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Catalogue Reference:CAB/23/5
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[This Document is the Property of His-Britannic Majestys Government.]
Printed for the War Cabinet.
January
WAR
312,
1918.
SECRET.
Minutes
CABINET,
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on
Thursday, January 3 , 191S, at 11"30 A.M.
Present :
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R (in the Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n . t h e VISCOUNT M I L N E R
Lieutenant-General
J.
G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
T h e R i g h t Hon. G . N . B A R N E S , M . P .
the
Right
Hon.
C . SMUTS, K . C .
T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R EDWAPWD C A R S O N ,
K.C., M.P.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t :T h e R i g h t Hon. L O R D R O B E R T C E C I L . C ,
M.P., A c t i n g Secretary of State for
F o r e i g n Affairs, Minister of Blockade.
T h e R i g h t Hon. t h e E A R L O F D E R B Y , K . G . ,
A d m i r a l S I R R. E . W E M Y S S , K.C.B.,
C.M.G., M.V.O., F i r s t Sea L o r d a n d
Chief of t h e N a v a l Staff (for Minute 1).
Major-General
SIR F.
B. M A U R I C E ,
K.O.M.G., C.B., Director of Military
Operations (for Minutes 1 to 4 ) .
T h e Right, Hon. W . LONG, M.P., Secretary
of State for t h e Colonies.
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . S. C H U R C H I L L , M.P.,
SIR
A. D . S T E E L
A I T L A N D , B A R T . , M.P.
(for Minute 6 ) .
Mr.
STANLEY
BALDWIN,
M.P.,
Treasury
(for Minutes 6 a n d 7).
T h e H o n . S I R E D W A R D K E M P , K.C.M.G.,
Minister of Overseas Military Forces
from C a n a d a i n t h e United K i n g d o m .
G.C.V.O., C.B., Secretary of State for
W a r (for Minutes 1 to 5).
Minister of Munitions (for Minutes 6
a n d 7).
T h e R i g h t H o n . C. A D D I S O N , M . D . , M.P.,
Minister of Reconstruction (for Minutes
6 a n d 1).
The
Right
Hon. S I R A . STANLEY, M.P.,
P r e s i d e n t of t h e Board of T r a d e (for
Minutes 6 a n d 7).
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
C a p t a i n C L E M E N T J O N E S , Assistant
Secretary.
Mr. T H O M A S J O N E S , Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L. F . B U R G I S , Assistant
Secretary.
Secretary.
Sir Edward Kemp.
j . . T H E Prime Minister welcomed Sir E d w a r d K e m p to the
m e e t i n g of t h e W a r Cabinet.
Canadian Man­
power.
2. Sir E d w a r d K e m p s t a t e d t h a t t h e 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 men t h e Canadian
Government jxroposed to raise by conscription were now civilians
and could be reckoned as over a n d above t h e n u m b e r now in t h e
recruiting depots. Before further drafts could be made, t h e
consent of P a r l i a m e n t would have to be obtained. There was a
strong feeling in Canada t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , with t h e i r large
reserves of man-power, should now do t h e i r share.
N.
/
New Zealand
Man-power,
it
Russia.
3 . The Secretary of S t a t e for the Colonies expressed t h e opinion
t h a t t h e r e was very little chance of obtaining m a n y more recruits
from N e w Zealand.
4 . The A c t i n g Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs s t a t e d t h a t
t h e news from Russia was not encouraging, a l t h o u g h a hitch
had occurred in t h e peace negotiations. H e t h e n r e a d t e l e g r a m
No. 4 from Petrograd, d a t e d 1 s t J a n u a r y , 1 9 1 8 , in which t h e British
military a t t a c h e said t h a t M. Trotzki had postponed t h e re-assembly
of the J o i n t Conference, as t h e G e r m a n s h a d tried to trick him ;
also differences h a d arisen over t h e ' no a n n e x a t i o n " clause.
M. Trotzki maintained t h a t t h e e n e m y delegates a t Brest-Litovsk
agreed t o evacuate t h e occupied territory in order to allow t h e
population to select t h e i r form of government w i t h o u t pressure.
The enemy s t a t e d t h a t assemblies of notables in P o l a n d a n d Courlaiid
had already declared t h e i r wish for independence, while remaining
in t h e sphere of t h e Central PoAvers. It was s t a t e d t h a t K u h h n a n n
w a s in Berlin endeavouring to induce t h e G e r m a n General Staff to
agree to M. T r o t z k i s wishes. The t e l e g r a m s t a t e d , in conclusion,
t h a t M. Trotzki a n d his friends h a d so ruined t h e Russian a r m y
t h a t if he does break off negotiations t h e enemy will advance a few
kilometres a n d capture his guns. Telegram No. 5 was also referred
to, in which t h e British Ambassador s t a t e d t h a t t h e Bolsheviks h a d
discovered a G e r m a n plot, a n d t h a t thev m i g h t have to break off.
negotiations, a n d t h e y therefore w a n t e d to know w h a t assistance
m i g h t be expected from America should they have to go on. w i t h t h e
war.
T h e P r i m e Minister asked t h e Director of Military Operations
w h e t h e r h e would prefer t h e Russians to continue in t h e war a t
t h e price of t h e loss of t h e g u n s , as described by t h e A c t i n g
Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs, or a separate peace.
General Maurice replied t h a t h e would prefer t h e former, as,
though there was little hope from the N o r t h e r n Russian front, t h e
situation in t h e South would keep t h e A u s t r i a n s engaged.
Mr. Lone' suggested t h a t it m i g h t be worth while for t h e W a r
Cabinet t o obtain information from a certain Mr. L a t t i m o r e , an
E n g l i s h m a n who had j u s t r e t u r n e d from P e t r o g r a d , where his
brother, a bookseller, still resided. L a t t i m o r e could p u t t h e P r i m e
Minister in touch with M. Trotzki.
D u r i n g t h e m e e t i n g t h e A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for Foreign
Affairs a n d General S m u t s saw Mr. L a t t i m o r e m an adjoining room,
b u t , as a m o n t h h a d elapsed since he h a d left P e t r o g r a d , no
information of special value was elicited, beyond a n expression of
Mr. Lattimore's personal opinion t h a t M. Trotzki was an honest
idealist.
:
W a r Priorities:
5. General S m u t s raised t h e question of t h e position, in a scheme
priorities, of t h e naval a n d mercantile shipbuilding pro­
rimes.
Admiralty and
Mercantile Ship­
building-.
of
Trade W a r :
G. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet 2 4 8 , Minute 1 3 , t h e W a r
Cabinet had before t h e m interim report No. 6 of t h e Committee
appointed to consider t h e question of an Economic Offensive ( P a p e r
D e n u n c i a t i o n of
Commercial
Treaties.
T h e W a r Cabinet confirmed t h e decision which t h e y h a d t a k e n
on t h e Sth F e b r u a r y , 1 9 1 7 ( W a r Cabinet 5 8 , M i n u t e I), by
which t h e N a v a l programme had been partially cut down,
but, subject to t h a t reduction, had retained priority over
m e r c h a n t shipbuilding.
G.-177).
Sir E d w a r d Carson explained t h a t t h e report g a v e additional
reasons for t h e policy—already approved by t h e W a r Cabinet—of
denouncing commercial treaties.
H e drew special a t t e n t i o n to
paragraph 5 of t h e report, dealing with t h e s t a t e of opinion in t h e
House of Commons. In view of t h e criticism of, and opposition to,
t h e Non-ferrous Metal Bill a n d t h e Imports and E x p o r t s Temporary
Control Bill, it was most desirable t h a t a s t a t e m e n t of t h e general
commercial policy of the G o v e r n m e n t should be m a d e as early as
possible, in order t h a t t h e significance of each Bill, in relation to t h e
policy as a whole, should be appreciated. I t was most undesirable
t h a t the measures connected with the economic offensive a n d w i t h
post-war reconstruction should become entangled with t h e fiscal
controversies which had a g i t a t e d t h e country before t h e war.
Dr. Addison said he t h o u g h t , when t h e position was explained
to business men, t h e y would recognise a t once t h e necessity of t h e
proposed legislation. I t was not necessary a t t h i s stage to commit
ourselves t o the details of t h e control of t r a d e beyond i n t i m a t i n g t h a t
imports a n d exports would be regulated by licence.
Sir A l b e r t Stanley s t a t e d t h a t t h e Bill dealing with imports
and exports could be considered w i t h o u t a n y declaration on t h e
G o v e r n m e n t s general' policy in t h e future. P o w e r to e x t e n d t h e
control of imports a n d exports to t h e period after t h e stoppage of
hostilities was absolutely essential t o prevent chaos. On t h e question
of t h e control of raw materials, he hesitated about m a k i n g a n v
Government declaration, because of t h e enormous difficulties of
p u t t i n g such control into effective operation. T h e m a t t e r was a t
present before him a t t h e Board of Trade, b u t so far no solution of
t h e difficulties involved h a d been discovered.
Mr. Long said t h a t h e was certain t h a t t h e Dominion Govern­
m e n t s would give t h e most favourable consideration t o a n y proposals
for control of materials within t h e Empire, which m i g h t be placed
before them.
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil said t h a t it was essential to have t h e power
of suspending t h e most-favoured-nation clause, in order to enable us
to fulfil our obligations t o our Allies. The rebuilding of Belgium,
for example, could n o t t a k e place w i t h o u t such a suspension.
Mr. Churchill said t h a t he was in agreement w i t h t h e measures
proposed, in so far, and only in so far, as t h e y were war measures
a n d necessary for t h e wearing down of t h e enemy.
The W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
(a.) The I m p o r t s a n d E x p o r t s Control Bill should be considered
by P a r l i a m e n t a t t h e earliest possible d a t e ;
( 6 . ) A convenient Opportunity should be found a t an early d a t e
for a s t a t e m e n t of t h e general commercial policy of t h e
Government in relation t o t h e war a n d t o t h e transition
period immediately following t h e war ;
(c.) The R e p o r t of t h e Economic Offensive Committee (Paper
G.-177) be approved, b u t t h a t such approval should n o t
compromise t h e political a n d economic views of anyone
agreeing to it, t h e measures proposed being accepted as
essential as a war measure for b a r g a i n i n g in t h e peace
negotiations a n d for the rationing of materials in t h e
transitional period a t t h e close of t h e war.
New Issues of
Capital.
^
v-^-.
,
V- '
1
J
7. The W a r Cabinet h a d before t h e m t h e seventh interim report
£ j . ] Economic Offensive Committee, dealing with new issues of
capital ( P a p e r G.-183).
Sir E d w a r d Carson explained t h a t it was n o t proposed to
abolish t h e N e w Issues Committee at present a c t i n g for t h e
Treasury, b u t t h a t t h e r e should be a r i g h t of appeal t o a Committee
of Ministers by t h e Minister responsible for a n y D e p a r t m e n t whose
recommendation h a d not been accepted b y t h e N e w Issues Com­
mittee.
The W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
0
i e
The m a t t e r should be adjourned u n t i l t h e Chancellor of t h e
E x c h e q u e r could be present.
War Aims ^
^/
j^C-^-
* *
/-
g
p ;
Minister said t h a t the W a r Cabinet had h a d
several conversations on t h e subject of the action t o be taken in
r e g a r d to t h e s t a t e m e n t issued b y t h e enemy on t h e 25th December
of their negotiations for peace with the Bolshevik P a r t y in Russia.
A l t h o u g h t h e Allies were not in diplomatic relations w i t h t h e Bol­
sheviks, a n d did not recognise their a u t h o r i t y to t r e a t for peace on
behalf of Russia, these negotiations h a d resulted in an i m p o r t a n t
declaration of policy by t h e Central Powers. The W a r Cabinet h a d
felt t h a t we ought not to pass t h i s declaration by unnoticed.
We
o u g h t to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of it to issue such a declaration of our own
war aims as would maintain our own public opinion, and, if possible,
lower t h a t of t h e enemy. I n fact, t h e view to which the W a r
Cabinet inclined was to issue a declaration of our war aims which
w e n t to t h e extreme limit of concession, and-which would show to
our own people and to our Allies, as well as to t h e peoples of Austria,
T u r k e y , a n d even G e r m a n y , t h a t our object was not to destroy t h e
enemy nations. H e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e r e was a general agreement of
t h e W a r C a b i n e t a s t o the kind of t e r m s which we could offer. T h e y
m u s t include t h e restoration of Belgium, and reparation for all t h e
d a m a g e inflicted on t h a t country. The same applied to Serbia a n d
Roumania. G e r m a n y h a d as yet n o t even offered complete restora­
tion of Belgium, for there were phrases in t h e e n e m y s t a t e m e n t
which suggested t h e possibility of t h e retention of garrisons a n d
economic control. Much less had G e r m a n y m a d e a n y suggestion of
reparation. On t h i s point we m i g h t hope even t o secure t h e assent
of the Russian Bolsheviks.
The n e x t point brought us on to
much more disputable ground, namely, Alsace-Lorraine.
What­
ever m i g h t be t h e opinions held by individuals as to t h e prob­
ability t h a t France could realise the whole of her war aims in
this respect, it would be dangerous a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e war to
s u g g e s t t h e contrary. W e should t r e a t Alsace-Lorraine as a m a t t e r
in which we would support t h e wishes of t h e F r e n c h democracy,
who were m a k i n g very g r e a t sacrifices. I n r e g a r d t o I t a l y , we
could indicate in general t e r m s our support to the I t a l i a n claims t o
be united w i t h t h e peoples of Italian nationality now under A u s t r i a n
rule, w i t h o u t specific reference to t h e whole of t h e I t a l i a n war aims.
Some reference ought to be made in our s t a t e m e n t to such races
as t h e I t a l i a n s , Croats, Slovaks, Czechs, & c , who are u n d e r A u s t r i a n
rule, a n d w h o seek some form of autonomy. A s t a t e m e n t should
also be made in favour of a n independent Poland.
T h e most difficult point, so far as we were concerned, related to
t h e G e r m a n colonies. W e must remove t h e impression, sedulously
T
h
e
r
m e
spread a b o u t by German propaganda, t h a t we were merely t r y i n g t o
annex more t e r r i t o r y to an over-gorged Empire. H e t h o u g h t t h e
W a r Cabinet were in general a g r e e m e n t t h a t our proper course
would be to express our willingness to accept t h e application of t h e
principle of self-determination to the c a p t u r e d German colonies.
Precisely how t h e principle was to be applied need not now be
discussed, b u t t h e r e were chiefs and beads of tribes who could be
consulted.
The same principle might be applied in t h e case of
Mesopotamia—which was occupied by Arabs a n d n o t b y T u r k s —
a n d in t h e case of Palestine, which had a very mixed population.
O u r a t t i t u d e should be t h a t we were not going to h a n d these
territories back to t h e Germans or T u r k s unless their i n h a b i t a n t s
expressed a preference for German or Turkish rule. The first step
to be t a k e n , therefore, was to d r a w up a s t a t e m e n t of t h e case for
t h e consideration of t h e W a r Cabinet, in accordance with t h e
democratic principles enunciated by t h e Bolsheviks and to some
e x t e n t accepted by t h e enemy.
The n e x t question which arose was as to w h e t h e r we were to
discuss t h e question with all our Allies before publishing a s t a t e ­
ment. Tins would t a k e some weeks, and it would be very difficult
to draw up a document to which general assent would be given
which did not lack virility a n d individuality. Hence, if an answer
was to be given promptly, t h i s course was unsuitable, and we o u g h t
to adopt President W i l s o n s plan of an independent statement.
If this was agreed on, t h e question arose as to t h e form which
our answer should take. Should it be a note, and, if so, to whom
should it be addressed - W e could not send a note to M. Trotzki,
since we were not in diplomatic relations with him : neither could
we send it to Count Czernin. because t h a t would involve opening­
negotiations with t h e enemy. An a l t e r n a t i v e was to issue an
official statement. Our Allies m i g h t j u s t l y complain if we took this
course.
A second alternative was to m a k e a s t a t e m e n t in t h e form of a
speech. Speeches were constantly made by political leaders of all
the Allies, and t h e r e was no obligation to consult them before m a k i n g
a speech.
The suggestion t h a t had been m a d e to him was t h a t , in the
course of t h e negotiations which Sir Auckland Geddes was con­
d u c t i n g with the t r a d e s union leaders on t h e subject of man-power
and t h e release from certain pledges entered into earlier in t h e war,
it should be a r r a n g e d t h a t t h e P r i m e Minister should read a carefully
weighed s t a t e m e n t of t h e W a r Cabinet's policy. This was t h e more
easy to provide for, since it was understood t h a t t h e t r a d e unionists
would raise t h e question of war aims in t h e course of t h e discussions
with Sir A u c k l a n d Geddes. If the W a r Cabinet agreed to such a
s t a t e m e n t , it should, in his opinion, be couched in t e r m s which would
provide a counter-offensive to Count C z e r n i n s recent s t a t e m e n t , and
which would weaken t h e enemy. The Germans had got their blow
in first in t h i s peace offensive, b u t t h e r e were not lacking signs t h a t
it w a s beginning to expend its force. Personally, he did not believe
t h a t t h e e n e m y ' s s t a t e m e n t was a bond fide peace offer. I t s object
was to sow dissension among t h e Allies and t o rally t h e G e r m a n
people.
Sir E d w a r d Carson drew a t t e n t i o n to a n article in t h e " Cologne
G a z e t t e " which indicated alarm on t h e p a r t of t h e Germans lest
they should be t a k e n a t their word in r e g a r d to their s t a t e m e n t of
peace terms.
Mr. Barnes s t a t e d t h a t h e a t t a c h e d g r e a t importance t o t h e
psychological effect which would be produced a t home by t h e issue
of a full a n d reasoned s t a t e m e n t of our war aims.
Lord R o b e r t Cecil said t h a t he would like an o p p o r t u n i t y t o
express his views a t full l e n g t h , b o t h in r e g a r d to t h e form a n d
substance of t h e s t a t e m e n t to be issued.
H e w a r n e d t h e WatCabinet t h a t t h e speeches of Ministers in t h i s country, a n d
p a r t i c u l a r l y those of t h e P r i m e Minister, were very closely scrutinised
h y our Allies. H e was opposed to a n y u n n e c e s s a r y delay, b u t he
u r g e d t h a t t h e subject should be most carefully weighed before a
decision was taken.
The Secretary of S t a t e for t h e Colonies u r g e d t h a t , before a n y
s t a t e m e n t were m a d e , he should communicate t h e general lines of it
to t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e self-governing Dominions.
The P r i m e Minister agreed, a n d suggested t h a t Mr. W a l t e r
L o n g should tell t h e Dominions the reasons for m a k i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t .
H e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e press should be warned t h a t t h i s was i n t e n d e d
as a counter-offensive to C o u n t Czernin's s t a t e m e n t .
One point which h e proposed t o add, if t h e W a r C a b i n e t agreed,
was t h a t if t h e Russian democracy had not t a k e n t h e responsibility
of e n t e r i n g into negotiations w i t h t h e e n e m y b y themselves, we
should have stood by them, as we intended to s t a n d by t h e F r e n c h
democracy.
This w a s agreed to.
The W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
(1.) T h e question should be adjourned u n t i l 5 P . M .
(2.) Mr. Barnes, w h o w a s to t a k e t h e chair a t Sir A u c k l a n d
Gecldes's conference with t r a d e unionists in t h e afternoon,
should endeavour to secure an o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e P r i m e
Minister to m a k e his s t a t e m e n t on S a t u r d a y , if a n earlier
m o m e n t could n o t be arranged.
(3.) Before t h e m e e t i n g a t 5 o'clock, the S e c r e t a r y should
reproduce a n d circulate t h e t h r e e draft s t a t e m e n t s
prepared respectively by Mr. Philip K e r r , u n d e r instruc­
tions from t h e P r i m e Minister, General S m u t s , a n d L o r d
R o b e r t Cecil.
(4.) T h e Secretary of S t a t e for t h e Colonies should be authorised
t o telegraph t o t h e self-governing Dominions informing
t h e m t h a t a s t a t e m e n t was to be made, and explaining
the reasons for t h i s course.
Obligations to Our
Allies:
German Colonies.
s / L t-*C- "p.
9 . Sir E d w a r d Carson said t h a t he found g r e a t difficulty in
folio wing w h a t our obligations were t o our Allies, a n d suggested t h a t
;i synopsis should be m a d e by t h e Foreign Office showing (with
maps) the obligations we h a d u n d e r t a k e n . Sir E d w a r d Carson said
it would be a g r e a t help if h e could give a p a p e r of this sore to t h e
C h a i r m a n of t h e Newspajier Proprietors' Association (Sir George
Ridded).
The P r i m e Minister t h o u g h t t h e l a t t e r suggestion inadvisable.
A t t e n t i o n was d r a w n t o a Memorandum p r e p a r e d in t h e Colonial
Office ( P a p e r G . T . - 3 1 7 4 ) on t h e subject of the disposal of t h e G e r m a n
colonies.
Mr. L o n g said t h a t t h e l-e-establishment of G e r m a n y in t h e
Pacific would expose t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of America and C a n a d a to
g r e a t danger, and would involve an additional b u r d e n on G r e a t
Britain.
The P r i m e Minister suggested t h a t a copy of this P a p e r should
be s e n t t o t h e President of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of America.
T h e question w a s postponed for t h e further discussion agreed t o
on T u e s d a y , t h e 1 s t J a n u a r y , 1 9 1 8 ( W a r Cabinet 3 0 9 ,
Minute 1 8 ) .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t decided however, t h a t —
I n t h e meantime t h e Foreign Office should prepare a synopsis,
w i t h maps.
2 , Whitehall Gardens,
January 3, 1 9 1 8 .
S.W.,
o
'L
XD
1
);