R
June 6, 2006
1776 Main Street, PO Box 2138 Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
ERRATA
PUBLICATIONS
DEPARTMENT
To:
Recipients of U.S. Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities
and Military Roles (MG-338-AF)
From:
Publications Department
Please note the following corrections:
Page 14—Figure data, figure title, and SOURCE information
updated for Figure 2.1
Page 15—Figure data and SOURCE information updated for
Figure 2.2
14
U.S. Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities and Military Roles
Figure 2.1
Total U.S. Government Assistance to Central Asia, 1992–2004
3,500
$ millions obligated
3,000
2001–2003
1992–9/30/2000
2,500
1,061.95
2,000
1,500
1,000
1,855.62
261.63
187.15
on
re
-w
To
ta
lf
or
on
gi
ek
gi
id
e
an
ist
an
en
m
rk
Tu
Ta
jik
ist
ist
an
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
st
kh
za
Ka
22.91
218.32
181.65
an
0
328.54
42.36
287.2
zb
484.23
Re
219.36
684.22
U
500
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State (2004).
RAND MG338-2.1
nancing (FMF) and IMET assistance to these countries grew since
OEF began. Although at the time this report was written comprehensive data were available only through the end of 2003, it is clear that a
disproportionate amount of assistance since the collapse of the USSR
was provided in 2001 and after.
One area in which there seems to have been little benefit to either Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan is direct spending in local communities as a result of the base presence. Although some local personnel
were hired on and near the bases to provide food and other services,
U.S. personnel are largely confined to the base facilities and do not
venture out to local restaurants and shops to spend money. This
is in contrast, for example, to the German presence in Uzbeki-
Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia
15
Figure 2.2
U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia (IMET and FMF), 1990–2003
110
100
2001–2003
1992–2000
$ millions obligated
90
80
70
76.165
60
50
40
30
36.151
20
on
re
gi
ist
lf
or
ek
ta
Tu
zb
m
Ta
en
jik
ist
an
an
an
ist
an
st
yz
rg
Ky
8.154
3.703
To
0.7
6.375
an
st
kh
za
1.658
rk
9.871
0
Ka
28.103
8.650
U
8.233
10
SOURCE: U.S. Department of State (2004).
RAND MG338-2.2
stan and to other coalition forces based at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, who
enjoyed considerably more freedom of movement.23
The United States did not take advantage of Kazakhstan’s offer
of base access for U.S. forces in support of OEF. Although the two
countries agreed that the United States could use Kazakh facilities in
an emergency, this never took place. However, the offer of access itself was unprecedented—the base offered, Lugovoi, had never been
visited by U.S. personnel until the offer was made. Moreover, overflight was useful for OEF, and the United States government appreciated the Kazakh willingness to help. As elsewhere in Central Asia, this
meant stepped-up assistance.24 Border security is one critical aspect of
____________
23 Oliker,
Lal, and Blasi (unpublished).
24 Interviews
with U.S. officials, summer 2003.