Matthew Lemons
Philosophy 430
Final Paper
Travis Butler
5/3/2005
Long describes Epictetus’s hegemonikon and prohairesis in Chapter 8. Both of
these are parts of how Epictetus thinks we reason and how we take in information and
make sense of it. The hegemonikon means “governing faculty” or the soul. The
prohairesis is limited to God and humans. The prohairesis is how we make sense of
impressions. God’s gift to us was our rational, self-scrutinizing, and self-motivating
faculty. God gives us our independent sense of reasoning. Reason is the only thing that
is in fact ours. There is only one way to reason, and because of this the only way that a
person can make a mistake is to make an error in our reasoning.
On page 31 Epictetus says “It is not that I am looking into, you slave, but how
you act in your choices and refusals, your desires and aversions, how you go at things,
and apply yourself to them, and prepare yourself to them, and prepare yourself, whether
you are acting in harmony with nature therein, orout of harmony with it. For if you are
acting in harmony, show me that, and I will tell you that you are making progress; but if
out of harmony, begone, and do not confine yourself to expounding your books, but go
and write some of the same kind yourself”. On page 35 he says “If indeed one had to be
deceived into learning that among things external and independent of our free choice
none concerns us, I for my part, should consent to a deception which would result in my
living thereafter serenely and without turmoil.” As he is talking about choices, desires,
aversions, and free choices in these quotes, we are lead to believe that Epictetus does
seem to think that there is a line between us and the rest of the world. There is a line
between us and God. He does believe in freedom and individual actions.
On page 33, Epictetus talks about the need to align ourself with nature. “Where
then is progress? If any man among you, withdrawing from external things, has turned
his attention to the question of his own moral purpose, cultivating and perfecting it so as
to make it finally harmonious with nature, elevated, free, unhindered, untrammeled,
faithful, and honourable; and if he has learned that he who craves or shuns the things that
are not under his control can be neither faithful or free, but must himself of necessity be
changed and tossed to and fro with them, and must end by subordinating himself to
others, those, namely who are able to procure or prevent these things that he craves or
shuns” The importance of aligning ourselves with nature would make it more likely that
our souls are part of nature.
Scientific proof that all future actions must be caused by past events would
require Epictetus to change his view of the fully-autonomous self some, but ultimately he
could still argue that a person is free and that they are morally responsible.
Since Epictetus has talked both about free will, and the importance of aligning
ourselves with God and nature, it seems unlikely that he would want to deny free will
entirely. We would be left with autonomy, but in a different sense. While the accepted
definition of freedom would involve a strong sense of individuality and ability to choose
our actions, Epictetus’s version of the soul involves being part of God so we should
expect his sense of freedom to be different. We are no longer free independently of
nature, but only as a part of nature.
Natural causality seems to imply that our actions fit into laws of nature, and that
our future actions are predictable and necessary like things in the scientific and
mechanical world. God created the natural world and all the rules of the natural world, so
if the natural world causes future actions of people, then God is responsible for the future
actions of people.
Necessary causality for all future actions would require Epictetus to think the line
between individual soul, God, and the rest of the world. He already is talking about the
need for us to align ourselves with God, or figure out how we fit into the puzzle of the
universe. He already talks about the prohairesis as being something that only humans
and God’s have. It seems reasonable that he would make the move that we are only us in
the sense of how we relate to the rest of the world or God. The line between our
individual selves, God, and the universe would have to be blurry or nonexistent. God
would now be part of each person’s prohairesis.
Epictetus talks about God created all the people, objects, and animals of the
world. All these things exist for a reason. God created the natural world. God created
the laws of science and nature. They all fit together by design and on purpose. Since
God created the laws of science and world in which people fit into, the idea of past events
causing future events sounds reasonable.
Long summarizes Epictetus’s view of autonomy as the “correct use of
impression”. It seems that this would still be the case with scientifically-necessary
causality. Since all future actions would be determined by past actions, it doesn’t seem
possible that there could be an incorrect use of impression.
Epictetus thinks we need to align ourselves with God as much as possible.
Epictetus I thi9nk could argue for a slightly different sense of self and sense of freedom
that comes from scientifically-necessary causality. The line of where we leave off and
where the rest of the world begins, or where we leave off and where God begins is blurry
or nonexistent. God is a part of us. The world is a part of us. By uniting ourselves with
God, we find our place in the world. Since God, nature, and scientific rules are part of
us, our actions are also part of the world.
Humans are still morally responsible for their actions even if past events cause all
future actions. All people are aligned with God, and God created nature and the rules of
nature. There is still freedom because as people are aligned with God and are part of
God, God has the ultimate power to have created a different set of past events, or a
different natural world. Even though our current natural world would require that person
X do action Y, he is still free in the sense that he is aligned with God, and God could
have created a different world and a different set of rules, which have could have caused
a different set of past events.
An argument against Epictetus’s hypothetical response would be that person X
would suffer the sometimes-negative consequences based on their actions. If past events
require me to commit murder, it isn’t fair that I (in the separate from God sense) suffer
the painful consequences.
Epictetus would then point out that Bob’s negative consequences ultimately don’t
matter because Bob’s part in the larger puzzle of life is more important. Sometimes
people or animals do suffer pain, but this is OK as it is just a piece in the puzzle of the
universe that God has created. One person’s pain is necessary for other things to happen
in the natural world.
On page 47, Epictetus talks about men experiencing unpleasant or painful things.
After a slave complains of a runny nose, he asks “Is it reasonable, then, that there should
be running noses in the world?” Epictetus responds “Or what do you think Heracles
would have amounted to, if there had been a lion like the one which he encountered, and
a hydra, and a stag, and a boar, and a wicked and brutal men, whom he made it his
business to drive out and clear away? And what would he have been doing had nothing
of the sort existed?”
On the top of page 41, Epictetus talks about God creating elements of the world
and how they fit together. “If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of
seeing them, of what good had it been? None at all. But conversely, if He had made the
faculty, but in making objects had made the incapable of falling under the faculty of
vision, in that case also of what good had it been? None at all. What then, if He had
even made both of these, but had not made light? Even thus it would have been of no
use. Who is it then, that has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has
fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword? No one? Assuredly
from the very structure of all made objects we are accustomed to prove that the work is
certainly the product of some artificer, and has not been constructed at random.”
On page 99, Epictetus talks about how God controls the natural world and how
people are united with God. “Now when someone asked him how a man could be
convinced that each thing which he does is under the eye of God, do you not think, he
answered that all things are united in one? -- I do said the other. – Very well, do you not
think that what is on earth feels the influence of that which is in heaven? I do, he replied.
For how else comes it that so regularly, as if from God’s command?, when He bids the
plants flower, they flower, when He bids them put forth shoots, they put them forth, when
He bids them bear their fruit, they bear it, when to ripen, they ripen.”
On page 43, Epictetus talks about each animal having a different purpose. “For of
beings whose constitutions are different, the works and the ends are likewise different.
So for the being whose constitutions are different, the works and the ends are likewise
different. So for the being whose constitution is adapted to use only, mere use is
sufficient, but where a being has also the faculty of understanding the use, unless the
principle of propriety can be added, he will never attain the end. What then? Each of the
animals God constitutes, one to be eaten, another to serve in farming, another to produce
cheese, and yet another for some other similar use; to perform these functions what need
they to understand external impressions and to be able to differentiate them? But God
has brought man into the world to be a spectator of Himself and of His works, and not
merely a spectator, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is shameful for man to begin
and end just where the irrational animals do; he should rather begin where they do, but
end where nature has ended in dealing with us. Now she did not end until she reached
contemplation and understanding and a manner of life harmonious with nature” This is
another example of Epictetus talking about the importance of uniting yourself with
nature.