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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1940.
SECRET
Copy N o .
W.M. (40)
116th Conclusions.
TO
B E
K E P T
U N D E R
LOCK
A N DK E Y .
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure t h e secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET
116 ( 4 0 ) .
CONCLUSIONS
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime
Ministers
Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Thursday, May 9, 1940, at 11-45 A.M.
Present :
The. R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN SIMON,
K.C.,
M . P . , Chancellor
of t h e
Exchequer.
The Right H o n . VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
The Right Hon. S i r KINGSLEY WOOD,
M . P . , L o r d P r i v y Seal.
The
Right
Hon. WINSTON
C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of
S.
the
Admiralty.
T h e R i g h t H o n . O L I V E R STANLEY, M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r .
The R i g h t H o n . S i r SAMUEL HOARE,
Bt., M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for A i r .
HANKEY,
The
Right Hon. LORD
Minister without Portfolio.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t Hon. S i r J O H N ANDERSON,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
Home Security.
The R i g h t Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n
Affairs.
The
A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r CYRIL L. N .
N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff.
Hon.
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff.
General Sir W . EDMUND IRONSIDE,
Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff.
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Major-General H . L. ISMAY.
Lieutenant-Colonel V . DYKES, R . E .
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l E . I . C. J A C O B , R . E .
Mr. G . N . FLEMMING.
[21271]
WAR
CABINET
116
(40).
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
Subject.
Page
1
Strategical Situation ...
...
...
...
...
...
Bofors guns.
Output of aircraft.
Denial of Dutch aerodromes to the Germans in the event of a
German invasion of Holland.
Invasion of Great Britain.
Passive defence measures.
Diversion of shipping.
Reduction of non-essential imports.
Financial considerations.
65
2
Netherland West Indies
Protection of oil refineries in Aruba and Curacao in the event of a
German invasion of Holland.
68
3
The Air Situation
69
4
The Naval Situation
Submarine operations.
69
5
O p e r a t i o n s in N o r w a y . . .
...
Kirkenes area.
Narvik area.
Bodo and Mosjoen area.
Casualties in t h e Trondhjem area.
6
Italy
Naval dispositions in the Mediterranean.
Diversion of Australian and New Zealand troop convoy.
71
7
The Netherlands
Possible German invasion.
72
...
...
...
...
70
Strategical
Situation.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 76th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
1. The W a r C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a R e p o r t by t h e Chiefs
of Staff C o m m i t t e e ( W . P . (40) 145) m a k i n g c e r t a i n r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t G e r m a n y h a d decided t o seek a decision
in 1940.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t considered seriatim t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s set
o u t i n p a r a g r a p h 3 of t h e R e p o r t .
(a) That every possible step should be taken to hasten the
production
of anti-aircraft
equipment,
particularly
Bofors guns, bomber
and fighter aircraft
and fully trained crews, even at the
temporary expense of our long-term
programme.
Bofors guns.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 47th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)
The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t t h e B o f o r s g u n s i t u a t i o n
w a s very serious, a n d the C h i e f s of Staff h a d p u t u p a special
R e p o r t on the subject to t h e M i l i t a r y C o - o r d i n a t i o n C o m m i t t e e
(M.C. (40) 95).
I n discussion, i t w a s e x p l a i n e d t h a t the M i l i t a r y C o - o r d i n a t i o n
C o m m i t t e e h a d recently e x a m i n e d the s i t u a t i o n w i t h t h e M i n i s t e r
of S u p p l y .
T h e factory a t N o t t i n g h a m w a s w o r k i n g a t full
c a p a c i t y . A t Coventry, however, o w i n g to l a b o u r difficulties, a
full n i g h t - s h i f t w a s not employed, a n d i t w a s suggested t h a t f u r t h e r
e n d e a v o u r s should be m a d e to improve t h e l a b o u r s i t u a t i o n a t
Coventry.
A n o t h e r difficulty w a s t h e w e a k n e s s of t h e Nuffield
Organisation.
The Prime Minister r e f e r r e d to t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t some of t h e
B o f o r s g u n s sent t o N o r w a y h a d lacked p r e d i c t o r s . The
Secretary
of State for War e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s w a s not so, b u t t h a t , o w i n g
to difficulties i n u n l o a d i n g , c e r t a i n g u n s m i g h t h a v e been u n l o a d e d
without their predictors.
Reference w a s also m a d e to r e p o r t s from officers r e t u r n i n g f r o m
N o r w a y t h a t the p r e d i c t o r m a d e the w o r k i n g of the Bofors g u n
too slow. T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r s a i d t h a t t h i s p o i n t
w o u l d be dealt w i t h in r e p o r t s of o p e r a t i o n s in N o r w a y .
Output of
I n r e g a r d to t h e p a r t of t h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n w h i c h dealt w i t h
aircraft.
F i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , the Secretary
of State for Air s a i d t h a t he h a d
(Previous
been e x a m i n i n g w h a t steps could be t a k e n to i m p r o v e o u t p u t d u r i n g
Reference:
t h e n e x t few m o n t h s w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h our long-term
W.M. (40) 111th p r o g r a m m e . H e w o u l d s u b m i t a R e p o r t to t h e W a r Cabinet on
Conclusions,
t h i s m a t t e r in t h e n e a r f u t u r e .
Minute 9.)
Denial of Dutch
aerodromes to
the Germans in
the event of a
German
invasion of
Plolland.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 113th
Conclusions,
Minute 9.)
(b) That every endeavour
should be made to induce the
Dutch
Government
to give the assurance for which -they have been
asked that they will make immediate
preparations
for the
demolition
of their aerodromes in the event of
invasion.
The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t t h e D u t c h Government
were believed to have t a k e n c e r t a i n steps in p r e p a r a t i o n for t h e
demolition of t h e i r a e r o d r o m e s in t h e event of invasion. H e w a s
t r y i n g to get f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h the A i r A t t a c h e .
Invasion of
(c) That the plan,s already prepared for dealing with invasion of
Great Britain.
this country should be reviewed forthwith
and
requirements
(Previous
met. In this respect the Ministry­ of Home Security
should
Reference:
be instructed
to maintain
the closest touch with the Service
W.M. (40) 108th
Departments.
Conclusions,
The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t the Chiefs of Staff C o m ­
Minute 4.)
m i t t e e w e r e e n g a g e d in a full e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s problem, and.
[21271]
B 2
h a d discussed t h e m a t t e r w i t h the Commander-in-Chief, H o m e
Forces. T h e y would be r e p o r t i n g shortly to t h e M i l i t a r y C o - o r d i n a ­
tion Committee.
The Minister
of Home
Security
said t h a t t h e R e g i o n a l
O r g a n i s a t i o n w a s in very close touch w i t h t h e Service a u t h o r i t i e s ,
b u t t h e n e w a p p r e c i a t i o n w h i c h extended the a r e a for r a i d s to t h e
N o r t h of Scotland, a n d envisaged the possibility of i n v a s i o n
a n y w h e r e between the W a s h a n d Newhaven, w o u l d involve t h e
w o r k i n g o u t of p l a n s on a broader basis t h a n before.
The Secretary of State for War questioned w h e t h e r a n y p a r t
of the S o u t h coast of E n g l a n d could be r e g a r d e d as a likely a r e a
for invasion. I f a r e a s in w h i c h a t t a c k w a s unlikely w e r e i n c l u d e d
in the scheme, one result w o u l d be to d e t r a c t from t h e s t r e n g t h of
the forces available to p r o t e c t more vulnerable areas.
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
thought that the
p r o p o s a l m a d e i n debate by L o r d M o t t i s t o n e t h a t local levies a r m e d
w i t h rifles m i g h t be f o u n d from a m o n g the older men to g u a r d
isolated places of i m p o r t a n c e , w a s w o r t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t all these m a t t e r s would be
fully s t u d i e d by the Chiefs of Staff. The First Lord of the A dmiralty
said t h a t t h e first e s s e n t i a l
of a successful defence a g a i n s t invasion was t h e h o l d i n g of c o m p a c t
mobile forces composed of good troops, a r m e d w i t h complete a n d
u p - t o - d a t e e q u i p m e n t , r e a d y to s t r i k e any force l a n d i n g in t h e
country.
The Secretary of State for War said t h a t A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n s
r e p r e s e n t e d the best t y p e of troops for t h i s p u r p o s e . W h e n t h e
1st A r m o u r e d Division w e n t t o F r a n c e — w h i c h i t would shortly be
d o i n g — i t w a s proposed t o b r i n g back the r e s t of the 5th Division,
so t h a t t h e r e would be a complete R e g u l a r f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s c o u n t r y .
Passive defence
(d) That
active
steps should
be taken
to editcate
public
opinion
to
the reality of the air threat and to develop to the
highest
measures.
pitch of efficiency our passive defence
measures.
(Previous
Reference:
The Minister of Home Security strongly s u p p o r t e d t h i s recom­
W.M. (39) 121st m e n d a t i o n . H e w a s a n x i o u s a b o u t the a p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y e d
Conclusions,
by t h e general public t o w a r d s civil defence, in s p i t e of efforts to
Minute 2.)
s t i m u l a t e them. M a n y people seemed to t h i n k t h a t a i r a t t a c k w o u l d
n o t t a k e place, or, if it did, would be easily d e a l t w i t h . T h i s i d e a
h a d been to some extent fostered by t h e c u t t i n g d o w n of p e r m a n e n t
A . R . P . personnel. I f t h e general public, from w h o m civil defence
volunteers were d r a w n , w e r e a p a t h e t i c , it w a s difficult to a r o u s e
e n t h u s i a s m in t h e volunteers. H e t h o u g h t t h a t m u c h could be done
in t h e course of speeches by M i n i s t e r s , a n d in t a l k s to t h e P r e s s ,
to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to the d a n g e r of a i r a t t a c k .
The First Lord of the A dmiralty said t h a t h e would d e p r e c a t e
a r e g u l a r c a m p a i g n a t t h i s s t a g e as to t h e d a n g e r of a i r a t t a c k .
H e t h o u g h t the r i g h t policy w a s to perfect t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n to deal
w i t h a i r a t t a c k , a n d to rely on the falling of the first bombs to
b r i n g people to t h e i r senses.
The Prime Minister
agreed. I f a fresh c a m p a i g n to a r o u s e
p u b l i c opinion on t h i s p o i n t w e r e now u n d e r t a k e n , a n d if n o bombing
took place in t h e course of the n e x t month or so, t h e c a m p a i g n w o u l d
not only lose i t s effect, b u t would cause a renewed onset of p u b l i c
a p a t h y . I t would be r i g h t , however, t h a t an occasional w a r n i n g
should be m a d e by M i n i s t e r s i n t h e i r speeches.
The First Lord of the Admiralty
suggested t h a t a c i r c u l a r to
local a u t h o r i t i e s d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n to recent events i n N o r w a y
m i g h t serve t h e p u r p o s e of w a r n i n g the c o u n t r y of t h e t y p e of
d a n g e r to be expected.
The Prime Minister
t h o u g h t t h i s suggestion w o r t h following
up. H e u n d e r t o o k to d r a w t h e a t t e n t i o n of the M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a ­
tion to the need for c o u n t e r a c t i n g a p a t h y w i t h o u t c a u s i n g a l a r m .
Diversion of
shipping.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 93rd
Conclusions.,
Minute 15.)
(e) That arrangements
for the diversion of shipping
to West Coast
ports should be placed in a state of immediate readiness,
This
should
be combined
with urgent
measures
drastically
to
restrict non-essential
imports.
The Minister
without Portfolio
said t h a t i n t h e course of t h e
p r e v i o u s few d a y s he h a d overhauled the a r r a n g e m e n t s for t h e
diversion of s h i p p i n g to W e s t coast p o r t s . A l l t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
of L o r d Chatfield's R e p o r t h a d been c a r r i e d out. S t e p s h a d been
t a k e n to e n s u r e t h a t there w a s n o congestion a t t h e W e s t coast p o r t s .
I n fact, at t h e p r e s e n t moment, t h e r e were less goods i n the W e s t
coast p o r t s t h a n a t a n y t i m e for y e a r s past.
The First Lord of the Admiralty
e n q u i r e d w h e t h e r there w a s
a n executive officer, who, if t h e emergency arose, could over-ride
G o v e r n m e n t D e p a r t m e n t s , a n d e n s u r e the successful execution of
diversion plans.
The Minister
without
Portfolio
said t h a t the whole a r r a n g e ­
m e n t s w e r e centred i n t h e M i n i s t r y of T r a n s p o r t , w h e r e t h e P o r t
a n d T r a n s i t Committee dealt d a i l y w i t h all movements of s h i p p i n g
i n a m o s t efficient m a n n e r . H e r e m i n d e d t h e W a r C a b i n e t t h a t
he h a d been i n v i t e d to a c t as the referee to w h o m D e p a r t m e n t a l
M i n i s t e r s could come for help in a n y case of difficulty.
Reduction of
non-essential
imports.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 56th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
Financial
considerations.
The Chancellor
of the Exchequer
said t h a t he h a d recently
e x a m i n e d t h e q u e s t i o n of c u t t i n g down non-essential i m p o r t s . A
d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n h a d a l r e a d y been made, a n d he w a s satisfied t h a t
non-essential goods would not be i m p o r t e d .
(f) In vietv of the seriousness
of the situation
we submit that, in
putting
these recommendations
into effect', financial
con­
siderations
should not be allowed to stand in the way.
The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t the Chiefs of Staff Com­
m i t t e e h a d p u t f o r w a r d t h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n w i t h diffidence, as they
a p p r e c i a t e d t h e g r e a t financial difficulties; b u t they hoped t h a t , if
t h e r e w e r e a n y financial r e s t r i c t i o n s w h i c h w e r e h o l d i n g u p
p r o d u c t i o n , or the execution of contracts, they w o u l d speedily be
removed.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said t h a t he i n no w a y objected
to this recommendation.
H e h a d e x a m i n e d t h e R e p o r t to see
w h e t h e r a n y of the m e a s u r e s recommended were b e i n g held u p for
financial reasons, a n d h e was g l a d to find t h a t t h e y w e r e not. T h e
difficulties of p r o d u c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n of p a y m e n t w e r e t h e governing­
factors.
The W a r Cabinet—
(1) Took note of t h e R e v i e w by the C h i e f s of Staff of t h e
s t r a t e g i c a l s i t u a t i o n on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t G e r m a n y
h a s decided t o seek a decision in 1940 ( W . P . (40) 145),
a n d gave g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l to the recommendations con­
t a i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h 3.
(2) Took note of t h e p o i n t s m a d e i n discussion in r e g a r d to
these recommendations, a n d a g r e e d t h a t t h e following
action should be t a k e n :—
(a) Production
of anti-aircraft
equipment,
particularly
Bofors
guns.
T h a t the Military Co-ordination Committee
should keep a close w a t c h on the p r o d u c t i o n of a n t i ­
[21271]
B3
a i r c r a f t e q u i p m e n t , especially B o f o r s g u n s .
The
p o s s i b i l i t y of i n c r e a s i n g the p r o d u c t i o n of the
Nuffield F a c t o r y a t Coventry, by w o r k i n g a full
n i g h t - s h i f t , should be e x a m i n e d .
(b) Passive defence
measures:
T h a t , while it w o u l d be u n d e s i r a b l e to i n s t i t u t e
a n i n t e n s i v e c a m p a i g n , steps should be t a k e n t o
r e m i n d public o p i n i o n of the r e a l i t y of t h e a i r
t h r e a t , a n d of t h e need for b r i n g i n g o u r passive
defence measures t o a h i g h s t a t e of efficiency.
In
t h i s connection—
(i) T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r u n d e r t o o k t o c o n s u l t w i t h
t h e M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n a s t o t h e steps
which s h o u l d be t a k e n to c o u n t e r a c t public
apathy :
(ii) T h e M i n i s t e r of H o m e S e c u r i t y u n d e r t o o k to
consider t h e issue of a C i r c u l a r L e t t e r t o
Local A u t h o r i t i e s , d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n , in the
l i g h t of t h e c a m p a i g n i n N o r w a y , to t h e
d a n g e r s w h i c h m u s t be g u a r d e d a g a i n s t :
(iii) M i n i s t e r s would no doubt t a k e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
of d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n to t h i s m a t t e r from time
to time in t h e i r speeches.
Netherland
West Indies.
2. T h e "War C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a R e p o r t by the Chiefs
of Staff C o m m i t t e e ( W . P . (40) 148).
Protection of oil
refineries in
Aruba and
Curacao in the
event of a
German
invasion of
Holland.
The First Sea Lord s a i d t h a t i t w a s of v i t a l . i m p o r t a n c e t o
p r e v e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e oil refineries in A r u b a a n d C u r a c a o .
T h e g r e a t e s t d a n g e r w a s t h a t of sabotage.
T h e r e w e r e seven
G e r m a n ships n o w i n C u r a c a o a n d one a t A r u b a , a n d m a n y G e r m a n
r e s i d e n t s i n t h e I s l a n d s . A scheme for the d e s p a t c h of t r o o p s to the
I s l a n d s h a d been a g r e e d w i t h t h e F r e n c h , a n d the C o m m a n d e r - i n Chief, A m e r i c a a n d W e s t I n d i e s S t a t i o n s , h a d been i n s t r u c t e d t o
m a k e all a r r a n g e m e n t s for the t r a n s p o r t of t h r e e companies of
B r i t i s h t r o o p s from J a m a i c a to C u r a c a o , a n d a d e t a c h m e n t of
F r e n c h troops from M a r t i n i q u e to A r u b a . T h e C h i e f s of Staff
p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y should be responsible for g i v i n g the
executive o r d e r for these moves i m m e d i a t e l y a G e r m a n invasion
of H o l l a n d b e g a n .
I n a n s w e r to a question by t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , h e said t h a t
t h e D u t c h , who seemed to realise t h e d a n g e r of sabotage a n d also t h e
possibility of t h e V e n e z u e l a n s t r y i n g to occupy t h e I s l a n d s them­
selves, h a d a l r e a d y increased t h e i r p r e c a u t i o n s .
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
deprecated the
p r o p o s a l i n p a r a g r a p h 4 of the R e p o r t to w a r n the D u t c h Govern­
m e n t now to b e on t h e i r g u a r d . T h e D u t c h showed clearly t h a t
t h e y d i d not w i s h to be involved w i t h u s in any w a y in taking­
p r e c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t enemy action. Moreover, such a move would r u n
c o u n t e r to o u r p r e s e n t policy, w h i c h we h a d followed i n t h e case
of Iceland, of h a v i n g no p r e l i m i n a r y consultations before l a n d i n g
forces in the o u t l y i n g possessions of countries o v e r r u n by G e r m a n y .
A l l t h e necessary a r r a n g e m e n t s h a d been m a d e by t h e F o r e i g n Office
for i n v i t i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t to s h a r e i n the control
of t h e I s l a n d s , t h o u g h we s h o u l d be careful n o t t o u s e t h e w o r d
" o c c u p a t i o n " w h e n the a p p r o a c h w a s made. W e should m a k e
i t clear t h a t t h e d e s p a t c h of t r o o p s w a s a p u r e l y t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e
so long a s t h e d a n g e r lasted. T h e t e x t s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to
be m a d e to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t h a d been a g r e e d w i t h
L o r d L o t h i a n i n W a s h i n g t o n , w h o w a s i n favour of t h e proposals
of t h e Chiefs of Staff to send t r o o p s to the I s l a n d s a n d to invite
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s to s h a r e i n t h e i r control. D r a f t s of these com­
m u n i c a t i o n s h a d been given to the F r e n c h ; they were s u g g e s t i n g
some a m e n d m e n t s w h i c h had not yet been received.
The Minister
without
Portfolio
suggested t h a t , if a formal
a p p r o a c h to t h e D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t w a s n o t to be made, t h e B r i t i s h
Consul should be i n s t r u c t e d to m a k e a n informal a p p r o a c h to the
D u t c h a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e I s l a n d s a s to the d a n g e r of sabotage.
The Secretary
of State for War said t h a t h e h a d spoken to
M r . Rogers, t h e C a n a d i a n M i n i s t e r of Defence, on the m a t t e r , a n d
h a d suggested t h a t it would be of g r e a t assistance to us if t h e troops
w i t h d r a w n from J a m a i c a could be replaced by C a n a d i a n s .
M r . R o g e r s h a d u n d e r t a k e n to m e n t i o n the m a t t e r to M r . Mackenzie
K i n g , w i t h o u t s t a t i n g t h e d e s t i n a t i o n of t h e troops to be w i t h d r a w n
from J a m a i c a . H e w a s hopeful t h a t the C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t
would supply the necessary troops.
The Secretary
of State for Dominion
Affairs
t h o u g h t t h a t it
would be better t o t a k e M r . M a c k e n z i e K i n g completely i n t o our
confidence.
The W a r C a b i n e t —
(i) A p p r o v e d the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of the Chiefs of Staff
c o n t a i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h 12 of W . P . (40) 148, subject
to the proviso t h a t n o official a p p r o a c h should be m a d e
to the D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t i n r e g a r d to p r e c a u t i o n s
a g a i n s t sabotage in A r u b a a n d Curacao.
(ii) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs to
consider t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of i n s t r u c t i n g t h e B r i t i s h
Consul in t h e I s l a n d s to m a k e a n informal a p p r o a c h to
t h e local D u t c h a u t h o r i t i e s on the subject of a n t i ­
sabotage p r e c a u t i o n s .
(in) Authorised t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n Affairs to
communicate with M r . Mackenzie K i n g :
(a) i n f o r m i n g h i m of the action p r o p o s e d ; a n d
(b) a s k i n g h i m to a g r e e t h a t , if B r i t i s h t r o o p s were
w i t h d r a w n from J a m a i c a , they m i g h t be replaced
by C a n a d i a n t r o o p s .
3. The Secretary
of State for Air said t h a t the only enemy
activity r e p o r t e d in t h e neighbourhood of our coast h a d been the
a p p r o a c h of t w o a i r c r a f t to t h e south coast early on t h e m o r n i n g
(Previous
of
the 9th M a y .
Reference:
No o p e r a t i o n s h a d been c a r r i e d out by the Bomber Command
W.M. (40) 115th
on
the
p r e v i o u s n i g h t on account of the b a d weather.
Conclusions,
T
h
e Coastal C o m m a n d h a d c a r r i e d o u t reconnaissances of the
Minute 2.)
H e l i g o l a n d B i g h t a n d of the N o r w e g i a n Coast. A t S t a v a n g e r only
12 a i r c r a f t h a d been seen on t h e a e r o d r o m e a n d t w o a i r c r a f t moored
in t h e a d j a c e n t a n c h o r a g e .
The Air
Situation.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above statement.
The Naval
Situation.
(Previous
4. The First Lord of the A dmiralty
described c e r t a i n n a v a l
movements w h i c h w e r e being m a d e to meet the contingency of a
G e r m a n invasion of H o l l a n d .
Reference:
W.M. (40) 115th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
Submarine
operations.
H . M . s u b m a r i n e Taku h a d r e p o r t e d t h a t she h a d a t t a c k e d two
t r a n s p o r t s escorted by two destroyers 100 miles n o r t h - n o r t h - w e s t
of H o r n s Reef o n t h e afternoon of the 8 t h M a y a n d believed t h a t
she h a d m a d e t h r e e h i t s . She h a d subsequently been a t t a c k e d by
d e p t h c h a r g e s a n d h a d r e t i r e d to w e s t w a r d to r e p a i r h e r d a m a g e .
A n enemy s u b m a r i n e w a s suspected in t h e D o g g e r B a n k a r e a
a n d a suspicious surface craft, w h i c h m i g h t have been m i n e - l a y i n g ,
h a d been r e p o r t e d off Newcastle. T h e T y n e w a s ' n o w closed p e n d i n g
search, but, g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , traffic w a s p r o c e e d i n g almost
n o r m a l l y in s p i t e of t h e recent enemy m i n e - l a y i n g activities.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took n o t e of t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
Operations in
Norway.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 115th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Kirkenes area.
Narvik area.
5.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t were given t h e following
information—
( 1 ) T h e c r u i s e r Devonshire h a d sailed from S c a p a for K i r k e n e s
to f o r e s t a l l a n y l a n d i n g of G e r m a n s there.
(2) L o r d C o r k h a d r e p o r t e d c e r t a i n o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h he w a s
p l a n n i n g in o r d e r to i m p r o v e t h e position of h i s troops.
H e h a d e x p l a i n e d t h a t h e w a s committed to these
o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h a t h e would p r e p a r e a t t h e same t i m e
for a more d i r e c t a t t a c k .
(3) T h e a r r i v a l of H . M . S . Ark Royal h a d h a d a m a r k e d effect
on t h e a i r s i t u a t i o n for 24 h o u r s , but bombing h a d b e g u n
a g a i n , a l l a n c h o r a g e s h a v i n g been a t t a c k e d on t h e
8 t h M a y , as well as s h i p s off N a r v i k .
(4) L o r d C o r k h a d visited S k a a n l a n d aerodi-ome a n d r e p o r t e d
t h a t a t least 9 days w o u l d be r e q u i r e d before i t could
be used. H e stressed the i m p o r t a n c e of s e c u r i n g t h e
a r r i v a l of H u r r i c a n e a i r c r a f t a t the e a r l i e s t possible
d a t e , a s these were t h e only a i r c r a f t capable of d e a l i n g
w i t h Heinkels.
The Chief of the Air Staff p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , w h i l e
it w a s n o doubt i m p o r t a n t to e x p e d i t e the a r r i v a l of t h e
H u r r i c a n e s , G l a d i a t o r s w e r e in fact of considerable u s e
against Heinkels.
S k u a s h a d also h a d some success
a g a i n s t H e i n k e l s in t h e T r o n d h j e m area.
Bodo and
Mosjoen.
( 5 ) I n a n s w e r to a question, the Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t
t h e r e w e r e r u m o u r s from S w e d e n t h a t t h e G e r m a n s h a d
established new aerodromes in Norway, but t h a t this
i n f o r m a t i o n h a d not been confirmed.
(6) T h e d e s t r o y e r I sis h a d h i t s u b m e r g e d w r e c k a g e i n B a l l e n g e r
F j o r d close to N a r v i k a n d w a s being t o w e d to Skjel
F j o r d a f t e r l a n d i n g her troops. Penelope, w h i c h h a d
been effecting r e p a i r s a t Skjel F j o r d , h a d been due to
leave o n t h e n i g h t of t h e 8 t h - 9 t h M a y . Aurora
had
r e p o r t e d some casualties a n d one t u r r e t out of a c t i o n ;
t h e cause of the d a m a g e was n o t yet k n o w n , b u t w a s
p r e s u m e d to have been a bomb. A convoy w i t h fuel a n d
stores w a s d u e to a r r i v e o n the evening of t h e 9 t h May.
A r r a n g e m e n t s h a d been m a d e to m a n a B r i t i s h destroyer
w i t h t h e c r e w of t h e P o l i s h destroyer Grom, w h i c h h a d
been s u n k a few d a y s previously.
L o r d Cork h a d
d e s c r i b e d t h e crew a s " excellent m a t e r i a l . "
(7) F o g h a d p r e v e n t e d the p r o p o s e d l a n d i n g of t r o o p s a t Bodo,
b u t t r o o p s h a d been d i s e m b a r k e d at M o s j o e n a n d t h e
F r e n c h t r o o p s e m b a r k e d from there.
The French
r e p o r t e d 2 G e r m a n b a t t a l i o n s 25 miles to t h e S o u t h .
The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff s a i d t h a t
t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n need n o t necessarily be accepted as.
a l t o g e t h e r a c c u r a t e . T h e force w h i c h h a d been landed
u n d e r Lieut.-Colonel G u b b i n s w a s specially e q u i p p e d
for g u e r r i l l a tactics, a n d m i g h t be e x p e c t e d effectively
to h a r a s s t h e enemy.
Casualties in
the Trondhjem
area.
(8) The Secretary
of State for War said t h a t definite i n f o r m a ­
t i o n w a s n o t yet available as to c a s u a l t i e s i n c u r r e d by
o u r t r o o p s i n the
fighting
N o r t h a n d South of
T r o n d h j e m , b u t i t w a s t h o u g h t t h a t they w o u l d probably
a m o u n t to 1,700 or 1,800 in all. B r i g a d i e r P h i l l i p s ' s
B r i g a d e , w h i c h h a d been described by A m e r i c a n P r e s s
C o r r e s p o n d e n t s a s h a v i n g been seriously cut u p , had, i n
fact, suffered some 200 casualties i n all.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of these s t a t e m e n t s .
Italy.
Naval
dispositions
in the
Mediterranean.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 115th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
Diversion of
Australian and
New Zealand
troop convoy.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 111th
Conclusions,
Minute 6.)
6. The First Lord of the A dmiralty i n f o r m e d t h e W a r Cabinet
t h a t H . M . S . Warspite h a d now p a s s e d t h r o u g h t h e d a n g e r zone a n d
would s h o r t l y join t h e rest of t h e Fleet a t A l e x a n d r i a .
The First Sea Lord said t h a t t h e slow convoy w i t h A u s t r a l i a n
a n d N e w Z e a l a n d troops w a s n o w a p p r o a c h i n g A d e n a n d t h a t i t
w o u l d soon be too l a t e to d i v e r t i t from going t h r o u g h the R e d Sea.
T h e convoy consisted of five s h i p s a n d w o u l d be escorted by H . M . S .
Ramillies,
o n e c r u i s e r a n d two destroyers. T h i s escort could be
r e g a r d e d as a d e q u a t e a g a i n s t a n y possible sea a t t a c k b u t could not,
of course, p r o v i d e complete p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t a i r a c t i o n in the
d a n g e r o u s s t r e t c h of 500 miles i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r p a s s i n g A d e n .
I n a n s w e r to a question, the Chief of the Air Staff e x p l a i n e d
t h a t some p r o t e c t i o n could be p r o v i d e d by fighter a i r c r a f t from
A d e n a n d a g a i n w h e n t h e convoy w o u l d be a p p r o a c h i n g Suez, b u t
n o t i n between.
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
s a i d t h a t he h a d
n o i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t the p o s i t i o n w a s becoming
more serious and t h a t the convoy o u g h t to be diverted.
The Secretary
of State for Dominion
Affairs
said t h a t the
A u s t r a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t w e r e r e a d y to accept our p r o p o s a l s in r e g a r d
to t h e convoy, b u t t h a t t h e y a s s u m e d t h a t sufficient protection would
be p r o v i d e d a g a i n s t sea a n d a i r a t t a c k .
I t w a s generally a g r e e d t h a t w h i l e it w a s impossible to give
a n a s s u r a n c e t h a t the convoy w a s p r o v i d e d w i t h " sufficient p r o ­
t e c t i o n " a g a i n s t all possible a i r a t t a c k , i t w a s nevertheless
reasonable i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t t h e convoy should be allowed
to proceed. I n t h e o r d i n a r y w a y it w o u l d r e a c h Suez about the
15th May.
The W a r Cabinet agreed—
T h a t t h e slow convoy w i t h A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d
t r o o p s t h e n a p p r o a c h i n g A d e n should proceed on its voyage
to Suez, a s o r i g i n a l l y p l a n n e d .
The
Netherlands.
Possible
German
invasion.
7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t t h e r e w a s no confirmation of the r e p o r t received the p r e v i o u s n i g h t via the United States Embassy t h a t the German Government h a d p r e s e n t e d a n u l t i m a t u m to the N e t h e r l a n d G o v e r n m e n t . T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h i s s t a t e m e n t . (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 115th
Conclusions,
Minute 6.)
Richmond
Terrace,
S.W.1,
May 9, 1940.