Keeping
State
Policy
Public:
Meeting
Accountability
in
Commission
Governance
by
Scott
S.
Stauffer
MPP
Essay
Submitted
to
Oregon
State
University
In
partial
fulfillment
of
the
requirements
for
the
degree
of
Master
of
Public
Policy
Presented
April
29th,
2009
Commencement
June
13th,
2009
i
“The
strongest
democracies
flourish
from
frequent
and
lively
debate,
but
they
endure
when
people
of
every
background
and
belief
find
a
way
to
set
aside
smaller
differences
in
service
of
a
greater
purpose.”
‐
Barack
Obama,
February
9,
2009
“Our
goal
is
to
make…
government
both
less
expensive
and
more
efficient,
and
to
change
the
culture
of
our
national
bureaucracy…
We
intend
to
redesign,
reinvent,
to
reinvigorate…
government.”
‐
Bill
Clinton,
March
3,
1993
“A
governing
board
is
a
social
invention
developed
in
many
times
and
at
many
places
to
provide
control
and
sponsorship
for
a
governmental
or
private
function.”
‐
Cyril
O.
Houle,
Governing
Boards
Stauffer
ii
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
.
.
.
.
4
2.1.1
Considering
Corporate
Board
Best
Practices
.
.
7
2.1.2
Rise
and
Fall
of
the
Chief
Executive
Officer
.
.
.
10
2.1.3
The
Corporate
Board
Re‐Emerges
and
Re‐Evaluates
Itself
.
12
2.2.1
Public
Governance:
A
Critically
Un‐Examined
Issue
.
.
16
2.2.2
The
Transportation
Commission
.
20
.
24
1. Introduction
.
2. Literature
Review
.
.
.
.
.
.
2.3.1
The
Board
Meeting:
Where
Accountability
Can
Occur
3. Methods
.
.
.
.
.
29
3.1.1
The
2005‐07
OTC
Agenda
Analysis
.
.
.
.
31
3.1.2
The
Formal
Meeting
by
ODOT
Division
and
Action
Type
.
33
3.1.3
The
Formal
Meeting
by
Board
Responsibility
Categories
.
34
3.2.1
The
State
Transportation
Commission
Survey
4. Results
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
35
.
.
39
4.1
The
OTC
Agenda
Analysis:
The
Highway
Division
Steals
the
Show
39
4.2
The
Literature
Review:
Mostly
Corporate
Best
Practices
.
48
4.3
The
STCS:
Despite
Mobility,
Commissions
Lack
Identity
.
51
5. Discussion
and
Recommendations
for
Future
Research
.
58
5.1
Key
Conclusions:
State
Policy
Needs
Our
Attention!
.
.
60
5.2
Key
Recommendations:
Who
are
We?
6. Conclusion
.
.
.
62
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
65
Works
Cited
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
68
References
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
71
7. Appendices
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
73
7.1
Appendix
I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
73
7.2
Appendix
II
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
74
7.3
Appendix
III
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
82
7.4
Appendix
IV
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
84
Stauffer
iii
TABLE
OF
BOXES
1. Robert
Moses
of
New
York
.
.
.
.
.
5
2. Glenn
L.
Jackson
of
Oregon
.
.
.
.
.
6
3. ODOT
Revenue
Sources
2007‐2009
.
.
.
.
23
.
48
4. Oregon
Transportation
Commission
Work
Session
Summary
TABLE
OF
GRAPHS
1. Formal
Meeting
Time
Spent
(by
Division)
.
.
.
40
2. Time
Spent
by
Board
Responsibility
Categories
.
.
.
41
Stauffer
iv
ABSTRACT
Despite
their
widespread
use
and
presence
at
all
levels
of
government,
public
commissions
and
boards
are
rarely
given
much
attention,
by
the
general
public,
academia,
or
surprisingly
by
public
policy
and
agency
experts.
As
a
state
infrastructure
governing
entity
transportation
commissions
often
deal
with
controversy,
but
do
we
really
understand
the
roles
and
responsibilities
of
these
important
oversight
mechanisms
of
typically
massive
state
transportation
agencies?
And
more
importantly,
do
the
usually
volunteer
members
of
these
important
policymaking
and
activity
monitoring
boards
know
what
they
are
supposed
to
be
doing?
How
would
a
transportation
commission
chair
know
her
commission
is
carrying
out
their
statutorily
mandated
duties
in
an
efficient
and
effective
way?
To
answer
these
questions,
and
to
collect
basic
data
about
the
current
state
of
our
transportation
commissions
nationally,
this
essay
analyzes
the
time
management
practices
of
one
state
transportation
commission,
reviews
existing
literature
on
public
and
corporate
governance,
and
considers
the
results
of
a
nation‐wide
survey
of
state
transportation
commission
administrative
assistants.
The
results
support
the
prevailing
conclusion
that
there
is
a
lack
of
literature
on
public
commission
government
and
that
because
of
their
often
un‐distinguished
role
in
relation
to
the
agency,
a
profound
lack
of
independence
and
identity
exists
which
ought
to
be
corrected
if
the
intent
of
these
boards
is
to
provide
policy
leadership
and
accountability
to
the
citizens
they
represent
and
serve.
By
reconsidering
how
they
run
their
regular
meetings,
focusing
on
the
key
agency‐commission
relationships,
and
devoting
time
to
consider
their
own
performance
and
expectations,
transportation
commissions
can
better
assert
themselves
in
their
necessary
public
duty
of
ensuring
efficient
and
effective
government.
This
essay
sheds
light
on
the
present
condition
of
our
transportation
commissions
and
considers
how
transportation
commissions
ought
to
manage
their
time
for
effective
public
policy
creation
and
oversight.
Stauffer
1
1. INTRODUCTION
OF
A
PROBLEM:
Transportation
Governance
and
Leadership
Popular
depictions
of
public
service
seldom
include
the
thousands
of
boards
and
commissions
that
do
so
much
to
shape
daily
life
(Houle
1989).
Although
transportation
agencies
provide
critical
infrastructure
we
depend
on,
transportation
commission
meetings
rarely
gain
attention
unless
a
serious
service
failure
has
occurred.
Despite
repeated
nationwide
calls
for
significant
financial
investment
in
aging
highways,
bridges,
rail
lines,
and
seaports
(Cambridge
2005;
National
Surface
Transportation
Policy
and
Revenue
Study
Commission
2007;
National
Surface
Transportation
Infrastructure
Financing
Committee
2009)
the
public
response
often
lacks
any
sense
of
urgency,
and
more
importantly,
or
new
financial
resources.
The
embarrassing
reality
is
that
we
and
our
elected
leaders
generally
only
pay
attention
to
the
needs
of
our
physical
infrastructure,
the
domain
of
transportation
departments
and
commissions,
when
something
goes
wrong;
a
fact
sadly
supported
by
the
tragedy
of
the
Minneapolis,
Minnesota
Interstate
35
bridge
collapse,
which
during
rush
hour
plunging
unsuspecting
commuters
into
the
Mississippi
River
below
(Sherman
2008).
Despite
the
very
real
threat
to
our
way
of
life,
as
we
go
scurrying
from
home
to
work
or
school
we
place
an
incredible
amount
of
faith
in
pivotal
infrastructure
agencies,
and
their
associated
oversight
bodies
–
our
state
transportation
commissions.
And
yet,
these
vital
mechanisms
of
accountability
continue
to
be
critically
under
evaluated
by
public
administration
and
governance
paradigms
that
are
increasingly
outdated
for
modern
circumstances
(Carver
1997;
Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Without
a
crisis,
and
aside
from
the
groans
of
Stauffer
2
constant
road
maintenance
projects,
the
needs
and
behavior
of
transportation
agencies
do
not
capture
the
attention
of
most
Americans,
and
that’s
a
tragedy.
This
graduate
essay
grew
from
a
series
of
self‐assessment
work
sessions
conducted
in
late
2007
and
early
2008
by
the
Oregon
Transportation
Commission
(OTC).
As
a
result
of
these
exercises
the
OTC
members
found
it
not
only
helpful
to
identify
what
state
law
required
them
to
do,
but
what
unspoken
assumptions
each
commission
member
held
about
their
time
management
practices,
relationships,
and
policy
goals
(Oregon
Transportation
Commission
2008).
The
only
readily
available
reference
on
best
practices
for
the
OTC’s
self‐assessment
was
a
2005
report
prepared
by
the
University
of
Kentucky’s
Transportation
Research
Center
(KTC),
which
provides
the
findings
of
an
analysis
of
all
50
state
departments
of
transportation
(DOTs)
in
the
form
of
a
Roles
and
Responsibilities
outline
(O’Connell
et
al.
2005,
see
Appendix
I).
The
University
of
Kentucky
outline
helped
the
OTC
in
its
discussion
by
providing
an
adaptable
framework
for
defining
the
unique
characteristics
of
the
OTC
(Oregon
Transportation
Commission
2008)
as
the
oversight
arm
of
major
infrastructure
service
agency.
Other
research
to
assess
public
oversight
entities,
specifically
in
the
field
of
public
transit
agencies,
have
recently
been
published
and
hold
promise
for
providing
tools
for
public
boards
to
evaluate
their
performance
(AECOM
2004).
The
work
sessions
and
exercises
conducted
by
the
OTC
in
2007
and
2008
provide
the
key
question
my
graduate
work
addresses.
Finding
literature
on
transportation
governance,
specifically
at
the
state
level,
is
not
an
easy
task,
although
there
have
been
moments
in
the
last
century
when
the
Stauffer
3
formal
structure
and
behavior
of
transportation
government
were
front
and
center
in
the
minds
of
public
administration
researchers
(Shafritz
et
al.
2005),
as
evidenced
by
the
aging
work
of
W.
L.
Haas,
who
in
1947
examined
state
highway
organization.
There
was
also,
at
least
in
Oregon,
a
more
recent
period
of
administrative
reform
when
the
body
known
as
the
State
Highway
Commission
was
reorganized
in
1969
into
the
Department
of
Transportation
(Merriam
1992).
Today
because
of
work
by
the
Transportation
Research
Board
and
other
industry
and
academic
groups
there
are
encouraging
signs
of
renewed
attention
in
transportation
administration
research,
but
despite
periodic
attention
there
has
just
not
been
much
consistent
focus
on
transportation
commissions
as
governance
bodies
(O’Connell
et
al.
2005).
Because
of
this
lack
of
attention,
there
has
been
little
scrutiny
of
the
oversight
system
that
governs
public
transportation,
creating
a
status
quo
atmosphere
with
little
accountability
by
public
transportation
agencies.
In
a
world
that
demands
cost
effective,
responsive
service
from
such
agencies,
what
practices
can
public
boards
and
commissions
employ
to
manage
their
agency’s
resources
for
effectiveness
and
accountability?
How
can
commission
members
know
they
are
doing
what
they
are
charged
to
do:
to
oversee
vast
agencies
that
provide
critical
services
every
day?
This
essay
examines
current
time
management
practices
of
transportation
commissions,
reviews
the
existing
literature
on
public
and
corporate
governance,
and
suggests
future
areas
of
research.
This
analysis
is
about
time
management
in
public
commission
meetings,
how
it
is
currently
done
and
how
we
might
endeavor
to
do
it
better,
or
at
least
more
effectively.
Stauffer
4
2. LITERATURE
REVIEW:
What
Corporate
America
Can
Teach
Us
Since
at
least
the
1940s
and
1950s,
a
heyday
era
for
governance
and
organizational
research
(Shafritz
et
al.
2005),
state
transportation
agencies
have
been
predominantly
run
by
commissions,
a
model
supported
by
post‐war
era
public
administration
literature
that
has
historically
favored
a
strong
executive
authority
serving
at
the
pleasure
of
the
elected
governor,
alongside
a
vaguely
identified
board
or
commission
(Shafritz
et
al.
2005).
Although
in
wide
use
by
the
end
of
the
New
Deal
era
(approximately
1945),
the
invention
of
the
public
commission
‐
intended
to
encourage
public
participation
in
government
–
finds
much
of
its
theoretical
heritage
in
the
writings
of
Progressive
era
authors
(Shafrtiz
et
al.
2005;
Ward
1997).
As
a
very
specific
branch
of
such
public
administration
roots,
transportation
commissions
have
had
a
varied
history
of
success,
failure,
neglect
and
abuse.
To
preface
this
examination
of
contemporary
public
governance,
we
briefly
reflect
upon
the
careers
of
two
prominent
transportation
leaders
of
the
twentieth
century,
who
impacted
their
respective
states
and
regions
profoundly,
although
they
remain
unknown
to
many.
There
was
a
time
in
American
life
when
a
forceful
personality
with
connections
and
a
little
political
luck
could
dominate
public
agencies
(see
Box
1
and
Box
2).
From
urban
bosses
to
rural
judges,
there
are
plenty
of
examples
of
officials
acting
like
medieval
lords
rather
than
public
servants.
State
transportation
departments
have
not
been
immune
to
such
personalities.
In
two
very
different
styles,
and
in
two
very
different
settings,
Robert
Moses
of
New
York,
and
Glenn
Stauffer
5
Jackson
of
Oregon,
came
to
dominate
their
state’s
transportation
and
parks
departments,
and
importantly
the
large
budgets
associated
with
infrastructure
agencies.
Over
the
course
of
their
careers
both
men
came
to
be
regarded
as
giants
–
for
better
or
worse
–
and
while
not
identical
in
their
paths
to
power,
they
exemplify
how
public
board
and
commissions
have
wielded
great
power.
Box
1:
Robert
Moses
of
New
York.
Robert
Moses
by
most
accounts
was
a
brilliant
sculptor
of
one
the
world’s
elite
urban
areas
–
New
York
(Caro
1975).
The
Moses
style
was
aggressive
and
demanding,
and
as
he
worked
his
way
up
through
the
ranks
of
various
New
York
state
agencies,
he
established
a
reputation
for
acting
quickly
and
only
explaining
himself
later
when
forced
to
by
officials
of
higher
officer
or
at
times
of
extreme
public
dissatisfaction
(Caro
1975).
Although
he
was
never
an
elected
official,
having
failed
in
a
bid
for
the
governorship,
Moses
reached
his
pinnacle
of
power
as
the
habitually
reappointed
commissioner
of
New
York’s
parks,
and
eventually
highways
(Caro
1975).
While
officially
he
was
chair
of
various
parks
and
highway
commissions,
Moses
seldom
took
his
co‐commissioners
seriously;
instead
relying
upon
hand
picked
and
tirelessly
worked
assistants
to
do
his
bidding
(Caro
1975).
By
the
end
of
his
career
in
the
1960s,
Moses
could
look
back
on
a
city
and
state
infrastructure
he
had
almost
single
handedly
created
(Caro
1975).
He
could
also
reflect
on
the
national
and
international
reputation
he
had
created,
and
importantly
the
great
influence
he
had
exerted
on
the
geographic
and
political
designs
of
other
major
cities.
Robert
Moses,
or
“RM”,
was
a
one
man
show,
an
all‐in‐one
master
builder,
who
ultimately
failed
to
grasp
the
importance
of
public
disclosure,
who
was
rarely
held
accountable
for
his
actions
to
either
the
politicians
who
appointed
him
or
the
public
(Caro
1975).
But
no
one
can
deny
the
impact
of
the
power
Moses
wielded
through
his
roles
on
public
commissions.
Stauffer
6
Box
2:
Glenn
L.
Jackson
of
Oregon.
In
a
state
very
different
from
urban
New
York,
Glenn
Jackson
–
as
much
an
Oregonian
as
Moses
was
a
New
Yorker
–
came
to
hold
similar
political
power
and
influence.
Rising
through
the
ranks
of
a
southern
Oregon
utility
corporation,
Jackson
worked
his
way
into
positions
of
delegated
authority
more
from
a
conviction
of
civic
duty,
as
a
member
of
the
dominating
energy
industry,
than
from
any
lust
for
power
(Dierdorff
1971).
The
affable
Jackson
was
not
shy
about
making
decisions,
but
he
was
also
more
interested
in
getting
people
together
and
building
some
form
of
policy
consensus
(Merriam
1992,
Walth
1994).
He
was
a
business
leader
with
bipartisan
connections
and
was
rewarded
with
the
chairmanship
of
the
Oregon
Highway
Commission,
which
in
1958
also
oversaw
the
state
parks
system
(Merriam
1992).
Unlike
Moses,
who
struggled
for
decades
to
put
the
pieces
of
New
York’s
infrastructure
governance
together
under
his
command
(Caro
1975),
Jackson
was
given
the
reigns
with
little
struggle,
more
as
a
reward
for
a
career
dedicated
to
private
interests,
than
a
desire
to
concentrate
and
wield
power.
With
a
little
more
personal
finesse,
and
perhaps
the
assistance
of
a
state
that
allowed
for
less
prominence
for
highway
commissioners,
Glenn
Jackson
–
“Mr.
Oregon”
–
oversaw
the
creation
of
much
of
Oregon’s
modern
highway
and
parks
system,
leaving
his
mark
–
and
literally
his
name
–
on
his
efforts.
Both
Moses
and
Jackson
had
the
capacity
and
personality
to
make
decisions
quickly
and
without
much
consultation
with
others;
something
in
their
character,
and
their
station
in
government,
allowed
them
to
operate
as
contemporary
emperors
of
parks
and
highways.
It
is
also
worth
noting
that
Moses
and
Jackson
held
power
at
moments
in
American
history
when
public
–
political
–
leadership
was
generally
trusted,
accepted,
and
held
in
high
esteem,
though
occasionally
they
were
forced
to
let
go
of
a
project,
or
step
back
from
a
debate,
more
often
then
not,
when
“RM”
or
Stauffer
7
“Mr.
Oregon”
wanted
something
done,
the
question
wasn’t
if,
but
when
and
how
(Caro
1975,
Walth
1994).
Their
ability
to
command
action
from
the
organs
of
government
was
thus
being
a
product
of
who
they
were
and
the
era
in
which
they
governed.
Today,
bridges
and
buildings
bear
their
names,
but
do
we
understand
what
Moses
and
Jackson
represent
for
public
governance?
The
problem
of
concentrating
power
in
one
man
is
that
no
one,
save
that
one
man,
really
knows
what
is
going
on.
The
legacies
of
Robert
Moses
and
Glenn
Jackson
characterize
a
reliance
on
strong,
charismatic
public
leaders
as
the
ideal
of
public
governance
during
their
time
in
power.
Perhaps
the
collective
reaction
to
the
legacies
of
such
public
servants,
once
broader
governance
concerns
became
important
in
the
public
conscience,
prompted
the
move
for
more
open
public
governance
and
accountability.
2.1.2
Considering
Governance
Board
Best
Practices
A
flow
chart
of
trends
of
the
last
fifty
years
in
commission
governance
would
begin
with
autocrats
like
Robert
Moses
and
Glenn
Jackson,
and
end
with
increasingly
active
boards,
who
attempt
to
carefully
examine
their
roles
and
responsibilities
based
on
legal
standards
and
public
expectations.
This
shift
in
governance
did
not
occur
in
an
unbroken
straight
line,
there
were
many
reform
efforts,
natural
changes,
and
structural
reconfigurations
that
took
governing
boards
on
detours,
dead
ends,
and
off
track
completely.
Because
of
government’s
famous
inability
to
evolve
quickly,
and
a
lack
of
public
governance
analysis,
combined
with
high
profile
scandals,
like
Enron,
corporate
board
behavior
has
been
analyzed,
critiqued,
and
ultimately
changed
Stauffer
8
faster.
In
addition,
most
members
of
public
agency
governing
boards
have
served
on
a
variety
of
private
and
non‐profit
boards
and
base
their
approaches
on
their
prior
experiences.
Any
analysis
of
commission
governance,
therefore,
would
be
incomplete
without
a
review
of
the
extensive
literature
on
corporate
and
non‐profit
board
accountability
and
behavior.
The
importance,
and
ultimately
rise
in
popularity,
of
governing
bodies
is
rooted
in
public
concern
about
the
actions
and
behaviors
of
government;
I
have
found
Cyril
O.
Houle’s
definition,
and
perhaps
simple
justification,
for
governing
boards
to
be
the
most
efficient
definition
of
these
authoritative
entities:
“A
governing
board
is
a
social
invention
developed
in
many
times
and
at
many
places
to
provide
control
and
sponsorship
for
a
governmental
or
private
function”
(Houle
1989).
In
ways
often
not
fully
understood
or
left
purposely
vague,
the
men
and
women
purposely
associated
with
the
organization
they
are
charged
to
supervise,
are
rarely
regularly
involved
in
daily
operations
of
the
organization,
and
have
historically
been
left
with
little
guidance
as
to
what
they
are
to
supposed
to
do
with
these
prominent
positions
of
authority
(Houle
1989;
Ward
1997).
From
time
to
time
there
have
been
efforts
to
define
the
purpose
of
these
boards,
as
President
Bill
Clinton
and
Vice
President
Al
Gore
attempted
to
do
in
the
early
1990s,
with
what
was
often
called
Total
Quality
Management
or
“Reinventing
Government”,
the
high‐minded
effort
to
make
governing
“…both
less
expensive
and
more
efficient…”
meant
“to
redesign,
reinvent,
to
reinvigorate…”
government
operations
(Shafrtiz
et
al.
2005).
But
what
do
these,
and
similar
idealist
calls
for
public
service
heard
more
recently
from
Stauffer
9
President
Barack
Obama,
mean
for
governing
boards?
How
do
the
members
of
these
commissions
translate
efficiency
and
reinvigoration
into
actions
and
behaviors
in
practice?
While
not
ignoring
their
statutorily
mandated
responsibilities,
the
demands
of
their
agency
and
the
general
public,
the
men
and
women
who
serve
on
the
countless
boards
and
commissions
–
in
public
and
corporate
America
–
often
struggle
to
understand
their
role.
Both
public
and
private
governing
bodies
are
accountable
to
the
people
who
are
impacted
by
board
decisions
and
actions
(Carver
1997);
these
bodies
differ
in
how
they
are
monitored
and
the
consequences
they
suffer
as
a
result
of
their
mistakes
(Carver
1997).
Private
boards
deal
more
directly
with
the
livelihood
and
personal
resources
of
private
citizens,
so
they
are
forced
to
respond
quickly
to
scandal,
corruption,
board
inadequacies,
or
the
possibility
of
corporate
fiscal
failure,
often
the
result
of
Chief
Executive
Office
(CEO)
actions
(Ward
1997).
Occurring
in
tandem
with
the
age
of
Moses
and
Jackson
was
a
similar
corporate
preference
for
charismatic
leaders;
men
like
Lee
Iacocca
of
Chrysler,
Kenneth
Lay
of
Enron,
and
Jack
Welch
of
General
Electric,
were
able
to
rise
in
power
as
weak
corporate
boards
acquiesced
to
their
actions
(Ward
1997).
In
the
post‐World
War
II
era,
corporate
America,
like
public
America,
willingly
went
along
with
the
guy
who
could
talk
well,
trusting
their
actions
were
honest
and
in
the
best
interest
of
the
firm
(Ward
1997).
Stauffer
10
2.1.2
Rise
and
Fall
of
the
Chief
Executive
Officer
The
relationship
between
the
CEO
and
the
board
of
directors
is
older
than
United
States
itself,
and
certainly
as
old
as
the
exchanging
of
money
for
goods
and
services
(Ward
1997).
As
a
matter
of
historical
development,
the
place
of
the
board
in
the
legal
structure
of
an
organization
has
changed
over
time.
Only
recently
have
corporations
begun
to
explore
using
the
board
beyond
moments
of
traditional
ceremony
or
crisis,
when
the
CEO
required
credibility
with
the
shareholders
(Ward
1997).
It
typically
happens
that
weak
boards
developed
partially
as
a
result
of
membership
being
a
reward
for
loyal
years
of
service
to
the
corporation
or
personal
relationships
with
the
CEO
they
were
to
oversee.
Thus
board
members
seldom
rocked
the
boat
or
asked
tough
questions
of
their
long
time
colleagues
(Ward
1997).
The
functional
lack
of
board
oversight
gave
rise
to
the
CEO
as
a
nearly
“absolute
authority”,
contemporary
kings
of
industry
rarely
held
to
account
for
their
actions
by
men
who
were
their
friends‐in‐cahoots
more
often
than
their
auditors
(Minow
and
Monks
1996).
Certainly
by
the
mid‐twentieth
century
the
corporate
board
room
was
a
place
dedicated
to
preserving
the
status
quo
and
usually
the
authority
of
the
CEO.
It
was
apparent
by
the
1960s
and
1970s
however,
that
this
dominant
executive
and
weak
board
relationship
was
changing,
along
with
the
culture
of
America.
The
cynicism
toward
authority
figures
and
decision
makers
at‐large,
that
gained
prominence
in
this
era
known
for
social
turmoil,
eventually
spread
to
the
board
room
as
tough
questions
of
unethical
practices
and
accountability
were
asked
and
CEOs
failed
to
respond
quick
enough
or
well
enough
for
the
public
(Ward
1997).
Stauffer
11
The
previously
acceptable
board
ignorance
of
CEO
activities,
coupled
with
growing
concern
for
American
production
power
and
the
high‐profile
corruption
lead
shareholders
to
demand
more
from
those
who
were
supposed
to
monitor
the
behavior
of
the
organization
(Ward
1997;
Minow
and
Monks
1996).
More
was
expected
from
boards
that
were
ill
prepared
for
such
an
active
oversight
role,
and
had
relied
so
heavily
upon
these
same
previously
less
questioned
CEOs
(Minow
and
Monks
1996).
By
the
1990s
change
had
come,
as
much
of
the
preceding
decade
had
shown
the
light
brightly
on
the
problems
of
single
authority
administration
of
large
corporations
and
organizations,
resulting
in
new
programs
and
paradigms
on
leadership
designed
to
encourage
good
governance
through
a
functioning
board
room
(Ward
1997).
Although
corporate,
public,
and
nonprofit
boards
share
many
common
traits,
private
corporations
have
received
more
attention
in
the
literature
on
governing
practices
(Carver
1997).
Being
a
board
member
no
longer
meant
occasional
meetings
at
the
country
club;
corporations
were
looking
for
new
management
energy
to
ensure
oversight
mechanisms
were
in
place.
The
move
to
active
boards
had
occurred
(Ward
1997;
Conger
2001).
It
is
no
coincidence
that
the
rise
of
professionalism
in
board
governance
happened
in
tandem
with
the
late
twentieth
century
focus
on
corporate
board
rooms
(Ward
1997);
the
once
awkwardly
under
utilized
appendage
of
corporate
America
had
found
a
purpose,
and
that
purpose
required
redefinition
for
the
real
tasks
of
governing.
Stauffer
12
2.1.3
The
Corporate
Board
Re‐Emerges
and
Re‐Evaluates
Itself
Eventually,
public
sensitivity
to
CEO
scandals
intensified
and
by
the
early
twenty‐first
century,
in
the
wake
of
shocking
corporate
scandals,
corporate
board
rooms
appeared
unable
to
control
the
beasts
they
had
created
and
were
supposed
to
supervise.
Finally,
in
the
wake
of
loud
cries
for
greater
accountability,
Congress
enacted
shareholder
rights
legislation
over
concerns
about
corporate
management
practices.
In
2002
Congress
passed
the
Sarbanes‐Oxley
Act
(“SOX”)
which
effectively
placed
corporate
CEOs
on
notice
that
the
growing
discontent
over
their
more
questionable
actions
would
be
addressed
not
only
through
legal
proceedings,
but
by
the
boards
who
had
for
so
long
overlooked
such
behavior
(Ward
1997;
BoardSource
et
al.
2003).
Additionally
SOX
placed
greater
emphasis
on
procedures
for
auditing
CEO
and
corporate
fiscal
activities,
spelling
out
in
minute
detail
internal
procedures
to
protect
whistle
blowers,
protect
documents
from
destruction,
and
how
to
avoid
conflict
of
interest
issues
to
name
but
a
few
of
the
sixty‐six
page
act’s
provisions
(BoardSource
et
al.
2003;
Government
Printing
Office
2002).
The
build‐up
of
more
professional
and
active
boards
had
been
a
long
time
coming
and
SOX
symbolizes
the
effort
to
decentralize
the
power
so
tightly
invested
in
CEOs
by
way
of
reinventing
and
utilizing
the
board
room
(Ward
1997).
Because
of
the
failure
of
private
boards
to
protect
their
shareholder
interests,
and
because
an
increasingly
partisan
political
world
found
common
cause
in
regulating
corporate
behavior,
the
public
stepped
into
the
board
room.
Stauffer
13
This
recently
revived
public
scrutiny
requires
corporate
and
non‐profit
boards
to
reassess
what
a
board
is
supposed
to
do.
As
boards
have
been
forced,
by
law,
to
re‐examine
their
relationship
to
their
CEO,
employees
and
shareholders,
they
have
also
turned
the
focus
on
themselves,
asking
such
questions
as
what
are
we
doing,
is
this
what
we
are
supposed
to
be
doing,
can
we
do
this
better,
and
what
has
been
done
before?
In
response
to
such
self‐examination,
much
of
the
literature
on
governance
focuses
on
board
best
practices,
which
come
from
informal
interviews
with
long
time
board
members
as
well
as
thoroughly‐researched
analytical
summaries
of
corporate
statistics,
resulting
in
best
practice
checklists
that
range
from
broadly
defined
categorizations
to
detailed
processes
boards
should
follow
to
increase
their
ability
to
function
effectively
as
a
group.
On
the
one
hand
is
Peter
Drucker’s
book,
Managing
the
Non‐Profit,
which
offers
guiding
principles
for
effective
board
leadership,
that
includes
defining
the
organizational
mission,
knowing
the
business
of
the
organization,
managing
for
results
performance,
and
maintaining
key
board‐CEO‐staff
relationships
(Drucker
1990).
On
the
other
end
are
recommendations
from
a
veteran
board
member
in
Cyril
Houle’s
book,
Governing
Boards:
Their
Nature
and
Nurture,
that
includes
“the
board
member
must
insist
on
full
discussion
of
each
important
issue,”
“the
board
member
must
act
as
an
effective
intermediary
between
the
agency
and
any
special
group
he
represents”
and
“the
board
member
must
support
the
board
as
long
as
he
remains
a
part
of
it”
(Houle
1989).
There
are
a
number
of
ways
a
board
member
can
understand
his
or
her
role,
as
existing
literature
can
be
digested
Stauffer
14
through
diagrams,
flow
charts,
checklists
or
fairly
random
tidbits
from
the
brains
of
past
board
members;
varying
formats
for
advice
on
what
a
governing
board
ought
to
be
and
do.
Other
studies
offer
similar
results,
but
the
drive
to
craft
a
codified
set
of
guiding
principles
makes
up
the
bulk
of
corporate
governance
literature.
Along
side
the
redefinition
of
corporate
best
practices
is
a
renewed
interest
in
specific
roles
and
responsibilities,
an
often
more
in‐depth
sidebar
than
the
larger
examination
of
successful
boards.
Because
such
identifiable
roles
and
responsibilities
depend
on
the
nature
of
the
organization’s
work,
developing
anything
that
might
be
called
universal
role
descriptions
is
hard
to
do
in
any
generalized
review
format;
but
the
need
to
go
through
such
exercises
is
a
consistent
recommendation
of
the
literature
on
governance
practices
(Carver
1997).
As
a
tool
for
board
evaluation
and
possible
reform,
defining
the
legal,
traditional,
and
expected
roles
and
responsibilities
of
an
organization
can
be
helpful,
for
the
details
it
brings
out
and
the
big
picture
perspective
it
can
provide.
There
are,
however,
key
differences
between
private
and
public
organizations
in
general
that
should
be
noted
when
the
two
are
compared.
Foremost
among
these
is
ownership
accountability.
Ownership
is
relatively
straightforward
in
the
corporate
world;
those
who
purchase
stock
or
are
otherwise
associated
voluntarily
with
the
organization
have
a
stake
in
corporate
success
or
failure.
For
public
agencies,
ownership
is
much
more
ambiguous,
as
many
state
services
–
namely
transportation
–
are
for
the
benefit
of
all
members
of
society
including
anyone
who
resides
in
a
state
or
is
merely
passing
through.
What
goods
and
services
the
government
ought
to
Stauffer
15
provide,
and
what
goods
and
services
might
be
produced
by
private
firms
in
a
free
market,
is
a
popular
topic
of
public
administration
and
policy
(Wilson
1989).
Despite
periodic
questioning
of
who
provides
what
services,
it
is
clear
that
some
services
have
been
and
will
continue
to
be
provided
by
the
public
sector
because
of
a
lack
of
ability
in
defining
a
certain
owner
or
group
of
owners
(Wilson
1989;
Shafritz
et
al.
2005).
Interstate
highways,
roads,
and
bike
lanes
are
public
goods,
available
to
all
and
the
impossibility
of
identifying
a
single
owner,
or
group
of
owners,
leads
to
the
necessity
of
government
agencies
–
bureaucracies
–
and
defines
the
public
agency
as
different
from
private
firms
(Shafritz
et
al.
2005).
So
the
question
of
who
is
accountable
to
whom
shifts
between
private
and
public
sectors:
are
you,
as
a
board
member,
accountable
to
those
whose
money
you
manage,
or
to
those
who
depend
on
your
agency
for
public
infrastructure
to
function?
Answering
the
second
part
of
this
question,
especially
in
the
transportation
field
becomes
rather
messy
as
the
OTC
is
legally
responsible
to
the
citizens
of
Oregon
who
daily
utilize
the
many
services
the
Oregon
Department
of
Transportation
(ODOT)
provides,
but
it
is
also
the
case
that
commuters
who
live
in
neighboring
states
like
Washington
also
use
the
roads,
rails,
and
waterways
administered
by
ODOT.
Clearly
the
OTC
is
not
directly
held
to
account
by
citizens
of
the
Portland
suburb
of
Vancouver,
WA,
despite
the
very
real
consideration
given
by
ODOT
engineers
and
policymakers
to
the
number
of
vehicles
from
Vancouver
that
cross
the
Glenn
Jackson
and
Interstate‐5
bridges
every
day.
Similarly,
ODOT
sets
policy
for
cities,
counties,
special
districts,
rail
road
companies,
and
other
Stauffer
16
transportation
providers.
Governing
agencies
like
ODOT
force
the
oversight
commission
to
deal
with
this
less
defined
but
crucial
set
of
owners,
who
at
times
can
make
themselves
quite
vocal,
and
at
others
times
completely
absent.
2.2.1
Public
Governance:
A
Critically
Un‐Examined
Issue
In
popular
political
science
theory
the
idea
of
the
classic
“iron
triangle”
of
agency‐legislative‐interest
group
pressure
is
very
much
in
play
with
this
commission
accountability
question.
Public
commissions,
especially
those
authorized
by
law
to
set
agency
policy
and
distribute
resources,
are
a
very
real
part
of
the
classic
“iron
triangle”
model
of
public
administration
literature.
The
notion
of
a
three‐player
arena
harkens
back
to,
perhaps,
simpler
times
in
governing,
when
powerful
figures
like
Robert
Moses
and
Glenn
Jackson
could
wield
their
authority
via
seemingly
direct
and
durable
relationships
with
recognized
interest
groups
and
government
entities.
However
those
who
observe
and
participate
in
governing
today
have
taken
due
notice
of
the
growing
evidence
that
such
“iron
triangles”
have
morphed
into
four,
five,
or
more
player
relationships
as
increases
in
the
size
of
government
along
with
recognition
of
citizen
initiated
law
suits
has
lead
to
the
increased
presence
and
influence
of
interest
groups
and
the
judicial
system
in
practiced
public
policy
(Lunch
2001).
There
is
plenty
of
reason
to
suspect
that
classic
public
administration
theories,
like
the
“iron
triangle”
are
increasingly
relics
of
a
by‐gone
era
in
government
as
well
as
transportation
leadership,
as
complex
globally
connect
world
requires
the
input
and
recognition
of
more
and
more
players
at
the
tables
of
power.
Stauffer
17
In
our
American
system
of
agonizingly
slow
change
and
focus
on
maintaining
the
status
quo,
attempts
to
clarify
who
a
commission
is
accountable
to
is
a
part
of
the
system
(Lunch
2001).
It
is
not
hard
to
identify
the
very
real
need
for
public
accountability
which
emerges
out
of
the
fear
that
the
absence
of
some
type
of
oversight
mechanism
will
lead
agents
–
in
this
case
commission
–
to
behave
in
ways
that
do
not
meet
public
expectations
(Miller
2002;
Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Just
as
private
groups
pay
attention
to
those
who
administer
their
personal
resources,
society‐at‐large
should
require
that
attention
be
given
to
those
who
administer
our
shared
assets.
With
growing
recognition
in
public
administration
literature
that
new
models
of
the
actions,
behavior,
and
culture
of
government
is
needed,
a
concern
for
commission
governments
in
particular
is
their
ability
to
quickly
react
and
take
action
in
a
highly‐wired
and
rapid
environment.
Can
we
conclude
that
today’s
commission
governments
are
serving
their
intended
constituency
in
an
efficient
and
effective
way?
Understanding
who
governments
are
responsible
to,
who
the
shareholders
are,
is
complicated
by
our
American
Federal
system
and
the
many
diverse
purposes
for
public
commission
governing
bodies.
With
a
uniquely
government‐centric
outlook,
there
have
been
calls
in
recent
public
administration
scholarship
for
reassessments
of
the
roles,
responsibilities,
scope,
and
size
required
for
effective
governance
in
an
era
of
widely
held
distrust
of
those
placed
in
charge
of
large
bureaucratic
agencies
(Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Along
similar
lines
as
corporate
and
nonprofit
boards,
public
agency
oversight
authorities
have
had
to
deal
with
changed
expectations
and
sometimes
changes
in
Stauffer
18
organizational
structures
(Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Much
like
their
corporate
colleagues,
public
commissioners
and
board
members
have
–
for
several
decades
now
–
been
struggling
to
identify
themselves
and
their
job
descriptions
in
the
face
of
social
and
political
realities
that
tend
to
favor
limited
government
intervention
while
simultaneously
demanding
optimum
agency
output.
Yet
even
with
calls
for
increased
attention
it
is
clear
that,
as
George
Frederickson
and
Kevin
Smith
note
in
their
concluding
thoughts
on
governance
theory,
the
term
governance
seems
to
presently
symbolize
the
present
reforms
and
changes
occurring
in
what
was
once
called
“public
administration”
or
“public
management”
(Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Although
most
recent
changes
in
how
we
govern
ourselves
has
focused
on
corporate
boards,
public
commissions
and
authorities
have
also
begun
to
re‐evaluate
themselves
and
their
way
of
operating
(BoardSource
et
al.
2003).
As
state
and
local
governments
struggle
with
shrinking
revenues
and
increasing
demand
for
services,
as
well
as
the
same
public
cries
for
reform
that
corporate
entities
are
dealing
with,
the
governance
and
accountability
processes
of
public
agency
boards
has
received
renewed
attention
in
fairly
limited
academic
circles
(Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
At
the
time
of
their
creation,
commission
governance
models
were
thought
to
improve
citizen
access
to
government
while
streamlining
the
protocols
of
agency
administration
since
commissions
were
expected
to
delegate
much
of
their
authority
to
the
departmental
executive,
who
would
be
able
to
act
quickly
in
times
of
crisis
(Haas
1947).
This
might
work
if
it
is
assumed
that
agency
executives
truly
behave
as
honest
public
servants.
Stauffer
19
However
experience
has
taught
us
otherwise
about
the
realities
of
human
nature.
Governance
trends
shifted
significantly
toward
decentralization
after
the
Watergate
era,
as
the
risks
of
single
executive
authority
proved
too
susceptible
to
corruption
(Conger
2001;
Ward
1997;
Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Despite
the
corporate
focus
in
much
of
the
literature
on
governance,
recent
trends
in
public
administration
literature
reflect
the
changes
in
leadership
frameworks;
attention
to
the
problems
of
centralized
authority
has
resulted
in
decentralization
and
a
decrease
in
the
importance
of
hierarchy
(Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
Today,
one
side
effect
in
the
public
sector
movement
away
from
single
executive
authority,
are
the
34
state
transportation
agencies
that
continue
to
use
some
type
of
commission‐style
governance.
Although
to‐date
literature
on
how
to
maintain
DOT
bureaucratic
efficiency
with
a
commission
is
almost
non‐existent,
with
only
the
University
of
Kentucky
study
providing
any
analysis;
it
appears
that
the
commission
model
remains
popular,
if
un‐examined.
A
key
conclusion
of
this
graduate
essay
is
the
general
lack
of
research
on
the
behavior
and
trends
of
public
commission
governance.
This
is
not
to
say
that
there
has
been
no
thought
given
to
this
topic
or
comparable
subjects
in
academia
at
large.
There
is
a
wealth
of
public
administration
literature
that
has
examined
government
leadership
models,
from
the
bureaucratic
insights
of
Max
Weber
over
a
hundred
years
ago,
through
the
mid‐twentieth
century’s
focus
on
organizational
definition,
to
the
reformist
movements
of
gendering
and
Total
Quality
Management
(Shafritz
et
al.
2005;
Frederickson
and
Smith
2003).
There
are
many
prominent
names
in
the
world
Stauffer
20
of
public
administration
theory
that
have
spent
their
time
considering
the
dynamics
and
purposes,
and
consequences,
of
specific
organizational
structures
and
inter‐
official
relationships
that
combine
to
create
governing
successes
and
failures.
However,
despite
generalized
public
administration
considerations
–
and
corporate
governance
evaluations
–
there
remains
a
lack
of
true
analysis
and
study
of
governing
boards
on
the
state
level,
and
specifically
in
the
transportation
field
(Simon
and
Simon
2002).
2.2.2
The
Transportation
Commission
Unique
among
public
agencies,
state
transportation
departments
(DOTs)
stand
out
prominently
because
of
their
shear
size,
dedicated
source
of
funding,
and
are
necessary
for
social
functioning.
When
a
new
bridge
is
proposed,
a
major
highway
project
is
undertaken,
or
a
change
in
driver
licensing
is
proposed,
DOTs
are
front
and
center
in
the
public’s
attention,
and
all
too
often
under
less
than
hospitable
circumstances.
Certainly
there
is
controversy
in
a
policy
field
that
requires
so
much
capital
and
fiscal
resources
to
provide
basic
infrastructure
services.
And
although
modern
society
depends
heavily
on
transportation
agencies
for
safe
and
secure
modes
of
transit,
how
these
giant
organizations
are
governed
is
seldom
considered
by
folks
outside
of
the
DOTs
themselves
(Simon
and
Simon
2002).
It
may
be
that
little
has
been
done
to
examine
transportation
commissions
because
their
formal
structure
is
dictated
by
statute
(Simon
and
Simon
2002)
and
members
serve
at
the
pleasure
of
the
governor
who
appoints
commission
members
and
is
accountable
to
Stauffer
21
the
voting
public.
Since
the
first
studies
and
scholarly
articles
on
what
were
then
often
called
state
highway
departments
appeared
early
in
the
twentieth
century
(Haas
1947),
there
has
been
periodic
interest
in
and
analysis
of
transportation
governance,
but
few
publications
directly
discuss
the
characteristics
and
practices
of
transportation
commissions
(Simon
and
Simon
2002).
With
the
rise
of
regional
transit
agencies
in
major
urban
areas
over
the
last
four
decades,
there
have
been
attempts
to
expand
what
we
know
about
organizing
and
managing
large
public
infrastructure
agencies;
various
studies
have
focused
on
the
closely
related
cousin
of
the
state
transportation
commission,
the
public
transit
agency
and
their
governing
boards
(Simon
and
Simon
2002).
Particularly
helpful
in
the
development
of
recent
transportation
scholarship
has
been
the
Transportation
Research
Board
(TRB)
of
the
National
Academies.
It
has
been
responsible
for
extensive
research
on
transportation
issues
–
on
a
wide
range
of
topics
–
and
has
produced
the
only
nationwide
examination
of
transportation
oversight
authorities
(Simon
and
Simon
2002),
aside
from
the
University
of
Kentucky
study.
One
conclusion
often
noted
by
reports
produced
by
the
Transportation
Research
Information
Service,
a
branch
of
the
TRB,
confirms
the
prevailing
lack
of
analysis
on
transportation
governance.
In
conjunction
with
the
TRB,
state
and
federal
transportation
agencies
have
vigorously
noted
the
increasing
importance
of
understanding
our
DOT
commissions
and
boards
as
booming
populations
demand
more
from
our
aging
transit
infrastructure,
which
will
require
massive
amounts
of
public
funding
to
repair
and
maintain
in
the
future
(ODOT
2006;
Texas
DOT
2007;
Stauffer
22
National
Surface
Transportation
Policy
and
Revenue
Study
Commission
2007;
National
Surface
Transportation
Infrastructure
Financing
Commission
2009).
Just
about
everything
government
does
is
political,
and
how
public
agencies
receive
the
funding
to
fulfill
their
missions
and
duties
is
very
much
a
political
process
of
jockeying
for
legislative
attention
and
influence
to
ensure
not
only
the
agency’s
existence,
but
the
amount
of
power
they
wield
relative
to
other
agencies
(Wildavsky
1979).
As
the
fiscal
allotment
process
means
competing
for
the
agency’s
“base”
–
that
is
continual
funding
–
and
ensuring
that
they
receive
their
“fair
share”
of
the
overall
budget
proceeds,
agencies
are
in
effect
vying
with
each
for
influence
and
authority
–
in
the
form
of
financial
resources
–
to
exercise
power,
and
it
is
not
too
hard
to
connect
larger
budget
shares
to
greater
authority
within
government
(Wildavsky
1979).
As
a
large
department,
transportation
agencies
receive
a
sizable
amount
of
money
from
a
variety
of
Federal,
state
and
local
governments
(ODOT
2008).
What
makes
transportation
funding
unique
is
that
much
of
the
money
received
by
agencies
like
ODOT
are
often
referred
to
as
dedicated
funds,
in
that
they
are
from
certain
revenue
sources
(taxes
and
fees)
and
are
for
the
sole
discretionary
use
of
ODOT
for
usually
specific
projects
or
programs.
In
the
case
of
ODOT
dedicated
funding
comes
from
sources
like
the
gas
tax,
licensing
fees,
and
the
State
Highway
Fund
(ODOT
2008);
see
Box
3.
These
dedicated
funds
provide
reliable
and
nearly
constant
resources
that
support
ODOT’s
mission
and
authority,
unlike
other
agencies
that
are
forced
to
compete
with
each
other
during
legislative
sessions
for
fluctuating
and
always
limited
amounts
of
money.
Despite
this
relatively
secure
funding
there
Stauffer
23
will
be
growing
concern
about
such
sources
of
revenue
like
the
gas
tax,
which
will
be
subject
to
changes
in
the
future
as
the
auto
industry
diversifies
fuel
types,
which
would
impact
present
forms
of
taxing
gas
consumption.
Additionally,
transportation
budgets
and
their
governing
bodies
are
also
part
of
much
larger
interaction
with
the
Federal
government,
providing
access
to
large
sources
of
funding
other
agencies
Box 3. Oregon Department of Transportation
Revenue Sources 2007 – 2009
Revenue Source
$ Millions
and
commissions
are
not.
Twenty
Beginning Balance
391
Motor Fuels Taxes
890
percent
of
ODOT’s
2007‐2009
Driver and Vehicle Licenses
67
and Fees
budget
comes
from
the
Federal
Weight-Mile Tax
506
Transfers to the Department
136
government
(ODOT
2008),
a
State General Funds
4
Oregon Lottery Proceeds
46
significant
amount
of
revenue
not
only
because
of
the
projects
and
programs
funded
All Other Revenue
39
Sales and Charges for
22
by
the
Federal
government,
but
because
of
the
complicated
relationship
these
Services
Subtotal State Funds
2,602
represented
financial
resources
represent.
The
presence
of
the
national
government,
Federal Funds
863
State Highway and Oregon
909
through
the
Federal
Highway
Administration
and
the
Department
of
Transportation
Lottery Revenue Bonds
TOTAL REVENUE
4,374
(Funding Facts ODOT 2008)
as
well
as
others,
suggests
that
a
significant
national
voice
ought
to
be
present
when
Oregon’s
transportation
budget
is
crafted.
A
logical
notion
not
necessarily
supported
by
the
practices
and
behaviors
of
state
transportation
commissions.
Despite
questions
of
the
cooperative
ownership
interactions
of
the
transportation
world,
the
relative
security
of
dedicated
funds
puts
transportation
commissions,
often
the
fiscal
policy
makers
of
DOTs,
in
an
important
role
as
the
distributers
of
resources;
a
prominent
position
that
turns
board
members,
usually
volunteers,
into
great
wielders
of
considerable
authority
and
power
independent
from
the
agency
itself.
Stauffer
24
Because
of
the
very
serious
nature
of
the
services
provided
by
transportation
agencies,
and
because
the
funding
for
transportation
projects
is
dedicated
to
their
projects,
factors
likely
to
intensify
with
the
growing
decay
of
our
infrastructure
systems,
the
prominence
and
importance
of
state
transportation
commissions,
boards,
and
authorities
will
increase.
The
urgency
of
the
issues
facing
such
governing
bodies
also
raises
the
question,
addressed
later,
about
the
independence
of
transportation
commissions,
who
arguably
need
a
certain
amount
of
agency
freedom
to
be
fair
and
accountable
auditors
of
transportation
activities.
And
as
future
DOT
attention
will
require
serious
decisions
about
major
projects,
it
is
in
the
best
interest
of
commission
members
and
society
in
general
to
better
understand
the
purpose
and
behavior
of
effective
transportation
governance.
2.3.1
The
Board
Meeting:
Where
Accountability
Can
Occur
The
arena
of
activity
for
governing
boards
and
commissions
is
the
regular
formal
meeting,
held
periodically,
where
the
board
members
conduct
their
business.
Their
oversight
function
is
critical
for
not
only
the
agency,
but
the
many
associated
social
networks
and
interest
groups
(Doyle
and
Straus
1976).
For
public
commissions
and
boards
the
formal
meeting
is
where
they
hold
their
agency
accountable,
and
the
commission
itself
is
held
accountable
by
the
decisions
they
make
and
the
ways
they
spend
their
time.
Historically,
the
board
meeting
has
been
the
common
identifying
characteristic
of
governance
authority
and
power,
giving
to
such
institutions
its
very
name:
the
board.
Seventeenth
century
firm
owners
used
actual
wood
boards
to
sit
Stauffer
25
around
and
make
strategic
decisions,
and
the
meeting
leader
was
known
as
the
chairman
because
he
was
ensured
the
use
of
the
only
chair,
the
other
members
present
sat
on
wooden
benches
(Ward
1997;
Houle
1989).
In
the
ongoing
war
against
corruption,
immoral
behavior,
and
resource
waste,
the
regular
–
often
public
or
open
–
formal
meeting
is
the
board’s
primary
vehicle
for
action.
Armed
with
Robert’s
Rules
of
Order,
or
some
version
of
parliamentary
procedure,
as
the
titular
decision
makers
for
organizational
strategy,
policy
making,
financial
management,
and
occasionally
CEO
appraisal,
the
board
meeting
is
where
business
is
conducted
and
the
board
should
makes
itself
heard.
As
important
as
the
board
meeting
is
for
the
success
of
an
organization,
it
is
surprising
to
consider
just
how
painful
meetings
can
be
for
participants
and
observers
alike,
especially
as
organizations
grow
and
deal
with
increasingly
complex
issues
and
decisions
(Doyle
and
Straus
1976;
Lencioni
2004).
In
The
Policy
Governance
Fieldbook,
Caroline
Oliver
et
al.
list
several
common
“traps”
boards
fall
into
that
throw
meetings
off
and
impede
the
group’s
ability
to
function.
Such
traps
include
hot
political
issues
that
dominate
public
and
commission
attention
to
the
detriment
of
other
agency
business,
and
CEO
proposals
and
priorities
that
can
eclipse
the
desires
of
less
independent
boards
(Oliver
1999).
Anyone
who
has
ever
attended
a
meeting
of
any
kind
–
at
school,
work,
or
social
group
–
should
be
able
to
identify
with
the
many
painfully
slow
and
seemingly
wasteful
amounts
of
time
spent
talking
about
things
most
people
could
care
less
about.
All
of
the
books
reviewed
for
this
essay
note
the
universal
groan
heard
at
the
when
a
meeting
is
proposed
(Doyle
and
Straus
Stauffer
26
1976).
Meetings
can
be
reduced
from
productive
work
sessions
to
lessons
in
futility
if
there
is
a
lack
of
single‐leader
control,
there
is
excessive
pandering
to
what
the
leader
wants
to
hear,
the
agenda
items
are
not
clearly
defined
or
are
chaotically
interwoven,
the
decision
making
processes
are
ill‐defined,
or
the
end
goal
is
not
understood
(Doyle
and
Straus
1976;
Lencioni
2004).
Just
about
anyone
who
has
been
involved
in
any
kind
of
organization
has
some
experience
with
meetings,
and
its
not
hard
for
even
the
least
experienced
meeting
participants
to
appreciate
the
problems
with
meetings.
Yet
despite
their
reputation
as
pointless,
we
are,
as
Michael
Doyle
and
David
Strauss
observe,
a
meeting
society.
Meetings
are
essential
to
how
we
function
and
how
our
organizations,
agencies,
and
firms
operate.
Since
meetings
are
easily
infected
with
maladies
that
throw
the
participants
off
track,
finding
a
way
to
organize
an
effective
agenda
is
important,
especially
for
governing
bodies
that
typically
meet
only
monthly
or
less
and
thus
rely
upon
the
meeting
time
to
get
their
job
done.
The
importance
of
a
well
crafted
agenda
and
a
well‐run
meeting
is
placed
squarely
on
the
board
chair,
their
staff,
or
those
responsible
for
running
the
meeting
(Doyle
and
Straus
1976;
Carver
1997).
Just
about
any
book
or
article
on
meetings
or
corporate
governance
will
at
some
point
reference
agenda
setting,
and
there
are
many
methods
and
tips
for
conducting
well‐prepared
and
efficient
meetings.
The
pre‐meeting
work
seems
to
be
the
most
important,
especially
if
the
meeting
is
to
be
held
in
public,
as
any
unexpected
event
can
not
only
throw
off
the
pace
of
the
meeting,
but
can
cause
serious
damage
to
the
board’s
credibility
when
Stauffer
27
making
decisions
and
overseeing
the
organization
(Doyle
and
Straus
1976;
Carver
1997;
Oliver
1999).
There
is
even
a
school
of
thought
that
suggests
the
pre‐meeting
is
the
most
important
part
of
governance,
getting
the
decisions
made
before
hand
makes
for
smooth
operations
in
front
of
outside
observers
and
organization
employees
who
are
affected
by
the
behavior
of
the
board
(Houle
1989).
Although
this
recommendation
seems
contrary
to
open
meeting
laws,
the
point
that
certain
questions
ought
to
be
asked
and
discussed
before
the
actual
meeting
is
important.
Efficiently
managed
meetings
rely
on
being
able
to
answer
questions
like
(Carver
1997;
Oliver
1999):

What
are
the
issues,
and
what
have
we
done
on
this
before?

What
will
we
be
talking
about,
and
in
what
order?

How
long
do
we
have
to
discuss
this?

What
is
the
process
for
making
this
decision?

How
is
this
related
to
the
big
organizational
picture
and
policies?

What
do
we
anticipate
the
outcome
of
this
to
be?
Answering
these
questions
not
only
allows
the
chair
to
conduct
the
formal
meeting
effectively,
but
it
allows
participants
and
observers
to
know
what
will
happen,
giving
all
a
chance
to
be
ready
for
the
discussions
or
decisions
to
be
made
(Doyle
and
Straus
1976;
Schwarz
2002).
In
the
worlds
of
public
and
corporate
governance
these
questions
are
often
handled
during
pre‐meeting
huddles
with
the
board
members,
the
CEO,
and
the
executive
staff.
Establishing
the
ground
rules
for
the
formal
meeting
–
how
the
issue
before
the
board
will
be
handled
–
is
just
as
important
as
Stauffer
28
actually
making
the
decision
(Schwarz
2002).
The
bottom
line
is
that
the
more
a
board
gets
done
before
the
actual
meeting
typically
leads
to
more
productive,
and
less
painful,
meetings.
With
a
solid
agenda,
the
effectiveness
of
the
governing
board
can
be
maximized
to
avoid
the
many
common
traps
that
sideline
meetings.
At
the
least
a
carefully
prepared
agenda
improves
the
odds
of
successfully
handling
any
situation
that
occurs
during
the
meeting
(Oliver
1999).
The
literature
suggests
effective
meetings
are
related
to
effective
governance
and
leadership.
In
their
seminal
2005
transportation
governance
study,
O’Connell
et
al.
at
the
KTC,
linked
board
effectiveness,
and
the
adoption
of
a
set
of
best
practices
employed
during
public
meetings
where
decisions
are
made,
to
improved
performance
and
accountability.
Meetings
are
social
functions,
susceptible
to
all
the
hang‐ups
and
influences
that
inhibit
a
board’s
ability
to
operate.
As
part
of
recommended
best
practices
from
corporate,
nonprofit
and
public
governance
literature,
running
well‐prepared
public
meetings
is
a
vital
part
of
effective
organization
oversight
and
accountability.
Stauffer
29
3. METHODS
As
the
arena
where
transportation
commissions
conduct
their
business
is
the
regularly
scheduled
formal
meeting,
and
because
these
meetings
are
usually
well
documented
by
commission
or
agency
administrative
employees,
my
evaluation
of
commission
governance
focuses
on
these
public
meetings.
Because,
as
public
entities,
transportation
commissions
provide
agendas
and
minutes
to
the
public,
I
was
able
to
access
the
OTC
provided
information,
as
well
as
inquire
about
such
information
with
the
thirty‐four
state
transportation
commissions
and
boards,
through
the
State
Transportation
Commissions
Survey
(STCS).
For
practical
reasons
the
basic
unit
of
analysis
for
quantifying
and
categorizing
time
management
behaviors
of
the
transportation
governing
bodies
included
in
this
essay
is
time
in
minutes,
the
standard
unit
used
to
allocate
time
for
an
agenda
item
and
to
quantify
the
total
length
of
meetings.
The
use
of
time
in
minutes
provides
basic
information
about
what
the
commission
most
considers
to
be
important,
as
presumably
the
commission
will
spend
more
time
on
what
is
important
–
per
the
commission,
agency
executive
staff,
or
on
occasion
the
general
public
when
a
particular
issue
captures
their
attention
and
emotion.
The
literature
reviewed
on
governance
provides
several
interpretations
of
the
phrase
“roles
and
responsibilities”
of
how
to,
in
practice,
best
serve
the
leadership
and
oversight
functions
of
a
governing
board.
To
compare
the
conclusions
and
advice
from
corporate
authors
and
public
administration
scholars
and
theorists,
the
research
projects
undertaken
in
the
last
year
incorporated
something
of
a
“top
ten”
best
Stauffer
30
practices
list,
which
is
employed
in
the
OTC
agenda
analysis
and
STCS
to
categorize
the
activities,
or
agenda
items
considered.
To
organize
and
compare
the
focal
areas
of
the
OTC
each
commission
agenda
item
was
1)
categorized
by
agency
division
and
by
the
broad
role
and
responsibility
categories
and
2)
quantified
in
minutes
as
provided
by
the
agendas
and
personal
knowledge
of
commission
staff
in
the
case
of
the
STCS.
By
quantifying
each
commission
action
into
minutes,
and
categorizing
the
same
actions
into
the
board
responsibility
categories
from
the
literature,
conclusions
can
be
made
about
commissions
and
their
time
use
practices,
to
explain
what
transportation
commissions
currently
spend
their
formal
meeting
time
on.
And
because
each
action
is
also
categorized
into
broad
role
and
responsibility
areas,
conclusions
can
be
made
about
how
commissions
presently
operate
in
comparison
to
the
best
practices
recommended
in
the
literature
and
as
prescribed
by
state
law.
By
categorizing
and
quantifying
the
available
public
data
on
transportation
commissions,
we
can
identify
where
commissions
might
focus
their
agendas
in
the
future
for
more
effective
and
efficient
leadership.
In
order
to
assess
what
transportation
commissions
do
today,
I
undertook
two
related
studies:
(1)
I
examined
two
years
of
public
meetings
of
a
state
transportation
commission
to
see
how
the
commission
spent
its
time;
and
(2),
I
prepared
and
reviewed
the
initial
results
of
a
survey
on
board
practices
and
time
management
sent
to
the
administrative
staff
of
the
34
states
that
presently
have
transportation
commissions.
The
results
of
these
analyses
should
help
establish
a
baseline
of
public
Stauffer
31
commission
activity
and
behavior,
to
judge
where
we
presently
are,
and
where
we
should
go
in
the
future.
3.1.1
The
2005‐07
OTC
Agenda
Analysis
To
assess
current
state
transportation
commission
time
management
practices,
an
examination
of
the
OTC
was
conducted
through
an
empirical
analysis
of
24
monthly
meeting
agendas
from
December
2005
to
November
2007.
As
commissions
mostly
operate
in
open
public
meetings
where
decisions
are
made
and
the
agency’s
business
is
conducted,
I
focused
on
board
time
management
during
these
regularly
held
events.
Effective
public
governance
must
include
efficient
time
allocation
practices,
and
to
establish
a
baseline
set
of
statistics
for
how
the
OTC
spent
its
official
formal
–
public
–
meeting
time,
an
assessment
and
analysis
of
current
practices
of
this
one
transportation
commission
was
undertaken.
The
result
of
such
an
examination
is
not
only
of
value
to
the
OTC’s
present
members,
but
to
other
commissions
who
might
use
these
findings
to
compare
their
own
time
management
trends.
The
OTC
2005‐07
agenda
analysis
was
provoked
by
Chair
Gail
Achterman,
who
as
a
member
of
the
OTC
since
2000
(ODOT
2009),
was
concerned
that
the
OTC
was
not
spending
its
time
on
matters
where
volunteer
commission
members
added
value
and
accountability.
The
OTC
analysis
was
conducted
by
Scott
Stauffer
and
John
Miaso,
graduate
students
at
Oregon
State
University,
during
the
winter
quarter
of
2007‐2008.
Stauffer
32
Generally
OTC
agendas
include
three
main
components:
a
pre‐meeting
gathering
where
the
agenda
is
reviewed;
the
formal
meeting
which
includes
routine
director
and
commission
reports,
public
comment,
various
informational
presentations,
and
ODOT
policy
or
project
items
requiring
commission
approval;
and
a
consent
calendar
of
various
action
items
to
be
approved,
or
rejected,
as
an
omnibus
package
at
the
end
of
the
formal
meeting.
Because
Stauffer
and
Miaso
were
not
past
employees
of
ODOT,
or
in
any
way
OTC
experts,
they
relied
upon
the
advice
of
Chair
Achterman
to
categorize
the
agenda,
if
enough
information
was
not
provided
by
the
agenda
item
or
through
the
ODOT
website.
Each
of
the
24
agendas
reviewed
were
divided
into
three
assessment
sections,
aimed
at
current
OTC
focus
areas,
and
to
identify
statutorily
mandated
and
general
governing
categories:

Formal
meeting
time
by
ODOT
division
(measured
in
minutes)
o
Sub‐divided
by
type
of
action
required:
action
or
informational

Formal
meeting
time
by
board
responsibility
categories
(measured
in
minutes)

Consent
agenda
items
(measured
in
number
of
items
per
category)
Meeting
location
was
also
recorded
to
track
the
physical
movements
of
board
meetings
around
geographically
diverse
Oregon.
Formal
meeting
time
was
analyzed
by
ODOT
division
and
board
responsibility
categories
to
identify
what
statutorily
assigned
tasks
received
the
OTC’s
attention
(ODOT
divisions)
and
what,
based
on
common
public
board
duties,
was
the
focus
of
OTC
time
in
the
bigger
agency‐wide
picture.
Because
each
agenda
item
requires
different
attention
from
the
OTC,
each
Stauffer
33
was
also
identified
as
either
an
action
decision
or
an
informational
presentation
to
the
commission
not
requiring
immediate
action.
The
board
responsibility
categories
were
based
on
seven
areas
defined
by
OTC
Chair
Achterman
and
Stauffer
and
Miaso,
based
on
prior
informal
research
on
governing
board
best
practices
literature.
For
purposes
of
establishing
a
time
measurement
reference,
ODOT
divisional
and
responsibility
categories
were
quantified
in
terms
of
time,
usually
minutes,
spent
on
each
item
on
the
agenda.
Chair
Achterman
provided
input
on
how
long
routine
items
and
various
presentations
would
take
in
terms
of
minutes
if
the
OTC
agenda
did
not
specify
an
allotted
amount
of
time.
Routine
items,
like
director
and
commission
reports
and
other
administrative
tasks,
were
all
given
equal
amounts
of
time
in
each
meeting.
Because
consent
calendar
items
do
not
receive
individual
attention
and
are
included
in
the
formal
meeting
time,
each
consent
item
was
categorized
by
the
nature
of
the
action
being
taken:
administrative
tasks,
property
(project
right‐of‐way
acquisitions),
emergency
board
actions
taken
since
the
last
OTC
meeting,
and
items
related
to
the
Statewide
Transportation
Improvement
Program
(STIP).
The
consent
calendar
items
were
quantified
by
the
number
of
items
in
each
category
noted,
to
present
a
less
detailed
picture
of
what
kind
of
actions
the
consent
calendar
included.
3.1.2 The
Formal
Meeting
by
ODOT
Division
and
Action
Type
There
are
seven
divisions
of
ODOT,
each
with
a
director
and
staff
responsible
for
administering
different
types
of
transportation
modes
or
agency
focus
areas.
Stauffer
34
Some
divisions
are
much
bigger
than
others
in
terms
of
staff
and
budget.
The
agenda
items
were
assigned
to
a
particular
division
based
on
the
nature
of
the
item
and/or
the
agency
staff
involved
in
presenting
the
agenda
item.
The
seven
ODOT
divisions
include:
Rail,
Driver
and
Motor
Vehicles,
Highway,
Public
Transit,
Transportation
Safety,
Motor
Carrier
Transportation,
and
Transportation
Development.
An
agenda
item
either
requires
action
or
provides
information
to
the
OTC,
so
each
item
was
also
identified
as
one
that
required
a
decision
or
action,
or
was
purely
informative
in
providing
some
background
or
data
to
the
OTC
to
fulfill
the
OTC’s
oversight
duties.
3.1.3 The
Formal
Meeting
by
Board
Responsibility
Categories
When
an
informational
or
action
item
was
categorized
by
ODOT
division
it
was
also
classified
under
one
of
the
seven
broad
board
responsibility
areas.
Based
largely
on
the
board
responsibilities
identified
by
the
2005
KTC
study
(see
Appendix
I),
the
areas
included:

Policy:
regulations
and
guidelines
for
agency
activities.

Oversight:
implementation
of
projects
and
policies.

Strategic
Investment:
prioritization
of
major
capital
projects.

Risk
Management:
assessment
of
financial
exposure.

Financial
Management:
funding
allocations
for
projects
and
budget
issues.

CEO
Evaluation:
review
and
oversight
specifically
of
the
ODOT
director.

Public
Engagement:
time
spent
interacting
with
–
hearing
from,
responding
to
–
the
general
public
during
the
course
of
the
meeting.
Stauffer
35
Several
of
these
broad
categories
overlap
on
specific
agenda
items,
for
example
a
Policy
item
could
involve
Strategic
investment
and
Financial
Management
issues;
therefore
the
total
time
for
an
agenda
item
was
included
in
multiple
categories
if
the
topic
could
be
included
in
more
than
one
category.
This
accounts
for
the
total
time
discrepancy
between
ODOT
divisional
(4020)
and
board
category
breakdown
(6505)
by
minutes.
Taken
together,
this
breakdown
of
the
2005‐2007
OTC
agendas
shows
the
patterns,
trends,
and
focal
areas
of
one
state’s
transportation
governing
commission.
3.2.1
The
State
Transportation
Commissions
Survey
The
State
Transportation
Commissions
Survey
(STCS)
was
created
to
establish
a
baseline
set
of
statistics
and
characteristics
of
how
transportation
oversight
and
governance
boards
operate.
The
questions
were
designed
based
on
the
literature
of
governing
board
best
practices,
as
described
above.
Specifically,
the
survey
was
intended
to
provide
basic
information
on
how
transportation
commissions,
boards,
or
authorities,
spend
their
time,
particularly
in
their
regularly
occurring
public
meetings.
The
goal
of
the
survey
was
to
identify
any
possible
best
practices
for
state
transportation
commissions,
similar
to
those
used
by
private
corporate
boards.
The
questions
chosen
were
based
on
the
literature
review
conducted
over
the
last
year
for
this
essay,
as
well
as
the
work
conducted
by
Stauffer
and
Miaso
as
interns
working
for
OTC
Chair
Actherman.
Using
various
lists
of
questions
identified
as
important
for
governing
boards
to
ask
themselves
from
governance
literature,
a
Stauffer
36
set
of
18
questions
regarding
basic
board
characteristics,
agenda
creation,
and
self‐
assessment
areas,
were
crafted.
These
questions
were
reviewed
by
OTC
Chair
Achterman,
Dr.
Brent
Steel
of
Oregon
State
University,
and
Barnie
Frank
and
Amanda
Pietz
of
the
ODOT
Research
Unit.
The
deployment
of
the
STCS’
online
format
–
the
critical
method
for
reaching
34
state
transportation
commission
administrators
–
was
administered
by
Amanda
Pietz,
with
the
ODOT
Research
Unit.
Her
assistance
with
the
STCS
was
vital
to
our
limited
time
table,
which
included
finalizing
the
survey
questions,
entering
them
into
the
online‐based
Survey
Monkey
software,
sending
the
link
via
email
to
the
34
state
transportation
commission
support
staff
employees,
and
monitoring
the
survey
as
it
was
completed
between
March
4,
2009
and
March
23,
2009.
The
emails
with
the
Survey
Monkey
link
were
sent
out
in
OTC
Chair
Gail
Actherman’s
name,
in
the
hopes
that
using
the
name
of
a
transportation
agency
official
would
encourage
the
response
rate
of
the
targeted
recipients.
Ms.
Pietz
was
also
instrumental
in
providing
the
written
summary
and
Microsoft
Excel
spreadsheet
containing
the
raw
STCS
results.
The
ideal
STCS
respondents
were
the
individuals
most
directly
involved
in
the
routine
operations
of
the
state
transportation
commission.
Because
it
is
likely
that
the
actual
members
of
state
transportation
commissions,
authorities,
or
boards,
would
not
have
the
time,
or
direct
knowledge,
of
all
the
details
asked
in
this
survey,
we
targeted
each
commission’s
administrative
staff,
either
dedicated
to
the
board
or
shared
with
the
executive
officers.
I
found
that
not
all
states
have
transportation
commissions;
many
appear
to
have
single
executive
authority
entities,
often
referred
Stauffer
37
to
as
Transportation
Secretaries
or
Commissioners,
with
no
prominent
or
noted
oversight
body.
I
was
able
to
identify
34
state
transportation
commissions,
boards,
or
authorities,
with
the
stated
duties
of
oversight
or
governance
of
transportation
agencies.
To
locate
contact
information,
and
to
establish
the
existence
of
the
34
state
transportation
commissions
I
visited
each
of
the
51
DOT
websites
(including
the
District
of
Columbia)
and
searching
for
links
to
agency
organizational
charts
or
using
various
search
engines
at
each
website
to
find
any
governing
commission,
board,
or
authority,
that
met
the
broad
definition
of
an
oversight
or
advisory
board
for
the
transportation
agency.
While
conducting
this
internet‐based
search
method
I
employed
various
terms
to
locate
the
governing
entity
and
their
associated
staff,
looking
for
administrative
titles
like
Secretary
to
the
Board,
Executive
Administrator,
etc.,
to
find
a
contact
person,
preferably
not
a
commission
member,
who
would
be
knowledgeable
about
the
commission.
Attention
was
given
specifically
to
commission
meetings
and
agenda
set‐up
as
well
as
general
administrative
duties.
It
was
often
the
case
that
full
contact
information
(name,
title,
phone
number
and
email)
was
not
available
online;
in
such
cases
I
worked
my
way
through
the
agency
general
phone
numbers
to
locate
a
solid
contact
person
for
the
commission.
This
work
was
conducted
during
the
winter
quarter
of
2009,
when
I
served
as
an
intern
with
ODOT,
working
with
Amanda
Pietz
of
the
ODOT
Research
Unit.
Because
the
data
being
collected
is
public
information,
and
because
the
STCS
is
relatively
short,
we
estimated
that
a
reasonable
return
rate
would
be
50%
of
survey
recipients,
or
16
surveys.
Given
the
nature
of
this
graduate
essay,
and
the
Stauffer
38
relatively
recent
date
of
deployment
of
the
survey,
the
desired
response
rate,
for
reporting
purposes
here,
was
linked
to
the
tentative
essay
timeline.
For
use
in
this
essay
the
survey
results
were
prepared,
sent
out,
and
returned
during
February
and
March
2009.
Surveys
returned
after
March
2009
may
still
be
useful
in
later
research
and
adaptations
of
this
essay.
Since
the
data
being
collected
from
this
survey
is
intended
to
establish
basic
qualitative
data,
this
initial
analysis
is
limited
to
basic
frequencies
and
Microsoft
Excel‐based
pivot
table.
The
more
informative
results
are
the
qualitative
conclusions
about
common
trends
or
responses
from
state
transportation
commissions.
Stauffer
39
4. RESULTS
For
all
the
existing
literature
on
governance,
for
all
the
corporate
boards
and
public
commissions,
the
fact
remains
that
we
know
very
little
about
these
organizations,
especially
for
transportation
infrastructure
agencies.
To
identify
not
only
the
present
status
of
transportation
governance,
but
also
at
where
further
research
might
focus,
this
essay
reports
on
three
projects
undertaken
in
the
last
year
aimed
at
exploring
this
area
of
public
policy:
(1)
the
analysis
of
the
OTC’s
time
management
practices;
(2)
the
cumulative
results
of
a
literature
review
on
governance;
and
(3),
the
preliminary
results
of
a
survey
sent
to
the
34
state
transportation
commissions.
These
projects
point
to
a
lack
of
consistency
in
governance
activity
and
research,
a
lack
of
independent
commission
identity
separate
from
the
agency,
and
the
need
for
further
investigation
and
exploration
of
governance
best
practices
for
state
commissions.
4.1
The
OTC
Agenda
Analysis:
The
Highway
Division
Steals
the
Show
The
goal
of
the
agenda
analysis
project
was
to
identify
time
management
trends
broken
down
by
ODOT
division
and
board
responsibility
areas,
to
determine
what
topics
occupy
OTC
formal
meeting
time.
This
analysis
found
that
the
Highway
Division
and
informational
items
dominated
the
agenda;
it
also
concludes
that
the
OTC
spent
near
equal
amounts
of
time
in
their
roles
to
engage
the
public,
oversee
ODOT
activities,
and
to
craft
or
amend
agency
policy.
For
the
full
details
of
the
agenda
analysis
refer
to
Appendix
II.
Stauffer
40
The
prevailing
suspicion
that
the
Highway
Division
captures
the
bulk
of
the
OTC’s
public
time
was
strongly
confirmed
in
the
analysis
of
agendas
from
December
2005
to
November
2007.
Fifty‐
three
percent
of
formal
meeting
minutes
were
spent
on
approval
and
informational
items
regarding
the
Highway
Division,
followed
by
21%
on
routine
administrative
tasks.
All
other
divisions
received
between
3%
and
6%.
This
suggests
that,
as
one
might
have
guessed,
motor
vehicle
transportation
services
and
the
high‐profile
capital
projects
associated
with
them
are
the
chief
focus
of
the
OTC.
This
confirms
the
belief
by
Chair
Achterman,
that
the
volunteer
commission
members
primarily
consider
the
activities
of
just
one
of
the
seven
ODOT
divisions.
This
is
not
surprising
given
the
historical
focus
and
budget
allocation
to
highways,
rather
then
other
transportation
modes.
OTC
agenda
items
during
the
formal
meeting
are
either
informational,
providing
background
or
updates
on
ODOT
projects
or
studies,
or
require
approval
of
an
appropriation
or
decision
recommended
by
the
agency.
Sixty‐four
percent
of
all
agenda
items
during
the
formal
OTC
meetings
were
spent
on
informational
items.
The
only
division
that
presented
the
commission
with
mostly
approval
items
was
the
Motor
Carrier
Transportation
Division.
It
is
reasonable
to
conclude
that
the
information
only
or
required
approval
break
down
by
division
depends
upon
the
Stauffer
41
nature
of
the
division’s
work
and
its
size
relative
to
the
rest
of
ODOT.
It
is
important
to
note
that
the
public
meetings
are
not
the
only
place
divisions
report
to
the
OTC;
therefore
it
is
likely
some
divisional
reporting
or
approving
is
not
captured
in
this
analysis,
although
commission
meetings
are
the
primary
and
most
public
setting
for
the
OTC.
However,
the
finding
that
the
volunteer
commissioners
spend
a
majority
of
their
time
receiving
information,
confirms
a
pattern
identified
by
Chair
Achterman
as
a
persistent
issue
the
OTC
should
address,
reflecting
the
OTC’s
reactive
position.
Of
the
seven
categories
of
board
responsibilities,
those
broadly
defined
areas
governing
bodies
ought
to
spend
their
time
on,
the
OTC
spent
nearly
equal
amounts
of
time
on
Public
Engagement
(23%),
Oversight
(23%),
and
Policy
Creation
(22%).
These
areas
were
followed
by
Financial
Management
(17%),
Strategic
Time Spent by Board Responsibility
Categories
Publi
Engagement
c
22
%
Fin.
17
Mgmt.
Risk%
Mgmt. 1
Strategi
% Investment
c
14
%
Policy
23
%
Oversight
23
%
Investment
(14%),
Risk
Management
(1%),
and
CEO
Evaluation
(0%).
Since
Oversight
and
Policy
creation
agenda
items
overlap
frequently,
we
can
conclude
that
almost
half
of
OTC
time
is
spent
monitoring
the
agency
and
focusing
on
where
the
agency
is
going
in
a
big
picture
way.
The
OTC
is
not
responsible
for
evaluating
the
ODOT
director,
who
is
appointed
by
the
governor
and
therefore
serves
at
the
pleasure
of
the
state’s
chief
executive,
with
the
advice
of
the
OTC;
this
is
why
no
time
was
spent
Stauffer
42
in
the
two
year
period
reviewed
assessing
the
job
performance
of
the
agency
director.
Of
the
229
Consent
Agenda
items
approved
by
the
OTC
in
an
omnibus
package
at
the
end
of
the
formal
meeting,
110
were
administrative
rules
and
69
were
changes
in
the
Statewide
Transportation
Improvement
Program
(STIP),
which
is
the
highway
capital
expenditure
plan.
Again
it
seems
that
the
Consent
Agenda
also
largely
deals
with
Highway
Division
programs
and
projects.
These
conclusions,
along
with
the
detailed
reports,
were
presented
to
the
OTC
in
January
2008,
during
the
course
of
a
public
work
session
in
Salem,
Oregon.
The
work
session
was
audio
recorded
and
the
review
presented
here
is
based
on
those
recordings.
The
agenda
analysis
was
presented
to
the
commissioners
and
agency
staff
as
a
part
of
Chair
Achterman’s
efforts
to
identify
“what
the
commission
ought
to
be
working
on”
(OTC
2008).
It
was
also
noted
that
the
agenda
analysis
was
something
of
precursor
to
the
literature
review
to
be
done
later
in
2008.
The
presentation
by
Stauffer
and
Miaso
came
at
a
time
when
the
OTC
was
developing
a
comprehensive
Work
Plan
for
the
commission
and
the
agency,
and
was
especially
important
as
the
commission
prepared
to
welcome
two
new
board
members,
then
scheduled
to
take
their
seats
at
the
commission’s
February
2008
meeting
(OTC
2008).
At
the
time
of
the
presentation
the
OTC
only
had
three
of
its
five
positions
filled,
as
two
commissioners
had
just
resigned
and
the
governor
was
in
the
process
of
appointing
two
replacement
commissioners.
Stauffer
43
Generally,
commissioners
and
agency
staff
accepted
the
conclusions
from
the
formal
agenda
analysis
presented
by
Stauffer
and
Miaso.
Particularly
for
Chair
Actherman,
the
results
confirmed
her
suspicion
that
the
commission
was
spending
too
much
time,
during
the
formal
meeting,
on
specifically
Highway
Division
informational
matters.
Commissioner
Mike
Nelson
concluded
that
the
analysis
report
yielded
“good
stuff”
(OTC
2008).
Motor
Carrier
Transportation
division
director
Greg
Dal
Ponte
appreciated
the
new
information,
saying
the
new
data
was
“edifying
and
adds
value”
to
the
discussion
of
OTC
roles
and
responsibilities
(OTC
2008).
ODOT
Director
Matthew
Garrett
also
pointed
out
that
the
findings
of
the
agenda
analysis
was
“surprising
because
we
didn’t
know”
what
would
be
found,
although
he
noted
the
conclusions
about
what
divisions
occupied
OTC
formal
meeting
time
was
along
the
lines
they
might
have
guessed
(OTC
2008),
a
sentiment
shared
by
Chair
Achterman.
However,
commissioners
and
agency
senior
staff
also
pointed
out
some
of
the
analysis’
shortcomings
and
areas
that
might
need
further
definition.
Director
Dal
Ponte
emphasized
that
formal
meeting
time
fails
to
reflect
the
many
informal
ways
–
like
ODOT
committees
and
designated
commissioner
liaisons
‐
that
the
OTC
employs
to
stay
informed
of
divisional
activity
and
thus
serves
its
oversight
charge.
Director
Dal
Ponte
was
specifically
concerned
that
the
agenda
analysis
reflected
very
little
Motor
Carrier
Transportation
division
time
during
the
formal
commission
meeting
(OTC
2008).
Director
Garrett
and
Chair
Actherman
agreed
with
Director
Dal
Ponte,
noting
that
the
concern
was
valid,
and
explained
that
Stauffer
and
Miaso
has
been
Stauffer
44
asked
to
analyze
what
amounts
to
only
one
data
point
of
OTC
and
ODOT
activity.
Director
Garrett
noted
that
the
monthly
OTC
meeting
was
only
one
way
the
OTC
performs
its
job
(OTC
2008).
Similarly,
Commissioner
Nelson
and
Central
Services
Deputy
Director
Lorna
Young
noted
that
the
analysis
finding
of
very
little
OTC
formal
time
spent
on
Risk
Management
issues
might
be
seen
as
a
call
for
more
OTC
attention
to
such
agency
risk
issues.
However
they
noted
that
because
of
the
lack
of
a
specifically
transportation
background
on
the
part
of
Stauffer
and
Miaso,
certain
agenda
items
that
actually
did
include
Risk
Management
issues
might
not
have
been
classified
as
appropriately
(OTC
2008).
As
a
way
to
go
forward
with
further
risk
management
oversight
in
the
future,
Deputy
Director
Young
suggested
that
the
commission
might
find
it
“helpful”
to
better
define
risk
management
in
individual
projects
and
programs
the
OTC
considers
(OTC
2008).
It
was
also
noted
by
both
commissioners
and
agency
staff
that
the
informational
and
approval
break
down
of
each
agenda
item
is
important
to
consider,
given
that
the
OTC
is
trying
to
identify
what
it
ought
to
be
doing
as
opposed
to
what
it
is
doing
presently.
Commissioner
Wilson
and
ODOT
Director
Garrett
pointed
out
that
since
the
OTC
spends
a
lot
of
their
formal
time
on
informational
items,
“a
lot
of
informational
items
eventually
yield
an
approval,”
suggesting
that
a
lot
of
the
informational
items
are
preparation
for
the
commission
make
a
decision
(OTC
2008).
As
a
primary
concern
for
Chair
Achterman
was
the
amount
of
time
spent
on
Stauffer
45
informational
items,
this
suggestion
may
alter
perceptions
of
the
informational
nature
of
OTC
time
management
practices.
Bringing
the
conversation
to
the
big‐picture
level,
Director
Garrett
noted
that
what
the
agenda
analysis,
along
with
the
OTC’s
examination
of
their
roles
and
responsibilities,
gets
at
is
“what
is
the
commission
engaging
in
and
how
is
the
commission
engaging
in
this…”
by
asking
if
the
OTC
as
an
example
commission
is
an
anomaly,
in
terms
of
behavior
and
activity
compared
to
other
transportation
commissions
(OTC
2008).
He
continued
to
say
that
balancing
agency
and
commission
oversight
priorities
is
“a
balance
between
the
commission’s
role,
[and]
the
CEO/senior
management…”when
deciding
if
the
situation
calls
for
“boards
that
rubber
stamp
and
those
that
are
hands
on…”;
Director
Garrett
suggested
that
for
ODOT
the
right
balance
was
“in
the
middle”(OTC
2008).
Director
Garrett
also
noted
that
as
he
reports
directly
to
the
governor,
he
found
the
0%
of
OTC
time
spent
on
CEO
evaluation
to
be
the
perfect
amount
of
time,
a
comment
that
received
the
anticipated
chuckle
from
audience
members
(OTC
2008).
Summing
up
the
OTC’s
response
to
the
agenda
analysis,
Commissioner
Wilson
noted
that
the
goal
was
to
look
at
their
authority,
their
roles
and
responsibilities,
and
how
they
spend
their
time;
despite
several
limitations,
and
suggesting
that
the
formal
agenda
items
only
show
“about
a
1/3
of
commission
time,”
Commissioner
Nelson
found
that
the
analysis
“…allows
us
to
have
a
snapshot
to
say,
based
on
what
our
responsibilities
are,
based
on
what
we
are
spending
our
time
on…”
the
results
will
be
Stauffer
46
beneficial
“…for
deeper
conversations…
about
what
the
roles
of
the
commission
are”
(OTC
2008).
As
a
part
of
the
OTC’s
long‐term
effort
to
identify
its
legal
and
informal
oversight
roles
and
responsibilities,
the
agenda
analysis
discussion
eventually
gave
way
to
a
continuation
of
a
conversation
the
commission
began
in
late
2007
about
defining
their
roles
and
responsibilities.
Commissioner
Nelson
reiterated
what
he
considered
to
be
a
common
board
concern
about
orienting
new
members
to
the
purpose
of
the
OTC,
as
he
had
experienced
“concern
as
a
new
commission
member
as
to
what
our
role
was…”(OTC
2008).
The
agency
directors’
perspective
on
what
is
expected
by
the
OTC
was
expressed
by
the
Driver
and
Motor
Vehicle
director,
who
explained
that
as
a
divisional
director
she
“takes
[her]
cue
from
the
commission
as
to
what
they
want
to
see,
if
they
want
to
know
more
from
each
division
the
commission
should
request
it
and
the
divisions
can
provide
that…”
concluding
that
“[divisional
directors]
won’t
show
unless
we
have
to”
(OTC
2008).
In
large
part
the
discussion
placed
the
focus
on
the
motivation
of
the
OTC
to
function
in
the
terms
Director
Garrett
illustrated,
as
a
“rubber
stamp”
or
very
“hands
on”,
but
preferably
at
some
happy
middle
place.
By
the
January
2008
work
session
the
OTC
had
already
drafted
a
set
of
eight
responsibility
roles,
with
the
guidance
of
designated
senior
staff,
external
consultations,
public
comments,
and
armed
with
findings
of
the
OTC
agenda
analysis
and
the
2005
KTC
study
roles
and
responsibility
report
(see
Appendix
I).
As
a
work‐in‐
progress
project,
occurring
as
the
OTC
was
undergoing
changes
in
membership
and
Stauffer
47
leadership,
the
document
referred
to
as
the
“Role
and
of
the
OTC”
was
a
way
for
commission
members
and
ODOT
senior
staff
to
reflect
on
the
operations
of
the
commission
and
to
put
their
brainstorming
sessions
through
a
public
review
processes,
allowing
time
for
consideration
of
the
drafted
roles
and
responsibilities
and
receiving
input
along
the
way.
During
the
January
2008
work
session
the
commissioners
and
agency
directors
informally
approved
the
eight
areas
they
had
identified
and
agreed
to
set
future
time
for
further
development
of
each
responsibility
area
(OTC
2008).
The
eight
role
areas
as
approved
by
the
OTC
in
March
2008
are
presented
in
Box
4
(for
roles
with
authorizing
statutes
see
Appendix
III).
The
identified
roles
embody
what
Commissioner
Wilson
explained
as
what
“we
are
trying
to
do,
what
are
we
trying
to
accomplish”
(OTC
2008).
Stauffer
48
Box
4:
Oregon
Transportation
Commission
Work
Session
Summary.
(Fall
2007,
January
24,
2008
and
February
21,
2008,
Finalized
March
19,
2008)
Role of the Oregon Transportation Commission
The principal functions of the commission, along with current commission priorities
are:
1. Policy development
a) Land use and transportation integration
b) Federal transportation act reauthorization
c) Intermodal integration
d) Governance across all transportation ownerships and jurisdictions
e) Systems optimization-mobility services
2. Strategic planning
a) Strategic investment analysis and project investment criteria
b) Rail assessment and action strategy
c) Climate change plan implementation
3. Oversight of operations (performance measures and tracking)
a) Project delivery performance
b) Cost accountability
4. Strategic transactions (major projects/corridors)
a) Columbia River Crossing
b) Central Oregon
c) Other major Portland metro projects
5. Financial management (revenue and expenses)
a) Future funding strategies
i) Tolling
ii) Value capture
iii) Odometer-based tax
b) Gap analysis of funding shortfalls across all jurisdictions
c) Revenue allocation
6. Risk management
7. External relations (independent eyes and ears, independent advocate for
transportation needs)
a) Communications
b) Intergovernmental relations
c) Stakeholder/citizen relations
8. Review of director’s effectiveness
4.2
The
Literature
Review:
Mostly
Corporate
Best
Practices
From
the
existing
public,
corporate,
and
nonprofit
governance
scholarship,
John
Miaso
and
I
were
able
to
construct
a
working
list
of
best
practices.
Based
on
the
literature
reviewed,
a
“Top
10”
list
of
board
best
practices
has
been
compiled
for
use
by
both
public
and
private
governing
entities.
Although
they
do
not
proceed
in
any
Stauffer
49
particular
order,
this
list
is
based
on
the
outlines
of
the
studies
reviewed.
The
use
of
this
master
best
practices
list
is
intended
for
public
governance
bodies,
most
directly
for
application
in
the
transportation
field,
where
issues
of
accountability
and
time
management
are
of
particular
concern.
1. What
will
we
be
doing?
Boards
should
establish
a
clear
mission,
to
be
periodically
reviewed
under
new
circumstances.
It
is
useful
for
boards
to
put
in
writing
their
individual
and
group
expectations
for
the
agency
and
themselves.
2. Are
we
on
track?
Consistently
apply
the
mission
to
decisions.
Has
the
board
been
guided
by
its
mission?
Program
monitoring
should
consider
the
initial
goals.
Using
“dashboard”
measurement
tools
is
an
effective
way
to
maintain
and
review
the
agency’s
mission
through
key
performance
areas
over
time.
3. Do
we
know
the
agency
financially
and
strategically?
Oversight
includes
understanding
the
present
and
historic
needs
of
the
agency,
which
shows
an
appreciation
for
the
agency
and
can
build
relationships
with
employees
and
provides
the
board
with
important
background
for
decision
making.
4. Are
we
up‐to‐date?
Develop
board
self‐evaluation
practices
to
understand
what
the
board
is
doing
and
highlight
to
improve.
Staying
technologically
current
aids
the
board
in
keeping
in
contact
with
each
other
and
the
agency.
5. Are
we
dealing
with
change?
Provide
orientation
and
training
sessions
and
materials
for
new,
and
veteran,
board
members.
6. Can’t
we
all
just
get
along?
Maintain
an
open
dialogue
with
the
agency
staff
to
enable
board
members
to
know
where
they
are
needed
most.
Stauffer
50
7. Can
they
see
us?
Boards
should
be
redundantly
transparent
in
presenting
their
performance
indicators
to
the
public,
agency,
and
legislative
entities.
8. Do
we
play
favorites?
Conduct
neutral
and
open
meetings
to
avoid
the
appearance
of
influences
that
may
hurt
the
board’s
oversight
of
the
agency.
9. Are
we
too
risky?
Evaluate
the
board’s
role
in
the
agency’s
risk
management.
10. Do
we
oversee
what
we
are
supposed
to
oversee?
If
the
board
is
responsible
for
CEO
selection,
the
process
and
desired
criteria
should
be
reviewed.
For
public
boards,
understand
the
executive’s
(governor’s)
expectations.
You
are
there
to
hold
others
accountable,
so
ask
questions
and
get
answers.
The
key
to
the
success
for
any
governing
body
lies
in
its
ability
to
adapt
in
an
organic
and
elastic
way,
within
the
well‐established
boundaries
and
expectations
of
the
board,
the
executive,
and
the
agency.
It
is
important
for
board
members
to
know
their
role
in
the
bigger
picture
of
the
organization
and
be
willing
to
roll
with
the
inevitable
punches.
The
ability
of
the
board
to
work
together
depends
largely
on
the
relationships
built,
and
tested;
by
simply
working
together
which
goes
as
far
as
any
tool
or
technique
in
determining
the
success
of
governance
and
oversight.
Board
failures,
it
seems,
occur
not
as
a
result
of
poor
planning,
but
due
to
a
lack
of
communication
and
camaraderie
between
board
members,
the
agency
staff,
the
executive,
and
the
public.
Most
important
of
these
best
practices,
for
application
to
the
transportation
commission
setting,
are
the
recommendations
to
know
the
agency,
maintain
open
dialogue
with
the
agency
staff,
be
redundantly
transparent,
and
conduct
neutral
and
Stauffer
51
open
meetings.
Some
of
the
concerns
of
OTC
Chair
Achterman
were
consistent
with
these
popularly
identified
areas
where
other
boards
and
commissions
have
gotten
off
track.
The
need
to
maintain
neutrality
and
transparency
during
formal
meetings,
by
avoiding
too
much
preoccupation
with
a
particular
ODOT
division,
maybe
remedied
by
diversify
the
existing
OTC
agenda
and
including
divisions
and
issues
from
other
areas
of
agency
policy
influence.
This
recommendation
is
largely
to
be
implemented
at
the
discretion
of
those
who
craft
the
agenda,
which
varies
with
each
agency,
but
emphasizes
the
importance
of
understanding
the
roles
within
the
commission
and
agency
that
most
influence
the
function
and
ultimately
performance
success
or
failure.
4.3
The
STCS:
Despite
Mobility,
Commissions
Lack
Identity
State
transportation
commissions
typically
have
their
own
staff
or
access
to
agency
staff
support
that
set
commission
agendas;
most
commissions
are
able
to
get
around
their
state
for
meetings;
and
most
commissions
spend
little
time
conducting
self‐assessments.
They
appear
to
be
true
to
what
literature
and
experience
have
suggested:
vaguely
understood
oversight
mechanisms
that
are
dependent
upon
the
agency
and
state
they
serve,
and
do
not
spend
much
time
thinking
about
who
they
are
and
what
they
do.
Thirty‐four
states
have
some
form
of
transportation
governing
body,
be
it
a
commission,
board,
or
authority;
for
each
of
the
34
state
transportation
governing
entity
an
administrative
staff
member
was
identified
for
participation
in
the
STCS;
of
Stauffer
52
the
34
administrative
staff
members
who
received
the
STCS
invitation
via
email
26,
or
76%,
responded.
As
this
is
above
the
predicted
50%
or
17
respondents
mark
the
return
rate
is
better
than
expected
and
adds
to
the
weight
and
meaning
of
our
conclusions
about
how
state
transportation
governing
bodies
behave
in
terms
of
staffing,
agenda
setting,
and
basic
routine
activities.
Thanks
to
the
essential
assistance
of
Amanda
Pietz,
with
the
ODOT
Research
Unit,
a
full
compilation
and
basic
summary
of
these
results
are
included
in
this
essay
(see
Appendix
IV).
The
results
of
the
STCS
are
presented
here
in
general
conclusion
bullet
point
format.
The
points
are
grouped
by
the
broad
areas
the
survey
was
organized
by.
Who
the
STCS
Respondents
Were
and
Commission
Support
•
Ninety‐Two
percent
of
STCS
respondents
were
either
dedicated
commission
support
staff
or
executive.
50%
identified
themselves
as
commission
dedicated,
and
42.3%
identified
themselves
as
agency
staff,
suggesting
they
are
not
commission
designated
and
likely
perform
other
agency
support
tasks
as
well.
15
of
the
26
respondents
reported
that
their
transportation
commission
has
some
type
of
dedicated
staff;
there
seems
to
be
some
commission
staff
members
who
serve
dual
commission‐agency
functions.
The
Montana
Transportation
Commission
Secretary
summarized
the
existence
of
this
dual‐role
situation
with
her
comment
that
“there
are
many
department
staff
that
assist
with
the
Commission
but
one
designated
Commission
staff
person.”
Stauffer
53
•
The
largest
reported
full‐time
commission
dedicated
staff
was
17
and
one
respondent
reported
0;
50%
of
commission
aides
reported
a
staff
of
1
or
2
people.
Agenda
Setting
and
Meeting
Time
•
Most
commission
meetings
last
about
2
hours
and
require
between
1
and
8
hours
of
preparation
time.
The
Secretary
to
the
Georgia
State
Transportation
Board
noted
that
she
spends
10‐12
hours
per
monthly
meeting,
adding
that
what
is
required
varies
with
“each
board
chair…
some
want
more
input
than
others.”
This
echoes
similar
findings
from
the
OTC
agenda
analysis
discussions,
where
the
Driver
and
Motor
Vehicle
Director
suggested
that
formal
agenda
patterns
depend
on
the
expectation
of
the
commission
chair.
Suggesting
that
despite
efforts
to
reform
single
person
authority,
especially
in
the
commission
setting,
the
enabling
forces
that
brought
such
men
as
Robert
Moses
and
Glenn
Jackson
to
prominence
remain
in
place
and
in
potential
practice.
•
Seventy‐six
percent
of
commission
agendas
are
created
by
dedicated
or
agency
executive
staff.
•
Ninety‐two
percent
of
commissions
meetings
are
mobile,
and
travel
to
various
parts
of
the
state
to
hold
meetings.
To
encourage
“public
participation”
the
Pennsylvania
Commonwealth
Transportation
Commission’s
administrative
officer
reported
that
his
commission
holds
about
five
public
hearings
every
two
years.
The
executive
assistant
to
the
Florida
Transportation
Commission
(FTC)
reports
the
FTC
is
required
by
law
to
meet
four
times
a
year,
but
in
practice
meets
6
times
Stauffer
54
a
year
at
“various
locations
around
the
state.”
The
Secretary
to
the
Mississippi
Transportation
Commission
reports
that
that
body
meets
twice
a
month.
These
comments,
and
this
high
percentage
rate
of
traveling
meetings,
suggests
that
commissions
find
moving
around
to
different
locations
to
be
a
good
way
of
being
transparent
and
accessible
to
different
parts
of
the
public.
•
Creating
and
using
annual
work
plans,
or
some
form
of
a
master
calendar,
is
hit
or
miss.
54.2%
of
commission
staff
members
reported
using
an
annual
work
plan,
and
45.8%
reported
that
they
did
not.
This
finding
reinforces
the
notion
that
not
much
time
is
given
to
the
big‐picture
purposes
of
transportation
commissions,
and
that
a
general
vagueness
remains
about
the
point
these
oversight
mechanisms.
This
may
however
also
mean
that
different
DOT
agencies
have
different
administrative
practices
and
behavior
as
a
part
of
their
operational
culture,
and
commissions
may
share
calendars
with
other
agency
offices,
or
the
agency
may
rely
upon
state
laws
to
dictate
when
they
meet.
•
Commissions
very
rarely
meet
alone,
without
executive
staff
or
the
public.
According
to
the
Secretary
to
the
Missouri
Highway
and
Transportation
Commission,
that
body
has
not
met
alone
for
“several
years
now.”
This
finding
is
most
intriguing
as
it
suggests
a
lack
of
commission
independence,
separate
from
agency
staff
and
executive
branch
influences.
A
key
finding
of
governing
board
literature,
especially
since
the
days
of
Ken
Lay
and
SOX
legislation,
is
the
need
for
commissions
to
exercise
a
certain
amount
of
independence
from
those
they
oversee
(Oliver
1999).
As
transportation
commissions
are
called
upon
to
render
a
Stauffer
55
key
accountability
role,
the
commission
from
time
to
time,
ought
to
separate
itself
and
form
some
unique
identity
and
cohesion.
Commission
Self‐Administration
Activities
•
Eighty‐Seven
and
a‐half
percent
of
commissions
do
not
conduct
self‐
assessments,
and
75%
of
commissions
do
not
hold
annual
retreats.
Both
of
these
findings
are
counter
to
what
the
literature
suggests
are
keys
ways
to
strengthen
board
performance
(Houle
1989;
Drucker
1990;
Minow
and
Monks
1996;
Oliver
1999).
These
statistics
also
reinforce
the
idea
that
little
attention
is
paid
to
commissions,
even
by
commission
members.
Starting
with
internal
reviews
is
a
good
place
to
turn
the
tide
of
the
lack
of
review
and
independence
of
the
commission
as
an
organ
of
good
governance
practices.
•
A
bit
more
than
half,
56.5%,
of
commissions
maintain
member
job
descriptions;
65.2%
of
commissions
report
maintaining
and
using
some
form
of
a
member
manual
for
training
of
information
purposes;
69%
of
commission
report
training
new
commission
members.
Following
through
on
these
simple
housekeeping
chores
should
go
a
long
way
in
helping
establish
independence
in
the
key
auditing
body
with
large
DOT
organizations.
It
is
encouraging
that
more
than
half
of
existing
transportation
commissions
practice
these
tasks.
Taken
together
these
results
paint
a
world
of
transportation
governance
that
might
have
been
predicted,
with
most
bodies
not
concerning
themselves
with
their
own
job
performance,
although
there
are
signs
of
efforts
to
be
accessible.
Half
of
STCS
respondents
reported
an
interest
in
being
kept
informed
of
this
survey’s
results,
Stauffer
56
and
this
essay’s
larger
examination
of
transportation
governance;
this
suggests
that
there
is
at
least
some
minimal
internal
concern
about
the
governance
practices
of
transportation
agencies,
if
for
no
other
reason
than
because
these
folks
work
in
this
specific
field
and
have
a
direct
interest.
There
may
also
be
a
growing
need
to
“clarify”
the
roles
of
these
boards,
to
explore
what
the
Secretary
to
the
Georgia
State
Transportation
Board
referred
to
as
“gray
area.”
The
STCS
suggests
that
transportation
governance
bodies
remain
entities
operating
without
much
serious
reflection
about
their
agenda
and
performance.
It
seems
that
in
many
ways
the
STCS
identifies
boards
and
commissions
that
are
merely
extensions
of
the
agencies
they
are
supposed
to
hold
accountable,
partly
due
to
the
varying
legal
formulas
used
to
select
members,
and
partly
because
they
are
usually
not
responsible
for
what
their
agenda
presents
them,
they
rely
upon
support
staff
that
may
work
for
the
agency,
and
they
usually
don’t
spend
anytime
as
independently
for
any
purpose,
let
alone
self‐assessment.
The
suspected
disconnect
between
recommended
best
practices,
based
on
corporate
and
public
administration
literature,
and
what
transportation
commissions
do
in
reality
seems
to
be
confirmed
by
the
STCS
findings.
Particularly
when
it
comes
to
board
independence,
essential
for
critical
auditing
duties
in
the
post‐SOX
era
(Oliver
1999),
and
self‐evaluation
activities,
which
many
corporate
authors
suggest
is
essential
for
effective
governing
boards
(Houle
1989;
Drucker
1990;
Minow
and
Monks
1996;
Oliver
1999).
These
findings
indicate
that
transportation
commissions
are
not
utilizing
the
governance
lessons
and
practices
of
other
fields,
particularly
the
Stauffer
57
corporate
world
where
governing
bodies
have
been
forced
to
be
more
responsive
to
the
rights
of
shareholders
and
government
regulators.
And
indeed
it
may
take
not
only
active
commission
members,
but
a
more
attentive
and
concerned
public
for
transportation
commissions
to
take
themselves,
and
their
roles,
more
seriously.
Given
this
commission
behavior,
it
is
easy
to
see
how
a
Robert
Moses
or
Glenn
Jackson
–
powerful
and
charismatic
personalities
invested
with
the
powers
of
a
chairman
–
could
dominate
the
activities
of
a
commission.
It
is
also
easy
to
see
how
there
might
be
frustration
amongst
present
commission
members
and
chairs,
or
their
staff,
who
would
appreciate
a
little
more
clarity
and
explanation
in
the
purpose
of
transportation
governance
from
a
commission
standpoint.
Of
course
a
lot
of
these
questions
are
readily
answered
on
a
state‐by‐state
basis,
with
actual
practices
yielding
to
the
traditions
of
each
agency
and
the
momentary
fancies
of
the
appointing
governor
or
electing
public.
But
if
nothing
else,
the
STCS
reinforces
that
there
is
a
lack
of
consistency
in
what
transportation
commissions
are
doing,
and
what
we
as
a
public,
can
take
away
from
governing
transportation
agencies
–
agencies
that
consume
and
expend
vast
amounts
of
public
resources.
Stauffer
58
5. DISCUSSION
&
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
FUTURE
RESEARCH
The
picture
painted
by
the
OTC
agenda
analysis
and
the
STCS,
suggests
that
the
historical
description
of
the
governing
board
–
as
vaguely
understood
and
inconsistently
used
accountability
entities
–
remains
more
or
less
in
effect,
despite
the
valiant
efforts
of
reformers
through
the
last
several
decades.
These
noble
efforts
at
bringing
out
governance
paradigm
shifts,
organizational
remodeling,
and
behavior
altering
practices,
is
well
documented
in
the
literature
review
of
corporate
governance
and
public
administration.
And
yet,
as
the
STCS
and
OTC
agenda
presentation
made
clear,
there
remains
a
distinct
disconnect
between
what
we
believe
our
transportation
commissions
ought
to
be
doing
and
what
they
are
actually
doing.
More
importantly
there
remains
a
lack
of
independence,
a
lack
of
willingness
to
spend
time
on
examining
themselves
that
exists
within
transportation
commissions
that
should
concern
the
observer
as
well
as
those
who
have
more
directly
at
stake
in
the
activities
of
government
accountability.
Unfortunately
for
OTC
Chair
Achterman,
it
would
appear
that
her
pre‐existing
suspicions
about
a
lack
of
effective
time
management
does
indeed
bear
some
truth
in
the
practices
of
not
only
her
commission,
but
in
the
behavior
of
commissions
across
the
country.
There
is
a
practical
need
to
study
and
assess
how
transportation
commissions
should,
and
do
operate,
not
only
as
statutorily
mandated
oversight
mechanisms
of
large
public
agencies,
but
as
the
setting
for
human
interactions
on
political
and
social
terms.
Areas
for
future
commission
research
ought
to
focus
on
include:
the
broad
area
of
commission
culture,
the
other
2/3
of
commission
time
not
captured
in
Stauffer
59
meeting
agendas
or
minutes;
the
critical
Federal‐state
relationship
ought
to
be
explored
deeper,
especially
given
the
lack
of
attention
for
the
Federal
role
in
transportation
funding,
which
this
essay
found
to
be
none‐existent
in
a
post‐“iron
triangle”
world;
the
real
concern
about
commission
responsiveness
to
constituency
groups;
and
the
overall
satisfaction
rate
of
commission
members.
The
role
of
our
public
commissions
in
many
fields
of
interest,
who
do
so
much
to
regulate,
protect,
and
promote,
our
civil
society,
is
still
lacking
and
un‐explored,
a
surprising
state
affairs
despite
the
widespread
presence
of
these
government
bodies.
In
a
not
too‐far
stretched
way,
governing
boards
like
transportation
commissions
reflect
popular
ideas
and
values
expressed
by
the
interested,
attentive,
active,
and
perhaps
general
public.
Various
commissions
and
boards,
to
a
degree,
reflect
what
we
in
society
find
to
be
important,
and
how
they
spend
their
time
matters
not
only
because
it
may
lead
to
where
money
is
spent,
or
what
highway
is
repaved,
but
it
also
reflects
the
sacrifices
we
are
willing
to
make
in
the
name
of
filling
a
pot
hole,
building
a
new
bridge,
or
licensing
a
new
group
of
drivers.
Understanding
how
much
time
the
OTC
spends
on
the
new
Columbia
River
Crossing
(project
name
for
the
future
expansion
of
the
Interstate‐5
Bridge
between
Portland,
OR
and
Vancouver,
WA)
is
one
way
to
identify
the
importance
of
that
issue
for
Oregon
and
its
citizenry.
At
present
we
can
conclude
that
Oregon
cares
about
its
highways,
a
finding
found
in
the
guesses
of
agency
insiders
and
the
supported
by
the
OTC
agenda
analysis.
But
is
this
truly
accurate,
or
are
there
organizational
forces
at
work?
Or
is
this
just
a
reflection
of
1/3
of
OTC
time
data,
as
suggested
by
ODOT
staff?
Stauffer
60
As
with
so
many
studies
this
attempt
at
answering
rather
broad
questions
about
meeting
accountability
in
the
state
transportation
commission
setting,
has
yielded
more
questions.
However,
armed
with
the
findings
presented
here,
future
assaults
on
our
lack
of
transportation
governance
knowledge
will
know
that
there
is
somewhere
else
to
go!
5.1
Key
Conclusions:
State
Policy
Needs
Our
Attention!
From
the
two
projects
and
literature
review
I
have
reported
here
in
this
graduate
essay,
I
have
come
to
some
general
conclusions
about
public
governance
presently.
It’s
a
Good
Idea
to
Question
the
Diversity
of
Your
Agenda.
A
basic
finding
of
the
OTC
agenda
analysis
was
that
the
Highway
Division
receives
a
lot
of
attention,
and
it’s
a
finding
that
was
predicted
by
those
who
ought
to
know.
As
this
is
identified
as
a
problem
from
the
standpoint
of
addressing
all
the
concerns
of
a
complex
transportation
agency,
as
well
as
from
the
perspective
of
a
volunteer
commissioner
wanting
to
be
as
helpful
as
possible,
it
would
seem
wise
to
explore
the
possibilities
of
opening
up
and
diversifying
commission
agenda
items
to
match
key
strategic
issues.
This
can
incorporate
commission
movement
around
the
state;
time
spent
on
specific
highway
projects.
But
of
course
caution
must
be
emphasized,
as
a
commission
would
not
want
to
act
too
boldly
in
its
zealous
efforts
to
be
diverse
and
lose
sight
of
it’s
agency’s
needs;
the
question
however
Stauffer
61
must
be
asked
in
a
fair
tone:
does
the
highway
division
need
53%
of
the
commission’s
time?
Building
Key
Relationships
is
Critical
for
Successful
Fulfillment
of
Your
Duties.
So
much
of
the
literature
I
reviewed
on
governance
focused
whole
chapters
and
many
pages
to
the
importance
of
developing
the
three
primary
relationships
a
governing
board
has:
with
executive
powers,
with
agency
staff,
and
with
the
public.
And
I
would
add
a
fourth:
with
itself.
The
ability
to
govern
appears
to
be
so
dependent
upon
how
well
the
commission
gets
along
with
the
agency
senior
and
executive
staff,
as
well
as
with
itself
as
a
supposedly
quasi‐independent
entity,
that
time
should
be
spent
on
just
building
up
the
dialogue
and
knowledge
of
the
folks
at
commission
meetings.
With
open
lines
of
communication
the
commission
can
better
understand
the
agency,
be
better
informed
on
key
issues,
and
hopefully
foster
new
ideas
and
activities
that
encourage
better
and
more
effective
policy
governance.
When
Practicing
the
Art
of
Governance,
Do
as
We
Hope,
Not
as
We
Really
Do.
It
seems
to
me
that
there
are
two
worlds
co‐existing
around
public
governance:
tips
and
lessons
from
past
leaders
and
academics
in
the
know,
and
the
trends
and
practices
of
what
this
essay
has
identified
as
the
reality
of
public
governance.
How
we
go
about
breaching
the
gap
that
exists
between
these
two
worlds
has
–
and
will
–
consume
many
pages
and
many
hours
of
research.
The
goal
of
this
essay
was
to
establish
a
picture
of
where
we
are
today
and
identify
“best
practices”
for
commissions
to
use
going
forward.
This
picture
is
filled
with
“gray
Stauffer
62
area”
but
we
know
that
there
are
key
areas
where
more
can
be
done
to
improve
the
effectiveness
of
volunteer
commissioner’s
time.
Commissions
ought
to
do
more
self‐exploration
of
their
activities
and
behaviors;
in
the
hopes
that
such
self‐
assessment
might
inspire
increased
independence
from
those
they
are
to
oversee,
and
to
promote
unity
and
cohesion
as
a
group.
5.2
Key
Recommendations:
Who
are
We?
I
have
also
come
across
some
critical
areas
future
studies
ought
to
go
in
the
continuing
dialogue
on
governance,
public
administration,
and
accountability.
Research
on
Public
–
State
Transportation
–
Governance
is
Needed!
The
present
extent
of
analysis
on
the
behavior
of
public
governance
models
is
critically
lacking,
particularly
for
transportation
agencies.
As
we
continue
to
move
farther
away
from
the
20th
century
heydays
of
attention
to
commission
government,
it
becomes
increasingly
critical
for
a
reassessment
of
this
apparently
still
popular
form
of
public
oversight;
research
should
be
pursued
in
academic
and
professional
arenas
with
urgency.
One
such
application,
taken
from
these
pages,
might
be
some
more
general
agenda
analysis
of
all
34
state
transportation
commissions.
The
STCS
conducted
for
this
essay
yielded
critical
information,
but
it
did
not
dive
deep
enough
to
run
across
regular
meeting
time
management
practices:
the
question
ought
to
be
asked
if
Mississippi,
Florida,
Pennsylvania,
and
Washington
all
spend
a
majority
of
time
on
highway
division
informational
items?
Stauffer
63
o The
Bigger
Picture.
Despite
my
best
efforts
to
capture
the
activities
and
behaviors
of
the
OTC,
as
Director
of
Motor
Carrier
Transportation
Dal
Ponte
pointed
out
during
the
work
session
discussion
of
the
agenda
analysis,
there
is
a
lot
of
work
and
reporting
done
outside
of
the
formal
meeting.
Future
efforts
to
quantify
and
evaluate
commission
governance
should
find
ways
to
incorporate
the
out‐of‐meeting
work
and
meeting
patterns,
where
perhaps
the
style
and
tradition
of
a
given
commission
may
influence
their
collective
ability
to
lead
and
to
function.
Utilize
What
We
Already
Have
Going…
Anyone
who
has
visited
the
TRB
website
realizes
that
there
is
a
lot
of
good
research
going
on
in
the
transportation
field.
The
problem
for
students
of
public
policy
is
that
very
little
of
this
vast
research
field
seems
to
be
paying
close
attention
to
the
decision
making
processes,
although
the
two
TRB
authored
studies
referenced
in
this
essay
both
cite
the
urgency
of
further
research,
which
is
based
on
the
critical
lack
of
study
so
far,
on
the
municipal,
county,
regional,
state,
and
national
levels.
Do
You
Hear
that
Echo?
Take
Time
for
Yourself.
For
as
much
writing
I
can
do
as
a
graduate
student
assessing
the
lack
of
research,
and
for
as
much
lecturing
and
writing
academics
and
industry
experts
can
do,
there
are
really
only
a
few
people
who
can
effect
the
changes
suggested
in
the
literature
review,
agenda
analysis,
and
commission
survey.
The
men
and
women
who
serve
on
the
34
state‐level
transportation
commissions
across
the
country
are
–
in
theory
–
the
ones
with
the
power
to
make
what
they
do
count,
to
ensure
that
their
time
is
used
wisely,
and
Stauffer
64
to
bridge
the
gap
between
the
literature
and
what
happens
in
practice.
The
most
essential
recommendations
for
action,
in
my
opinion,
are
board
self‐assessment,
relationship
building,
and
knowing
your
agency.
Steps
that
can
come
in
many
forms,
in
many
ways,
at
many
different
times,
but
all
require
commitment
and
investment
of
time
and
energy,
something
that
perhaps
is
the
real
culprit
in
governing
success:
can
volunteers
be
counted
upon
to
put
into
the
job
what
we
idealistically
say
we
want?
Or
is
the
cynical
bet
that
the
answer
is
‘no’
really
the
desired
outcome?
Stauffer
65
6.
CONCLUSION
It
seems
that
transportation
commissions
are
at
an
eternal
crossroads,
and
governing
in
general
is
at
a
never‐ending
junction
of
consequences
and
expectations.
As
executives
and
boards
at
the
top
of
major
corporations
and
public
agencies
are
called
to
answer
before
the
court
of
public
opinion,
it
seems
appropriate
that
we
should
launch
a
massive
reevaluation
of
one
of
our
largest
taxpayer
supported
–
and
utilized
–
institutions:
transportation
departments.
The
crossroads
these
governing
authorities
find
themselves
at
however
is
not
one
they
are
likely
to
completely
cross
any
time
soon.
The
argument
could
be
made
that
this
lack
of
identity,
both
internally
and
externally,
has
existed
since
the
creation
of
public
governance,
and
perhaps
even
intentionally.
There
are
those
who
suggest
that
the
very
system
of
American
governance
is
designed
to
stall
decision
making
that
James
Madison,
an
author
of
the
influential
Federalist
papers,
sought
to
minimize
rapid‐action
government
(Lunch
2001).
Original
intent
aside
and
perhaps
only
because
of
a
few
“squeaky
wheel”
members
of
these
commissions,
the
need
to
assess
public
governance
is
presented,
and
the
picture
painted
supports
the
lack
of
identity
and
consistency
that
seem
to
characterize
such
governing
bodies.
This
essay
relies
upon
a
comprehensive
governance
literature
review,
an
analysis
of
OTC
agendas
over
two
years,
and
the
results
of
a
survey
sent
to
thirty‐four
state
transportation
commissions’
administrative
employees.
The
results
of
these
efforts
describe
the
realities
of
disconnect
between
written
“best
practices”
mainly
from
other
fields,
and
the
widespread
lack
of
transportation
commission
Stauffer
66
independence
and
self‐assessment.
The
fact
that
so
many
commissions
fail
to
consider
their
actions
or
what
it
is
they
spend
their
time
doing
every
month
suggests
that
these
governing
boards
are
largely
ignored
by
the
agencies
they
serve
and
are,
inline
with
OTC
Chair
Achterman’s
primary
concern,
not
focusing
on
what
they
ought
to
be.
The
fact
that
there
is
a
lack
of
specific
research
on
transportation
commissions
is
thus
likely
a
result
of
the
little
interest
transportation
commissions
have
in
assessing
themselves.
We
do
however
know
that
there
are
general
steps
to
be
taken
that
can
strengthen
the
efficiency
and
effectiveness
of
a
transportation
commission
in
any
state,
and
these
are
the
lessons
transferred
from
corporate
board
rooms.
Namely
it
is
in
the
best
interest
of
everyone
associated
with
a
transportation
commission
to
have
solid
working
relationships
with
the
commission
members
and
the
agency
staff;
and
to
that
end
the
conversation
about
what
is
on
the
agenda
is
a
good
starting
place
for
building
the
dialogue
between
the
commission,
agency,
and
general
public.
It
should
not
be
taken
for
granted
that
the
agenda
is
the
same
month
after
month,
year
after
year;
unless
there
are
specific
state
laws
requiring
the
inclusion
of
certain
agenda
items
it
should
be
fair
for
commission
members
and
agency
directors
to
propose
adding
and
editing
the
formal
agenda.
Implementing
these
and
other
internal
activities
shouldn’t
require
any
grand
act
of
state,
but
it
does
need
the
willingness
of
commissions
and
agencies
to
be
open
to
new
ideas,
a
bold
idea
in
a
field
of
public
policy
that
has
become
stale
with
routine.
Stauffer
67
If
this
essay
succeeds
in
nothing
else,
let
it
be
a
call
for
further
study
and
analysis
of
public
governance,
particularly
in
the
area
of
state
transportation
agencies.
Because
the
task
before
state
transportation
departments
in
the
future
will
include
massive
capital
projects
–
as
aging
infrastructure
systems
are
replaced
–
the
need
to
understand
how
they
function
becomes
even
more
critical.
We
have
neglected
this
widely
used
organ
of
state
government
for
too
long,
it
is
time
to
re‐
evaluate
what
we
are
doing,
how
we
are
doing
it,
and
ask
ourselves
what
we
ought
to
be
doing.
And
that
process
begins
with
the
commissions
themselves.
Stauffer
68
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73
7.1
Appendix
I:
Roles
and
Responsibilities
of
Transportation
Commissions
Roles and Responsibilities of Transportation Commissions
From Today’s DOT and the Quest for
More Accountable Organizational Structures
Kentucky Transportation Center
College of Engineering
University of Kentucky
December 2005
Policy making
Policy making encompasses determining statewide transportation policy, in addition to
departmental policies such as rules and regulations pertaining to the administration and
operations of the Department of Transportation.
Short-term planning
Short-term planning is defined as transportation planning activities with durations less
than 10 years.
Long-range planning
Long-range planning is defined as planning activities with time horizons beyond 10
years. This includes comprehensive and balanced statewide transportation planning
and long-term multimodal planning.
Project selection
Project selection encompasses all activities related to the selection, ranking and
prioritization of projects and the matching of these projects to the budget and other
funding sources.
Financial management and oversight
Financial management and oversight involves all fiscal activities related to the
financing and managing of transportation systems. It includes budget development,
resource allocation, bond issuance and financial audits.
Selection of the Department of Transportation director
Statute states that commission either nominates candidates or selects the candidates for
director of the Department of Transportation.
Stauffer
74
7.2
Appendix
II:
Oregon
Transportation
Commission
Agenda
Analysis
DATE:
January 22, 2008
TO:
Oregon Transportation Commission
FROM:
Gail L. Achterman, Chair
SUBJECT:
Time Allocation at Commission Meetings
Requested Action: Informational
Background: Commission Chair Gail Achterman asked John Miaso and Scott
Stauffer, graduate students at Oregon State University, in the Master of Public Policy
program, to analyze the Commission’s agendas for the last two years, including all
monthly agendas from December 12, 2005, to November 15, 2007. John Miaso and
Scott Stauffer were asked to analyze the agendas and report on the amount of time the
Commission spent on each division of the Oregon Department of Transportation
(ODOT), the amount of time the Commission spent on seven board responsibility
categories, and to provide a total number of consent agenda items.
The results of the agenda analysis found the following:
53% of Formal Meeting minutes were spent on approval and informational
items regarding the Highway Division. After the Highway Division, administrative
tasks received 21% of the Commission’s attention. All other ODOT divisions
received between 3 and 6 %.
64% of Formal Meeting minutes were spent on informational items. Broken
down by division, all but the Motor Carrier Transport (MCT) division presented the
Commission with primarily informational items. The majority of MCT items required
board approval.
Of the 229 Consent Agenda items approved by the Commission, 110 were
administrative and 69 were in regards to the Statewide Transportation Improvement
Program (STIP).
Of the seven board responsibility categories, the Commission spent nearly
equal amounts of time on Public Engagement (23%), Oversight (23%), and Policy
(22%). Other categories included Financial Management (17%), Strategic Investment
(14%), Risk Management (1%), and CEO Evaluation (0%).
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Time Spent by Board Responsibility
Categories
Public
Engagement
22%
Polic
y23
%
Fin. Mgmt.
17%
Risk
Mgmt.
1%
Oversigh
t 23%
Strategi
c
Investment
14%
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INSERT:
“OTC
2005‐07
Agendas”
Excel
Spreadsheet
Page
1
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INSERT:
“OTC
2005‐07
Agendas”
Excel
Spreadsheet
Page
2
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INSERT:
“OTC
2005‐07
Agendas”
Excel
Spreadsheet
Page
3
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7.3
Appendix
III:
Oregon
Transportation
Roles
and
Responsibilities
(Statutes)
Roles and Responsibilities of the
Oregon Transportation Commission – 2008
1. Policy Development – Policy making and adoption of administrative rules related
to highways, motor carriers, motor vehicles, public transit, rail, and other
transportation programs, encompassing statewide transportation policy and department
operations.
Examples:
• Project Selection Criteria
• Driver License Issuance Policies
• Tolling Policies
Authority: ORS 184.618(1); also ORS 184.616(1), 184.618(2), 184.619, 366.205,
366.215 and 366.220.
2. Strategic Planning – Specific initiatives or work items targeted at long-term
transportation improvements or advancements.
Examples:
• Oregon Transportation Plan
• Governor’s Initiatives
• Inter-Modal Integration
Authority: ORS 184.618(2); also ORS 184.612(1), 184.618(1), 284.575, 802.010 and
802.310.
3. Oversight of Operations – Monitor Performance Measures established by the
agency and the Legislature.
Examples:
• Performance Measures (i.e. Project Delivery Performance)
• Targeted Questions such as the Benchmarking Study Recently done by DMV
• Asset Management
Authority: ORS 184.617(1) and (3); also ORS 184.634, 366.205, 366.215 and
366.220.
4. Strategic Projects/Programs – Direct involvement and briefing on major projects
or issues.
Examples:
• Columbia River Crossing
• Pioneer Mountain
• OTIA III Bridge
• Major Computer/Program Updates
Authority: ORS 184.633; also ORS 366.155, 366.205, 366.215 and 366.220.
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5. Financial Management – Financial management and oversight of fiscal
activities related to the financing and managing of transportation systems,
including budget development, resource allocation, bond issuance and financial
audits.
Examples:
• Approval of Biennial Budget
• Quarterly Monitoring of Overall Budget
• Monitor of specific key programs such as OTIA III Bridge
• Transportation Funding Options (tolling, mileage fees)
Authority: ORS 184.656 through 184.666, Transportation Spending
Accountability Act; also, ORS 184.617(4), 184.618(3), 184.636, 184.637, 184.638,
184.651, 366.506, 366.517, 366.518, Chapter 377 and 802.110.
6. Risk Management – Managing uncertainty through risk assessment, developing
strategies to manage risk and mitigate identified risks.
Examples:
• Interchange Area Management Plans
• Errors and Omissions Policies
• Targeted Internal Audits
Authority: ORS 184.617(1) and (3); also, 184.633(4), 184.639, 184.649,
366.155(2), 366.205, 802.310(2), 810.010 and 810.030.
7. External Relationships – Using existing contacts and relationships to be
independent eyes and ears and independent advocates for Oregon transportation.
Examples:
• Meeting with local elected officials and legislators
• Speaking to and meeting with local community leaders and organizations
• Meeting with concerned citizens, as needed
Authority: ORS 184.612(1) and 184.635(1).
8. Sounding Board for the Director – Provide the Director support as he leads
the organization.
Example:
• Ad-hoc conversations with the Director as needed on issues of concern
and importance to the day-to-day activities of the agency.
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7.4
Appendix
IV:
State
Transportation
Commission
Survey
Summary
of
Results
Amanda
Pietz
(2009)
Oregon
Department
of
Transportation
Research
Unit
State Transportation Commission Survey – Summary of Results
Response rate
A total of 34 state transportation commissions, boards, or authorities were
identified. An email was sent to the primary contact for each organization
requesting them to complete the survey. A total of 26 organizations replied,
representing a response rate of 76%.
RESULTS
Please indicate your organization or affiliation.
Most respondents were either Governance board support staff (50%) or State
Transportation Agency staff (42.3%).
Frequency
Executive Secretary - State Highway
Commission
Governance board (commission) member
Governance board (commission) support staff
State Transportation Agency staff
Total
Percent
1
3.8
1
13
11
26
3.8
50.0
42.3
100.0
For a typical meeting, who prepares the board’s agenda?
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On average, how long are the board’s regular meetings?
Responses ranged from 1 to 16 hours, with a mean of 3.68 hours. The most
common response (44%) was 2 hours.
Does the board hold meetings at different places throughout the state?
Frequency
15
2
8
25
Yes
No
Sometimes
Total
Percent
60.0
8.0
32.0
100.0
Does the board prepare an annual work plan to guide calendar development?
Frequency
13
11
24
Yes
No
Total
Percent
54.2
45.8
100.0
How often does the board meet in executive session, without agency staff or
the public (times per year)?
Responses ranged from 0 to 20 times per year, with a mean of 3.25 times. The
most common response (33%) was 0 times, followed by 1 time (25%) and 2 times
(12.5%).
Do board members conduct periodic self-assessments?
Most organizations do not conduct periodic self-assessments. Of those that do, the
assessments are conducted only once a year.
Frequency
3
21
24
Yes
No
Total
Percent
12.5
87.5
100.0
Does the Board evaluate the performance of the agency director?
Yes
No
Not applicable
Total
Frequency
9
13
2
24
Percent
37.5
54.2
8.3
100.0
Frequency
3
3
18
24
Percent
12.5
12.5
75.0
100.0
Does the board have an annual retreat?
Yes
Yes, but not annually
No
Total
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Who prepares the agenda for the retreat?
Frequency
1
4
2
7
The Board Chair
The Executive staff
The Board’s dedicated staff
Total
Percent
14.3
57.1
28.6
100.0
What percentage of time at the retreat is spent on the following activities?
Percent of time spent on presentations by agency staff
Frequency
1
1
2
1
1
6
0
10
20
30
60
Total
Percent
16.7
16.7
33.3
16.7
16.7
100.0
Percent of time spent on presentations by outside consultants
0
5
20
Total
Frequency
3
1
1
5
Percent
60.0
20.0
20.0
100.0
Frequency
4
Percent
100.0
Percent of time spent on workshops with agency staff
0
Percent of time spent on workshops with outside consultants
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Frequency
4
0
Percent
100.0
Percent of time spent on workshops with local government or other partners
Frequency
3
1
4
0
5
Total
Percent
75.0
25.0
100.0
Percent of time spent on board/agency strategic planning discussions
Frequency
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
0
30
40
50
60
80
Total
Percent
16.7
16.7
16.7
16.7
16.7
16.7
100.0
Percent of time spent on board/agency management or budget discussions
0
10
40
Total
Frequency
1
2
1
4
Percent
25.0
50.0
25.0
100.0
Frequency
1
1
1
3
Percent
33.3
33.3
33.3
100.0
Frequency
1
Percent
100.0
Percent of time spent on board only discussions
0
10
100
Total
Percent of time other
0
Does the board have dedicated staff that work exclusively with/for the board?
Frequency
15
8
23
Yes
No
Total
Percent
65.2
34.8
100.0
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If the board has dedicated staff, how many are employed full-time? (please
include staff that work for other DOT offices aside from the Board)
The full-time staff ranges from 0 to 17 people. The mean number of staff is 3.79
people.
0
1
2
3
4
5
7
17
Total
Frequency
1
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
14
Percent
7.1
28.6
21.4
7.1
7.1
7.1
14.3
7.1
100.0
Frequency
5
2
7
Percent
71.4
28.6
100.0
Please indicate the number of part-time employees
0
1
Total
On average, how many hours of preparation time per board member do
board meetings require?
The hours of prep time range from 1 to 25. The mean number of hours is 4.81.
1
2
3
8
15
25
Total
Frequency
4
8
3
4
1
1
21
Percent
19.0
38.1
14.3
19.0
4.8
4.8
100.0
Frequency
11
2
9
1
23
Percent
47.8
8.7
39.1
4.3
100.0
Does the board maintain member job descriptions?
Yes, as mandated by statute
Yes, as unofficial board guidelines
No
Don't know
Total
Do board members have and use informational, training, or member
manuals?
Frequency
15
Yes
Percent
65.2
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No
Don't know
Total
7
1
23
30.4
4.3
100.0
Do you offer orientation or training for new and veteran board members?
New members
Veteran members
Neither
Don't know
Total
Frequency
20
6
2
1
Percent
69.0
20.7
6.9
3.4
29
100.0
Comments
We [Florida] have 9 Governor appointees who serve 4-year terms. They are
confirmed by the Senate. Agendas are built by the Executive Director with
guidance from the Chairman of the Commission. (The Chairman is elected by the
Commissioners to serve a one-year term.) The Commission is required by Florida
Statute to hold a minimum of 4 meetings per year, though the FTC traditionally
meets an average of 6 times per year at various locations around the state. The
agency report (given by FDOT Secretary) is a statutory mandate for each meeting.
We work with the Agency to develop the list of topics to cover to ensure that all
issues of relevance are covered. We bring in experts from local, state and national
positions to convey information that would prove useful in policy deliberations by
Commissioners. Commission recommendations on transportation policy, FDOT
performance, production and fiscal management are made directly to the Governor
and Legislature. The Commission also has oversight of 15 transportation, transit,
tolling and expressway authorities in Florida.
Every two years, the Pennsylvania State Transportation Commission conducts
approximately 5 public hearings throughout the state to gain public participation in
the development of the Commonwealth's Transportation Program.
We [Mississippi] have 3 elected Transportation Commissioners representing each
of the 3 Supreme Court districts. The Commission appoints the Executive Director
of MDOT and the Secretary to the Commission. They also each have an
administrative assistant and an assistant to the Commissioner who work in each of
their respective offices. They meet on the 2nd and 4th Tuesday of each month.
The Executive Staff give their items to the Secretary to the Commission, who in
turn creates the agenda. Special call meetings are handled by the Secretary on an
as-needed basis.
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[Question] #6 - annual work plan; I'm [Idaho] not sure if this would be considered
an "annual work plan", but every year I prepare a list of items that I expect at each
meeting. (The board meets every month.) This list is based on things such as board
policies that require staff to report on a specific topic annually. I use this list when
drafting the meeting agenda.
The Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission meets monthly. At each
regularly scheduled meeting there is both a scheduled open and closed session.
The question about closed meetings was a little confusing for me. If you were
asking if the Commission holds closed meetings with just the Commissioners
present and no one else, then that hasn't occurred for several years now. The
Director, Chief Counsel and I are always present at closed meetings. So I may not
have answered your question correctly.
My [Georgia] answer to question #13 could be a bit misleading.. we have 13 Board
members. Though, I estimate that I spend 10-12 hours per board meeting
(monthly) preparing. As for agenda creation, as Board secretary, I compile and
finalize Board meeting agendas with staff, then run it past our Board Chair. Each
Board chair is different though.. some want more input than others. I also make
sure the other 12 board members know what is on the agenda well in advance. By
law, I have to send out a "Board mail out" with agendas, previous month's meeting
minutes and resolutions to be considered for the upcoming meeting to each Board
members 10 days in advance of the meeting. Regarding our Board members, they
are elected to 5-year terms by the legislators within their congressional district,
hence the reason we have 13 Board members. We are a policy Board, though the
Board has some operational-type duties (such as approving our monthly letting).
There has been a lot of discussion about the need to clarify the role of the Board
and our Commissioner, as that has always been a gray area. The Board elects our
Commissioner, Treasurer and Board secretary and has approval over the
Commissioner's recommendations for Deputy Commissioner and Chief Engineer.
The Board elects its Chair and Vice Chair annually, and the Chair may serve a
maximum of 2 consecutive years. The Board must have a Secretary (me), and I
have an assistant. That is generally how we're set up, but if you have any other
questions, please contact me. I'm very interested in the outcome of your project.
[Montana] Transportation Commission members are appointed by the Governor
and serve 4 year terms. There are many department staff that assist with the
Commission but on one designated Commission staff person.
The California Transportation Commission consists of eleven voting members and
two non-voting ex-officio members. Of the eleven voting members, nine are
appointed by the Governor, one is appointed by the Senate Rules Committee, and
one is appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly. The two ex-officio non-voting
members are appointed from the State Senate and Assembly, usually the respective
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chairs of the transportation policy committee in each house. The members are not
full time employees of the Commission. They are paid per diem per meeting only.
The Commission is responsible for the programming and allocating of funds for
the construction of highway, passenger rail and transit improvements throughout
California. The Commission, also advises and assists the Secretary of Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency and the Legislature in formulating and
evaluating state policies and plans for California’s transportation programs. The
Commission is also an active participant in the initiation and development of State
and Federal legislation that seeks to secure financial stability for the State’s
transportation needs. Commission staff works with the California Department of
Transportation staff to develop the agenda. The Commission is an independent
agency and is not part of the California Department of Transportation.
The Nebraska State Highway Commission acts as a liaison between the public and
personnel of the Nebraska Department of Roads; however, the Commission is
advisory in the establishment of broad policies; conducts hearings and studies
related to the State's highway system. The Commission is comprised of eight
members which serve a six-year term and are appointed by the Governor. The
Commission meets monthly and with the exception of one outstate meeting, all
meeting are held in the Capital City, Lincoln, Nebraska.
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