of six terror
operations that were to take place simultaneously.[17] Nobody will ever know the scope of the
bloodbath that was prevented by thwarting these attempts. These acts never made headlines; they
constitute the silent terror—the terror that never happened.
Political Risks
Targeted killing is a risky business, especially when missions fail, and they often do. The
outcome in such cases is operationally damaging, and some blundered attempts have entangled
Israel in a diplomatic morass.
In 1973, for example, a Mossad team in Lillehammer, Norway, on a mission to assassinate a
PLO leader, mistakenly targeted an innocent restaurant waiter and caused an unpleasant
diplomatic incident between Israel and Norway. Worse, in September 1997, two Mossad agents
were captured in Amman after attacking a Hamas leader, Khalid Mash‘al, with a high-tech
device intended to poison him. Mash‘al's life was saved after he was treated with an antidote
demanded of the Israelis by the furious King Hussein. The failed attempt was not only a blow to
the Mossad's impeccable image but also to fragile Israeli-Jordanian relations. It occurred during
one of the low points of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process during the short term of the rightwing government of Binyamin Netanyahu. To ease the king's wrath over Israel's violation of
Jordanian sovereignty, Netanyahu himself secretly traveled to Jordan, but King Hussein refused
to meet with him, sending his crown prince instead. Subsequently, a deal was reached to spare
the two Mossad agents from trial in Jordan by exchanging them for Hamas founder Sheikh
Ahmad Yasin, imprisoned in Israel. The assassination attempt meant to weaken the leadership of
Hamas instead ended up achieving exactly the opposite result.
To make things worse, Israel also found itself involved in an embarrassing diplomatic incident
with the government of Canada. It was discovered that the Mossad tried to cover its tracks by
equipping Mash‘al's assassins with forged Canadian passports. The Mash‘al case is a good
example of the risks involved in assassination attempts carried out in foreign countries. The
short-term gain derived from a successful operation can be easily offset by the severe damage to
long-term diplomatic relations in the case of a blunder.
Another problem of a systematic targeting campaign is that Israel's actions have become a
widely used cover for domestic killings among Palestinians. Many of the feuds and tensions in
the divided and highly corrupt Palestinian security establishment are handled violently. Blaming
Israel for the murder of every security leader, terrorist, or any other visible figure has become a
conditioned reflex among Palestinians. When a powerful car bomb exploded in March 1998,
killing one of ‘Ayyash's disciples, Muhi ad-Din ash-Sharif, one of Israel's most wanted terrorists,
a finger of blame was automatically pointed at Israel. Only later was it discovered that the killing
was a result of internal rivalries among various factions of Hamas. Arafat blamed Israel for
killing his confidant Hisham Makki, director of Palestinian television, shot point blank by three
assassins in Gaza.[18] Palestinian television hurried to blame the "dark forces of the occupation"
for Makki's death, only later to learn the assassination was carried out by the forces of what was
then a nascent Palestinian organization called Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.[19]
To Terrorize a Terrorist
Despite the shortcomings of the current policy, there is nearly a consensus among Israel's
defense officials that it is the most effective and least injurious way to deter and prevent terrorist
groups from perpetrating terror attacks, especially in light of the PA's refusal to fight terror.
Officials believe that despite occasional mistakes causing the death of innocent civilians—in the
first twenty-two months of the intifada, forty-four Palestinian bystanders were killed in the
process of targeted killings—any alternative tactic would inflict much more harm to innocent
civilians.
To assess the real impact of targeted killing on the infrastructure of terrorist groups, one needs to
understand their organizational culture, psychology, and behavior. The operational branches of
organizations such as Hamas or the PIJ consist of three layers: political-military command,
intermediate level, and what can be referred to as the "ground troops." The political-military
command echelon—most of which is in the Gaza Strip—consists of a small group, no more than
a dozen activists, responsible for funding, political and spiritual guidance, and direction of the
organization's strategy. They maintain regular contact with the headquarters of terrorist groups
throughout the Arab world as well as with senior leaders of the PA and chiefs of its security
forces.[20]
The intermediate level of command is a group slightly larger in size, a few dozens in each
Palestinian city. Its members are involved in planning operations, and recruiting, training,
arming, and dispatching terrorists. The different cells are loosely connected, and their members
do not usually operate outside their area of jurisdiction. Members of this group, especially those
living in Gaza, meet frequently with the senior leadership and receive daily orders and funds to
finance their operations. Unlike members of the first group, intermediate-level activists are not
so familiar to the public, and their killing does not evoke the same rage as does the targeting of
senior leaders. For this reason, Israel has so far preferred to target as few senior leaders as
possible and focus on members of the second group.
Israel has always believed that draining the swamp is more important than fighting the
mosquitoes: the infrastructure of the terror organizations, those who initiate, plan, or facilitate
terror attacks as well recruiters, dispatchers, and fundraisers are just as culpable as those who
actually pull the trigger or detonate the bomb. Hence, members of the second group are
considered "ticking bombs" even if they are not those who personally carry out the attacks.
The ground troops are those recruited to be the actual perpetrators of either suicide operations or
what Palestinians refer to as "martyrdom operations"—shooting attacks in Israeli population
centers in which the probability of survival of the perpetrator is slim. These volunteers are
recruited on an ad hoc basis and maintain contact only with their operators. In most cases they
are not exposed to the organization's secrets and have very little knowledge about its structure
and operations. Occasionally, due to technical malfunction or cold feet, suicide bombers fail in
their mission and are captured alive by the Israeli authorities. A "dud" who breaks during
interrogation and provides information on his (or her) dispatchers is a threat to the entire
organization. As a result, some operators refrain from exposing their identity to their troops.
They prefer to wear a mask or communicate with them indirectly through letters or by
phone.[21]
As a result, the nature of Palestinian terror organizations is that they are secretive and
compartmentalized. People hardly know each other. There are no headquarters, files, computers,
radio equipment, or organizational memory. Removing one activist can handicap or destroy an
entire cell, but removal of one cell does not necessarily bring down the entire organization.
Despite defiant Palestinian rhetoric, Palestinian activists' fear of being on Israel's target list is
paralyzing, and that is exactly what Israel wants. Explained Sharon:
The plan is to place the terrorists in varying situations every day and knock them off balance so
that they will be busy protecting themselves.[22]
While on the run, the Palestinian terrorist's energy is devoted to survival rather than to planning
the next attack. The terrorist detaches himself from his close circle of friends and family and
begins to live a fugitive's life. He is forced to spend each night in a different location, often
sleeping in the open field. Hours each day are wasted looking for a safe haven to spend the
coming night. Most difficult is the distance from his home and family. He knows that any contact
with his wife or parents could cost him his life. Consequently, he is completely at the mercy of
his confidants, not knowing which one of them might be an Israeli collaborator.
Booby-trapped cars and telephones increase the feeling among Palestinian militants that the long
arm of the Israeli security forces reaches their most intimate surroundings. They become nervous
and suspicious of collaborators who might live among them. A Palestinian journalist conveyed
the atmosphere of fear and confusion in the Palestinian street after Shihada's killing:
People are now looking for wanted men. They are stopping them in the middle of the street and
will now begin asking for their identification before they enter a specific residential
neighborhood. … No one feels safe. … How do you know who will be Shihada number two, and
where the missile will come from? … Someone must have told the Shin Bet (GSS) that Shihada
was visiting his house; that someone must live among us, and now everyone is looking for
collaborators.[23]
And they should. Despite the deep animosity toward Israel, many Palestinians are still willing to
face the risk of the death penalty the PA imposes on collaborators and provide valuable
information to the Israelis. In a society where more than half of the families live below the
poverty line, one can always find people willing to collaborate with the enemy in exchange for
money or other benefits.
Assassinations of military leaders are traumatic events in the lives of their organizations, often
leading to a change in organizational behavior. Commanders become extremely suspicious and
cautious. They leave few traces of their whereabouts; restrict information about operational
planning to small groups of secret keepers; and recruit new members more selectively. The
paranoid environment in which terrorists operate reduces their effectiveness drastically. Trust is
the bedrock of any human activity, including terrorism. Without it, the organization becomes
disjointed; information cannot be disseminated; people do not feel part of a team; lessons are not
learned properly.
Additionally, communication between the different cells breaks down. Following the killing of
Musawi, Hizbullah squads began to maintain strict radio silence, preventing Israel from
monitoring the organization's action. In the territories, Palestinian militants who fear Israeli
eavesdropping refrain from using the telephone to communicate with each other. This leads to
further confusion and misunderstandings. Such a dynamic has a cumulative, holistic, negative
influence on the organization's effectiveness. The influence cannot be precisely measured or
even assessed by empirical tools, but it is certainly profound.
Thankless
Counterterrorism is a shadow war carried out far from the public's eye. It is a war of prevention.
Success is an uneventful day in which people go about their lives without being killed, maimed,
or stunned by a blast. It is a war without celebrated victories: public consciousness is much better
in recording those days in which prevention failed than those of normalcy.
The soldiers of this war drive no tanks and fire no cannons. They search homes, operate
surveillance equipment, recruit informers, and interrogate suspects. But no war is sterile, and at
times the only weapon able to target the enemy's center of gravity is the hit man.
Knowing that retaliation is inevitable, the decision to use this weapon is difficult and is taken by
the highest authority in Israel only when it is probable that inaction will carry an even higher
price. Israel is at war, and war, as Clausewitz wrote, has its own grammar.[24] Targeted killing,
Israelis overwhelmingly believe, is still an essential part of their war's grammar.
Gal Luft, a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, is the author of The Palestinian Security Forces: Between Police
and Army (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).
[1] Moshe Zonder, Sayeret Matkal (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000), pp. 238-48.
[2] Ha'aretz, (Tel Aviv), Apr. 6, 2001.
[3] Ibid., Mar. 14, 2001.
[4] "The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism," U.N.
General Assembly resolution 54/109, Dec. 9, 1999, at http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm;
U.N. Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) at
http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm#reso.
[5] Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), July 12, 2002.
[6] Ha'aretz, Feb. 12, 2001.
[7] Richard Boucher, State Department briefing, July 2, 2001, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/4656.htm.
[8] Fox News Special Report, Aug. 2, 2001, at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,31241,00.html.
[9] White House briefing, Aug. 3, 2001, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/20010803.html#some%20justification.
[10] The Guardian, July 3, 2001.
[11] Newsweek, Dec. 15, 2001.
[12] USA Today, May 9, 2002.
[13] The Guardian, June 17, 2002.
[14] The Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2002.
[15] Ibid., Dec. 12, 2000.
[16] Ha'aretz, July 18, 2001.
[17] The Jerusalem Post, July 30, 2002.
[18] Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Apr. 6, 2001.
[19] The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 18, 2000.
[20] Based on author's discussion with Israeli intelligence sources.
[21] Based on author's discussion with Israeli intelligence sources.
[22] The New York Times, Apr. 12, 2001.
[23] The Jerusalem Post, July 26, 2002.
[24] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 100, 605.