EEVA MAURING
https://sites.google.com/site/eevamauring/
eevamauring@gmail.com
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Placement Director: Andrew Chesher
Graduate Coordinator: Daniella Harper
andrew.chesher@ucl.ac.uk
economics.jobmarket@ucl.ac.uk
CONTACT DETAILS
Department of Economics
University College London
30 Gordon Street
London WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 75 8383 8329
EDUCATION
PhD Candidate, Economics, University College London (UCL), UK, 2011 to present
Advisors: Rani Spiegler and Martin Cripps
Expected completion: June 2016
Job market paper: “Learning from Trades”
MRes, Economics, University College London, UK, 2011
MSc, Economics, University of Helsinki, Finland, 2010
BSc, Economics, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga), Latvia, 2006
REFERENCES
Rani Spiegler (Primary Advisor)
Department of Economics
University College London
30 Gordon Street
London WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom
r.spiegler@ucl.ac.uk
Martin Cripps (Advisor)
Department of Economics
University College London
30 Gordon Street
London WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom
m.cripps@ucl.ac.uk
Jan Eeckhout
Department of Economics
University College London
30 Gordon Street
London WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom
j.eeckhout@ucl.ac.uk
RESEARCH FIELDS
Microeconomic theory, industrial organisation, choice theory, search, game theory
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Fall 2015/16, Introduction to Mathematics for Economics, UCL, TA for Malcolm Pemberton
Spring 2014/15, Industrial Organisation, UCL, TA for Vasiliki Skreta
Fall 2012/13, Game Theory, UCL, TA for Nikita Roketskiy
Spring 2011/12, Industrial Organisation, UCL, TA for Cristoph Bertsch
Fall 2004/05, Microeconomics, SSE Riga, TA for Morten Hansen
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT
July 2013 - Nov 2014, Research Assistant to Rani Spiegler, UCL
Oct 2011 - July 2012, Research Assistant to Rani Spiegler, UCL
June 2010 - Aug 2010, Research Assistant to Klaus Kultti, University of Helsinki
June 2009 - Aug 2009, Research Assistant to Klaus Kultti, University of Helsinki
April 2007 - Aug 2008, Financial Analyst, AS Hansapank (now AS Swedbank), Estonia
CONFERENCE & SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS
May 2015, SaM Conference, Aix-en-Provence, France
April 2015, Royal Economic Society Junior Symposium, Manchester, UK
Nov 2014, ENTER seminar, Tilburg, Netherlands
Aug 2011, European Economics Association Conference, Oslo, Norway
Aug 2011, Irish Society of New Economists Conference, Dublin, Ireland
OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Refereeing: Economic Journal
Conference organisation: Frontiers in Economics and Psychology, UCL, 5-6 June 2014
Summer schools: Decision Theory, Jerusalem, 2013; Incomplete Contracts, Bronnbach, 2012
SCHOLARSHIPS
2014, Kristjan Jaak Scholarship, Estonian Ministry of Education and Research
2010-2012, WM Gorman Scholarship, UCL
2010-2012, ESRC Scholarship, Economic & Social Research Council, UK
2010, Rein Otsason Scholarship, Rein Otsason Foundation
2009, Kristjan Jaak Scholarship, Estonian Ministry of Education and Research
2008-2009, International Student Grant, University of Helsinki
2008, Staffan Burenstam Linder Scholarship, Staffan Burenstam Linder Memorial Foundation
RESEARCH PAPERS IN PROGRESS
Job Market Paper: “Learning from Trades”
Buyers learn about the distribution of options on the market from many types of information. This
paper analyses the efficiency of various information regimes in a dynamic market model with pairwise
meetings where buyers face an unknown distribution of options. I show that, contrary to the intuition that more information leads to greater market efficiency, a market where buyers learn about the
unknown distribution from a private signal with an equilibrium-determined precision (“trade signal”)
may be less efficient than a market where buyers do not receive this signal. The trade signal reveals
to a buyer whether a randomly chosen seller traded in the previous period. In equilibrium, observing
that the seller traded is good news about the unknown distribution. In contrast to the trade signal,
a market where buyers learn from a private signal with a suitable exogenously given precision is more
efficient than both a market where buyers do not receive a signal and a market where buyers know the
distribution of options.
“Two-Person Search”
This paper extends the standard sequential search model by allowing the agent who compiles the choice
set via search (the “searcher”) to differ from the agent who chooses from the set (the “chooser”). I
show for a general joint distribution of the agents’ preferences that the searcher’s optimal policy is a
threshold rule. I characterise the optimal threshold and show that it features a “discouragement effect”:
if the searcher is unlikely to find an item that is better for the chooser than the best item found so far,
the searcher stops searching.
“Search with Mistakes”
PRE-DOCTORAL WORK
Kultti, K., E. Mauring, J. Vanhala and T. Vesala (2015): “Adverse Selection in Dynamic Matching
Markets”, Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 67, pp. 115-133.
Kultti, K. and E. Mauring (2014): “Low Price Signals High Capacity”, Journal of Economics, Vol.
112, pp. 165-181.
Kultti, K. and E. Mauring (2010): “Search with Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Agents”, Finnish
Economic Papers, Vol. 23, No. 2.
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Citizenship: Estonia
Languages: Estonian (mother tongue), English (fluent), Finnish (advanced), German (intermediate),
Russian (beginner)