T h e circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
"
T O P SECRET
­ q
C o p y No.
k.*r
C ( 6 7 ) 119
4th J u l y ,
1967
CABINET
FAR EAST D E F E N C E : CONSULTATIONS WITH THE
"GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA,, NEW Z E A L A N D ,
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
M e m o r a n d u m b y t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r
Commonwealth Affairs
D i s c u s s i o n s w e r e h e l d d u r i n g J u n e w i t h t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of
A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and Singapore.
Consultations with the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r of M a l a y s i a w i l l s t a r t on 5 t h J u l y .
2.
A s a p p r o v e d by the Cabinet (CC(67) 34th C o n c l u s i o n s ) the J u n e
c o n s u l t a t i o n s w e r e h e l d on t h e b a s i s t h a t we should m a k e c l e a r t o our
A l l i e s t h a t we p l a n n e d t o r u n d o w n o u r f o r c e s in t h e a r e a b y a b o u t one
h a l f b y 1 9 7 0 / 7 1 a n d t o g i v e u p o u r b a s e s o n t h e m a i n l a n d of S o u t h E a s t
A s i a by the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s and t h a t we a l s o p l a n n e d t o r e t a i n a m i l i t a r y
c a p a b i l i t y f o r u s e , if r e q u i r e d , i n t h e F a r E a s t a f t e r 1 9 7 5 .
I attach the
r e c o r d s of t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s m e e t i n g s , w h i c h s u m m a r i s e d a n d
brought to a conclusion the d i s c u s s i o n s held with e a c h G o v e r n m e n t .
V i e w s of C o m m o n w e a l t h
Governments
3,
W h i l e s h o w i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r n e e d t o m a k e r e d u c t i o n s
over the next few y e a r s , our Commonwealth allies a r g u e d against our
t a k i n g a n y d e c i s i o n n o w t o l e a v e t h e m a i n l a n d of A s i a b y 1 9 7 5 o r t o o u r
adopting this a s our sole planning assumption.
If n e v e r t h e l e s s w e
took any such decision now they w e r e emphatically opposed to our
c o m m i t t i n g o u r s e l v e s to a d a t e in any public a n n o u n c e m e n t .
The points
they made were ­
(i)
It i s t o o e a r l y t o t a k e d e c i s i o n s n o w o n o u r d e f e n c e
p o s t u r e in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , e s p e c i a l l y while the
Vietnam war continues.
We should r e t a i n
flexibility in our planning, k e e p i n g t h e options
open until the situation is c l e a r e r in, say, t h r e e
years time.
r
-1
( i i )
T o d e c i d e on o u r w i t h d r a w a l w h i l e t h e c o u n t r i e s
concerned still wish us to stay would be c o n t r a r y
to the 1966 D e f e n c e White P a p e r and o t h e r r e c e n t
M i n i s t e r i a l public s t a t e m e n t s , and would be n e e d l e s s l y
p u t t i n g a t r i s k a l l B r i t a i n h a d b u i l t u p in M a l a y s i a a n d
S i n g a p o r e , e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g t h e l a s t t w e n t y y e a r s of
resistance to Communism,,
( i i i )
A d e c i s i o n on t o t a l w i t h d r a w a l by 1 9 7 5 , e s p e c i a l l y
if a n n o u n c e d , w o u l d g i v e i m m e n s e e n c o u r a g e m e n t
to t h e C o m m u n i s t s in H a n o i and I n d o n e s i a a s w e l l
a s in M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e .
We should lay the
a r e a open to hostile influences, and p r e s s u r e s
would d e v e l o p for an even e a r l i e r w i t h d r a w a l .
( i v )
T h e a n n o u n c e m e n t of a d e c i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w b y a
f i r m date would lead to a collapse in confidence,
t h e l o s s of s u b s t a n t i a l B r i t i s h i n v e s t m e n t s a n d t h e
d i v e r s i o n of s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s ] i n p a r t i c u l a r
Lee Kuan Yew s t r e s s e d that in Singapore his
r e g i m e and all he stands for would be at r i s k ; we
m i g h t w e l l t h e r e f o r e find it i m p o s s i b l e t o w i t h d r a w
i n an o r d e r l y f a s h i o n .
Conclusions
4.
D u r i n g the June c o n s u l t a t i o n s we w e r e s u c c e s s f u l in b r i n g i n g
our C o m m o n w e a l t h allies a long way t o w a r d s a c q u i e s c e n c e in our
plans.
Our d i s c l o s u r e that we w e r e p r e p a r e d to m a i n t a i n a
c o n t i n u i n g m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y f o r u s e i n t h e F a r E a s t w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y
helpful.
But they r e m a i n e d entirely opposed to a public announcement
of a n y e a r l y d a t e f o r w i t h d r a w a l w h i c h t h e y w e r e c o n v i n c e d w o u l d
b r i n g t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s s e t out u n d e r (iii) a n d (iv) a b o v e ,
I a m bound
t h e r e f o r e to r e p o r t to m y colleagues that m y a s s e s s m e n t is that the
c o - o p e r a t i o n of o u r C o m m o n w e a l t h a l l i e s i s e s s e n t i a l if w e a r e t o
achieve the d e s i r e d savings through an o r d e r l y withdrawal; and that
v/e s h a l l n o t b e a b l e t o s e c u r e t h e i r c o - o p e r a t i o n u n l e s s
(a)
we avoid announcing 1 9 7 5 / 7 6 , let alone any e a r l i e r d a t e ,
a s a f i r m d a t e , even a s a planning a s s u m p t i o n , for our
withdrawal from our mainland b a s e s ;
( b )
we announce our intention t o m a i n t a i n a continuing
m i l i t a r y capability for u s e in the F a r E a s t after our
withdrawal from our mainland b a s e s .
W i t h d r a w a l b y 1970/ 71
5.
I h a v e j u s t s e e n t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t s p a p e r (C(67) 116) i n
which he suggests that consideration be given to complete withdrawal
b y 1 9 7 0 / 7 1 . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e x a g g e r a t e t h e e f f e c t of s u c h a t i m e t a b l e
on our r e l a t i o n s with our C o m m o n w e a l t h a l l i e s , since we a s s u r e d t h e m
that the consultations we w e r e having with t h e m would be meaningful
a n d t h a t we would t a k e t h e i r v i e w s into a c c o u n t in c o m i n g to final
decisions.
If, a f t e r c o n s u l t i n g t h e m o n t h e b a s i s of w i t h d r a w a l b y
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 , and h e a r i n g t h e i r a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t t h i s , we w e r e t o d e c i d e
to w i t h d r a w by 1 9 7 0 / 7 1 , they would with r e a s o n feel t h a t they had b e e n
t a k i n g p a r t in a m e a n i n g l e s s c h a r a d e .
6.
The Commonwealth countries concerned would certainly
a c c u s e u s of b a d f a i t h a n d t h e r e w o u l d b e b i t t e r r e c r i m i n a t i o n i n a l l
four c o u n t r i e s .
S i n g a p o r e , in p a r t i c u l a r , would find it i m p o s s i b l e
to cope with such a timetable which would b r i n g e c o n o m i c d i s a s t e r
and h e r future a l i g n m e n t would a l m o s t inevitably be affected.
The
w h o l e p o l i t i c a l p a t t e r n of S o u t h E a s t A s i a w o u l d b e t h r o w n i n t o
uncertainty.
H. W. B .
C o m m o n w e a l t h O f f i c e , S. W . 1.
4th J u l y ,
1967
-3.
I RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
' THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OP NEW ZEALAND AT 1 0 , DOWNING
STREET AT 6 . 3 0 p . m . ON MONDAY, JUNE 12
Present
Prime M i n i s t e r
Mr. A.M. P a l l l s e r
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Marshall
Moriarty
Miller
A f t e r d e a l i n g w i t h B r i t a i n and t h e E . E . C .
(recorded
s e p a r a t e l y ) the d i s c u s s i o n turned t o B r i t i s h Far East
Defence P o l i c y .
f
Mr. M a r s h a l l e x p r e s s e d Mr. H o l y o a k e s
i
g r a t i t u d e f o r t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s
t h i s w i t h him.
i n v i t a t i o n to
discuss
But Mr. H o l y o a k e h a d h i s B u d g e t D e h a t e
and h a d a s k e d Mr. M a r s h a l l t o r a i s e t h i s matter" on
"behalf of t h e New Z e a l a n d G o v e r n m e n t .
Th
Q
P r i m e M i n i s t e r e x p l a i n e d t h e economic "burden
of o u r o v e r s e a s c o m m i t m e n t s , t h e n e e d t o r e d u c e
imports
i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n a "balance of p a y m e n t s s u r p l u s ;
the d i f f i c u l t
and
s o c i a l and economic p r o b l e m s c a u s e d "by
d e f l a t i o n a r y measures which i n themselves appeared
achieve disproportionate
to
import s a v i n g s having r e g a r d
to
t h e s i z e o f o u r o v e r s e a s e x p e n d i t u r e , w h i c h was s t i l l a t
excessively high r a t e .
this.
M r jfajpslialjl
v
an
s a i d he u n d e r s t o o d
The New Z e a l a n d Government d i d n o t o b j e c t t o our
n e e d t o r e d u c e t h e s i z e of our f o r c e s .
But t h e y w e r e
g r a v e l y c o n c e r n e d a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t o t a l
withdrawal.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t h e h a d d i s c u s s e d
this
w i t h P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n a n d would be d o i n g so w i t h
Mr. H o l t .
Our i n t e n t i o n was t o r e t a i n a m i l i t a r y
c a p a b i l i t y i n t h e a r e a w h e r e a s A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d
and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i s h e d u s t o k e e p a f o o t h o l d on t h e
/mainland.
mainland.
expensive.
But such f o o t h o l d s were
Mr. M a r s h a l l a g r e e d .
one s e n s e New Z e a l a n d ' s f r o n t
there unless B r i t a i n did;
disproportionately
But S i n g a p o r e was i n
line.
and i t
They c o u l d n o t
s h o u l d s u r e l y "be p o s s i b l e
to reduce s u b s t a n t i a l l y but not completely.
In
t h e y hoped t h a t a s m a l l Commonwealth f o r c e
retained in Singapore.
particular
could be
As l o n g a s B r i t a i n was t h e r e ,
she could r a p i d l y r e - i n f o r c c i n a c r i s i s ;
b u t when s h e
had g o n e , e v e n w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o
i t m i g h t p r o v e i m p o s s i b l e t o do so w i t h o u t an
foothold.
stay
re-inforce,
existing
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t even a s m a l l
foothold e n t a i l e d a t o t a l l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e
on i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e ,
expenditure
s t o r e s and t r o o p s t o p r o t e c t
s t o r e s and i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e .
the
We h a d b e e n e x a m i n i n g a
number of a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s ,
including the
maintenance
of what m i g h t become a c i v i l i a n d o c k y a r d i n S i n g a p o r e and
certain "fall-back"
s a i d he c o u l d n o t ,
facilities
of c o u r s e ,
in Australia.
speak for t h e
Mr.
Marshall
Australian
G-overnment b u t b e l i e v e d t h e y would a c c e p t t h i s i f
Britain
maintained a small front l i n e c a p a b i l i t y in Malaysia.
He
u r g e d r e - c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t of a s m a l l Commonwealth
f o r c e on t h e m a i n l a n d .
N e i t h e r A u s t r a l i a n o r New Z e a l a n d
h a d a l a r g e enough c a p a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n s u c h a f o r c e
t h e i r own;
b u t t h e y c o u l d do i t
in co-operation
on
with
Britain.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r said, t h a t a n o t h e r p r o b l e m was
c e r t a i n of o u r A s i a n f r i e n d s were slow t o h e l p
that
themselves
i f t h e y knew t h a t t h e y would b e p r o t e c t e d b y B r i t i s h
troops.
S i n g a p o r e and M a l a y s i a a l s o had s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s .
Our
p u r p o s e s h o u l d b e t o p e r s u a d e them t o c o - o p e r a t e more
effectively
w i t h o u t d e p e n d i n g m i l i t a r i l y on u s .
a g r e e d t h a t t h i s was n e c e s s a r y ;
small continuing p r e s e n c e .
Mr.
Marshall
b u t renewed h i s p l e a f o r a
The P r i m e M i j ^ s t e r s a i d t h a t we
/should
s h o u l d n o t e n c o u r a g e S i n g a p o r e and M a l a y s i a t o e x p e c t s u c h a
presence t o continue i n d e f i n i t e l y .
Moreover,
t h e r e was
c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l u n c e r t a i n t y and i t was d i f f i c u l t
predict the s i t u a t i o n in Singapore in eight years
to
time.
Mr., M a r s h a l l s a i d h e t h o u g h t Mr. L e e ' s p o s i t i o n would h e
s t r o n g e r i f we s t a y e d t h a n i f we
left.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t no f i n a l
decisions
b e e n t a k e n h y H.M.G. s i n c e t h e y h a d w i s h e d f i r s t
t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h New Z e a l a n d and t h e i r o t h e r
to
had
discuss
allies.
Mr. M a r s h a l l s a i d t h a t t h e Commonwealth S t r a t e g i c R e s e r v e
and t h e Commonwealth B r i g a d e h a d g r e a t v a l u e f o r
and New Z e a l a n d as t a n g i b l e e v i d e n c e of t h e
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e Commonwealth.
predict the future
Australia
continuing
I t was d i f f i c u l t
to
of t h e Commonwealth b u t he t h o u g h t
there
would a l w a y s b e a few of t h e o r i g i n a l members who would w i s h
to p r e s e r v e t h e fundamental
relationship that linked
them.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r a g r e e d .
He was s o m e t i m e s i n c l i n e d
to
f e e l t h a t t h e f u t u r e of t h e w i d e r Commonwealth w o u l d d e p e n d
on o u r s u c c e s s i n a v o i d i n g t o o f r e q u e n t m e e t i n g s o f
Commonwealth P r i m e M i n i s t e r s .
The 1966 m e e t i n g h a d been a
t r a u m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e f o r h i s c o l l e a g u e s and h i m s e l f ;
and
he h a d found i t n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e a f a r t o u g h e r l i n e t h a n h e
would e v e r n o r m a l l y w i s h i n s u c h a g a t h e r i n g .
s a i d he u n d e r s t o o d t h i s ;
Mr.
Marshall
and t h a t was n o t t h e k i n d o f
Commonwealth t h a t h e h a d i n mind.
He t h e n r e v e r t e d t o
the
q u e s t i o n of t h e Commonwealth B r i g a d e and p l e a d e d most
i n s i s t e n t l y f o r i t t o b e m a i n t a i n e d , and f o r t h e
p l a n n i n g f o r i t s e a r l y rundown t o h e u r g e n t l y
The B r i g a d e was v e r y m e a n i n g f u l
current
re-examined.
f o r A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d ;
h e h o p e d t h a t H.M.G. would r e g a r d i t
as a l i n k w i t h t h o s e two
c o u n t r i e s t h a t s h o u l d be p r e s e r v e d .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r u n d e r t o o k t o examine v e r y
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t Mr. M a r s h a l l h a d s a i d .
Mr. M a r s h a l l l e f t
a t 7.30 p.m.
carefully
EXTRACT
RECORD OP A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
THE PRIME MINISTER OP AUSTRALIA AT 1 0 DOWNING STREET AT
10.2+5 AoM ON TUESDAY, JUNE 1 3 , 1 9 6 7
0
Present;
Prime M i n i s t e r
Mr.
Par East
ArMo
The R t . Hon. H a r o l d H o l t
Palliser
S i r John Bunting
Defence
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t A u s t r a l i a ' s c o n c e r n a t t h e
proposed
B r i t i s h p o l i c y f o r t h e r n i d - 7 0 s was n o t p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r of
Australian military security.
T h i s was w e l l p r o t e c t e d "by t h e
ANZUS T r e a t y ( a n d , t o some e x t e n t e v e n t h r o u g h SEATO).
the significance
a l l the time;
of A u s t r a l i a n - U . S . r e l a t i o n s was
even i n t h e f i e l d
Moreover,
increasing
of i n v e s t m e n t , t h e A m e r i c a n s
must now b e s o m e t h i n g n e a r t o t h e B r i t i s h f i g u r e of
about
£1,000 millionso
growth
M o r e o v e r , t h e r e was a r e m a r k a b l e
o f A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t and i n v e s t m e n t i n A s i a g e n e r a l l y ;
and
t h i s was e q u a l l y t r u e o f A u s t r a l i a , whose e x p o r t s E a s t of Suez
now r e p r e s e n t e d 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r t o t a l e x p o r t s , w i t h J a p a n
as a major f a c t o r .
This y e a r , for the f i r s t
time,
Japan
had d i s p l a c e d t h e U n i t e d Kingdom a s A u s t r a l i a ' s l a r g e s t
market.
Admittedly,
t h e monejr v a l u e of A u s t r a l i a ' s
export
exports
t o B r i t a i n h a d i n c r e a s e d , e v e n t h o u g h t h e p e r c e n t a g e had
t h e y h o p e d t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n would c o n t i n u e , s u b j e c t
any c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t m i g h t f l o w from e v e n t u a l
fallens
to
British
membership of the E . E . C .
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t A u s t r a l i a ' s r e a l c o n c e r n was a t
long-term implications for the future
region.
the
s e c u r i t y p a t t e r n of
T a k i n g an a r c r o u n d t h e m a i n l a n d from J a p a n ,
the
through
Korea, Taiv/an, t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , T h a i l a n d , round to M a l a y s i a
and S i n g a p o r e , and i n c l u d i n g A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d ,
v/ere b o u n d t o n o t e t h a t t h e o n l y p a r t of t h e a r c where
they
there
was no A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y commitment ?/as i n M a l a y s i a and
/Singapore
Singapore
a
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Government h a d a l w a y s r e g a r d e d
t h i s a s a Commonwealth - and i n d e e d p r i m a r i l y a B r i t i s h
responsibility,,
­
I n t h e i r t a l k s w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t and w i t h
M e s s r s o Rusk and MeNamara he and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , he knew,
had b o t h b e e n t o l d i n t h e s t r o n g e s t t e r m s of t h e
difficulties
great
t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would f a c e w i t h C o n g r e s s and
American o p i n i o n g e n e r a l l y i f
t h e y were l e f t
i n due c o u r s e a s
o n l y n o n - A s i a n power e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e A s i a n mainland,,
was a l s o , he b e l i e v e d ,
themselves.
the
This
t h e v i e w o f many of t h e A s i a n G o v e r n m e n t s
Mr. H o l t t h o u g h t t h a t
the Defence S e c r e t a r y had
p r o b a b l y d e r i v e d a m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n from h i s t a l k s
S i n g a p o r e and M a l a y s i a , e s p e c i a l l y t h e l a t t e r .
in
The Tunku
was a calm and u r b a n e c h a r a c t e r who p e r h a p s t o o k a s l i g h t l y
complacent view.
B u t Tun Razak u n d o u b t e d l y f e l t
what Mr. H e a l e y h a d s a i d t o h i m .
strongly
The Prime M i n i s t e r
about
commented
t h a t Tun R a z a k ' s v i e w had i n d e e d b e e n made v e r y c l e a r t o
us.
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t t h e same was t r u e of t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f
Singapore.
At t h e t i m e Mr. H e a l e y h a d s p o k e n t o h i m , Mr. Lee
had b e e n a p p r e h e n s i v e l e s t p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n - i n S i n g a p o r e of
matter should lead i n t e r a l i a to a f a l l - o f f
there.
in foreign
B u t he h a d p r i v a t e l y e x p r e s s e d t o t h e
Government h i s s e r i o u s a p p r e h e n s i o n a t B r i t i s h
this
investment
Australian
plans.
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government u n d e r s t o o d
and s y m p a t h i s e d w i t h B r i t a i n ' s p r o b l e m .
As h e h a d made
clear
on a r r i v a l i n L o n d o n , h i s p u r p o s e was n o t t o " t w i s t t h e
British
arm" b u t t o f i n d ways o f m e e t i n g t h e l e g i t i m a t e c o n c e r n
felt
b y t h e A u s t r a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t , a n d , he knew, t h o s e of New Z e a l a n d
and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
They a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e r e must b e a b i g
reduction in B r i t i s h forces in the area.
But t h e y hoped
e v e n i n t h e r e d u c t i o n u p t o t h e 1969/70 p e r i o d some
that
flexibility
c o u l d b e r e t a i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e Commonwealth b r i g a d e .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t t h e same p o i n t h a d b e e n made t o
him b y Mr. M a r s h a l l
8
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t t h e p e o p l e of t h e
SECRET
area
/attached
I
a t t a c h e d much i m p o r t a n c e t o a c o n t i n u i n g B r i t i s h
presence..
The A u s t r a l i a n Government h a d t o l d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government
t h a t they b e l i e v e d t h a t B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g i n the long term
was much i n l i n e w i t h American
t h e end of t h e V i e t n a m w a r
0
ideas for
the period
after
But he h a d n o t f o u n d t h i s
view
a c c e p t e d i n W a s h i n g t o n , w h e r e i t was a r g u e d t h a t any A m e r i c a n
departure, for
e x a m p l e , from K o r e a , e v e n a f t e r
war i n V i e t n a m , w o u l d c r e a t e a c r i s i s
t h e end of
in U S./Korean
0
relations
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Government h a d s u b s t a n t i a l d e f e n c e
i n T a i w a n , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , Guam and Okinawa;
b u i l d i n g up f a c i l i t i e s
He t h e r e f o r e
facilities
i n T h a i l a n d on a s c a l e d e s i g n e d
to
situation
considered that a continuing U.S.
p r e s e n c e o r t h e m a i n l a n d c o u l d b e assumed, f o r
future
the
foreseeable
Only i f T h a i l a n d a t some p o i n t found t h e m s e l v e s
9
0
and t h e y were
p r e v e n t them f i n d i n g t h e m s e l v e s c a u g h t i n a V i e t n a m
thereo
the
the
only mainland country s t i l l with a U . S . presence might t h i s ;
s i t u a t i o n changeo
B u t t h i s was u n l i k e l y , ,
I n any c a s e ,
the
A u s t r a l i a n Government t h o u g h t i t v i t a l t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f
the
whole a r e a t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government s h o u l d h a v e
sufficient
p o l i t i c a l and p u b l i c s u p p o r t i n t e r n a l l y t o b e a b l e
m a i n t a i n t h e i r m i l i t a r y commitments and p r e s e n c e i n A s i a
to
s
The A u s t r a l i a n and New Z e a l a n d p r e s e n c e i n V i e t n a m was m a r g i n a l
but,
a s he h a d f o u n d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t was i m m e n s e l y
a p p r e c i a t e d t h e r e b e c a u s e the Americans l i k e " t o have t h e
of a f r i e n d l y v o i c e " .
Similarly,
the continuing
British
p r e s e n c e , however s m a l l , would h a v e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e
in this context.
support
value
As t o t h e Common?/ealth b r i g a d e , h e was
not versed in the. t e c h n i c a l arguments;
b u t he h o p e d
that
H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government c o u l d k e e p e n o u g h f l e x i b i l i t y
in
planning to maintain the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g the b r i g a d e ,
even i f
might be
substantial modifications
i n supply or
logistics
required.
/Mr
0
Holt
Mr. H c l t s a i d t h a t a s A u s t r a l i a
( a n d New Z e a l a n d )
grew
i n s t r e n g t h and i n p o p u l a t i o n , t h e y a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e y must
p l a y an i n c r e a s i n g p a r t ;
as r e g a r d s the s h o r t e r - t e r m
t h e y had a l w a y s a c c e p t e d t h a t B r i t a i n would w i s h
to reduce her f o r c e s a f t e r
aspects
substantially
t h e end of c o n f r o n t a t i o n !
what was
a t p r e s e n t b e i n g done c o u l d of c o u r s e b e p r e s e n t e d a s e n t i r e l s ^
in conformity with t h i s purpose.
wssmore d i f f i c u l t
But t h e l o n g e r - t e r m
and d i s t u r b i n g , ,
aspect
They n a t u r a l l y a c c e p t e d
p l a n s c o u l d and s h o u l d b e made t o meet a l l
that
eventualities.
But t o t a k e d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n s now seemed t o c o n t r a d i c t
all
the
l e s s o n s of c o n t e m p o r a r y h i s t o r y and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t o f
the
u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of e v e n t s - of w h i c h t h e M i d d l e E a s t h a d
just
furnished
t h e most r e c e n t e x a m p l e s
He a c c e p t e d t h a t
"Vietnam p r o b l e m m i g h t p r o v e r e l a t i v e l v s h o r t - t e r m .
bombing must b e h u r t i n g N o r t h V i e t n a m ;
the consequences in A u s t r a l i a i f
it
The
s u f f i c e ! to imagine
a l l t h e i r power and
p l a n t s were b e i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y e l i m i n a t e d .
mentality5
the
industrial
The communist
a s t h e y knew, a c c e p t e d a b r u p t c h a n g e s i n p o l i c y i f
r e g i m e r e c o g n i s e d t h a t a g i v e n p o l i c y was u n s u c c e s s f u l .
a
He
saw t h a t H e r M a j e s t y ' s Government h a d a p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m a t
home and t h a t i t
c o u l d seem a d v a n t a g e o u s t o h a n d l e t h i s b y
announcing f i r m d e c i s i o n s as soon as p o s s i b l e .
But
who were p r e s s i n g f o r t h i s now would o n l y p r e s s f o r
e l s e two months l a t e r i f
those
something
they r e c e i v e d s a t i s f a c t i o n ^
M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t t h e r e was some f o r c e
in t h i s ;
Tlie^Prijne
many o i
those
i n B r i t a i n who v/ere most " d o v e - l i k e " I n r e l a t i o n t o V i e t n a m
were " h a w k - l i k e " a b o u t t h e M i d d l e E a s t :
and t h e u s e of
napalm i n V i e t n a m was a p p a r e n t l y j u d g e d more
than i t s use in S y r i a .
reprehensible
But Mr. H o l t was m i s t a k e n i n
t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t s p o l i c y r e s u l t e d from p o l i t i c a l
I t was more s o u n d l y b a s e d t h a n
thinking
pressures,,
that.
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , an e a r l y announcement
of t h e p o l i c y would s e t o f f a c h a i n of c o n s e q u e n c e s .
Their
hope was t h a t ,
a l t h o u g h t h e y t h e m s e l v e s might h a v e a
c l e a r i d e a of t h e outcome o f B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g ,
presented p u b l i c l y in vaguer terms.
be r e l a t e d t o the need f o r
Could i t n o t , f o r
substantial reductions,
d e s i r a b i l i t y of f l e x i b i l i t y
to plan for a variety
t h i s could he
example
the
i n d i s p o s i t i o n s and c o n s e q u e n t l y
of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s - i t m i g h t e v e n b e
s a i d t h a t one of t h e s e m i g h t w e l l h a v e t o b e a c o m p l e t e withdrawal,
from t h e m a i n l a n d , '
b u t t h a t no f i n a l d e c i s i o n h a d b e e n t a k e n
and t h a t t h e Government would b e k e e p i n g t h e p o s i t i o n u n d e r
c o n s t a n t review,,
A p u b l i c B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n on t h e s e
would be v e r y h e l p f u l
t o t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government;
lines
after
the
V i e t n a m war was o v e r , A u s t r a l i a and o t h e r s might b e a b l e t o do
c o n s i d e r a b l y more t h e m s e l v e s .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d h e
r e c o g n i s e d t h a t Vietnam dominated the s i t x i a t i o n a t
present.
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t any u n e q u i v o c a l B r i t i s h s t a t e m e n t now t h a t
B r i t a i n would b e o f f t h e c o n t i n e n t o f A s i a b y t h e
would h a v e a s h a t t e r i n g e f f e c t
area,
mid-1970s
on Commonwealth r e l a t i o n s i n
the
on A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r and g e n e r a l l y
throughout the Par East.
The A u s t r a l i a n Government c o u l d n o t
u n d e r s t a n d t h e n e e d t o make s u c h an announcement a t t h i s
point.
They b e l i e v e d i t would a l s o b e d a m a g i n g t o A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
r e l a t i o n s ­ i n d e e d h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g was t h a t t h e U . S .
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d t o l d H.M.G. t h e y w o u l d p r e f e r B r i t i s h
defence
c u t s t o b e made i n E u r o p e t h a n E a s t o f S u e z .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t we h a d b e e n w i l l i n g t o make
further
cuts in Europe
difficulties
0
But t h i s also r a i s e d
great
w i t h t h e U . S . , a s h a d emerged from o u r
t a l k s a b o u t t h e German o f f s e t
problem,,
They h a d
great corcern l e s t s u b s t a n t i a l B r i t i s h cuts should
tripartite
expressed
strengthen
t h e i s o l a t i o n i s t p r e s s u r e s i n t h e U S . and t h e c o n t i n u i n g demand
0
for
cuts in U.S. forces in Europe.
On t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e
the
Prime M i n i s t e r r e p e a t e d t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y was n o t r e l a t e d
p o l i t i c a l or p a r t y p r e s s u r e s .
to
So f a r a s t h e l a t t e r was c o n c e r n e d
/there
t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e d i v e r s i t y of demand and p u r p o s e on t h e
p a r t of t h o s e u r g i n g t o t a l w i t h d r a w a l .
B u t , a s he h a d
made
c l e a r a f t e r the Labour P a r t y Conference t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r ,
1
G o v e r n m e n t s i n t e n t i o n was t o g o v e r n .
There were,
s t r o n g and l e g i t i m a t e p r e s s u r e s on t h e Government
to reduce overseas expenditure.
First,
the
however,
drastically
t h e r e we^e t h e v e r y
p o w e r f u l economic a r g u m e n t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e e s s e n t i a l n e e d
t o k e e p o u r b a l a n c e of payments i n s u r p l u s .
the f i r s t
The f i g u r e s
for
q u a r t e r of 1967 b e i n g p u b l i s h e d t h a t d a y would r e v e a l
such a s u r p l u s .
B u t e x c e s s i v e l y t o u g h measurer, h a d b e e n
r e q u i r e d from t h e G o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g m e a s u r e s o f
deflation
w h i c h h a d r e s u l t e d i n a c e r t a i n d e g r e e of u n e m p l o y m e n t .
c o m p a r i s o n s were made b e t w e e n t h e amount o f d e f l a t i o n
f o r o n l y £50 m i l l i o n o f i m p o r t s a v i n g and o v e r s e a s
of a b o u t £500 m i l l i o n ,
i t was c l e a r t h a t v e r y
When
required
expenditure
convincing
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s o v e r s e a s e x p e n d i t u r e was n e e d e d .
The
economic a r g u m e n t , h o w e v e r , t h o u g h s t r o n g was n o t
necessarily
conclusive.
analogy
I n t h i s r e s p e c t t h e r e was a c e r t a i n
with our p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the
EoEoC.
where t h e
economic
arguments f o r j o i n i n g could be h e l d to be f i n e l y b a l a n c e d ,
but
the political
in
a r g u m e n t s f o r d o i n g so were d e c i s i v e .
But,
t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v e d d e r i v e d from
our
whole c o n c e p t of what o u r g e n e r a l d e f e n c e p o s t u r e s h o u l d b e
0
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d he wished t o e m p h a s i s e t h a t no
final
d e c i s i o n s had y e t been t a k e n .
The Government h a d
made I t c l e a r t h a t t h e y i n t e n d e d f i r s t
Commonwealth p a r t n e r s and t h e
U.Soj
to consult
their
and M i n i s t e r s h a d
out a f u r t h e r r e v i e w of the m a t t e r b e f o r e h i s v i s i t
carried
to
W a s h i n g t o n , and i n t h e knowledge t h a t he would t h e r e a f t e r
s e e i n g Mr. H o l t , Mr. M a r s h a l l a n d , i n due c o u r s e ,
M i n i s t e r s of S i n g a p o r e and M a l a y s i a .
be
t h e Prime
They w e r e p r e p a r e d
to
s a y t h a t B r i t a i n would r e t a i n a m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y i n t h e
areaj
t h i s m e a n t , i n p r a c t i c e , t h a t we s h o u l d r e t a i n
certain
/commitments
commitments and a c c e p t e d ( a s was a l w a y s our i n t e n t i o n )
B r i t a i n s h o u l d n o t h e i s o l a t e d or c u t o f f from t h e
that
area.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r r e c o g n i s e d t h a t t h i s would n o t
satisfy
Mr. H o l t ' s d e s i d e r a t a : of a c o n t i n u i n g B r i t i s h p r e s e n c e
S i n g a p o r e o r on t h e Commonwealth " b r i g a d e .
He would h e
t h e Defence S e c r e t a r y t o d e v e l o p our arguments a t
length in the forthcoming plenary s e s s i o n ;
would h e a b l e t o do t h i s more e f f e c t i v e l y
d e t a i l t h a n he h i m s e l f h a d d o n e .
structure.
greater
and i n
greater
B u t one of t h e main
pffective
and v e r y c o s t l y
infra­
The A u s t r a l i a n s i n V i e t n a m d i d n o t have
p r o b l e m s i n c e t h e y c o u l d d e p e n d on t h e A m e r i c a n
structure.
asking
and Mr. H e a l e y
p r o b l e m s was t h a t of how t o a r r a n g e a s m a l l b u t
d e p l o y m e n t of f o r c e s w i t h o u t a v a s t
in
this
infra­
B u t t h e p r o b l e m would p r e s e n t i t s e l f
in
serious
form i f t h e r e were any q u e s t i o n of o u r t r y i n g t o k e e p o n l y
small f o r c e s in Singapore.
Mr. H o l t a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e c o s t
of
d o i n g t h i s c o u l d n o t b e b r o k e n down and s h a r e d w i t h some o f
Had
t h e o t h e r Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g A u s t r a l i a .
any s t u d i e s b e e n made of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s h a r i n g t h e b u r d e n
i n t h i s way w i t h M a l a y s i a and o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d
countries.
The^JPrime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t a f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t y was t h a t
Asian c o u n t r i e s , if they f e l t
t h e y c o u l d r e l y on t h e
of a W e s t e r n p o w e r , were r e l u c t a n t t o make any r e a l
defend t h e m s e l v e s .
effort
J a p a n was an i n t e r e s t i n g example of
in her r e l a t i o n s h i p with the U.S.
principle.
protection
Mr^^Holt a g r e e d
to
this
in
B u t he a r g u e d t h a t p a r t of any u n d e r s t a n d i n g
r e a c h e d w i t h M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e f o r a c o n t i n u i n g
British
p r e s e n c e t h e r e c o u l d b e t h a t t h e y t h e m s e l v e s s h o u l d make a
gre at e r
effort.
The tiro P r i m e M i n i s t e r s t h e n i n v i t e d t h e i r
t o j o i n them f o r t h e p l e n a r y m e e t i n g a t 1 1 . 3 0
colleagues
a.m
0
AMY(67) 1 s t Meeting
VISIT OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON, JUNE 1967
United Kingdom Record of a Meeting held
at 10 Downing Street, S.W.I., on
TUESDAY, 13th JUNE 1967 at 1 1 . 3 0 a.m.
PRESENT: United Kingdom
Australia
The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, MP
Prime Minister
The Rt. Hon. Harold Holt, MP Prime Minister The Rt. Hon. Herbert Bowden, MP
Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Affairs Hon. Allen Fairhall, MP Minister of Defence The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, MP
Secretary of State for Defence
H.E. Sir Alexander Downer, High Commissioner for Australia The Rt. Hon. Frederick Mulley, MP
Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs
Sir John Bunting, Secretary, Prime Minister's Department Field Marshal Sir Richard Hull,
Chief of the Defence Staff
Sir Edwin Hicks, Secretary, Department of Defence Sir Saville Garner,
Commonwealth Office
Sir Laurence Mclntyre, Deputy Secretary, Department of External Affairs Sir Charles Johnston,
British High Commissioner
in Australia Mr. T.K. Critchley, Australian High Commission Sir Neil Pritchard, Commonwealth Office Mr. R.A. Sykes, Foreign Office SECRETARIAT: Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
F.A.K. Harrison A.H. Reed O.R. Blair P.H. Bailey S U B J E CT: DEFENCE POLICY IN THE FAR EAST TOP SECRET (
DEFENCE POLICY IN THE PAR EAST THE PRIME MINISTER after welcoming Mr. Holt and Mr. Fairhall formally, said that in the discussion he had just had with Mr. Holt they had mentioned defence polic3^ in the Far East and Rhodesia. The former was by far the most important topic for discussion and might form the subject of the present meeting. He suggested that when they met again en the evening of l6th June they should discuss the European Economic Community and the Middle East. He added that Britain did not intend to suggest that there should be a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting this year. MR. HOLT thanked the Prime Minister for his welcome. The problem of defence policy in the Far East, he said, was one of critical significance and great concern to the Australian Government, the more so since they had been heartened by the discussions a year ago, from which they understood that Britain intended to maintain a military presence in Malaysia and Singapore for as far ahead as could be seen, so long as the host countries welcomed it. Australian military thinking had been based on this understanding, and the discussion of other possible facilities for the deployment of British forces, affecting Australia itself, had been seen as contingency planning for use only if Malaysia or Singapore changed their attitude towards the British military presence. It had been a shock to learn that the British Government had gone in their thinking beyond that point, and were contemplating the possibility of complete withdrawal from the area, even though eight years was a very long time to look ahead. The concern felt in Australia was not primarily for their own
security or welfare. There had been a remarkable development in
Australian export trade with the area, which had risen from 10 per cent
of her total export trade in the 1950s to more than l\0 per cent now.
For example, Australian exports to Japan would this year outstrip,
for the first time, the value of Australian exports to Britain. Yet,
although there were statistics showing that the Australian proportion of
exports to Britain had fallen, their money value was higher than ever
and this trade was a very considerable factor in the economy of both
countries. Britain had about £1,000 million invested in Australia, and
perhaps double that sum in the whole area East of Suez, so that British
interests had a very substantial material stake in the area.
-1­
Recent events in Hong Kong and the Gulf of Aqaba showed that Britain could not divorce herself from the problems af the area East of Suez. As for the countries cf South East Asia which Mr. Holt had visited, their economic growth was very considerable, and it was heartening to see, for example, South Korea and Taiwan building up their economies so rapidly. The prosperity and development of Malaysia were in marked contrast with the days of the fight against the terrorists there. Thailand, where the United States was building a substantial infrastructure, was making rapid strides. He drew attention to the potentialities for British trade with this rapidly developing area: three-fifths of the world's population lived East of Suez, and (unlike Africa) they had thousands of years of civilisation behind them, and were much closer than most African countries to the economic take-off point. It vras not true that Prince Sihanouk was another Sukarno; he was far more concerned with economic development than Sukarno ever had been. There was surely a British interest in being well regarded throughout this complex of countries and having a significant presence there, not merely as a military power but also as a trading partner. It was a question of the British position in the world, and in the Csmmonwealth as a whole, for withdrawal from the area would be shattering to Britain's relations with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, and the pull already exerted on these countries by the United States vTOuld be that much greater. He was also concerned about the readiness of the United States to maintain the security pattern which had emerged in South East Asia since the war. It was not generally recognised how far the United States was committed to the security of the countries in the area. There was a wide semi-circle of states to which they had given undertakings of some kind, and the only area for which they had not accepted a substantial security commitment was Malaysia and Singapore. This the United Sta/tes had always regarded as a Commonwealth, and primarily a British, responsibility.
The United States would feel it very strongly if she were the only external country left with a military presence on the mainland.
The view had been put in Britain that the complete withdrawal of British forces from Malaysia and Singapore would be paralleled by United States plans for leaving Vietnam after the war had ended there, but in practice the situations were very different. If Britain proclaimed her forthcoming complete -2­
withdrawal the effect on Congressional and general opinion in the United States would he very damaging, and would weaken the American capacity to sustain the stability of Ssuth East Asia. They considered the British presence there very important, just as they were tremendously, perhaps disproportionately, appreciative of the small Australian and New Zealand forces in Vietnam. They were still more grateful to have Britain standing by them, with her great moral Influence and standing in the world, helping to maintain the security of the area. After this general introduction, he wishod to say with relation to Britain's specific problems in the area that no one present underestimated her economic problems, nor did they dispute her need to run down her forces in the Ear East now that confrontation was over.
But they recalled the significance of the campaigns in Malaysia against the terrorists and the Indonesians, which illustrated the importance of the British military presence there. No doubt further threats would arise, but others would be deterred by the presence of British troops. Australia had never contemplated that Britain would seek to withdraw completely in the absence of pressure from Malaysia and Singapore. But he did not suggest that Britain should wholly reverse her policy,, He wished, however, to voice the unanimous wish of the four Commonwealth countries of the area - and he thought, the United States - in putting two suggestions to the British Government. Firstly, the Commonwealth countries hoped that we should, in the short term, retain some flexibility in our thinking about the future of the Commonwealth Brigade. This was an important manifestation of Commonwealth teamwork and one of the few examples of a joint attempt to preserve Commonwealth strategic interests. On the logistic side, he hoped that there would be at least a continuing British presence sufficient to make the Brigade viable. If the British did not take part in the Commonwealth Brigade, he could not see it being maintained, at least while the Vietnam war continued. If the United States Government-accepted General Westmoreland's plans to build up his forces to 600,000 men, there would be pressure on Australia (and others)
-3­
to augment her forces there. The maintenance of the existing Australian force in Vietnam, which was based on a twelve month t*ur of duty followed by three years' absence from the theatre, was complicated by the draft system and the need to keep regular treops fighting alongside conscripts. Therefore, for the period up to 1970- or 1971 the Australian Government would like to think
that Britain would remain flexible in her thinking about the future
of the Commonwealth Brigade.
The second point was that he wished most earnestly to impress
on the British Government that no final decisions should be taken
at this time about what should be done in the mid-1970s, and
certainly that no announcement of any such decisions should be made
at present. He did not preclude any planning which might contemplate
the eventual complete withdrawal of British forces from the mainland,
and he recognised that perhaps the situation which would exist in
the mid-1970s might justify this.
But If the British Government
felt that it must take the final decision to withdraw now, while
refraining from annfiuncing it, it must be accepted that the decision
would eventually become publicly known, perhaps as part of the process
of communicating it to other interested governments. There would
then be a chain reaction affecting the United States' attitude
towards Britain and South East Asia, which would be highly unfavourable
so far as the Australian view was concerned.
There was no compelling
need for a decision to be taken now, since eight years was quite a
long time in so turbulent an area as South East Asia. Planning was
quite a different question, and no one oould object to Britain making
contingency plans. So long as no final decision were taken, everyone
would be able to adjust themselves to new situations which might
arise in the period ahead. The uncertainties of the Vietnam situation
were a compelling factor for leaving the matter open, since no one
could say how long the war would last, what the ultimate result -would
be, nor what might develop on the way. He hoped that neither China
nor Russia would become involved, but there were such questions as
the direction of any expanded activity by North Vietnam, and the
possibility of subversion or infiltration in Malaysia or Thailand
if China were checked further North. It was therefore highly desirable
that no final decision should be taken at this time.
THE SECRETARY OE STATE FOR DEFENCE said that while we recognised the importance of our economic interests in the area and the prospects that they might grow, the fact was that we were now spending more there on defence than we earned from these countries, and that it was likely that we should continue to receive these earnings even if we had no military presence there. The real reason for our presence was our interest in the peace, prosperity and stability of South East Asia, and our task was to decide what contribution we could make to these ends by military means, and how much defence money we should spend in this area rather than others. Setting out the factors behind British thinking, he said that if it
had been possible to reduce the percentage of CNP spent on defence while
maintaining the defence budget at the 196k level, at constant prices,
there would have been no need for these changes in our policy in the Far
East, but unfortunately the economic assumptions about the rate of growth
of the British economy had not been borne out in reality. One reason for
this was excessive Government expenditure overall, and the Chancellor of
the Exchequer would have to impose cuts right across the board. It would
be politically impossible to make very painful cuts on the civil side
without also reducing defence expenditure, and he had been set the target
of cutting £200 million to £300 million a year by 1970-71. He had at first
hoped to do so without altering our basic military posture in the Far East,
but he had found that it was only possible to plan for this on-the basis
of removing our forces permanently from the mainland. Even so, this could
not be done by 1970 or 1971, and he must tell his civil colleagues that
he could do so only by 1975, long after the cuts that they would have to
suffer. These savings could be made only if we ceased to keep permanent
facilities on the mainland. The reasons for this were that fixed bases
were exceedingly expensive in two ways, especially if the local government
could not guarantee their security. Firstly, the stockpile of equipment
required so large a number of men to protect it and to provide naval and air
defence in support of the protecting force that it became quite disproportion
both to the real military oapability which it supported and to the money
available for defence, A multiplier effect was at work, and there were
some 300,000 people (including dependants) associated with the British bases
in Malaysia end Singapore. We could not make the required budgetary savings
without abolishing these base facilities altogether but it would not be
dene before the mid-1970s.
The second factor was that since Britain depended
upon volunteers for her forces, they must be offered a fair proportion of
their time at home with their families. This meant that there must in
fact be a relief battalion at home for every battalion in the Far
East, even though it might not be needed
-5- ' '
.
as part of our reserves.
Although, to make savings of the order required, the bases must be got rid
of entirely by 1975, this would not mean that the British military
capability in the area would decline proportionately. With the aid of
new types of aircraft, and of assault ships and commando carriers, we
could keep a capability with smaller base facilities or none, so that
even after withdrawal we could still have a very substantial capability
In the Par East. Ministers had agreed in the last fortnight to keep
such a capability, and to discuss its nature and deployment with our allies.
This capability would have naval and air elements. The Gurkhas would
remain in the area for some years, but the other land, forces would be
brought out. If they required equipment to a level sufficient solely
for internal security duties, they could be returned quite quickly, but
it would take three months before they could engage in a major campaign
like Korea or Vietnam.
The British Government hoped to save £300 iiiion on the defence budget
Q
hy 1975, of which about £200 million would come from the reductions In the
three Services as a result of the closure of the bases in Malaysia and
Singapore. It had been suggested that the compensatory aid to these
countries would eat up the savings, but their total earnings from the
British military presence in foreign exchange were about £50 million a year,
and even if we gave them that sum for 10 years we should still be saving
£150 million a-year. In view of the economic background, there was no
alternative to this policy.
Returning to the question of the phasing of the rundown, he said that
to achieve the maximum savings by 1970-71 , which was the target date for
the cuts on the civil Departments, it would be necessary to reduce by
then to a mainly maritime and air presence in the Par East, apart from
the Gurkhas (who would not be finally demobilised until the end of 1972).
The first reason for this was that the Governments of Malaysia and
Singapore thought that sophisticated sea and air forces would be more
useful to them than ground forces, which they themselves could provide.
He had discussed this question with Tunku Abdul Rahman and with
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and both had strongly agreed with this point. The
lesson of the recent war in the Middle East was that the availability ­
expensive sophisticated forces was critical. Malaysia and Singapore
could not provide them, whereas we could.
It was interesting that
Sir Alec Douglas-Home had made a similar point in the House of Commons
in April 1966.
The other reason for concentrating on a sea/air force
was the effect of early reductions on Singapore. Everyone was very conscious
that the Indonesian threat was dormant, and that the main problem was the
political and economic stability of the countries in the area, and
especially Singapore.. Between 20 and 30 per cent of the gross national
product of Singapore was entirely dependent on the British forces, and
we must, therefore, give the maximum help to cushion the shock of our
reductions. This meant that the first reductions would have to take
place in Malaysia, a richer country and one less dependent on the
prosperity brought by our forces, and thus that the Army units stationed
there must take the brunt of these first reductions. He agreed that it
was most important to maintain the image of Commonwealth military
capacity in the area but it was not necessary to maintain the Commonwealth
Brigade in that form for the purpose. The Commonwealth Brigade was
merely a part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, which had been set .
up years ago as a contribution to SEATO and the Malaysian Defence Treaty,
under ANZAM. The Brigade had never
operated as a force and New Zealand
had decided to take a company out to send it to fight in Vietnam without
telling us. MR. HOLT interjected that Australia would not take anything
out of the Brigade if Britain wanted her to keep it there.
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY continued that British forces would bo retained
in the area beyond 1975 if it was so decided in consultation with our
allies.
By 1970-71 we should have run down to a very powerful amphibious
force, always including one commando carrier and one assault ship as well
as other craft, supported by large air forces. The commandos could not
conveniently be counted as part of the Commonwealth Brigade, but there was
no reason why there should not be a rotation so that Australian and
New Zealand troops should sometimes sail in their place;
the commandos could exercise on land with
similarly,
other Commonwealth forces.
A maritime and air force was more visible than ground forces. It could
visit Djakarta or Thailand;
it could take an Australian company or
battalion to show the flag in these places, whereas soldiers in Malaysia
could only be seen in that country.
He added that although the United
States Government liked to say that the British presence in South East Asia
was of critical importance, it was curious that Mr. Macnamara had never­
mentioned it when introducing his defence budget in Congress this year,
even in the context of confrontation. Finally, THE DEFENCE SECRETARY
continued, although it had been agreed to consider providing a capability
for action in the area after 1975j and deploying some of it there, no
decisions on detail had yet been taken. The force might be based, for
example, on Britain (though this would provide a smaller and less efficient
presence in the Far East) or, if the Australian Government agreed, on
Cockburn Sound.
If there were a smooth rundown in Singapore, if the regime
-7­
consolidated its position, and if internal security was maintained, he could see no reason why the ships should not refit and maintain in the dockyoard there, which by that time would be under civil management. He was sure that Mr. Lee was able to control the situation if anyone could. It was possible that the naval base might be handed over to civilian management, and he could say that one of Britain s best firms 1
was very impressed by its possibilities. There was also no reason why military aircraft should not be passed through Singapore. But detailed decisions were not yet necessary, so long as it was decided in principle that Britain should deploy her forces in the area. As for the need to take, or to announce, at this time the decision
to leave the mainland, there must for planning purposes be an assumption
that we should have done so by 1975, since the necessary savings could-not
otherwise be achieved. And a planning assumption, like a decision, was
likely to become known. But there was a big difference between an
announced decision and one which had not been announced, to which the
Government were not publicly committed. British Ministers had made it
clear in Defence white Papers and in debate that they were committed to
producing a situation in which the local peoples could live at peace
without the presence of external forces, but they had been very careful
not to say when this would be. This could, of course, mean leaving the
Persian Gulf as well as Singapore and Malaysia. It would be possible
to take the line that we could see clearly only up to 1970-71, and that we
should have to look at the current situation then and take our decision
for the future of the bases. No doubt there would'be rumours, but this
would be different from a known decision which obliged other Governments
to base their plans upon it. On the other hand there were two points
against this approach. One was that if we gave the impression that we
were leaving but were vague about the date, some people might think that
it could be earlier than 1975 - for example 1971 . The other was that
the Government would gain great political kudos if it announced a decision
In principle to leave the bases by 1975.
This was not merely a matter
of party opinion, but of public opinion as a whole, and some people said
that it would be necessary to fix a date in order to get the required
public support. MR. HOLT said that he doubted whether anyone would think
the date would be earlier than 1975, in view of all that had been said,
but that it was important to make people think it might be later.
-8­
THE PRIME MINISTER observed that no decision had yet been taken about the matters that had been discussed, but the discussion had shown how the minds of British Ministers were moving. There would be talks with the Tunku and with Mr. Leo, and their views would be taken into account before a decision was taken, MR. HOLT said that he had tried to explain Australian thinking, and was grateful for the clean presentation by the Defence Secretary. All the implications however were not yet clear. It would be unwise to discount the United States' attitude to a British withdrawal, since they had spoken very vehemently on the subject to the Australians. The extent of their commitments made them firm in their resolution not to fill any vacuum that Britain might leave, though only the future could show xvhether they would adhere to this attitude. It would be for British Ministers to judge whether their plans would sustain In the minds of the people of South East Asia a view of Britain consonant with her historic role. It would be sad if in concentrating on Europe Britain were to forget the world outside. Her place in the Commonwealth and in the world at large was affected by the degree to which she found it possible to provide a military presence where it was needed. MR. EAIRH/iLL said that in the face of the British economic situation
It was hard to dispute the financial arguments, but pointed out that the
British now seemed to be planning to go home before the desired regional
situation could have been established in South East Asia. The United
States had made in plain that they would not fill the vacuun that Britain
would leave and Australia could not do so since her own defence budget
had grown by a third last year and was likely to go up by another 12 to
15 per cent this year, and since she had virtually doubled over the last
five years the proportion of her gross national product which she spent
on defence. The question mark over the future of Indonesia meant that
a credible deterrent must be retained, and he would like to discuss more
closely the future of the Commonwealth Brigade and the timetable
for a
military response after the bases had been closed.
MR. HOLT said that the relaxed attitude of the Tunku'and Mr. Loe was largely an expression of their desire not to produce a feeling of lack of confidence in the future of the area which might affect outside powers. Their very strong concern, which they had expressed to the Australians, should not be underestimated.
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY replied that when he had visited them both were mainly concerned about the announcement of the long-term decision, but he had been much impressed with the fact that -9­
Mr. Lee was better pleased with a sea/air presence. Both had said that they saw no threat from Thailand or China. Malaysia was not worried about Singapore (apart from the political influence of Mr. Lee on the Chinese). Although they were worried about the Indonesians they had assured Mr. Stewart and himself after confrontation that they would, themselves handle the defence of East Malaysia. Britain had little interest in the future of Sabah and Sarawak, and while we were worried about the long-term intentions of the Indonesians, it was in the air and at sea that any expansionist tendencies would have to be checked. It was not easy to see a military threat, unless Malaysia and Singapore fought each other. It had taken Australia a long time to contribute forces to the threat of confrontation, and there might be a different view beteeen us if there were a recurrence of that threat. The essential problem was economic, affecting the stability of Malaysia and Singapore. They could provide a dangerous focus of infection if the operation were wrongly carried out. But we were well aware of the danger of a key area which was totally dependent on foreign troops for its security. Eight years was a long time, and v/e were very fortunate that Mr. Lee was Prime Minister cf Singapore. We looked forward to his visit to Britain next week. THE PRIME MINISTER, in conclusion, underlined two points. First of all, whatever the Malaysians might feel, the right division would be for Britain to provide the sophisticated sea and air forces which they could not provide, while they (the Malaysians) ought to develop their ground forces. There would also be advantages from developing the civil airport and dockyard.
Secondly, a capability of this kind was much more effective as a visible deterrent than land forces. MR. HOLT said that he would contest the Defence Secretary's account of the risks to the countries in the area, and would do this in discussion with Mr. Healey on the next day. The Meeting concluded at 12.50 p.m. Cabinet Office,
14th June 1967
-10­
EXTRACT
RECORD OP A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PR IB/IE MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OP AUSTRALIA AT 1 0 DOWNING STREET AT
6 . 3 0 P.Mo ON THURSDAY, JUNE 1 5 * 1 9 6 7
Present:
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r
Mr. A.M. P a l l i s e r
The R t . Hon. H a r o l d H o l t
S i r John Bunting
BritishAFar^Eastern^Defence
Policy
Mro-: H o l t s a i d t h a t he h a d h a d an e x c e l l e n t t a l k
p r e v i o u s day w i t h t h e Defence S e c r e t a r y .
h a p p i e r t h a n when h e came t o B r i t a i n .
he h e l p f u l for
He f e l t
the
a good d e a l
But he t h o u g h t i t
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o r a v e a f a i r l y
w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t of t h e A u s t r a l i a n p o s i t i o n .
full
He w o u l d
a c c o r d i n g l y h e s e n d i n g t h i s t o Mr. W i l s o n b e f o r e he
left,,
M e a n w h i l e , he h a d t h e d r a f t w i t h him and t h o u g h t t h e
M i n i s t e r might care t o glance a t i t .
through the d r a f t
might
Prime
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r
read
and s a i d t h a t he t h o u g h t i t would i n d e e d
b e h e l p f u l f o r h i s c o l l e a g u e s and h i m s e l f
t o have
this
e x p o s i t i o n of t h e A u s t r a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t ' s
viewpoint.
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t he h a d a l s o p r e p a r e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e
list
of s t a t e m e n t s b y B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s and i n B r i t i s h White
P a p e r s o v e r t h e p a s t two y e a r s .
He w i s h e d t o a s s u r e
the
Prime M i n i s t e r t h a t t h i s h a d n o t b e e n d o n e i n any c a r p i n g or
critical
spirit;
b u t b e c a u s e he w i s h e d u s t o r e a l i s e t h a t
these
s t a t e m e n t s h a d b e e n t a k e n v e r y s e r i o u s l y i n A u s t r a l i a and i t was
i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e no m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
the
e x t e n t t o which A u s t r a l i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a t B r i t a i n was c o m m i t t e d
to a c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n in the a r e a .
l i s t t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r .
noted the reference
previously.
o
M
o
G
his
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t he
t o h i s own s p e e c h o f e x a c t l y one y e a r
He b e l i e v e d t h a t what he h a d s a i d s t o o d t h e
of t i m e v e r y w e l l .
H
He gave a copy of
test
I t s t i l l r e p r e s e n t e d t h e p o l i c y of
o
/Mr.
SECRET
Holt
Mr. H o l t t h e n r e f e r r e d
to the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l accounts
in
c e r t a i n m o r n i n g n e w s p a p e r s of h i s t a l k s t h e p r e v i o u s day w i t h
British Ministers.
He w i s h e d t o a s s u r e t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
t h e s e r e p o r t s were n o t t h e r e s u l t
of a " l e a k " from
that
the
A u s t r a l i a n team i n London or from h i m s e l f p e r s o n a l l y .
He
d e p l o r e d them as much a s he was s u r e t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r w o u l d .
They c o u l d o n l y do haim t o t h e common p u r p o s e s o f t h e two
Governments.
He had so f a r n o t s p o k e n t o any
journalists;
and "before l e a v i n g London he would o n l y s p e a k t o a few
A u s t r a l i a n c o r r e s p o n d e n t s t o whom he would p u t t h e b r o a d
considerations involved.
He would s a y t h a t he
recognised
t h a t no f i r m B r i t i s h d e c i s i o n s h a d b e e n c o n v e y e d t o him
at t h i s stage;
excellent;
t h a t the atmosphere f o r t h e i r
t a l k s had b e e n
and t h a t he knew t h e v i e w s he and h i s
colleagues
h a d e x p r e s s e d would r e c e i v e t h e f u l l e s t , c o n s i d e r a t i o n
London.
after
The Prime M i n i s t e r
this consideration,
i n t o u c h on t h e m a t t e r .
added t h a t he c o u l d s a y
in
that,
t h e two G o v e r n m e n t s would a g a i n b e
Mr. H o l t s a i d t h a t i n g e n e r a l he would
do h i s b e s t t o p l a y down t h e
significance
o f t h e exchangeso
Pr'i me, Mini s t e r s a i d t h a t t h i s would b e a p e r f e c t l y f a i r
to take with the P r e s s .
He r e f e r r e d t o h i s own r e p l y
The
line
that
a f t e r n o o n t o a Q u e s t i o n b y S i r A l e c D o u g l a s Home and h i s
refusal
t o make any S t a t e m e n t u n t i l t h e c o m p l e t i o n of h i s
w i t h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r of M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e .
talks
Mr. H o l t
s a i d t h a t he h o p e d t h e B r i t i s h Government would k e e p i n
c o n t i n u o u s t o t i c h w i t h t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government and t h a t
would be f u r t h e r
c o n s u l t a t i o n a s t h e p r o c e s s of
discussion
and s t u d y w i t h i n t h e B r i t i s h Government d e v e l o p e d o v e r
coming w e e k s .
there
the
1
PRIME MINISTER S PERSONAL
TELEGRAM SERIAL NO. T 1 7 6 / 6 7
P
R
I
M
E
M I N I S T E R
-'
CANBERRA.
You s a i d t o me b e f o r e I l e f t A u s t r a l i a 011 t h i s p r e s e n t
j o u r n e y t h a t y o u r Government would n o t p r o c e e d t o d e c i s i o n s on
d e f e n c e m a t t e r s a s t h e y r e l a t e t o t h e r e g i o n of M a l a y s i a and
S i n g a p o r e u n t i l s u c h t i m e a s I had had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u t
t o you p e r s o n a l l y t h e v i e w s of t h e A u s t r a l i a n Government .
I
have now h a d t h i s week w i t h you and a l s o with. Mr. H e a l e y and
Mr. Bowden a s e r i e s of v a l u a b l e d i s c u s s i o n s and you w i l l no
d o u b t b e p r o c e e d i n g i n due c o u r s e t o f u r t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of y o u r p o s i t i o n , t h o u g h I r e a l i s e t h a t p r i o r
t o t h a t you h a v e i t i n mind t o m e e t some of o u r o t h e r i n t e r e s t e d
c o l l e a g u e s from o t h e r Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s , ,
I t seems t o me t h a t
l e a v e w i t h you t h i s n o t e
v i e w s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
a g r e e m e n t of my C a b i n e t
i t would b e u s e f u l i f I were t o
i n which I r e c a p i t u l a t e b r i e f l y the
t h a t I e x p r e s s e d t o you w i t h t h e
colleagues.
As you know, I c o n c l u d e d our m e e t i n g on T u e s d a y b y
a s k i n g i f you c o u l d s e e y o u r way t o m e e t i n g two r e q u e s t s t h a t
I was s u r e would b e u n a n i m o u s l y s u p p o r t e d "by A u s t r a l i a and i t s
Commonwealth n e i g h b o u r s and b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
The f i r s t
was t h a t , i n t h e p e r i o d up t o 1970-71 , t h e B r i t i s h Government
s h o u l d r e t a i n some f l e x i b i l i t y on t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e
Commonwealth B r i g a d e i n M a l a y s i a .
The B r i g a d e , w h a t e v e r i t s
d e f i c i e n c i e s , h a s b e e n an e x a m p l e of e f f e c t i v e Commonwealth
teamwork and we would w i s h y o u r Government t o l e a v e enough
f o r c e s t o g i v e i t c o n t i n u e d v i a b i l i t y even i f t h e r e h a d t o
b e some r e d u c t i o n s on t h e l o g i s t i c s s i d e .
Secondly, I
e x p r e s s e d t h e e a r n e s t hope t h a t no f i n a l B r i t i s h d e c i s i o n s
a b o u t t h e p e r i o d a f t e r 1 970-7"! s h o u l d b e a n n o u n c e d or e v e n
so much a s t a k e n a t t h i s t i m e .
I fully accepted that t h i s
need not p r e c l u d e contingency p l a n n i n g covering v a r i o u s
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n c l u d i n g t h a t of w i t h d r a w a l of l a n d b a s e d f o r c e s
b u t we saw no n e e d t o r a t i f y any p l a n n i n g a s s u m p t i o n s a t t h i s
s t a g e and f e l t i t i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e s e s h o u l d s t a n d u n r a t i f i e d .
We f e l t i t h a d t o b e assumed t h a t i f a d e c i s i o n l o o k i n g t o w a r d s
w i t h d r a w a l from t h e m a i n l a n d were t a k e n , i t would become
w i d e l y known and t h e r e c o u l d b e a h i g h l y d a m a g i n g c h a i n
r e a c t i o n w h i c h would n o t o n l y b r i n g f o r w a r d t h e l o c a l e f f e c t s
of w i t h d r a w a l b u t m i g h t a l s o p r e c i p i t a t e an e a r l i e r w i t h d r a w a l
than intended.
I m e n t i o n t h e s e tireo r e q u e s t s a t t h i s s t a g e
so t h a t t h e r e m a i n d e r of my l e t t e r may b e r e a d i n c o n j u n c t i o n
with them.
B e f o r e I move on t o t h e g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t of t h e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h l e d up t o my r e q u e s t s l e t me s a y how much I
welcomed, on b e h a l f of m y s e l f and my G o v e r n m e n t , y o u r i n d i c a t i o n
t o me t h a t you h a v e d e c i d e d t o m a i n t a i n a c a p a b i l i t y f o r u s e
in the Par East a f t e r 1975.
T h i s d e c i s i o n r e c o g n i s e s , as I
b e l i e v e to be the c a s e , t h a t B r i t a i n ' s c o n t i n u i n g support i n
t h e r e g i o n i s n e e d e d t o h e l p e n s u r e t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t h e
s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y w h i c h have r e s u l t e d i n t h e M a l a y s i a n
r e g i o n from t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d r o l e w h i c h B r i t a i n h a s h i s t o r i c a l l y
played.
/However
f
H o w e v e r , what i s i m p o r t a n t o v e r and above t h i s d e c i s i o n
i s t h e l o c a t i o n and form i n w h i c h i t i s g i v e n e f f e c t , and i t i s
i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t I a g a i n s t r e s s our v i e w c o n c e r n i n g t h e
p r e s e r v a t i o n of l a n d f o r c e s "within t h e r e g i o n and of t h e
Commonwealth B r i g a d e .
We would w i s h t o s e e t h e B r i g a d e r e t a i n e d
as c l o s e a s p o s s i b l e t o i t s p r e s e n t form and e x i s t i n g s t a t e
of r e a d i n e s s a t l e a s t u n t i l 1970-71 , o r a t any r a t e t o h a v e
f o r c e s r e t a i n e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s so t h a t
t h e B r i g a d e p r e s e n t s a c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t and a l s o i s a b l e t o
act promptly for counter insurgency purposes.
I now move on t o an a c c o u n t i n a b r i e f form of t h e
v i e w s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h I p u t t o you i n d i s c u s s i o n .
We do of c o u r s e a p p r e c i a t e t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e
economic d i f f i c u l t i e s which, have c o m p e l l e d you and y o u r
colleagues to contemplate a s u b s t a n t i a l reduction in the
s t r e n g t h and c o m p o s i t i o n of B r i t i s h f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d e a s t
of S u e z .
We r e c o g n i s e a l s o t h a t some r u n n i n g down o f y o u r
l a r g e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e was t o b e
e x p e c t e d w i t h t h e e n d i n g of I n d o n e s i a ' s c o n f r o n t a t i o n
campaign.
B u t we n e v e r t h e l e s s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e r e would b e
a c o n t i n u i n g B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y presence w i t h i n the r e g i o n , a
p r e s e n c e w h i c h would i n c l u d e a s i g n i f i c a n t l a n d f o r c e ,
s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g a g r e e m e n t o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of
M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e .
As you know, we h a v e b e e n i n r e c e i p t
of a s s u r a n c e s from y o u r Government t h a t you would r e t a i n y o u r
i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s i n M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e f o r
a s l o n g a s t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s a g r e e d t h a t
you s h o u l d do s o on a c c e p t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s .
Thus we h a d worked
on and s u p p o r t e d t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s would
c o n t i n u e t o be as r e f l e c t e d i n the D i r e c t i v e i s s u e d to the
C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f F a r E a s t i n A p r i l of t h i s y e a r .
The main
r e l e v a n t p o i n t s in t h i s D i r e c t i v e are that i t i s the
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f t o p r e v e n t communist
and p a r t i c u l a r l y C h i n e s e communist e x p a n s i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e
SEATO a r e a and t o f u l f i l B r i t a i n ' s o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r t h e D e f e n c e
Agreement w i t h M a l a y s i a .
I n o u r v i e w t h e s e o b l i g a t i o n s would
r e q u i r e t h e r e t e n t i o n of t h e Commonwealth B r i g a d e a t a
s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a t e of r e a d i n e s s .
I t c o n s e q u e n t l y caused us deep concern t o l e a r n t h a t
t h e B r i t i s h Government was n o t o n l y c o n t e m p l a t i n g making a v e r y
e a r l y d e c i s i o n t o reduce i t s f o r c e s i n the r e g i o n by s u c c e s s i v e
s t a g e s b u t t o w i t h d r a w them a l l from t h e m a i n l a n d b y a b o u t 1975?
and f u r t h e r t o make t h e d e c i s i o n p u b l i c now.
The b a s i c r e a s o n f o r o u r c o n c e r n i s t h e c o n t i n u i n g
i n s t a b i l i t y o f t h e e n t i r e S o u t h - E a s t A s i a n a r e a and i t s
v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o p r e s s u r e and s u b v e r s i o n , b o t h i n t e r n a l and
external.
We n a t u r a l l y hope t h a t t h e c o u n t r i e s i n t h e a r e a
w i l l i n due c o u r s e b e a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h a c a p a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t
t h e m s e l v e s i n d i v i d u a l l y , and i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h one a n o t h e r ,
against these pressures.
I t i s one of t h e p r i m a r y a i m s of
A u s t r a l i a n p o l i c y t o h e l p them t o do s o .
But t h e a c h i e v e m e n t
of t h i s g o a l i s s t i l l a l o n g way o f f .
Until then there i s ,
i n o u r v i e w , a c r u c i a l n e e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e e x i s t i n g framework
of t r e a t i e s and a l l i a n c e s , and t o p r e s e r v e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of
SEATO.
As you know t h e Commonwealth S t r a t e g i c R e s e r v e forms
a v i t a l component of t h e f o r c e s n o m i n a t e d f o r t h e v a r i o u s SEATO
plans.
We would t h e r e f o r e w i s h t o s e e no c l o s i n g of o p t i o n s
at t h i s time.
s
/Further,
F u r t h e r ; , we i n v i t e B r i t a i n t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
f o r h e r w o r l d p o s i t i o n of a c o m p l e t e m i l i t a r y w i t h d r a w a l from
Asia.
I t i s our firm c o n v i c t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n ' s long e x p e r i e n c e
and knowledge o f t h e S o u t h - E a s t A s i a n a r e a , and p a r t i c u l a r l y of
M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e , c a r r i e s w i t h i t a d e g r e e of i n f l u e n c e
f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l good t h a t p e r h a p s t h e B r i t i s h p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s
tend to underestimate,,
We "believe t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of e v e n
a r e l a t i v e l y modest B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t i s i n i t s e l f
a p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e f o r s t a b i l i t y and a d e t e r r e n t a g a i n s t
e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , and a p o s i t i v e f a c t o r f o r B r i t a i n ^ own s t a n d i n g
and w e l f a r e .
I t i s my b e l i e f a l s o t h a t B r i t a i n ' s s u b s t a n t i a l
economic i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n a r e l i k e l y t o d e v e l o p a s t h e
c o u n t r i e s o f t h e r e g i o n become i n c r e a s i n g l y p r o s p e r o u s , , w h i c h
t h e y can o n l y do i f t h e y a r e a l l o w e d t o d e v e l o p i n p e a c e .
The A m e r i c a n s h a v e a wide n e t w o r k of d e f e n c e commitments
around t h e a r c of A s i a , b e g i n n i n g a s f a r n o r t h a s K o r e a ,
But
t h e y have a l w a y s made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e y l o o k u p o n M a l a y s i a end
S i n g a p o r e a s a Commonwealth d e f e n c e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
The B r i t i s h
m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n t h o s e two c o u n t r i e s , and i t s d e f e n c e
agreement w i t n M a l a y s i a a r e e a c h i n t e g r a l and c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o
t h e p a t t e r n of b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h "&he U n i t e d
States has developed with other c o u n t r i e s .
These a r r a n g e m e n t s
would s u f f e r a l o s s of s u p p o r t i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i t s e l f i f
B r i t a i n were t o wind down t o o f a r i n S i n g a p o r e and M a l a y s i a . ,
F u r t h e r , we would a l l hope t h a t t h e r e m i g h t b e a s e t t l e m e n t i n
V i e t n a m b e f o r e 1975; b u t i n t h e m e a n t i m e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s '
p o s i t i o n t h e r e could be s e r i o u s l y embarrassed by a B r i t i s h
d e c l a r a t i o n of i n t e n t t o w i t h d r a w .
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n
Washington would b e l i k e l y t o e n c o u n t e r m o u n t i n g r e s i s t a n c e
i n C o n g r e s s and g r o w i n g c r i t i c i s m from p u b l i c o p i n i o n .
A g a i n , and t h i s i s a v i t a l a s p e c t , w i t h d r a w a l of B r i t i s h
l a n d f o r c e s from t h i s p a r t of A s i a would g i v e r i s e t o d i f f i c u l t i e s
f o r b o t h New Z e a l a n d a n d o u r s e l v e s i n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of o u r
present forward defence p o s t u r e .
The;re would a l s o b e consequence
f o r ovr e x t e r n a l p o s i t i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r our r e l a t i o n s
with Asia,
While i t may b e e x p e c t e d t h a t o u r own c a p a c i t y t o
make a c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t h e r e g i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e a s o u r p o p u l a t i o n
and n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h g r o w , we c o u l d c e r t a i n l y n o t l o o k t o
discharge B r i t a i n ' s h i s t o r i c role alone.
T h i s w o u l d "be t r u e
e v e n i f , as we a l l v e r y much h o p e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g a b o u t
an e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t i n V i e t n a m ,
I t h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t nowadays t h e p r e s e n c e of f o r e i g n ,
and p a r t i c u l a r l y w h i t e , m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n A s i a n c o u n t r i e s i s
scarcely tolerated.
My c o l l e a g u e s and I do n o t a c c e p t t h i s .
So f a r a s M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e a r e c o n c e i t e d we know t h a t
n e i t h e r c o u n t r y i s h a p p y a t t h e p r o s p e c t of a c o m p l e t e
w i t h d r a w a l of a l l B r i t i s h l a n d f o r c e s a f t e r 'i975.
The s u b m i s s i o n I h a v e made, of c o u r s e , c a r r i e s t h e r i s k of
i n v o l v e m e n t t o an e x t e n t t h a t you h a v e made c l e a r you no l o n g e r
wish to b e a r .
However, any commitment i n v o l v e s r i s k .
In the
A u s t r a l i a n v i e w , t h e b e s t g u a r a n t e e t h a t t h e r i s k s , b o t h from
e x t e r n a l a t t a c k i n i n s u r g e n c y , w i l l be c o n t a i n e d i s the
c o n t i n u i n g p r e s e n c e i n t h e M a l a y s i a n r e g i o n of a c r e d i b l e
B r i t i s h p r e s e n c e , w h i c h m u s t , i n our v i e w , i n c l u d e a s i g n i f i c a n t
land f o r c e .
What we a r e f a c e d w i t h i s n o t so much t h e
l i k e l i h o o d of c o n v e n t i o n a l a t t a c k , w h i c h s e a and a i r f o r c e s c o u l d
p r o b a b l y e a s i l y enough r e p e l , a s t h e l i k e l i h o o d of s u b v e r s i o n
and. i n f i l t r a t i o n and g r o w i n g g u e r i l l a a c t i v i t y i n a n u n s t a b l e
/political
political situation,.
The u n d e r p i n n i n g of p o l i t i c a l
d e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e h a n d s of r e s p o n s i b l e , m o d e r a t e l e a d e r s h i p
can o n l y b e s e c u r e d a t t h i s s t a g e b y t h e f a m i l i a r , a c c e p t e d
p r e s e n c e of B r i t i s h g r o u n d t r o o p s .
T h i s , we b e l i e v e , i s s t i l l
e s s e n t i a l t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of p o l i t i c a l c o n f i d e n c e .
(Sgd )
9
Ho H o l t
The K t . Hon. H a r o l d W i l s o n , O . B . E . ,
Prime M i n i s t e r , 10 Downing S t r e e t , L o n d o n , S .W.1 * M.P., CMV(67) 1st Meeting
VISIT DP SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER TO LONDON, JUNE 1967
United Kingdom Record of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.I., on
MONDAY, 26th JUNE 1967 at 12.00 Noon
PRESENT:
United Kingdom
Singapore
The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, MP,
Prime Minister
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
Prime Minister
The Rt. Hon. Herbert Bowden, MP,
Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Affairs
Dr. Goh Keng Swee,
Minister of Defence
The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, MP,
Secretary of State for Defence
H.E. Arumugam Ponnu Rajah,
High Commissioner for Singapore
Pield Marshal Sir Richard Hull,
Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr. Tay Seow Huah,
Deputy Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Interior and Defence
Sir Neil Pritchard,
Commonwealth Office
Mr. J . 0 . Moreton,
Commonwealth Office
Mr. P. Cooper,
Ministry of Defence
SECRETARIAT;
Mr. P.A. K. Harrison
Mr. 0,R Blair
S
S U B J E C T DEFENCE POLICY IN THE FAR EAST DEFENCE POLICY IN THE EAR EAST THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Mr. Lee Kuan Yew should open the
discussion of British defence policy in the Far East, speaking as if the
Prime Minister had "been present at the discussions with the Commonwealth
Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence on 22nd and 23rd June.
MR. LEE KUAN YE!/ said that if in fact Britain adopted the course
which Mr. Healey had outlined at those meetings - that is, that British
forces should stay in Malaysia and Singapore until 1970-71 at half the
present force levels, then run down to 1976, by when they would hope to be off
the mainland, but would have a task force in the area and might even station
one of its two battalions on land in Singapore - then he thought that
Singapore would be all right. His first worry was that there must be no
timetable for the British withdrawals from the mainland; he had expressed
this view in his letter of 26th May to the Prime Minister.
Once people
believed that Britain was committed to leaving the mainland, anxieties, fears,
passions and ambitions would arise, and the eight years from now until the
proposed withdrawal would telescope.
But if the Governments statement in
July could be on the lines of the suggestions made by Mr. Healey, Singapore
would be satisfied, from the point of view of defence, and could live with
the situation, so long as - and this was his other worry - this policy was
not further amended as a result of some other economic crisis, say next
year.
He would speak frankly, since the lives of millions in Singapore
and Malaysia would be in jeopardy if the Singapore Government made the
wrong decisions.
When, in 1965, Singapore had been asked to leave the
Malaysian Federation, they had had to decide, within a period of weeks,
how best to ensure military and political security for themselves.
He had
banked on Britain being able to give Singapore protection for a few years;
how many years depended on such factors as the role that Britain wanted,
the state of her economy, and her approach to the Common Market.
By this
wholehearted and complete identification with Britain he had been able to
generate confidence and a good climate for investment in Singapore.
a calculated move, and he did not seek to appeal to sentiment.
It was
But he had
noticed with concern the procession of Defence White Papers in recent years,
and it was a real anxiety to him that in circumstances beyond the control
of the British Government It might be felt necessary once more to alter
British defence commitments and assumptions In South East Asia.
If this
were done there would be a complete loss of confidence among the people
of the area and those who controlled its assets, and no further decision
-1­
after those to be announced in July could restore that confidence.
In this
context he expressed his amazement at the viciousness of the attacks on
the British Government and Prime Minister which were made every day by the
whole British press and by other persons of influence or authority. When
he had been asked \)j a BBC interviewer the loaded question whether he
thought Britain had betrayed Singapore, he had replied that he thought
it was the last thing that Britain wanted to do.
But his real problem
was that British domestic party politics might compel a further adjust­
!
ment in Britain s position, this time with grievous results.
Therefore, if what Mr. Healey had said he would say in July had to
be watered down, Singapore would have to make her own planning assumptions.
But once she had adjusted her posture, it would make British withdrawal
from the mainland speedier than it need be; for once Singapore gave any
idea that she welcomed any association with countries other than Britain
and Australia it would start off a train of adverse events.
The Tunku's
baseless suspicions that he (Mr. Lee) was in contact with Chou En-lai
would be fostered and once the Tunku really began thinking on those lines,
Thus, either
the situation would then become unpredictable and unstable.
some stable arrangement must be devised which could endure to 1976, or
we should be led into quicksands; either the United States would step in,
underwriting the Tunku as they had underwritten Thailand (and Singapore
would have to fit in with this), or all would be lost.
It followed from this that there must be certainty in Britain's intentions and obligations towards Singapore, and vice, versa
t
At the right time there should be a formal defence treaty between the two countries, not because he thought the British would wish to evade their undertakings, but to create an air of relative permanence. The Treaty would have to be publicly announced, though not all the obligations and details contained in it need be.
The essential was that Singapore s ground 1
forces should join with Britain's sophisticated air cover and naval protection to provide stability.
If they did so, Singapore vrould still be a thriving community in a hundred year 's time. It was, at present, the only place in South Asia which adhered approximately to Western standards of administration, housing, health and social amenities. All this would go once the fear arose that the position was slipping. This might happen not at the wish of the British Prime Minister, but because pressures on sterling, the demands of the European Economic Community, the views of the trades unions and the spectre of devaluation -2­
night generate rumours which would flow hack to Singapore.
Once British
businesses began to liquidate their investments in Singapore and Malaysia
the local businessmen would follow suit, and Singapore would go down.
He had explained feis to Mr. Healey on 23rd April in Singapore.
He
would not pretend that Singapore had not done her own contingency thinking;
they read the British press and reports as assiduously as anybody in Asia,
since their lives depended on a correct understanding of their situation.
But they were still acting on their earlier decision that their future
lay for a long while to come in association with Britain.
He therefore suggested that, if it were politically convenient and feasible, there should be instituted along with the proposed defence treaty an arrangement which would be of great benefit to Singapore, Malaysia and perhaps to Britain.
This would be a kind of "Commonwealth Reserve", for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore and the maintenance of peace in their area.
It would be multi-national, with contingents from Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand as well as Britain. It did not matter if it did not make great sense in military terms, sinoe the political and economic advantages were enormous.
Prom his point of view it would remove Malaysian fears of Singapore and the danger of pre­
emptive action.
The Malaysian Government had an impression of Singapore as too clever and too dangerous by half, and foreign correspondents returning from Kuala Lumpur often reported that the Malaysians thought Fantastic stories might be set about that Singapore was up to no good.
in order to justify pre-emption by Malaysia, sinoe they realised that every day their capacity to snuff out Singapore was diminishing. Malaysia
must understand that unless relations in the area were stable, in ten years they would need to fear Singapore.
Malaysia was a divided nation, with areas where the Malays were outnumbered;
Chinese predominated in Johore.
for example, the Lord Head had remarked to him on the previous day that once there a was an air of instability about Singapore, then Malaysia and Indonesia would get together to destroy her.
a dangerous and unstable situation.
This was The present men in power in Kuala. Lumpur, whatever their defects, were not adventurers and wanted peace in their lifetime.
Therefore he wished to assist them to stay in power as long as possible.
The Tunku knew that if he took over Singapore once more, by pre-emptive action, he would be subject not only to all the dangers which had caused him to eject her from Malaysia, but also to a running international sore, since Singapore would retain her seat in the United Nations and would carry on propaganda against Malaysia indefinitely. -3­
Since the Tunku, like himself, wanted security, it would he test if the forces of both countries could bat on the same side under British captaincy.
There would then be less danger of their being exploited by the Indonesians, people who spent all their lives conspiring often to no purpose but very successfully when they dealt with Kuala Lumpur.
It was no doubt they who fed the Tunku stories of Mr. Lee's agreement with Ghou En-lai to start a Chinese communist empire in South 1
East Asia, and who fed the stispicions, vanities and jealousies of tho Malaysians.
It would, of course, kill any idea of a Commonwealth force if it became known that he (Mr. Lee) had suggested it.
Once there were a climate of relative ease, the climate for investment would improve enormously, and both Malaysia and Singapore would benefit.
He did not know what advantages it would bring to Britain, to provide a sort of NATO Commander, for such a disparate outfit, but if he were the Commonwealth Secretary s public relations officer he would make much 1
of the fact that in one part of the world the British were still loved and wanted. Only two powers presented dangers to Singapore.
In the short term,
Malaysia could endanger her, but this possibility would become serious
only if the Tunku were dead and Razak pushed out by some group of w i 2 d
men, along with the present army commanders; and if this did not happen for
the next few years, Singapore would be safe.
t.ame from Indonesia.
The real longer term danger
The military government there was making no progress
and the country was going down.
The United States had set up aid projects
and purchasing agencies, and was pumping in large quantities of consumer
goods to bolster the regime.
But it was as corrupt as ever, and the
students had already started to demonstrate against this corruption.
The
United States and Australia were convinced that they must back a right-wing
military government there, because if Sukarno returned the Indonesian
Communist Party would come into Its own.
When China had recovered from the
difficulties of the Red Guard period, she might start a running civil war
throughout Indonesia.
Then Malaysia and Singapore,if undefended, would
present the Indonesian Government with an attractive international
diversion, as West Irian had done.
this was no longer feasible.
A clear impression must be given that
The last confrontation campaign had been
mainly fought by British and Gurkha troops.
This time Malaysia and
Singapore would play a full part, and a credible British presence would be
all that was required to maintain stability.
MR. LEE said that his remarks would find no support in Canberra or
Wellington, where there were different views on what the countries in the
area should do.
suggestion.
There would he disapproval, or even anger, at his
But if he were an Englishman he would say to himself that
the policy that he had advocated was sound, hearing in mind that it was
nine years to 1976.
He had been in office for nearly nine, years, and the
Asia of 1959 was very different from that of today.
It had looked then
as if the Communists would take over all Southern Asia, and in 19&1 some
of his colleagues had acted on that assumption and changed sides.
But he
and his present oolleagues had gone on, and the world had changed.
The
1
Red Guards activities had caused China to lose face among the whole
Chinese population of South East Asia; the position of the Singapore
Government relative to other countries in Asia had vastly improved.
When
other United Kingdom troops were off the mainland in nine years time he
could not ask to have more than one battalion onshore in Singapore and
one afloat.
He Y/as only worried whether this would in fact be the timetable.
Mr. Healey had said that if no date were fixed it might mean that the
British might be off the mainland in 1972;
to this he would say that he
would take his chances, since five years was also a long time.
He therefore
urged that if it was politically possible the British Government should do
its best to see that its July statement put the issue of British defence
policy in the Far East to rest for a long time.
It must not recur every
two years with a change in policy at each economic crisis (not that leaving
1
the mainland would help Britain s economic situation - it might make it
worse).
For Singapore the touchstone was to create an air of finality or
relative finality.
Australian Ministers had been severely shaken by being
told that white faces were not welcomed on the mainland of Asia.
The
Australians were not accustomed to living in the shadow of great and
immediate danger.
But Singapore was, and they had shed the habit of
crying out at the prospect of danger, unlike the Malaysians.
If Britain adopted his suggestions, there was a negligible prospect of hor being called upon to pay heavily for it.
Indonesia would remain quiet, and Malaysia happy so far as external defence was concerned. Malaysia was in for internal security problems, and there might well be trouble in Sarawak, but the last British Defence White Paper had made it clear that Britain would not again embark alone on a campaign like that against confrontation.
If Sabah and Sarawak were lost, it would be dear to the world that the Malaysians had lost them through driving the local people to revolt by their desire to create an empire from them.
would not worry him.
This
It would be very different if Singapore had big
neighbours who thought that she would be ready for the picking in five to
ton years, and if those whose money was invested in Singapore also
believed that the country must die.
He therefore urged - and there were
arguments of sentiment and moral obligation to which he could appeal - that
Britain should create on air of relative finality about her defence policy
in the area.
If she did not, Singapore would be in very great peril, hut
Britain would also have more sterling problems than now.
While the
Middle Eastern countries held £450 million in sterling in Britain,
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Hong Kong had £750 million.
If British
merchants were to decide to sell their rubber estates and tin mines the
hundred rich families in Singapore, who owned half the non-British
holdings of rubber and tin in Malaysia yet lived in Singapore for greater
safety, would also sell up,
A rumour that a loading British bank had
started to sell could load to a crash, and this might load to another run on
the pound and, perhaps a further Defence Review.
such a policy.
No one could gain from
It would bo possible for the British to make careful
secret preparations to soil out and leave Singapore at short notice, but he
did not believe that Britain wanted this.
He was however very disturbed
by the climate of opinion among Labour Party backbenchers, and he hoped thoy
would realise that setting a date for withdrawal, as in Aden, was not the
way out of Britain's difficulties.
He feared that the climate almost of
despair at Britain's intractable economic problems might percolate from
the Labour backbenches through Britain.
THE PRIME MINISTER commented that
there had been a groat change of opinion recently.
Mr. Loe's forthcoming
mooting with the Parliamentary Labour Party could be very important,
THE SECRETARY 0E STATE EOR DEFENCE said he would begin his remarks
by correcting a misunderstanding.
Mr. Lee had spoken as if Britain firmly
intended to maintain a commando battalion on land in Singapore after the
bases had gone in 1975.
But this plan was for the period 1970 to 1975.
He would recapitulate the stage the Government had reached over plans for
after 1975.
The Cabinet had merely agreed that Ministers should bo
prepared to offer a continuing capability for action in the Far East after
British forces had left the mainland in 1975-76.
This was the only
Cabinet decision, and they had not decided what capability, if any, should
be kept in the area. The figures ho had mentioned in previous meetings
were devised in the Ministry of Defence for planning purposes, and were
based on costings assuming a naval presence in Australia; but so far the
Cabinet had not agreed what capability there should be in the area, if any,
nor where it should be based.
There were three theoretical possibilities: the ships could be based on Britain, or on Western Australia, or could use Singapore for rest and refit in the naval dockyard which would by then be under civil management.
In the afternoon Ministers would hear the first report on the consultations with Commonwealth countries.
Mr. Lee must not mistake the position by talcing as Cabinet policy his (the Defence Secretary's) personal views and the figures worked out by his Ministry. As for what should be said in public, the Cabinet had not decided whether to say that British forces would be off the mainland by 1976 or to be vague on the matter.
He would propose that they should say that British forces in the Far East would be reduced to half Defence Review force levels by 1970-71, leaving a residual presence of air and naval units, with a small number of Gurkhas;
that while reaffirming that the aim was to wind up the bases on the mainland of Asia, they could not foretell when this might come about; and that even then they intended to keep a capability for use in the Far East. There were also two points on which he would not at present wish to press for a decision.
One was whether to indicate in public the nature of the amphibious force Britain proposed to keep in the Far East after leaving the mainland; and the other was whether to indicate publicly at this stage that if Singapore and Britain, in co-operation, could ensure that the rundown caused no economic upheaval in Singapore and did not upset the stability of the country, it was intended that British forces should be rotated through Singapore after the bases there had been liquidated, using the present naval dockyard operated on a civilian basis by the Singapore Government. -* If he got that far he would have done extremely well, given the
present climate of opinion.
At a later date consideration could be given
to the suggestion discussed on 23rd June for a framework of Commonwealth
oo-operation which would associate
Singapore and Malaysia in a new defence
relationship with Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
The same applied
to the question of tailoring the Singapore and Malaysian defence forces so
as to provide the components absent from the proposed British naval-air
capacity.
It would also be necessary to defer consideration of the nature
of the new defence commitment which Britain might assume as regards
Singapore.
At present the commitment was unilateral, since while Singapore
acknowledged that she regarded Britain's defence agreement with Malaysia
as binding upon her, Britain was under no juridical obligation towards
Singapore.
It had been left to Singapore to initiate formal discussions
for an agreement to supersede the Malaysian Defence Agreement whose applica.­
tion in respect of Singapore came to an end when the country separated
from Malaysia.
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY added that he had not heard Mr. Lee's ideas before 23rd June. He saw nuch that was attractive in then, since ho had often thought that Britain had a legitimate role in Singapore and Malaysia which she did not have in the countries further north.
In his view it was not Britain's task to co-operate in the containment of China, but to provide an area, of peace and stability in the region of Malaysia and Singapore.
But Australia, New Zealand and the United States saw Britain s 1
role differently, and would disagree with him.
The policy proposed by Mr. Lee would raise problems for these countries, and it would be wise to pursue It slowly, keeping options open as far as possible.
If the issue of British defence policy in the Far East was to be put to rest, It would also be necessary to lot sleeping dogs lie.
It was
his personal judgment that the objective which he had just sketched were as far as the British Government, with effort and goodwill, was likely to get this year.
It
must be accepted that the price of leaving vague the date at which the British might withdraw from the mainland was leaving vague the question of what might happen when they had done so. THE PRIME MINISTER asked Mr. Lee for his views on the proposal that
Singapore should take over the naval dockyard for civil use.
replied that it was an excellent proposal.
MR. LEE
Swan Hunter had taken over
the management of the Singapore Government dookyard, which had been badly
run, and the Government was considering taking a share in the equity.
Throe years ago they had built a new dockyard in conjunction with two
Japanese firms, who had lost money on it for tho first two years. Now they
were doing well enough to start constructing a 190,000 ton dry dock for tho
big tankers which passed by Singapore.
The peculiarities of the tanker
trade meant that they would save money by docking in Singapore rather than
immediately after discharging in Japan.
He had discussed dockyards with
Mr. Reynolds at the Ministry of Defence.
The British service chiefs in
Singapore were naturally unhappy at the idea of moving out, like
aristocrats reluctant to hand over their stately homes.
But the phasing
in the White Paper meant that the dockyard would become redundant by 1974,
and he therefore suggested that a committee should now be formed, with
representation from the Navy Department and Swan Hunter, so that it could
immediately begin to plan for converting the dockyard to civilian use.
This planning would take eighteen months, by which time part of the base
might be available for conversion.
-8­
MR. LEE continued that a problem was what to do with throe service airfields.
He would like to know whether it was worth leaving one for use by the British P. 111s.
For the rest, he would like the British Government to agree that his Economic Development Board should begin to start looking at the workshops and facilities there to see what they could be turned into.
It would be helpful if clear directions to co-operate in this could be given to the service authorities concerned.
It was crucial that the machinery should be left behind, and not destroyed, as naval regulations had obliged the Navy to destroy machine tools which would have been most welcome in trade schools in Singapore. There was one more matter which was crucial in order to set at rest tho minds of the Singapore Government.
British Government owed to it.
This was the obligation that the It was not a very serious problem, unless the Tunku died and Razak was pushed out, in which case Mr. Leo would at once come back to London for an answer.
Britain should acknowledge
an obligation to defend Singapore against all forms of external attack, including all forms of attack by her neighbours.
He did not mind if this undertaking was given secretly, by an exchange of letters, but it was important that Singapore should know whore she stood.
THE C0MM03WEALTH SECRETARY said ho would like to have a look at this problem.
similar to the problem of Brunei.
MR. LEE said that Brunei was a very different proposition, since it was a British protectorate. The Meeting adjourned at 1.15 p.n. for lunch. Cabinet Office, S.W.1 .
28th June 1967
It was