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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT
Printed
for
the Cabinet.
November
SECRET.
1932.
Copy N o .
55
C P . 404 (32).
CABINET.
THE
LYTTON
REPORT.
JAPAN
AND
THE
LEAGUE
OF
NATIONS.
1. T H E
Lytton Commission, appointed by a Resolution, dated the
10th December, 1931, of the Council of the League, has presented a unanimous
Report, which comes before the Council (under the Presidency of M r . de V a l e r a )
on the 21st November. T h e Report is unanimous, being signed by the American,
French, German and Italian members, as well as by the Chairman.
I t is divided
into ten chapters, the first eight of which deal with matters of history and fact,
while Chapter I X is entitled
Principles and Conditions of S e t t l e m e n t " and
Chapter X *' Considerations and Suggestions to the C o u n c i l . " Japan applied for,
and was given, time to prepare observations on the contents of the R e p o r t and
these observations are being circulated before the Council meets. I t may be
assumed that they w i l l strongly challenge the conclusions of the Commission.
On the other hand, as the representatives of five nations, after hearing both
sides and visiting the ground, are in agreement on the Report, i t is difficult to
suppose that the Council w i l l reject its findings. A s regards the recommenda­
tions of the Report, these ,take the form of suggestions to^China and J a p a n —
e.g., the granting by the Government" of "China of autonomy "to "Manchuria, the
negotiation of a Sino-Japanese Treaty providing for Japan's special interests,
&c.—rather
than of explicit advice to the Council of the L e a g u e as to what it
should decide to do. But the deliberations of the Council, in view of the attitude
taken up by Japan, are not unlikely to result in a serious situation, and I feel
that I should place before the Cabinet some information about it and indicate
the course o f action which may have to be taken.
2. I w i l l not trouble the Cabinet with questions of procedure : the compli­
cation arises because there are three bodies ( i ) the Council, ( i i ) the Committee
of Nineteen, appointed by the Assembly, and ( i i i ) the Assembly itself, all of
whom w i l l have something to say. The R e p o r t is made to the first named, and
it would be possible for the Council to pass the matter over to the Committfv-i
of Nineteen forthwith.
But before this happens the Japanese representative,
Mr. Matsuoka. who has been sent specially from Tokio, will present the Japanese
case to the Council and, no doubt, the Chinese representative w i l l reply.
After
that everything is uncertain.
Sooner or later the Committee of Nineteen,
presided over by M . Hjanans, w i l l take the matter in hand and w i l l presumably
frame a Resolution which w i l l be recommended to the Assembly for its
acceptance.
The presence of a majority of small States and the very successful
propaganda conducted by the Chinese representative constitute conditions under
which things are likely to go unfavourably to Japan in the Assembly.
3. . T h e first question is whether the Council should approve the Report, o r
at any rate the first eight chapters which contain conclusions of fact.
These
chapters g i v e an admirable account of the quite unique character of the
Manchurian controversy, and lay stress on the shortcomings of China, and of the
absence of any settled government as a contributory cause of the Manchurian
trouble. T h e y also recognise fully the special interests of Japan in Manchuria,
e.(j., in connection with the South Manchurian R a i l w a y which Japan acquired
from Russia.
But the authors of the Report are unanimously of opinion that
6612
[7884]
the explanation put forward by Japan for starting military operations, viz:, the. ­
alleged blowing; up i by. the -Chinese: of, tflie. railway /line, is not at su ilicient ij ustifiba-'.
tion for its military activities in Manchuria during the past yeai", and, * indeed,
the Report throws grave doubt on the Japanese version of the incident. Also,
the Report reaches the conclusion that the creation of Manchukuo was not due to
the spontaneous action of Manchurian inhabitants, but was due to the organised
intervention of Japan. A s T have said, I do not see how the Council of the League
can be expected to do other than accept the unanimous R e p o r t of its own
Commission who have investigated matters on the spot, and I should expect this
to be the first decision reached at Geneva.
4. But this decision, however natural in itself, brings in its train some very
serious consequences. I f the Commission^ findings of fact are accepted. Japan
appears to be responsible for a disregard of the NineJ?ower Treaty, by the terms
of which she, along with the other signatories, was bound to respect the integrity
of China. This, of course, is M r . Stimson's view. I f the truth is that Japan has
deliberately promoted the creation of the new Manchurian State, and has followed
this up by recognising it. it is natural to contend that she has broken the Treaty.
There w i l l be those on the Council who w i l l also contend that, on these findings,
Japan has disregarded the Covenant, alleging that she has resorted to w a r without
taking the preliminary steps to resolve her controversy with the Chinese
authorities which the Covenant provides. T h e authors of the R e p o r t appear to
desire to ward off this latter conclusion by an important paragraph in Chapter I X ,
Avhich runs as follows : —
, " It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues
involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are.
on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of
all the facts, as well as of this historical background, should entitle anyone to express
a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war
on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation
provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the
violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country,
because in Manchuria thei e are many features without an exact parallel in other parts
of the w o r l d . " *
-
5. None the less, the League organs which are considering the matter w i l l
find it very difficult not to pronounce what amounts to a condemnation of Japan.
Y e t this may produce some very embarrassing, and even dangerous, results, for
M r . Matsuoka, the Japanese delegate, has recently told me that if the League
arrives at conclusions which conflict with Japan's sense of dignity, Japan will
leave the League. A p a r t from the deterioration of relations with Japan which
this might imply, Japan 's withdrawal would be especially regrettable, because
the opportunities of contact w i t h and influence over her would be seriously
lessened. I do not for a moment imagine that Japan wants to leave the League,
and there may be a considerable element of bluff in the w a r n i n g I have received,
but it makes it very necessary to act w i t h extreme caution.
6. Another issue which is likely to be raised is that of a League declaration
refusing to recognise the acceptance of the State of Manchukuo. Last March the
League, endeavouring to put itself in line with M r . Stimson, adopted a
Resolution : —
" That it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognise
any situation. Treaty or Agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to
-the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of P a r i s . "
That, however, was an abstract declaration, whereas the attempt w i l l now be
made from some quarters to apply it specifically to the findings of the Lytton
R e p o r t . Recognition is not a right which any new State may c l a i m ; it is a
privilege which existing States may confer on the newcomer.
But it is also a
convenience to both sides, and I should hesitate very much, whatever may be the
rights and wrongs of the origin of Manchukuo, to pledge the British Government
to all eternity never to recognise the new State if it becomes definitely established,
notwithstanding its illegitimate origin. A t any rate, indefinite non-recognition
*
Lytton Report, p. 121!.
;
i s a..practical,-policyonly if all other;States.do the same, and there are States
outside .fche [League!interested i n tradevwithMaiiebukuo who would not be hound
t :-i i*! - ;i-;;---', 17
- F ; ; / H n ; n i - i u i t i i -.M - i i . M i ;
by a League; R e s o l u t i o n .
1
1
7. Lastly, there is the question whether there is anything which the League'­
can properly do or suggest to promote a reconciliation between China and Japan
or to establish a compromise in regard to Manchuria. I t has been suggested that
though the League can do nothing directly, it might invite the Powers w i t h
special interests in the Pacific (including the United States, Soviet Russia and
Germany) to organise a Conference to consider the future of Manchuria. T h i s
is much the kind of proceeding which is contemplated in the N i n e - P o w e r T r e a t y
in case of trouble arising affecting China and involving the Pacific Powers.
W h i l e there may be no objection to this course in principle, I am disposed to
think that Japan will decline to have anything to do with it on the ground.that
she has done nothing wrong and that there is nothing to investigate, and, I
suspect that the U n i t e d States would much prefer to disclaim responsibility by
leaving the League of Nations to grasp the nettle itself and then bewailing, the
ineffectiveness of Geneva if a League of Nations solution is not forthcoming. ...
8. In these difficult circumstances it seems to me that British policy must
keep in mind the following desiderata; though it w i l l be difficult to pursue them
all at the same time. W e ought to act as a loyal member of the League and avoid,
as far as possible, bringing down on ourselves the condemnation which would,
attach to isolated or prominent individual action. I t is impossible to abandon
loyalty to the League and its principles merely because Japan would prefer this :
we must explain to Japan that the course w e take is fro League and riot
anti Japan. Even i f other considerations did not compel this course, w e have t o
remember the serious consequences to our trade of antagonising China. I n fact,
w e must strive to be f a i r to both sides. But w e must not involve ourselves in
trouble w i t h Japan.
(Initialled)
J . S.
Genera,
November
19, 1932.