November 24, 2015
Dimitri Migrow
Personal
information
Date of birth:
Citizenship:
Place of birth:
Address:
Email:
Webpage:
Phone:
17th November, 1982
German
Saint-Petersburg
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, UK
[email protected]
https://www2.[...]dmigrow
0044 (0)7454 162814
Education
University Of Warwick
PhD candidate in Economics
Thesis:
Essays in Informational Economics
2010Primary advisor: Prof. Francesco Squintani,
Advisors: Prof. Dan Bernhardt,
Dr. Marina Halac, Prof. Peter J. Hammond
Hebrew University Jerusalem
(Visiting PhD student in Rationality Center)
2012, 2013
University of Regensburg
Research Assistant
2008-2010
University of Mainz
Diploma in Economics (distinction)
2002-2007
Research
Interests
Primary: Organizational Economics, Economics of Information, Contract Theory
Secondary: Social Networks, Game Theory
Teaching
experience
Warwick University:
Advanced Microeconomic Analysis (MRes)
Economic Analysis: Micro (MSc)
Mathematical Economics (BSc 2d year)
Microeconomics (BSc 1st year)
201420142013-2014
2011-2012
University of Regensburg:
Game Theory (MSc)
Theory of International Trade (BSc, 3d year)
2008-2010
2008-2010
Awards and
Positions
Teaching Fellowship
Conference Attendance Fellowship, 5th Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting
Scholarship of the Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy
(Economic and Social Research Council)
20132014
2010-2013
Nominated by Students for the Warwick University Awards for Teaching Excellence
Erasmus Scholarship
Seminars and
conferences
Econometric Society, 2015 Winter Meeting (Job Market Paper accepted)
2013
2005-2006
Dec 15-16, 2015
Warwick PhD conference
2014
CAGE workshop, Warwick
2013
Sergiu’s Hart student seminar in Rationaly Center, Jerusalem
2012
Computer skills
LATEX, Mathematica, Office, Matlab (basic)
Languages
English: Fluent.
German: Fluent.
Working Papers
Designing Communication Hierarchies to Elicit Information (Job Market Paper), 2015.
Russian: Mother tongue.
Latin: Basic.
A central problem in organizations is that much of the information relevant for decision making
is dispersed among employees who are biased and may lack the incentives to communicate their
information to the management. This paper studies how a manager can elicit employees’ information
by designing a hierarchical communication network. The manager decides who communicates with
whom, and in which order, where communication takes the form of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel,
1982). I show that the optimal network is shaped by two competing forces: an intermediation force
that calls for grouping employees together and an uncertainty force that favours separating them.
The manager optimally divides employees into groups of similar bias. Under simple conditions, the
optimal network features a single intermediary who communicates directly to the manager.
Communication and Delegation in a Game With Evidence, 2015.
This paper studies a novel trade-off between centralization and decentralization with two experts
and a decision maker, when experts receive noisy and complementary evidence. There is a single
decision to be made, the decision maker can allocate the decision right to any of the experts,
and can commit to communication channels betweent the players. I study conditions under which
delegation combined with decentralized communication outperforms centralization. This happens
because delegation encourages information sharing between the experts. Two conditions have to be
satisfied in order for a decision maker to benefit from decentralization. First, the expert who decides
over policy has to be not too biased towards the decision maker. Second, he should have a smaller
distance to the bias of the other expert compared to the DM. In this case, the other expert is willing
to reveal more information to the first expert compared to the centralized case.
Publications in
refereed
journals
The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective. In: Games, 2011, 2, 452-462.
References
Prof Francesco Squintani (primary advisor)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Tel: +44(0) 2476 52 3446
Email: [email protected]
Prof Dan Bernhardt (advisor)
Department of Economics
University of Illinois
214 David Kinley Hall
Illinois 61801, United States
Tel: +1 (217) 333-0120
Email: [email protected]
Dr Marina Halac (advisor)
Department of Economics
Warwick Uni (and Columbia Business School)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Tel (in US): 212-851-5864
Email: [email protected]
Prof Peter J. Hammond, FBA (advisor)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Tel: +44(0) 2476 52 3052
Email: [email protected]
Prof Jeremy Smith (teaching)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Tel: +44(0) 2476 52 3336
Email: [email protected]