DR ATHANASIOS ATHANASOPOULOS
CONTACT INFORMATION
Department of Economics, Room S0.55
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Telephone number: (+44)7578704651
URL of my personal webpage:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/aathanasopoulos
E-mail: [email protected]
PLACEMENT DIRECTOR
Professor Dan Bernhardt
E-mail: [email protected]
EDUCATION
PhD in Economics, University of Warwick, UK
2009-2014
Thesis Title: Three Essays on Technological Change and Welfare (Awarded with
no corrections)
Examiners: Christopher Doyle (University of Warwick), Flavio Toxvaerd (University
of Cambridge)
MA in Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, US
MSc in Statistics and Operations Research, National and Kapodistrean
University of Athens, Athens, Greece
2007-2009
2003-2007
Dissertation Title: Equilibrium Behaviour in Observable and Non-Observable
Queueing Systems
BSc in Mathematics, University of Patras, Patra, Greece
1998-2003
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Primary: Industrial Organization; Competition and Regulatory Economics; Economics of Science and
Innovation; Public Policy
Secondary: Economics of Information; Finance
WORKING PAPERS
Incentives to Innovate, Compatibility and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects
(Job Market Paper) (Under Review, RAND Journal of Economics)
Compatibility, Intellectual Property, Innovation and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with
Network Effects (Submitted)
Efficient Upgrading in Network Goods; Is Commitment Always Good?
WORK IN PROGRESS
RJVs, Value Creation and Network Control in Durable Goods Markets
Mergers, Innovation and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects
TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, UK
2015-Present
Preparing and delivering seminars for the following modules:
Introductory Mathematics and Statistics (Pre-sessional course for Masters
students), Economics 2 (2nd year Undergraduate module), Corporate Finance
and Markets (Final year Undergraduate module), Topics in Financial Economics:
Theories and International Finance (Final year Undergraduate module),
Research in Applied Economics (Final year Undergraduate module),
Macroeconomics 2 (2nd year Undergraduate module)
Assessing student work
Personal Tutor
Part-time Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, University of Warwick,
UK
2012-2015
Preparing and delivering seminars for the following modules:
Economics 2 (2nd year undergraduate module), Corporate Finance and
Markets (Final year Undergraduate module), Topics in Financial Economics:
Theories and International Finance (Final year Undergraduate module),
Principles of Economics (Warwick Economics Summer School 2015)
Assessing Student Work
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, UK
2010-2012
Preparing and delivering seminars for the following modules:
Economics 2 (2nd year Undergraduate module), Corporate Finance and
Markets (Final year Undergraduate module)
Assessing student work
Research Assistant, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, UK
Conducting the statistical analysis of longitudinal data using SPSS
Teaching Assistant, University of Southern California, US
Preparing and delivering seminars for the following module: Principles of
Macroeconomics
Tutor in Mathematics, Athens, Greece
Private lessons for 12-18 year old students
2011-2012
2008-2009
2003-2007
HONOURS/ AWARDS/ PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
RISING STAR Session, EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial
Economics), Munich, Germany
STARS OF WARWICK: Nominated as one of the three best postgraduate
students teaching at Warwick, University of Warwick, UK
Award for Outstanding Contribution at the Department of Economics,
University of Warwick, UK
Nomination for Teaching Excellence, University of Warwick, UK
Graduate Assistantship, Department of Economics, University of Southern
California, US
Member of the Greek Statistical Institute (ESI)
2015
Research Bursary, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, UK
2010-2012
2012
2015
2013
2007-2009
2004-Present
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
Incentives to Innovate, Compatibility and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects
Presented at: Rising Star Session, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
(EARIE), Munich, Germany, 08/2015
Compatibility, Intellectual Property, Innovation and Welfare in Durable Goods
Markets with Network Effects
Presented at: International Conference on Competition and Regulation (CRESSE), Corfu, Greece,
07/2014
Royal Economics Society PhD Meetings and Job Market, London, UK, 01/2015
European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Munich, Germany, 08/2015
Efficient Upgrading in Network Goods; Is Commitment Always Good?
Presented at: CISS 2013 (Competition and Innovation Summer School), Turunc, Marmaris, Turkey
05/2013
3rd GAEL Conference (Product Differentiation and Innovation in Related Markets), Grenoble, France
06/2013
Forum on Industrial Organization and Marketing, Frankfurt, Germany, 08/2013
SKILLS
IT Skills: Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint, Word, STATA, Statgraphics, Matlab, SPSS
Administration: Warwick Economics Summer School (2014), University of Warwick Open Day (2015),
Development Review Meetings (University of Warwick)
Language: Greek (native), English (fluent), French (average)
REFERENCES
Professor Claudio Mezzetti
(PhD Supervisor)
School of Economics
The University of Queensland
550b (Colin Clark building)
Brisbane St Lucia, QLD 4072
Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
Professor Dan Bernhardt (PhD
Advisor)
Departments of Economics and Finance
1106 S. Prospect Ave, Champaign, Il 61820
University of Illinois Champaign, Il 61801
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
e-mail: [email protected],
[email protected]
Associate Professor Daniel Sgroi
(PhD Supervisor)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom
e-mail: [email protected]
Dr Flavio Toxvaerd
University of Cambridge Faculty
of Economics
Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge, CB3
9DDe-mail [email protected]
Dr Christopher Doyle
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom
email:[email protected]
Professor Jeremy Smith
(Teaching)
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL, United
Kingdom
e-mail:
[email protected]
ABSTRACTS
Incentives to Innovate, Compatibility and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects
(Job Market Paper) (Under Review, RAND Journal of Economics)
Abstract: This paper investigates firms' incentives to invest in R&D of a durable good with network
externalities, and their current compatibility decisions in the presence of forward-looking
consumers. Product innovation is sequential with both an initially dominant firm and a smaller
competitor as potential innovators.
I establish that firms' R&D efforts become strategic complements for the current market leader
when compatibility is present and network effects are strong, while they are strategic substitutes
for both firms when network externalities are weak. My analysis provides an explanation for
the compatibility agreements that firms with dominant market shares sign with smaller market
players: sufficiently innovative future products lead the dominant firm to support future
compatibility because the probability that it is the only innovator rises when compatibility is
present, allowing this firm to enjoy a higher expected future profit that outweighs its current lost
revenue. Interestingly, the smaller rival may reject compatibility in industries with few existing
consumers. For less innovative future products, the dominant firm rejects compatibility and there
is a cut-off on network externalities below which it invests more when incompatibility is present.
The welfare effects of mandating compatibility are complicated. I find that when network effects
are weak, future incompatible networks increase expected consumer surplus and lead to more
balanced market R&D incentives relative to an economy that mandates compatibility.
Compatibility, Intellectual Property, Innovation and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with
Network Effects (Submitted)
Abstract: Competition Authorities consider market leaders’ refusals to support compatibility with
competitors as a potential abuse of dominance with detrimental effects on consumer welfare and
competition. A prime example is the 2008 European Commission case against Microsoft regarding
its refusal to support compatibility of its Office software product with those of competitors. This
paper investigates a dominant firm's approach towards the compatibility of its durable network
goods with that of a future, innovative rival in the presence of overlapping generations of forwardlooking consumers and the welfare effects of its refusal to support compatibility. I consider
sequential, substitutable product innovations, where a rival can build on a dominant firm's existing
knowledge. For moderately innovative future products and weak network effects, the market
leader supports compatibility because strategic pricing allows him to extract in the present market
more of the higher total surplus that emerges when it is compatible with its competitor. A
dominant firm’s refusal to support compatibility leads to incompatible future networks and a
higher degree of competition that increases consumer surplus. I also find that there is no market
failure when network effects are weak.
Efficient Upgrading in Network Goods; Is Commitment Always Good?
Abstract: This paper explores an incumbent monopolist’s incentives to upgrade its durable
network product in the presence of overlapping generations of customers and a potential entrant
who may also sell a version of the same quality. When the incumbent has commitment power and
entry cannot be deterred, it decides to withhold the upgrade when network effects are weak, as
strategic complementarity between the competitors’ intertemporal pricing decisions allows it to
charge sufficiently patient forward-looking consumers more in the present market. On the other
hand, he commits to upgrade when network effects are strong, as there is strategic substitutability
between firms’ prices. Regarding welfare, the frequency of new products is not socially optimal
when the quality improvement is negligible and smaller than their adoption cost. I find that both
potential or actual competition and the incumbent’s commitment power are sources of
inefficiency. Regarding welfare, I find that both potential or actual competition and the
incumbent’s commitment power are sources of inefficiency.
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DR ATHANASIOS ATHANASOPOULOS CONTACT INFORMATION PLACEMENT DIRECTOR