DOCUMENT IS THE PPvOPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY*S GOVERNMENT
C(70) 48
COPY NO
63
7 April 1970
CABINET
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS B I L L
Memorandum by the F i r s t S e c r e t a r y of State and S e c r e t a r y
of State for E m p l o y m e n t and P r o d u c t i v i t y
1.
At its m e e t i n g on 30 October 1969 (CC(69) 52nd C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 4 ) , the Cabinet d e c i d e d that the Industrial R e l a t i o n s BUI should
contain the p r o v i s i o n s l i s t e d in Annex I to this m e m o r a n d u m , subject to
further detailed c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the C o m m i t t e e on Industrial R e l a t i o n s .
The Cabinet a l s o a g r e e d that the C o m m i t t e e should e x a m i n e the need for
l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n on 3 other m a t t e r s - the r e g i s t r a t i o n of p r o c e d u r e
a g r e e m e n t s by e m p l o y e r s ; a n t i - t r a d e union r u l e s of F r i e n d l y S o c i e t i e s ;
and the appointment of e m p l o y e e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to the boards of
undertakings,
2.
The Industrial R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e h a v e r e v i e w e d the p r o p o s e d
p r o v i s i o n s of the B i l l and have d i s c u s s e d the c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s which
have a r i s e n In the c o u r s e of consultations with the T r a d e s Union C o n g r e s s
(TUC) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). A s u m m a r y of the
i s s u e s and of the C o m m i t t e e s c o n c l u s i o n s i s attached at Annex II f o r the
information of m y c o l l e a g u e s .
T
3.
So f a r a s the o v e r a l l shape of the B i l l i3 c o n c e r n e d , the C o m m i t t e e
agreed that the B i l l should include those p r o v i s i o n s d e c i d e d on by Cabinet
in October - with 2 m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
F i r s t , the C o m m i t t e e a g r e e d that it
would be inadvisable t o s e e k to r e s t r i c t the Immunity enjoyed by trade
unions (under S e c t i o n 4 of the 1905 Trade D i s p u t e s A c t ) f r o m a c t i o n s in tort
to those t o r t s c o m m i t t e d in pursuance of trade d i s p u t e s .
This proposal
had been made in the Donovan C o m m i s s i o n ^ R e p o r t , and w a s e n d o r s e d in
the White P a p e r "In P l a c e of Strife".
But in v i e w of the Cabinet^s
subsequent d e c i s i o n not to extend the p r o t e c t i o n afforded by S e c t i o n 3 of the
Trade D i s p u t e s A c t to c o v e r inducement of the b r e a c h of any c o m m e r c i a l
contract, the C o m m i t t e e thought it n e c e s s a r y t o r e c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r it
would be w i s e to e f f e c t any change in Section 4 ,
The effect of the change
proposed would be to m a k e it p o s s i b l e to s e c u r e d a m a g e s f r o m unions (and
to get injunctions a g a i n s t them) in r e s p e c t of t o r t s a r i s i n g o t h e r w i s e than
1
"in contemplation or furtherance of a trade d i s p u t e " .
But s i n c e there can
be situations w h e r e strike a c t i o n i s taken in c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e the
courts jtidge that no "trade d i s p u t e " e x i s t s (eg Torquay Hotel v . Cousins
and Stratford v . I/indley), a narrowing of the immunity f r o m a c t i o n for
tore could h a v e the effect of putting union funds at r i s k in s o m e c a s e s
where they take industrial a c t i o n .
F o r this r e a s o n , there would be g r e a t
p r e s s u r e f r o m the TUC to w i d e n the definition cf a trade dispute to c o v e r
any industrial or s t r i k e a c t i o n by u n i o n s .
The C o m m i t t e e f e l t that on
balance it would be p r e f e r a b l e to l e a v e Section 4 (and the definition of a
trade dispute) a s it w a s ,
4.
Secondly, the C o m m i t t e e d e c i d e d that the B i l l should prevent
F r i e n d l y S o c i e t i e s f r o m having r u l e s d e b a r r i n g trade u n i o n i s t s f r o m
m e m b e r s h i p (Annex II, paragraph 6).
OUTSTANDING ISSUES
5.
There a r e 3 i s s u e s on which the C o m m i t t e e did not r e a c h a final
or a g r e e d c o n c l u s i o n and which I w a s invited t o bring before Cabinet; and
there i s a fourth I w i s h to bring to the C&binefs attention:
a,
the application to the Crown of the r e q u i r e m e n t on e m p l o y e r s
to d i s c l o s e information to r e c o g n i s e d trade u n i o n s ;
b.
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which it would be p e r m i s s i b l e f o r an
e m p l o y e r to require h i s e m p l o y e e to belong to a specified,,
independent trade union;
how to e n s u r e that Industrial Tribunals a r e capable of
c
dealing with the additional load of c a s e s a r i s i n g f r o m the Industrial
R e l a t i o n s Bill?
0
I
d,
the p o w e r s of the C o m m i s s i o n on Industrial R e l a t i o n s (CIR),
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY MANAGEMENT: A P P L I C A T I O N TO
THE CROWN
6.
The Industrial R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e w e r e g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d cn the
nature and extent of the r e q u i r e m e n t on e m p l o y e r s to d i s c l o s e to r e c o g n i s e d
unions information n e c e s s a r y and r e l e v a n t to n e g o t i a t i o n s , and on the
various s a f e g u a r d s which the B i l l should contain to p r o t e c t e m p l o y e r s
from having to d i s c l o s e information w h i c h could be damaging (Annex II,
paragraph 2).
The C o m m i t t e e did not, h o w e v e r , r e a c h a n y a g r e e m e n t
about the application to the C r o w n of the d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s .
I was
therefore invited to put before Cabinet the v a r i o u s a r g u m e n t s on this
question.
7.
It w a s argued by s o m e m e m b e r s of the C o m m i t t e e that there w e r e
powerful constitutional and p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n s for exempting the Government
f r o m the d i s c l o s u r e p r o v i s i o n s .
On the other hand, it w a s s u g g e s t e d that
no new points of principle w e r e involved and that, if the G o v e r n m e n t sought
to avoid the obligation laid on other e m p l o y e r s it would find it difficult to
insist that e m p l o y e r s in the private s e c t o r should be subject to the
statutory r e q u i r e m e n t s .
8.
The m a i n constitutional a r g u m e n t s for Crown e x e m p t i o n are that
M i n i s t e r s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e to P a r l i a m e n t f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e i r
D e p a r t m e n t s and b e c a u s e of the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the G o v e r n m e n t t h e i r
d i s c h a r g e of that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a y on o c c a s i o n be difficult or e v e n
i m p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e with the full r e q u i r e m e n t s of l e g i s l a t i o n of this
kind.
In g e n e r a l , t h e r e f o r e , it is p r e f e r a b l e for such l e g i s l a t i o n not to
bind the Crown but f o r the G o v e r n m e n t to state t h e i r intention to abide by
its s p i r i t .
E x c e p t i o n s have b e e n m a d e t o this p r i n c i p l e , but only w h e r e
there have been c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s f o r binding the Crown (for e x a m p l e ,
the Race R e l a t i o n s A c t , 1968). Although e x e m p t i o n w i l l be c r i t i c i s e d by
e m p l o y e r s and trade u n i o n s , if the Crown w a s bound there would be l i k e l y
to be e v e n m o r e s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m in p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s w h e r e M i n i s t e r s
found their s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n made it i m p o s s i b l e to d i s c l o s e i n f o r m a t i o n
which other e m p l o y e r s w e r e e x p e c t e d to d i s c l o s e .
Departments p o s s e s s a
large amount of s e n s i t i v e information the d i s c l o s u r e of which could be
particularly damaging or e m b a r r a s s i n g ; it would be i m p o s s i b l e to f o r e s e e
and provide for a l l s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h d i s c l o s u r e could c a u s e d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
and therefore M i n i s t e r s should be f r e e of any statutory r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on
this m a t t e r .
9.
A g a i n s t t h i s , it m u s t be e m p h a s i s e d that the principle of independent
adjudication or a r b i t r a t i o n in m a t t e r s affecting the Civil S e r v i c e is nothing
new - cf. the Grown P r o c e e d i n g s Act - and that other e m p l o y e r s would be
u n i m p r e s s e d by an undertaking that the Civil S e r v i c e abide by the s p i r i t of
the l e g i s l a t i o n , if the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r this w a s being o b s e r v e d w a s not open
to independent s c r u t i n y ; that s c r u t i n y is after a l l , e x a c t l y what other
e m p l o y e r s find m o s t objectionable about the p r o p o s a l s .
F u r t h e r m o r e , it
is not proposed to take a w a y f r o m a n y M i n i s t e r tne right and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
in the l a s t r e s o r t to d e c i d e whether or not information should be d i s c l o s e d ;
nor is it s u g g e s t e d that any r e f u s a l by a M i n i s t e r to d i s c l o s e i n f o r m a t i o n
should attract any f o r m a l s a n c t i o n .
So f a r a s s e n s i t i v e information i s
c o n c e r n e d , the s a f e g u a r d s a l r e a d y p r o p o s e d ( e g . those relating t o national
s e c u r i t y , to information about i n d i v i d u a l s , and t o confidential information
f r o m or abovit third p a r t i e s ) a r e v e r y e x t e n s i v e ; there w i l l be opportunity
to include in the p r o p o s e d Code of P r a c t i c e and r e g u l a t i o n s additional
safeguards to those included in the B i l l ; and in any c a s e , private e m p l o y e r s
have many of the s a m e p r o b l e m s in r e g a r d to d i s c l o s u r e a s G o v e r n m e n t
Departments,
10.
In m y v i e w , t h e r e a r e the s t r o n g e s t p o l i t i c a l and p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
r e a s o n s for applying the d i s c l o s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s to the Crov/n.
I
r e c o m m e n d we should s o d e c i d e .
STATUTORY RIGHT TO BELONG TO A TRADE UNION: REGULATION OF
THE CLOSED SHOP
U.
The B i l l will provide that it should be an i m p l i e d t e r m of e v e r y
contract of e m p l o y m e n t that the e m p l o y e r should do nothing to p r e v e n t or
deter h i s e m p l o y e e s f r o m belonging to an independent trade union, or to
p e n a l i s e thern for doing s o .
It i s no purpose of the l e g i s l a t i o n to regulate
the c l o s e d chop, or to give the e m p l o y e e a statutory right to belong to any
union he c h o o s e s - or to belong to no union at a l l .
The B i l l w i l l t h e r e f o r e
say nothing about an e m p l o y e r ' s right to require h i s e m p l o y e e s to belong to
a specified union.
It w i l l , h o w e v e r , be n e c e s s a r y to m a k e it c l e a r that an
e m p l o y e r w i l l not be acting in b r e a c h of the statutory p r o v i s i o n if he
r e s t r i c t s the choice of h i s e m p l o y e e s to a p a r t i c u l a r independent trade
union - i e , if they choose to belong they must belong to union x*. The
TUC a r e p r e s s i n g for the B i l l to include a p r o v i s o that such a r e s t r i c t i o n
should be p e r m i s s i b l e only w h e r e t h e r e is an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the
e m p l o y e r and the union c o n c e r n e d - though it i s net c l e a r e x a c t l y how they
would take this to be a c h i e v e d ,
r
1Z.
I b e l i e v e there a r e c o n s i d e r a b l e r i s k s in adopting the TUC
s u g g e s t i o n , which will not in any c a s e s e c u r e the r e s u l t s they expect or
hope f o r ,
I a m , h o w e v e r , e x a m i n i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y that e m p l o y e r s who
r e c o g n i s e and negotiate with trade unions might be p e r m i t t e d to r e s t r i c t
the e m p l o y e e s choice of independent trade union only to the unions - o r
some of the unions - with w h o m they n e g o t i a t e .
E m p l o y e r s w h o do not
r e c o g n i s e and negotiate with trade unions would not be p e r m i t t e d to r e s t r i c t
It s e e m s to m e that this w i l l substantially m e e t
their e m p l o y e e c c h o i c e .
the T U C s point and I intend to d i s c u s s the p r o p o s a l with the T U C .
Subject
to the T U C s r e a c t i o n , I would p r o p o s e either to include a p r o v i s i o n on
these l i n e s in the Bill or to l e a v e the B i l l s i l e n t about the c i r c u m s t a n c e s
where it i s p e r m i s s i b l e for an e m p l o y e r to r e s t r i c t h i s e m p l o y e e s '
f r e e d o m of c h o i c e .
1
T
THE LOAD ON INDUSTRIAL TJR.I3UNALS
13.
The m a i n outstanding p r o b l e m a r i s i n g f r o m the p r o v i s i o n for
appeals a g a i n s t unfair d i s m i s s a l s and e x t e n s i o n of the j u r i s d i c t i o n of
Industrial Tribunals i s the c a p a c i t y of Tribunals to cope with the w o r k .
R e s e a r c h h a s indicated that this m a y be a p r o b l e m of c o n s i d e r a b l e
magnitude. F o r that r e a s o n I have reluctantly had to introduce c e r t a i n
d i s i n c e n t i v e s and r e s t r i c t i o n s into the p r o p o s a l s : for e x a m p l e , a
qualifying period of 2 y e a r s s e r v i c e for appeal a g a i n s t unfair d i s m i s s a l
( e x c e p t f o r trade union m e m b e r s h i p and a c t i v i t y , w h e r e t h e r e will be no
qualifying period) in the hope that it can be r e l a x e d when the p o s i t i o n of
the Industrial Tribunals i m p r o v e s .
E v e n s o it is e s t i m a t e d that the
c a s e l o a d w i l l be about 2 5 , 000 to 4 0 , 000 a y e a r and the Lord C h a n c e l l o r has
advised that this would i n t o l e r a b l y overload the e x i s t i n g T r i b u n a l s .
The
C o m m i t t e e on Industrial R e l a t i o n s h a s invited the Lord Chancellor and
myself, in consultation with the Chief S e c r e t a r y , to s e e k a solution to the
1
problem and v/e a r e considering the adoption of a 2 - t i e r s y s t e m of a number
of local T r i b u n a l s and a right of appeal to a s u p e r i o r T r i b u n a l .
Moreover,
until s a t i s f a c t o r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s a r e d e v i s e d , the e x t e n s i o n
of the T r i b u n a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n to d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g from the individual
contract of e m p l o y m e n t w i l l need to be d e l a y e d .
This w i l l not be
unwelcome t o the TUC and CBI w h o oppose this p r o v i s i o n .
T
THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.
14.
The TUC a r e not in favour of the p r o p o s a l to e s t a b l i s h the CIR on
a statutory b a s i s , but they have not g i v e n m e any p r e c i s e r e a s o n s , beyond
g e n e r a l i t i e s about rigidity and inflexibility and s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to
Government i n f l u e n c e , which do not s e e m to m e to be w e l l - f o u n d e d .
The
Committee on Industrial R e l a t i o n s a g r e e d that a body e x e r c i s i n g such
important s t a t u t o r y p o w e r s should be e s t a b l i s h e d and r e g u l a t e d by statute.
I therefore p r o p o s e to go ahead with t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s .
15.
The p r o v i s i o n s w i l l give the CIR power to r e q u i r e p e r s o n s to
provide i n f o r m a t i o n and give e v i d e n c e in connection with its i n q u i r i e s .
The q u e s t i o n of e n f o r c e m e n t a r i s e s .
I p r o p o s e that the CIR should have
p o w e r s , like t h o s e g i v e n to the National Board for P r i c e s and I n c o m e s
(NBPI) under the P r i c e s and I n c o m e s A c t , to take p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t trade
unions and e m p l o y e r s a s s o c i a t i o n s , a s w e l l a s against c o r p o r a t e b o d i e s
and individuals, f o r failure to provide information, e t c .
It w i l l be
r e m e m b e r e d that when a s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n a r o s e in connection with the
C o m m i s s i o n for Industry and Manpower B i l l (CIM), it w a s d e c i d e d that it
would be u n d e s i r a b l e to make trade unions liable to p r o c e e d i n g s and
penalties; the l i a b i l i t y w a s t h e r e f o r e confined to corporate b o d i e s and
individuals (who could, of c o u r s e , be trade union o f f i c e r s ) .
The
Committee on Industrial R e l a t i o n s h a v e , h o w e v e r , a c c e p t e d the v i e w that
p r o v i s i o n s in r e l a t i o n to the CIR should follow the NBPI rather than the
CIM.
The p e n a l t i e s a r e not c o m p a r a b l e to the penal s a n c t i o n s e n v i s a g e d
in the i n t e r i m Industrial R e l a t i o n s B i l l .
The CIR by its n a t u r e , w i l l be
more involved than the CIM in getting information f r o m trade unions and
e m p l o y e r s a s s o c i a t i o n s , and m a y t h e r e f o r e need a sanction a g a i n s t refusal
to produce it.
1
1
TUC AND CBI REACTIONS
16,
The f o r e g o i n g p r o p o s a l s w i l l by and l a r g e be w e l c o m e d by the TUC
as a sound b a s i s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n subject to one m a j o r r e s e r v a t i o n .
They
greatly r e g r e t the G o v e r n m e n f s d e c i s i o n not to extend the p r o t e c t i o n of the
1906 Act to c o v e r inducement of the b r e a c h of any c o m m e r c i a l c o n t r a c t .
But
I a m convinced that no d e v e l o p m e n t s s i n c e l a s t October would justify any
modification of the d e c i s i o n then taken by the Cabinet not to y i e l d on this
point.
17.
The CBI a r e opposed to the Bill which they regard as o n e - s i d e d and
as m o s t l y involving c o n c e s s i o n s to the trade u n i o n s .
CONCLUSION
18.
I invite rny c o l l e a g u e s to a g r e e that:­
a.
the p r o v i s i o n s on d i s c l o s u r e of information by e m p l o y e r s
should apply to the Crown, but there should be no p r o v i s i o n for
s a n c t i o n s against any M i n i s t e r who r e f u s e s to d i s c l o s e information;
b.
I should decide the c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h a n e m p l o y e r
m a y r e s t r i c t an e m p l o y e e ^ m e m b e r s h i p t o a p a r t i c u l a r union in
the light of further consultation with the TUC;
1
c.
s a t i s f a c t o r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s for Industrial
T r i b u n a l s should be d e v i s e d by the Lord Chancellor and m y s e l f ,
in consultation with the Chief S e c r e t a r y ;
d.
the CIR should be e s t a b l i s h e d a s a statutory body with
p o w e r s to take p r o c e e d i n g s against trade unions and e m p l o y e r s
a s s o c i a t i o n s , a s w e l l a s a g a i n s t c o r p o r a t e bodies and individuals,
for f a i l u r e to provide information r e l e v a n t to che C o m m i s s i o n s
work.
1
BA C
Department of E m p l o y m e n t and P r o d u c t i v i t y SW1
6 A p r i l 1970
ANNEX I PROVISIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL AS AGREED BY CABINET ON 30 OCTOBER 1969 1.
Establishment of the Commission on Industrial Relations as a statutory body
2.
The power to make orders, on the recommendation of the CIR, requiring employers to recognise a trade union, 3.
Disclosure of information by management to recognised trade unions.
4,
Amendments to the Wages Councils Act.
5.
Establishment of a Trade Union Development Scheme.
6.
Establishment of a statutory right for employees to belong to a trade union
7.
Safeguards against unfair dismissal.
8.
Extension of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals.
9.
Amendments to the Contracts of Employment Act.
10. Modification of Section 4(4) of the 1871 Trade Union Act and amendment of the definition of a trade union. *11. Restriction of the protection trade unions enjoy from actions in tort
under Section 4 of the 1906 Trade Disputes Act.
12. Extension of the protection given by Section 3 of the 1906 Act to cover inducement of the breach of a labour-only contract. 13. Requirements for registered trade unions to appoint qualified auditors and to carry out regular valuations of their superannuation schemes. 14. If necessary, provisions to facilitate the appointment of workers' representatives to boards of undertakings (see Annex II, para 1 1 ) . * With the agreement of the Industrial Relations Committee, and following consultation with the Attorney-General, the proposal to limit the protection of Section 4 to torts committed in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute was not proceeded with. The. consultative document on changes in trade union law which was sent to the TUC and CBI made it clear that the Government had decided against limiting Section 4 immunity in the way suggested in the White Paper "In Place of Strife" (see paragraph 3 of the memorandum). ANNEX II NFIDENTJAL
REPORT ON ISSUES RAISED IN THE COURSE OF CONSULTATION ON THE G03/ERNMENT' S LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND ON CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE 1. RECOGNITION OF TRADE UNIONS Complaints of non-compliance with a recognition order. The TUC have pressed the Government to modify the procedure under which a union may complain if an employer fails to comply with a statutory recognition order. Under the G-overnment' s original proposals, a complaint of this kind would have been referred to the Industrial Court. The TUC believe that the CIR would be a more appropriate body for adjudicating on these complaints, particularly since the CIR will have made the recommendations on which the order would be based. The Industrial Relations Committee accepted the force of the TUCs view, and agreed that this change in the statutory procedure should be made . Position of the nationalised industries Representatives of the nationalised industries have expressed some-jconcern that the provisions on recognition of trade unions appear to over-ride the statutory responsibility laid on nationalised undertakings to establish appropriate consultative and negotiating machinery.
The Industrial Relations Committee agreed, however, that in the event of a reference to the CIR of a recognition dispute involving a nationalised undertaking, it was necessary to provide that any subsequent statutory recognition order made by the Secretary of State should supersede the discretion given under the appropriate nationalisation statute . 2.
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY MANAGEMENT The TUC have welcomed the proposals, but have suggested that they should be extended to require the disclosure of information needed to further the participation of employees in the processes leading to the taking of management decisions. This phrase seems to cover some aspects of both negotiation and consultation. The CBI have expressed total opposition to any statutory requirement on an employer to disclose to a recognised trade union information which is relevant and necessary to negotiations in which they engaged- ^The CBI believe v
this to be an unreasonable infringement of management's discretion, which is not calculated to further the development of satisfactory collective bargaining. In order to allay some of the more justified anxieties of employers, the Industrial Relations Committee agreed that: /a. the statutory conu;TD'B
a.
:
;teal
the statutory requirement should be related to negotiations, and not extended to consultation between an employer and trade union officials; b.
more detailed guidance about the requirement should be provided in a Code of Practice, in the preparation of which the CBI and TUG wouV.. be consulted. Parliament would be required to approve the Code of Practice before the requirement to disclose information becomes effective; c.
there should be additional safeguards to protect information which it might be unreasonable or damaging for an employer to disclose. The Industrial Relations Committee did not reach a view whether the disclosure
requirement should apply to the Crown (see paragraphs 6-10 of the memorandum).
3 .
IMMUNITIES AFFORDED BY SECTION 3 OF THE 1906 ACT
Labour-only contracts
The Industrial Relations Committee agreed that the scope of Section 3 of
the 1906 Act should be extended to cover contracts personally to execute work
as well as contracts of employment or service. This would make it possible
for union officials to induce a breach of a contract with a self-employed
worker or with a gang of self-employed workers. It would not make lawful any
inducement of a broach of a commercial contract between two companies under
which one of them agrees to furnish the other with labour to do a particular
piece of work.
Ex parte injunctions The TUC have expressed concern about these injunctions which they claim
can materially weaken union action,. It is also alleged that union officials
sometimes hear nothing about the proceedings taken by the employer until the
judge has actually decided to award an injunction., I am in touch with the
Lord Chancellor on these allegations. On ex parte injunctions per b o , the
Industrial delations Committee did not consider that the comparatively rare
occasions on which an ex parte injunction was awarded against trade union
officials provided grounds for special protection for unions from these
proceedings .
4.
EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
The TUC and CBI oppose the proposal to extend the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals to disputes arising from the individual contract of employment. The Industrial Relations - Committee nevertheless agreed in /principle CONFIDENTIAL
principle that legislation should he introduced hut expressed concern about
the load on the Tribunals which night result from the proposed extension of
their jurisdiction.
The Committee therefore invited the Departments chiefly­
concerned (Lord Chancellor's Department, Treasury and Department of Employment
and Productivity) to consider further the administrative problems which would
be involved in implementing the decision previously agreed (see paragraph 14
of the memorandum).
5. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST UNFAIR DISMISSAL
The Committee approved a number of changes proposed in the provisions to
safeguard employees against unfair dismissal (in particular, the basis of
compensation). The Committee also agreed that the protection against unfair
dismissal should not apply to the dismissal of strikers during a strike unless
it was found to be for one of the specified unfair reasons (for example, an
employer would not be able to use the excuse provided by a strike for dismissing workers on the grounds of colour, race, sex, etc) . 6. RULES OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES At its meeting in October 1 9 6 9 , Cabinet invited the Industrial Relations
Committee to consider further whether it was desirable to legislate to prevent
Friendly Societies having rules debarring members of trade unions from
membership or benefits of Friendly Societies. The TUC have taken the view
that, although the particular society most complained of in the past
(the Foremen and Staff Mutual Benefit Society) has repealed its anti-trade
union rules, it would be desirable nonetheless to make legislative provision
to prevent any other society adopting similar rules in the future. - The
Industrial Relations Committee concurred and recommended that appropriate
clauses should be included in the Bill.
7. REGISTRATION OF PROCEDURE AGREEMENTS
The Industrial Relations Committee agreed that the Secretary of State
should have powers, should improve necessary, to make regulations requiring employers to register any written procedure agreements or arrangements. 8.
MODIFICATION OF SECTION l+ih) OF
1871
TRADE UNION ACT AND AMENDMENT OF THE
DEFINITION OF A TRADE UNION
These provisions will enable agreements between employers' associations and trade unions to be directly enforceable if there is an express written provision in the agreement to that effect. The TUG have not objected to this, CO^DEOTIAL
/^Ployers'
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Employers' associations will in future no longer be defined as trade unions
In it the political fund provisions of the Trade Union Act, 1913 will continue
l.o apply to them.
The TUC attached importance to this and. the CBI did not object. 9. TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENT SCHEME There are clearly different views inside the TUC about this proposal and. the TUCs official reaction has boon very tepid. On present information they will not oppose it, 10. REQU.TOEMENTS FOR REGISTERED TRADE UNIONS TO APPOINT QUALIFIED AUDITORS AND TO CARRY OUT REGULAR VALUATIONS OF THEIR SUPERANNUATION SCHEMES The TUC have not objected, to these proposals. 11. APPOINTMENT OP WORKERS' REPRESENTATIVES TO BOARDS OP UNDERTAKINGS Neither the TUC nor the CBI have expressed groat interest in. the White Paper proposal, that the Government would consider what more needed to be done to facilitate the appointment of employee representatives to management boards. The Industrial Relations Committee noted thai; a discussion document outlining some of the major issues for consideration has been sent to the TUC, CBI and nationalised industries. This sets out fully the pros and cons of different possible developments in this field. No replies to it have yet boon received. Whatever the reactions to it, it was not expected, that any conclusions would, be reached which would necessitate the inclusion of enabling provisions in the Bill. C O N F I D E N T I A L