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unOUMSNT I S THE PROPERTY 0? HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).
COPY NO.
2 n RET.
0 A B I N S T
50 ( 5 5 ) .
M e e t i n g o f the C a b i n e t t o b e h e l d a t N o . 1 0 , Downing
S t r e e t , S . V 7 . 1 . , on MONDAY, 2nd DECEMBER, 1 9 3 5 ,
at
3e0
pcin,,
A G E N D U M.
THE ITALO-ABYSSINlaN DISPUTE.
(Reference
C a b i n e t 49 ( 3 5 ) , C o n c l u s i o n
2)
8
Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y , c o v e r i n g e x t r a c t from t h e
14th Minutes o f t h e Sub-Committee on D e f e n c e
P o l i c y and R e q u i r e m e n t s .
C P . 220 ( 3 5 )
to be c i r c u l a t e d .
Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
c o v e r i n g R e s o l u t i o n s adotjted by the Committee
of E i g h t e e n .
Co P. 208 ( 3 5 )
already circulated.
Memorandum by the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n
A f f a i r s and t h e M i n i s t e r f o r League o f N a t i o n s
A f f a i r s on t h e p r o p o s e d embargo on o i l s u p p l i e s
for Italy,
C;P. 212 ( 3 5 )
t o be c i r c u l a t e d .
Records o f c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h G e n e r a l G a r i b a l d i .
C P . 225 ( 3 5 )
already circulated.
(Signed)
M.P.A.
Secretary
2,
Whitehall Gardens,
28th November,
S.V.lo,
1935.
to
HANKSY,
the
Cabinet.
llgjTnCUMS-NT
IS THE PROPERTY OF
HIS
BRITANNIC
MAJESTY S
;
GOVERNMENT).
:JJ^3-1'
332
COPY NO.
C A B I N E T
50 ( 3 5 ) .
CONCLUSIONS o f a M e e t i n g o f the C a b i n e t h e l d
1 0 , Downing S t r e e t , S . W . I . , on MONDAY,
2nd DECEMBER, 1935, a t 3.0 p.m.
at
PRESENT:
The R i g h t Hon. S t a n l e y B a l d w i n , M . P . ,
Prime M i n i s t e r .
( i n the C h a i r ) .
he Right Hon.
j , Ramsay MacDonald,
I
Lord P r e s i d e n t
of the
Council,
e Right Hon.
Sir John Simon, G . C . S . I . ,
K.C.V.O., 0. B.E. , K . C . , M.P. ,
Secretary o f S t a t e f o r Home
Affairs.
l e Right Hon.
The V i s c o u n t H a l i f a x , K.G. ,
Gr*C*3.I. , G . C . I . E . ,
Lord P r i v y S e a l .
Ihe Right Hon.
Malcolm MacDonald,
Secretary o f S t a t e f o r
Affairs.
Dominion
The R i g h t Hon.
N e v i l l e Chamberlain, M.P.,
C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer.
The R i g h t Hon.
S i r Samuel Hoare , B t . , G. C.S. I . ,
G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary
of S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .
The R i g h t Hon.
A . Duff C o o p e r , D . S . O . , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r War,
The R i g h t Hon.
Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister,
G.B.E., M.C., Secretary of State
for Air.
She Most Hon.
The Marquess of Z e t l a n d ,
C C S . I . , G.C.I.E. , Secretary
of S t a t e f o r I n d i a .
The R i g h t Hon.
S i r Godfrey C o l l i n s , K.B.Eo,
C.M.G., M.P., S e c r e t a r y of State
f o r Scotland.
Ihe Right Hon.
J.H. Thomas , M. P. ,
Secretary o f S t a t e f o r
Colonies.
The R i g h t Hon.
W a l t e r Runciman, M . P . ,
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f
the
Trade.
fhe Right Hon.
Sir B o l t o n E y r e s M o n s e l l , G.B.E.
F i r s t L o r d o f the A d m i r a l t y .
The R i g h t Hon.
Anthony Eden, M . C . , M . P , ,
M i n i s t e r f o r League of N a t i o n s
Affairs.
F&e Right Hon,
Lord E u s t a c e P e r c y ,
Minister without P o r t f o l i o .
The R i g h t Hon
Walter E l l i o t , M.C., M.P.,
M i n i s t e r f o r A g r i c u l t u r e and
Fisheries.
The Right Hon.
O l i v e r S t a n l e y , M.C. , M . P . ,
P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f
Education.
The R i g h t Hon.
S i r K i n g s l e y Wood, M . P . ,
M i n i s t e r of Health.
The Right Hon.
Ernest Brown, M.C. , M.P. ,
Minister o f Labour.
The R i g h t Hon.
W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P. ,
F i r s t Commissioner o f Works.
0
1 mtf-g DEBATE ON
K r g ADDRESS.
1.
The Prime M i n i s t e r reminded h i s
colleagues
I
of
the importance o f M i n i s t e r s b e i n g w e l l
represented
L
on t h e F r o n t Bench d u r i n g t h e Debate on t h e Address on
I
t h e morrow.
i
created a particularly
An empty Government Bench, he a d d e d ,
bad i m p r e s s i o n on new Members.
^HB ITALOAEYSSTKIAW
DISPUTE.
2 . The Cabinet had b e f o r e
documents r e l a t i n g
Sanctions .
t o the
them t h e
following
Italo-Abyssinian
dispute:.-
E x t r a c t s from t h e Most S e c r e t Minutes
o f a M e e t i n g o f t h e Sub-Committee o f
t h e Committee o f I m p e r i a l Defence on
D e f e n c e P o l i c y and R e q u i r e m e n t s , h e l d
on Novernber 26th ( C . P . - 2 2 0 ( 3 5 ) ) ,
c i r c u l a t e d t o t h e C a b i n e t by d i r e c t i o n
o f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r :
Resolutions
adopted by,
the Committee
of E i g h t e e n
at Geneva.
Proposed
Embargo on
Oil Supplies
for I t a l y .
A N o t e by the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r
Foreign Affairs (CP.-SOB (35))
circulating ( i n continuation of
C P . - S O O ( 3 5 ) ) P r o p o s a l s adopted by
t h e Committee o f E i g h t e e n a t Geneva
on t h e 2nd and 6th November i n
connection with the a p p l i c a t i o n o f
sanctions to I t a l y :
(Previous
Reference:
Cabinet 49
( 3 5 ) , Con­
o lusion 2 .)
A J o i n t N o t e by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and t h e M i n i s t e r
f o r League o f N a t i o n s A f f a i r s ( C P . - 2 1 2
( 3 5 ) ) c i r c u l a t i n g a Memorandum drawn
up i n t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e on t h e q u e s t i o n
o f t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f an embargo on o i l
s u p p l i e s f o r I t a l y , and s u g g e s t i n g t h e
a t t i t u d e t o be t a k e n by H i s M a j e s t y ' s
Government i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s i t u a t i o n
described therein:
FA
51 (35)1,
A Note by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r
Foreign A f f a i r s ''CP.-225 (35)) cireu­
l a t i n g to h i s c o l l e a g u e s records o f
c o n v e r s a t i o n s t h e Permanent U n d e r S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e and h i m s e l f had
had. w i t h G e n e r a l G a r i b a l d i o n November
S 5 t h and S8th r e s p e c t i v e l y , t o which
was annexed t e n t a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s under
which I t a l y would b e p r e p a r e d t o c e a s e
h o s t i l i t i e s and come t o Geneva a g a i n
t o l a y h e r c a s e b e f o r e t h e League o f
Nations.
. .
( T h e Lord C h a n c e l l o r , who had an u n a v o i d a b l e
p u b l i c engagement, had communicated h i s
v i e w s t o t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y , and some o f them w e r e mentioned
t o t h e C a b i n e t by t h e l a t t e r . )
The S e c r e t a r y
o f State for Foreign Affairs
that the question o f
an embargo on o i l
I t a l y r a i s e d a number o f v e r y
First,
said
against
difficult
issues.
t h e r i s k o f a "mad d o g * a c t by S i g n o r
M u s s o l i n i and i t s
future o f
consequences.
Second,
the
s a n c t i o n s a n d , w i t h them, o f t h e L e a g u e ,
and, i n c i d e n t a l l y ,
the c r e d i t
o f His
Majesty s
r
Government.
Risk o f
Aggression.
(*-, R,
$
As r e g a r d s t h e r i s k o f a "mad d o g * act
w e r e two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
that c o u l d not be
there
ignored.
First,
he had r e c e i v e d a number o f a l a r m i s t ,
from d i f f e r e n t
Capitals
t e n d i n g t o show t h a t
M u s s o l i n i would r e g a r d an o i l -embargo as
defeat
inevitable,
g e t out o f h i s
and might
difficulties
use i t
of
to s u i c i d e .
the serious
gaps
Signor
rendering
as a p r e t e x t
by a t t a c k i n g t h e
i n the Mediterranean,
tantamount
reports
Second,
British
e v e n though i t was
t h e r e was t h e
i n our s y s t e m o f
question
Imperial
Defence,
w h i c h w e r e i n a weak s t a t e as compared w i t h an
mobilised
for war.
Meeting o f
Italy
T h i s had b e e n emphasised a t
the Defence P o l i c y
the
and Requirements Commits
t e e and i n a R e p o r t he had r e a d on t h e p r i o r i t y
defensive
needs.
to
That was a s u b j e c t
t o r e t u r n on a n o t h e r o c c a s i o n ,
of
t o which he w i s h e d
namely, to
enquire
w h e t h e r i t would not be p o s s i b l e t o speed up t h e
replacement
o f our d e f i c i e n c i e s .
Neither o f the
p o i n t s , h o w e v e r , c o u l d be i g n o r e d .
We ought not
under-rate the r i s k :
but n e i t h e r
it.
t h e r e was much I t a l i a n
In these r e p o r t s
and i t was o b v i o u s l y
should we
to Signor M u s s o l i n i ' s
make t h e danger appear as t e r r i b l e
Particular
c a s e s had b e e n brought
which were c l e a r l y
as
propaganda
interest
would meet economic
to h i s
notice
In addition^
to the
Mussolini
effect
t h a t he
s a n c t i o n s w i t h economic measures
and not regard, them as a casus b e l l i . .
Only a day
o r two ago t h e P r e s s had been t o l d i n Rome t h a t
oil
to
possible.
I t a l i a n propaganda.
s a i d on t h e s u b j e c t ,
to
ovefrrate
some account ought t o be t a k e n o f what S i g n o r
had h i m s e l f
above
embargo would be r e g a r d e d as an u n f r i e n d l y
but not a casus b e l l i .
He had a l s o j u s t
an
act
received
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t members o f L l o y d s had u n d e r t a k e n
large
i n s u r a n c e s on b e h a l f o f
Italian
covering a considerable period.
these
Companies
I t was u n l i k e l y
Companies would have r i s k e d t h e l o s s o f
money w h i c h would o c c u r i f war r e s u l t e d .
that,
their
To t h i s
must be added t h a t a t t h e moment t h e r e was a r e g u l a r
b a r r a g e o f moves f o r peace on b e h a l f o f I t a l y , * by
S i g n o r C e r r u t i i n P a r i s , Signor Suvieh i n Rome,
and General G a r i b a l d i i n London (who had now been
disowned by Signor G r a n d i , though t h e r e was no doubt
that he came from Signor M u s s o l i n i ) , and, l a s t o f
by Signor Grandi h i m s e l f , who, a f t e r
all,
a long p e r i o d o f
gloomy v a t i c i n a t i o n , had now become an e n t h u s i a s t
peace
negotiations.
-med
He sim/up t h i s p a r t o f h i s remarks by saying
oil
for
increased the r i s k o f a "mad dog" a c t , but
was no reason to get i n a panic about i t ,
i n view o f some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
return l a t e r .
to take
Nevertheless,
that
there
particularly
to which he would
i t was very
necessary
precautions.
That r a i s e d h i s
second p o i n t , namely, the
o f present events on our a t t i t u d e towards
and c o l l e c t i v e
security.
effect
sanctions
Whatever some members o f
the Cabinet might have thought i n the p a s t , o n the
subject of sanctions * there was no doubt that the
economic e f f e c t
great.
o f sanctions on I t a l y had a l r e a d y been
The p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t
been even g r e a t e r
a
had probably
The v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s
concerned
had p r o v i d e d a more s o l i d front, than we had r e a s o n
to e x p e c t , s u b j e c t , o f c o u r s e , to one o r two known
/ / As to o i l ,
exceptions, /the o i l
sanction had been agreed to
p r i n c i p l e unanimously by the Committee o f
on November 15th, s u b j e c t
Eighteen
to f u r t h e r e n q u i r i e s
the United S t a t e s a t t i t u d e .
in
He r e c a l l e d that
about
the
Cabinet had agreed to it on October 9th i n these
words
"(v)
That i f o i l - p r o d u c i n g or s u p p l y i n g
Member S t a t e s such as Roumania were
prepared to impose an embargo on
exports o f o i l . B i s Majesty s
Government would be prepared to
j o i n i n t h i s and to c o n s i d e r f u r t h e r
an embargo on exports o f c o a l " .
T*e proposed to i g n o r e c o a l f o r
the moment.
Since
then the Member S t a t e s producers, o-f o i l had expressed
I
t h e i r readiness
to co-operate.
had w r i t t e n i n t h i s
sense t o t h e L e a g u e , and t h e Dutch
had i n f o r m e d our M i n i s t e r
prepared to co-operate .
Secretary of
State
R u s s i a and Roumania
a t The Hague t h a t t h e y
In r e p l y
to a question
producing
The F r e n c h , though t h e y w e r e not
had e x p r e s s e d r e a d i n e s s t o
of
the
s a i d t h a t t h e Russian r e p l y was
dependent upon t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n o f o t h e r
countries.
were
co-operate.
The
producers,
attitude
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America had been defined,
Mr C o r d e l l H u l l ' s
had s a i d
in
speech o f November 1 5 t h , where h e
­
"This class o f trade is d i r e c t l y contrary
t o t h e p o l i c y o f t h i s Government as
announced i n t h e o f f i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s
o f t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e , as i t i s a l s o c o n t r a r y t o t h e
g e n e r a l s p i r i t o^" t h e N e u t r a l i t y A c t . "
S i n c e t h e n much p u b l i c p r e s s u r e had b e e n b r o u g h t
h e a r upon t h e O i l
and
America^probably
Companies, who w e r e unpopular
to
in
P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t had g a i n e d some
popularity
i n p r e s s i n g them.
therefore,
that
all
I t m i g h t be
t h e Member S t a t e s o f
said,
t h e League
e x c e p t o u r s e l v e s had e x p r e s s e d t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s
support the o i l
s a n c t i o n , and o f
t h e non-Member
to
States
t h e o n l y one t h a t counted was b r i n g i n g p r e s s u r e t o
on t h e
firms .
difficult
oil
to
U n t i l we g a v e our answer we w e r e i n a
position.
Italy,
His Majesty's
I r a n was t h e t h i r d s u p p l i e r
and i n t h e c a s e o f m o t o r - s p i r i t ,
had s t a r t e d ; a g a i n s t
f o r our f a i l u r e
b r i n g reproached
A very active
second.
propaganda
us i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and F r a n c e
to define our p o s i t i o n ,
and we w e r e
t h a t we l e d i n s a n c t i o n s u n t i l
moment when our own i n t e r e s t s w e r e
The S e c r e t a r y o f
(l)
of
Government had t h e l a r g e s t h o l d i n g in t h e
A n g l o - I r a n i a n O i l Company.
tions
bear
affected.
S t a t e t h e n made h i s own recoromenda­
t o t h e C a b i n e t , w h i c h w e r e as
On no account
the
should we adopt
follows
a negative
attitude
t o what we had a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d on O c t o b e r 9 t h and
November 29th, or g i v e any appearance o f
refusing
our part i n genuine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , provided
a c t i o n was not going to be f u t i l e .
that
Having taken the
l i n e that we h a v e , and having fought the E l e c t i o n on
it,
incidenta.lly,
any other course o f a c t i o n would,
i n h i s v i e w , be d i s a s t r o u s
o b v i o u s l y an e f f e c t i v e
and i n d e f e n s i b l e .
sanction.
The more
i t was the more should we be placed i n an
position if,
effective
indefensible
having supported what, many people thought
were i n e f f e c t i v e
tive one.
O i l was
s a n c t i o n s , we now opposed an e f f e c ­
The Lord Chancellor had taken that v i e w .
Rather to h i s
s u r p r i s e , he had learned that
the
Governor of the Bank o f England was f a v o u r a b l e
they
strong s a n c t i o n s , o n the ground that /
matter to a head r a p i d l y and that a
to
would b r i n g the
long-drawn-out
a p p l i c a t i o n o f sanctions would b r i n g about a s e r i o u s
situation.
He had r e c e i v e d a message from S i r Austen
Chamberlain, who had had a t a l k w i t h M . H e r r i o t .
The l a t t e r had been very d e f i n i t e to the e f f e c t
that
we ought to go ahead with the o i l s a n c t i o n and t h a t
the firmer the B r i t i s h Government was the
stronger
would be the support we should get from French p u b l i c
opinion.
His v i e v was that M * L a v a l and P a r i s
o p i n i o n a g a i n s t sanctions was not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
of
France.
(2)
We must, however, take every
precaution,
(a)
as
possible
follows:­
( m i l i t a r y ) . As the Defence P o l i c y and
Requirements Committee had s a i d , we must a t once
c l e a r up the p o s i t i o n w i t h P r a n c e .
He had taken
a c t i o n i n t h i s matter, w i t h some doubts i n h i e mind
as to the r e s u l t .
The q u e s t i o n had been put by
His M a j e s t y ' s Ambassador i n P a r i s very,
explicitly,
as to whether we could count on France to a s s i s t
if
us
a t t a c k e d , and whether, i n that e v e n t , she would
r e g a r d h e r s e l f as i n a s t a t e o f war w i t h
Italy.
M. L a v a l ' s
answer had been a c a t e g o r i c a l
Better
still,
he had r e p e a t e d t h i s v e r y
to t h e
I t a l i a n Ambassador i n P a r i s .
affirmative.
straight
No assurance
c o u l d be c l e a r e r t h a n t h e one we had r e c e i v e d .
p e o p l e , h o w e v e r , might t h i n k t h a t M, L a v a l ' s
was i n s u f f i c i e n t
of
He
a war w i t h I t a l y .
suggested, however, that
so l o n g as we w e r e on
friendly
terms w i t h F r a n c e we w e r e bound t o
t h e i r assurances.
supported
assurance
as F r e n c h p u b l i c o p i n i o n would n o t
f a c e the p o s s i b i l i t y
and i n t i m a t e
Some
this
The Lord
C h a n c e l l o r , he
accept
noticed,
opinion.
At t h e same t i m e we must check t h e e f f i c a c y
F r e n c h u n d e r t a k i n g by a d o p t i n g M . L a v a l ' s
of
the
own
s u g g e s t i o n t o e x t e n d t h e d i s c u s s i o n s which had begun
b e t w e e n N a v a l . E x p e r t s t o t h e Army and A i r
Staffs.
The t i m e would a l s o come when we ought
ascertain definitely
the p o s i t i o n o f other
Powers.
D i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e King o f
revealed
that t h e r e were not
difficulties
to
likely
Naval
Greece had
to be many
i n t h e use o f a Greek p o r t .
had a l r e a d y b e e n t e n t a t i v e l y r a i s e d w i t h
The
question
representa­
t i v e s o f Y u g o s l a v i a and T u r k e y , but t h e s e ought t o be
f o l l o w e d up i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n d e f i n i t e l y
were prepared to d o .
what
In a d d i t i o n , we must do
t h i n g p o s s i b l e t o e x p e d i t e our own programme
they
every­
of
re-equipment.
(b)
We must a l s o t e s t the p o s i t i o n w i t h the
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America.
We a l r e a d y had the s t r o n g
moral support, o f the United. S t a t e s Government *
Nevertheless, o i l
exports t o I t a l y
from America
in
the Quarter ending September were 96-000 tons as
a g a i n s t 34,000 tons i n the p r e v i o u s y e a r ,
p r o b a b l y more had been p u r c h a s e d .
If
and
an o i l
embargo
were adopted the p o s i t i o n would have to be watched,
and i f American exports to
-7­
I t a l y continued h i g h
t h e p o s i t i o n might have t o he r e - c o n s i d e r e d .
he understood
t h a t approaches had b e e n made t o t h e
t r a d e i n England t o s e e i f
brought
oil
some p r e s s u r e c o u l d be
t o b e a r on t h e American Companies t o a g r e e
a v o i d an e x c e s s o f
of
Incidental^
e x p o r t s , and perhaps t h e
t h e Exchequer c o u l d i n f o r m t h e Cabinet
to
Chancellor
as t o
the
result.
( c ) We must p r e s s on w i t h t h e pea.ce n e g o t i a t i o n s
rapidly
conflict
as p o s s i b l e , w i t h a v i e w t o b r i n g i n g
t o an e n d .
Mr P e t e r s o n , o f t h e
O f f i c e , was now i n P a r i s
short
the
Foreign
engaged on c o n v e r s a t i o n s .
He h i m s e l f ,
N o t much p r o g r e s s had b e e n made as y e t .
h o w e v e r , had t o
go away f o r r e a s o n s o f h e a l t h f o r
t i m e , and he p r o p o s e d on h i s
M. L a v a l and t o t r y
journey t o
and he proposed t h a t b e f o r e he l e f t
see
t o r e t u r n t o Rome,
he should, be
some i d e a o f o u r a t t i t u d e on t h e s u b j e c t .
I t a l i a n s w e r e anxious
t o know our v i e w s
But we must
avoid
of
sanctions.
He was i n some doubt, as t o w h e t h e r
t i o n s ought
t o be brought
i n a t once when t h e
give
a better
the peace c o n v e r s a t i o n s , the f i x i n g o f
s h o u l d be adjourned
for
the
sane­
League
chance t o
date
d e c i s i o n at a l a t e r
meeting.
The i s s u e was w h e t h e r i t might not be b e t t e r t o
the prospect o f
an o i l
s a n c t i o n hanging o v e r
M u s s o l i n i ' s head r a t h e r than t o f i x
once,
own a g e n t s
r e p r e s e n t e d , he would become much more
On t h e w h o l e , h e thought
keep
Signor
the date at
i n which c a s e , as S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i ^
that
getting
g i v i n g any i m p r e s s i o n o f weakening i n support
Committee me* , o r w h e t h e r , t o
in
directly,
t h e y w e r e not a c c e p t a b l e , i n s t e a d o f
them second-hand through P a r i s .
given
Later
the d i s c u s s i o n the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e e x p l a i n e d
even i f
a
and p r e s s on peace t a l k s w i t h h i m .
I n a d d i t i o n , S i g n o r Grand! was about
the
as
intransigeant.
t h e i s s u e ' d e p e n d e d on t h e
p r o s p e c t o f t h e peace t a l k s .
w e r e g o i n g w e l l - - and l a t e r
- &­
If
the
discussions
i n t h e M e e t i n g he
expressed the v i e w
be t h e e a s e —
t o l d that
and t h a t
that at f i r s t
t h i s was l i k e l y
t h e League Committee m i g h t meet and he
t h e p e a c e t a l k s w e r e g o i n g on
for
asking for
to
satisfactorily
t h a t r e a s o n we and t h e French w e r e not
t h e immediate i m p o s i t i o n o f
On the w h o l e , h e thought t h a t
if
an e m b a r g o .
the t a l k s were
going
w e l l i t would he w i s e t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e embargo by
two s t a g e s .
T h e r e was a g r e a t
this breathing-space,
(1)
embitter
the United
the d i f f i c u l t i e s
in controlling
sanctions
provided
that
it
o f the American S e c r e t a r y
or
(2) b r e a k down t h e
As r e g a r d s
( 1 ) he mentioned a t e l e ­
to the Cabinet.
r e a c t i o n s were bad, i t
State.
If
yet
t h e American
might be n e c e s s a r y
consider the suggestion o f
to
re­
t h e two s t a g e s , as i t was
t o have no m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h A m e r i c a
in
matter.
Summing up h i s s u g g e s t i o n s , t h e S e c r e t a r y
State
His
The Ambassador had n o t
seen the American S e c r e t a r y o f
this
State
Ambassador i n W a s h i n g t o n , which had b e e n
circulated
essential
increase
of
gram he had s e n t on t h e p r e v i o u s Saturday t o
Majesty's
fob
d i d not
S t a t e s o f America and
exports;
front.
d e a l t o be s a i d
for Foreign A f f a i r s
(l)
of
proposed:­
To go ahead w i t h t h e o i l s a n c t i o n
on t h e l i n e s he had p r o p o s e d :
(2) To t a k e t h e p r e c a u t i o n s he had
suggested:
(3) To go ahead w i t h t h e p e a c e t a l k s :
and
(4) P r o v i d e d the prospects were s a t i s f a c t o r y ,
to leave the date o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f
sanctions.
In reply
State
to various
questions
for Foreign Affairs
some d e t a i l s .
the Secretary
of
a m p l i f i e d h i s statement
A l l he p r o p o s e d t o g i v e t o
in
Signor
Grandi was a fra.me%vork o f our own i d e a s on t h e
subject.
A,s r e g a r d s t h e o i l
a l r e a d y a g r e e d +0 i t
s a n c t i o n , M. L a v a l had
in p r i n c i p l e .
-9­
Most n a t i o n s
had
agreed,
at
except o u r s e l v e s .
Consequently,
Geneva on t h e s u b j e c t was l i k e l y
the
procedure
S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i was e x p e c t i n g t h e d a t e o f
the
s a n c t i o n t o be f i x e d
If
a t Geneva next w e e k .
oil
there
w e r e a postponement t h i s would be such a r e l i e f
him t h a t he was u n l i k e l y
i n consequence o f
already
to take p r e c i p i t a t e
a mere c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a
the Secretary o f
course o f which the Prime M i n i s t e r
e v e r y member o f
the C a b i n e t .
agreement on t h e S e c r e t a r y o f
possible,
principle
State for
in the
i n v i t e d the
"Taere was
state's
to d i v i d e the a p p l i c a t i o n o f
and the d a t e l e f t
stage.if
opinion
general
proposal,
the o i l
if
sanction
State
t o be s e t t l e d
at
the
Lord o f t h e A d m i r a l t y and t h e
for Air
particulars
gave t h e Cabinet
o f the s t a t e o f
highly
a r e on r e c o r d
secret,
preparedness o f
i n the Cabinet
i n connection with C P . - 2 2 0
t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s was t h a t ,
(35)) .
the
Office
The g i s t
of
a l t h o u g h t h e r e was no
t h e F l e e t was s t r o n g enough t o
command o f
t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , we might s u s t a i n
obtain
s i n c e our f o r c e s w e r e not i n a p r o p e r
readiness
Fleet
area.
doubt t h a t
losses,
reached.
Secretary
and t h e R o y a l A i r F o r c e i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
(Particulars
the
second
i n t h e meantime no s e t t l e m e n t had been
The F i r s t
of
Foreign
two s t a g e s , t h e p r i n c i p l e b e i n g c o n f i r m e d a t
first,
of
action
was f o l l o w e d by a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n ,
Affairs
into
to
accepted .
The s t a t e m e n t o f
of
brief.
t o be r a t h e r
f o r war i n a l a n d - l o c k e d s e a .
serious
state
Economic
s a n c t i o n s had b e e n b u i l t up b e h i n d t h e s t r e n g t h o f
Mediterranean F l e e t ,
some o f
and i f
our
our weaknesses w e r e known
t h e n a t i o n s s u p p o r t i n g s a n c t i o n s might show
less a l a c r i t y .
The r e a c t i o n
of possible
hostilities
i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n on o u r I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e
position
i n other parts o f
The
defences
of
t h e w o r l d was e m p h a s i s e d .
Singapore were s t i l l
i n c o m p l e t e , and our
p o s i t i o n i n the P a r East depended on t h e B r i t i s h
Navy.
So l o n g as t h e F l e e t was t i e d upon t h e
t h e p o s i t i o n would he
The a i r
difficult.
p o s i t i o n i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was e v e n w o r s e
than that o f
forces
Mediterranean
the F l e e t ,
a s , a l t h o u g h when a l l
i n t h e Near F a s t ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e F l e e t A i r Arm,
w e r e added t o g e t h e r we had n u m e r i c a l p a r i t y ,
I t a l i a n machines had a b e t t e r p e r f o r m a n c e ,
as r e g a r d s
the
particularly
l o n g - r a n g e bombers and perhaps f i g h t e r s .
Our p e r s o n n e l , h o w e v e r , was s u p e r i o r .
air
the
A l t h o u g h our
f o r c e s would a c t i n some r e s p e c t s on
l i n e s , we w e r e
liable
interior
t o a t t a c h from, d i f f e r e n t
a t t h e same t i m e ,
so t h a t i t was d i f f i c u l t
bombing a t t a c k s -
Under p r e s e n t p l a n s no
guns would be a v a i l a b l e
for
quarters
to
intercept
anti-aircraft­
the defence o f
Alexandria.
The A i r F o r c e c o u l d t h e r e f o r e o n l y do t h e b e s t
could to act
i n support o f
the F l e e t
hypothetical
enemy i n L i b y a .
that could deflect
In the matter o f
production.
The o n l y
the
thing
an I t a l i a n a i r a t t a c k would be
should r e q u i r e not only
facilities
vVe
f o r our own
aircraft
c o - o p e r a t i o n by t h e F r e n c h A i r F o r c e
against
a s s i s t a n c e i n the matter o f
counter-attack.
to
That
depended o n c o m p l e t e c o - o p e r a t i o n by F r a n c e .
a t t a c k and d e f e n c e
the
impossible
a t t a c k t h e I t a l i a n b a s e s and N o r t h I t a l y .
but a c t i v e
it
and t o a t t a c k
o u t p u t o f machines and ammunition i t was
to increase the r a t e o f
.
in
Some
supply would, be r e q u i r e d
from t h e Army.
I t was p o i n t e d o u t
whether i n the F l e e t
that
from w h i c h t h e e x p a n s i o n o f
(as d e a l t w i t h i n the Report o f
Requirements
and A i r
losses,
o r t h e R o y a l A i r F o r c e , we should
l o w e r t h e datum p o i n t
forces
i f we s u f f e r e d
Committee) would s t a r t .
point o f v i e w ,
that our defence
M e d i t e r r a n e a n were n o t
therefore,
forces
the
our
Defence
From t h e
Naval
i t was r e p r e s e n t e d
and d e f e n c e s
i n the
in a proper c o n d i t i o n for
and from t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w i t was u r g e d t h a t an
war,
effort
s h o u l d be made t o o b t a i n p e a c e , h o l d i n g t h e t h r e a t
the o i l
the
of
of
sanction over
Italy,
and t h a t t h e f i x i n g
date should, not be decided, u n t i l a f t e r
peace
a
strongly urged,
the Defence
S e r v i c e s , t h a t no d e c i s i o n t o
sanctions
failure
from the p o i n t . o f
should be t a k e n u n t i l
by P r a n c e had b e e n s e c u r e d ,
effective
apply
co-operation
i n accordance w i t h previous
of
State
f o r War thought
easy t o e x a g g e r a t e the importance o f
that
ammunition, as t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s
anti-aircraft
guns was d o u b t f u l ,
of
value.
increase
ammunition.
of
s a t i s f i e d , as t o
As r e g a r d s t h e
i n our s t a t e o f
the
production
date,
f o r a fev- weeks o r a month, was not
t o make much d i f f e r e n c e
of
rendered the a
t h a t was b e i n g made i n t h e
anti-aircraft
postponement
He was f a i r l y
was
and t h e r e w e r e
o c c a s i o n s when c l o u d s , and. so f o r t h ,
little
it
the s h o r t a g e
anti-aircraft
rapid
view
decisions.
The S e c r e t a r y
of
of
discussions.
I t was a l s o
Cabinet
of
going
preparedness.
He a l s o made some comments o n t h e p o l i c y t o be a d o p t e d ,
w h i c h a r e i n c l u d e d i n t h e g e n e r a l summary which
follows .
One s u g g e s t i o n made i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e
was t h a t
if
the r e s u l t
of o i l
s a n c t i o n s was t o p r o d u c e
war i t would b r e a k t h e League o f
Nations,
since
n o - o n e would s u p p o r t a League w h i c h not o n l y
s t o p t h e war but a c t u a l l y
discussion
extended
failed
it.
A s u g g e s t i o n was made t h a t I n s t e a d o f
taking a
d e c i s i o n a t Geneva on December 12th i n f a v o u r o f
embargo i n p r i n c i p l e
and. p u b l i s h i n g
it
an
without
naming t h e d a t e , w h i c h would put S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i
a difficult
duress, i t
to
in
p o s i t i o n o f b e i n g aa.ke* t o c l i m b down under
might be b e t t e r t o
prolong the
a t Geneva pending t h e a s c e r t a i n m e n t
discussion
o f what
action
was going, t o be t a k e n e l s e w h e r e , and m e a n w h i l e ,
in
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h F r a n c e , t o warn Signc-r M u s s o l i n i
that the o i l
s a n c t i o n c o u l d n o t he h e l d o f f
I t was e x p l a i n e d , h o w e v e r ,
that almost a l l
had a l r e a d y committed t h e m s e l v e s
much l o n g e r .
t h e Governments
in p r i n c i p l e
s a n c t i o n s , as had most o t h e r n a t i o n s
except
t o the
ourselves,
and t h a t t h e o n l y t h i n g t o he done was t o s e t t l e t h e
I t was p o i n t e d out t h a t
the p o l i t i c a l
had gone f a r beyond our own m i l i t a r y
that
if
situation,
and
S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i were t o t a k e a c t i o n i t
he w e r e f o r c e d t o make a c o m p l e t e
date.
situation
would
n o t be a mere "mad d o g " a c t but b a s e d on some r e a l
If
oil
plan.
s u r r e n d e r he virould
p r o b a b l y d i s a p p e a r from I t a l i a n p o l i t i c s
and t h e r e
might
be a Communist Government i n I t a l y and a c o m p l e t e
alteration
i n the w h o l e European s i t u a t i o n .
In
the
c i r c u m s t a n c e s m e n t i o n e d by the D e f e n c e M i n i s t e r s we
ought n o t t o f a c e h o s t i l i t i e s
lutely
f o r c e d upon u s .
possible
of this
it
—
t h e y were
We ought t o do
t o shov/ our d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s
question —
everything
did not
of Abyssinian t e r r i t o r y
from Europe the danger o f a g g r e s s i o n .
i n t h i s drama showed S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i
figure
on t h e s t a g e .
would disappear^
Hitler
A t t h e end o f
the
as t o
remove
The F i r s t
as t h e
principal
t h e F i r s t A c t he
on t h e s t a g e , and we c o u l d n o t d i s s o c i a t e
the m a l i g n a n t
influences
i n another episode.
Italy
in the present
position
rather
I t was u r g e d ,
therefore,
t h a t i t was not t h e d i s p u t e
and A b y s s i n i a
our
i n the F i r s t A c t from t h e Second A c t ,
r e m a i n e d i n t a c t we s h o u l d have t o f a c e up t o them
s h o u l d make c l e a r
Act
b u t the Second A c t might show H e r r
present d i f f i c u l t i e s
If
believe
us s a n c t i o n s had one s a 4 &
t n a t we w e r e / c o n c e r n e d s o much w i t h
re-distribution
abso­
in the whole
though many p e o p l e
and p o i n t out t h a t f o r
object,
unless
that s p e c i a l l y
later
t h a t we
between
i n t e r e s t e d u s , but
t h e d i s p u t e between t h e League and an a g g r e s s o r .
A n o t h e r p o i n t made was t h a t the p o s i t i o n would b e
worse
in the future
sanctions
if,
having attempted
failed.
,
-13­
sanctions,
As r e g a r d s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
it
was pointed" out
t h a t we need n o t pay t o o much a t t e n t i o n t o
p o s i t i o n as t h e y w e r e a c t u a l l y
increasing
their
Moreover,
export o^ o i l
possible
Italy.
t o purchase t h e i r
a price,
heavily
it
was
c o - o p e r a t i o n at
^hey must r e a l i s e
our own s e c u r i t y ,
in this
to
their
too
t h a t we had t o
high
consider
t h e i r own p o s i t i o n b e i n g
unaffected
respect .
A point
s t r o n g l y u r g e d was t h a t i f
were a d o p t e d a t a l l
maximum e f f i c i e n c y
t h e y should he b r o u g h t t o
the g r e a t e r
t h e common f r o n t .
also that o i l
The l o n g e r
t h e danger o f
to
sanctions
a break
in
I t had to be b o r n e i n mind
sanctions
h i t the a r m i e s , whereas
the i m p o r t s s a n c t i o n h i t t h e c i v i l i a n
I t was u r g e d t h a t p r e s s
purchases of o i l
the
in order to b r i n g the c r i s i s
an end as soon as p o s s i b l e .
continued,
sanctions
population.
i n f o r m a t i o n as t o
in Suez,
for
Italian
examples
e x a m p l e , and o t h e r /
w o u l d be b r o u g h t up a t Geneva and make our
p o s i t i o n very
difficult
a p p l i c a t i o n of
the o i l
Some members o f
if
to
the
sanction.
the Cabinet thought t h e
o f an I t a l i a n a g g r e s s i o n
g i v e n hostages
we d i d n o t a g r e e
t o be r e m o t e .
to fortune.
risk
Italy
In t h e e v e n t
had
o f war
h e r a r m i e s i n A b y s s i n i a and L i b y a would b e i n a
precarious position with
On the o t h e r hand,
their
communications
the C a b i n e t were g i v e n
secret
i n f o r m a t i o n which i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e I t a l i a n
o f an a c t i v e r e t a l i a t i o n
implemented by a c t u a l
The M i n i s t e r
t o an o i l
if
threats
embargo had been
preparations.
f o r League o f N a t i o n s
urged strongly that
cut.
Affairs
he was a s k e d t o do a l l
c o u l d t o o b t a i n a postponement
in the date
of
he
s a n c t i o n s he must he i n s t r u c t e d on no account
b r e a k t h e common f r o n t .
He had r e c e i v e d
from Geneva t h a t when t h e Committee o f
met December 2 1 s t was l i k e l y
the i m p o s i t i o n o f
good
a/prospect of
it
might
ment o f
be
the o i l
to
the d a t e , b u t i f
talks,
a postpone­
the p r o s p e c t s w e r e n o t
good
instructions
two s t a g e s .
I t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t
t o adopt
for
there were
obtain
he asked t h a t he might n o t be g i v e n
t o work f o r
Eighteen
If
a r e s u l t from t h e p e a c e
possible
information
t o be proposed
sanction.
to
the o i l
i t would n o t b e w i s e
embargo as a t h r e a t u n l e s s we w e r e
p r e p a r e d t o implement
it
Q
Prom t h e p o i n t o f v i e w
of B r i t i s h t r a d e ,
Cabinet were asked to r e a l i s e
the
that sanctions
i n v o l v i n g v e r y s e r i o u s l o s s , and
were
representations
were c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g made t o t h e Board o f
Trade
by the v a r i o u s t r a d e o r g a n i s a t i o n s
effect.
That
justified,not
but g r e a t
to t h i s
the wriping out o f
sanctions,
c a u t i o n where B r i t i s h t r a d e was
The C a b i n e t w e r e reminded t h a t S a n c t i o n s
III
had b e e n a g r e e d t o b e c a u s e
concerned.
I,
II
and
they w o u l d put
pressure
on I t a l y with,
trade.
The p r o p o s e d S a n c t i o n IV was l e a d i n g us
further
the l e a s t p o s s i b l e
down the p a t h .
I t was i m p o s s i b l e t o
back b u t the p r o p o s e d o i l
very serious.
America,
their
embargo made t h e
AS regards
oil
l a s t s i x months had b e e n p r o d i g i o u s
to
turn
position
the U n i t e d S t a t e s
importation into I t a l y
i n c r e a s i n g e v e r y week.
cost
of
during
and was
T h i s i m p o r t a t i o n was n o t
c a r r i e d out o n l y b y t h e S t a n d a r d O i l
but a l s o by the independent
Company
companies.
Although
the
the o i l
t r a d e was unpopular i n America t h e s e
were p o l i t i c a l l y
of
oil
powerful.
was l i k e l y
to
Consequently
c o n t i n u e t o go i n t o
t h a t happened i t would not i n f a c t
been s u g g e s t e d ,
for
a great
deal
Italy.
If
be p o s s i b l e ,
t h e League t o r e t r a c e
b e c a u s e no-one would l i k e to
say t h a t
its
to c o n t r o l t h e s i t u a t i o n e x o n e r a t e d
nations
from f u r n i s h i n g
to
Italy.
p o i n t o f view a long-drawn-out
was t h e w o r s t
steps,
other
Prom a trade­
period of
condition of a l l .
as had
America's
failure
oil
companies
sanctions
A reverse
in the
M e d i t e r r a n e a n w o u l d c o s t us l e s s than t w e l v e months
of
sanctions .
The r e a l
question f o r
d e c i s i o n was
w h e t h e r we w e r e p r o c e e d i n g i n t h e r i g h t w a y .
M u s s o l i n i as yet had shown no s i g n s o f
Signor
weakness.
P o s s i b l y he was t h i n k i n g more o f Egypt t h a n o f
Abyssinia",
more o f A l e x a n d r i a
than o f M a l t a .
gap b e t w e e n our f o r e i g n p o l i c y
defence
forces
observations
of
the Secretary o f
possibility
the o i l
the F i r s t
State
The
Cabinet
c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the
Ford o f
our
the A d m i r a l t y
grave
and
f o r A i r and t h e i r w a r n i n g o f
o f serious l o s s e s , f o r
s a n c t i o n and i t
brought
t h e p u b l i c would not e a s i l y
especially
and t h e s t a t e o f
and d e f e n c e was t o o . w i d e .
ought t o g i v e t h e g r e a t e s t
The
the
i f we p r o c e e d e d w i t h
about
forgive
a serious
the
when t h e s e r i o u s w a r n i n g s o f
reverse,
Government,
the
Defence
Departments became known.
Towards t h e end o f
that
t h e M e e t i n g i t was p o i n t e d out
t h e r e was p r a c t i c a l l y
no d i f f e r e n c e
o f o p i n i o n on
what should be d o n e , but o n l y on e m p h a s i s .
There
appeared t o b e g e n e r a l agreement t h a t we should, not
d e c l i n e to take part
i n an o i l
o t h e r c o u n t r i e s were prepared
embargo, p r o v i d e d
t o go on w i t h i t .
that
As
t o t h e method, t h e q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e was whether we
should urge the a p p l i c a t i o n o f
sanctions
a t once
or a f t e r
an i n t e r v a l
a peaceful
i n which t o t r y and promote
settlement.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s
t h e hey t o t h e p o s i t i o n .
so l a r g e
that
T h e i r output of o i l
they could render the
o f produce o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s
If
at the p r e s e n t
not supported,
stultified
was
withholding
o f no
avail.
t i m e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a c t i o n was
the P r e s i d e n t ' s
s t r o n g p o l i c y - w o u l d he
and he would r e f u s e
to g i v e
co-operation.
In t h i s
wise
t h e Chairman o f
to consult
held
situation
it
the
further
had been
thought
Anglo-Iranian
O i l Company who had p r o m i s e d t o g e t i n touch w i t h
the Chairman o f
t h e Standard O i l Company.
Sir
Cadman had r e p o r t e d t h a t i t was n o t p o s s i b l e
o b t a i n an i n f o r m a l b a r on the s u p p l y o f o i l
in other words, a v o l u n t a r y arrangement,
the League a p p l i e d an embargo.
He was
John
to
to
Italy,
unless
satisfied,
however,
t h a t t h e companies would b e w i l l i n g not
increase
their
supplies
that p u b l i c opinion
President
to I t a l y .
He thought
i n A m e r i c a would e n a b l e
t o check t h e e x p o r t
of o i l .
to
also
the
Finally,
Sir
John had e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w t h a t an embargo on o i l
would be an e f f e c t i v e
The o b j e c t
If
of
sanction.
an o i l
s a n c t i o n was t o s t o p war.
the war c o u l d be s t o p p e d by making the
t h a t w o u l d be b e t t e r .
That ought to b e
therefore,
if
success.
The q u e s t i o n a t
oil
peace
tried,
there were a reasonable p r o s p e c t
i s s u e was w h e t h e r an
s a n c t i o n would c o n t r i b u t e
towards a
s o l u t i o n o r make S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i more
Prom t h i s p o i n t
of view
namely,
peaceful
intransigeant.
t h e r i g h t c o u r s e api^eared t o
be t h a t p r o p o s e d by the S e c r e t a r y
Foreign A f f a i r s ,
of
that i f
showed a r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t
of
State
for
peace
talks
of success, the
oil
s a n c t i o n s h o u l d b e p o s t p o n e d and the t r u e
given.
If
S i g n e r M u s s o l i n i was
reason
intransigeant
the League ought t o f a c e up t o t h e r i s k s .
M. L a v a l ' S
herself
definite
statement
opposed by a l l
After
I t a l y would
find
the o t h e r c o u n t r i e s
and an
a g g r e s s i o n on her p a r t would mean s u i c i d e .
M u s s o l i n i was so a l l - p o w e r f u l
his people b e l i e v e
was a s u c c e s s f u l
other
oil
countries
t h a t he c o u l d make
that a peaceful
issue.
Signor
settlement
On the o t h e r hand,
i t would be s a i d t h a t but f o r
s a n c t i o n he would have o b t a i n e d a good
more a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
deterrent
supported,
therefore,
if
peace d i s c u s s i o n s
of success,
the
s a n c t i o n s h o u l d be p o s t p o n e d , but t h a t i f
imposed i n s p i t e
of
success,
of
deal
The s u g g e s t i o n was
that
out r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t s
the
s a n c t i o n s would remain a
i n the f u t u r e .
up no p r o s p e c t s
in
held
oil
they
opened
the s a n c t i o n must be
the r i s k s .
I n the m e a n w h i l e ,
it
was u r g e d t h a t the i n t e r v a l
of
the League s h o u l d b e employed t o push on as
r a p i d l y as p o s s i b l e w i t h peace
before
the meeting
talks.
The C a b i n e t were reminded o f
the
remarkable
u n a n i m i t y between t h e Dominions and the Mother
Country on the q u e s t i o n o f s a n c t i o n s ,
urged that
and i t
i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h i s common
was
front
t h e r e should be an e a r l y m e e t i n g w i t h
representatives
Cabinet's
of
the/decision
the Dominions i n London as soon as
had been t a k e n .
The C a b i n e t w e r e
informed
t h a t £fee High Commissioners had a l r e a d y been
informally
of
as t o t h e l i n e p r o p o s e d by the
State f o r
likely
Foreign A f f a i r s
Secretary
and t h a t i t was
t o meet w i t h t h e i r a p p r o v a l a t t h e
meeting.
sounded
proposed
The p r o p o s e d m e e t i n g was g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d
to.
A s u g g e s t i o n was made t h a t
the p o s i t i o n o f
the
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America should, be c l e a r e d u p ,
o r d e r t o avoid the mlsunderstanding
i n which
t o work w i t h Washington so o f t e n r e s u l t e d .
disquieting
their
features
attempt
League o f N a t i o n s .
They m i g h t have a n o t h e r
to
the P r e s i d e n t
the
that
sanctions.
s e s s i o n , which enabled him t o t a k e t h e h i g h
t o support
undermined.
Neutrality
But i f
Congress w e r e
A paradoxical
p o i n t was t h a t , under t h e
Congress w e r e t o add e x p o r t s
what t h e P r e s i d e n t
was entitle-"'' t o w i t h h o l d and
Signor Mussolini
t h e s e doubts ought
from u s .
t o he put
t o t h e United. S t a t e s , hut t h e S e c r e t a r y o f
Foreign Affairs
thought
there were a g r e a t
i n the next
and i t
t h i s would be
fall
frankly
State
i n t h e amount o f
to a v o i d
exports
any i s s u e between
Congress
President.
t h e d a t e a t Geneva, we should, t r y
agreement
exports to
and s e c u r e
t h a t no n a t i o n would i n c r e a s e
Italy,
""his would
postponing the date o f
of
the Board o f
the Secretary o f
State
the
fixing
general
normal
policy
" I r i s was
suggestion that
the
Trade, in consultation
with
for Foreign A f f a i r s s h o u l d
once see r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f
S h e l l O i l Companies
its
facilitate
t h e embargo.
a g r e e d t o , as was a f u r t h e r
President
for
premature.
A n o t h e r s u g g e s t i o n was t h a t , p e n d i n g t h e
of
I t was
month we should have got what we w a n t e d ,
was d e s i r a b l e
and t h e
to
p e r p e t r a t e d , an a g g r e s s i o n , we should
a l s o have American s u p p l i e s w i t h h e l d
suggested that
to
t h e P r e s i d e n t h i s p o s i t i o n would be
Law, i f
If
at
was a c t i n g w h i l e Congress was
moral l i n e w i t h success .
refuse
to
firstly,,
bright
give a hint
t h e moment we d i d not want a d d i t i o n s
out o f
The most
keep a s t e p ahead o f
i d e a n e x t w e e k , and we ought
Secondly,
efforts
i n American p o l i c y w e r e ,
always to
in
t h e A n g l o - I r a n i a n and
(which controlled a l l
-19­
British
at
oil
concerns as s u b s i d i a r i e s )
a c t i o n by t h i s
After
with a view to
c o u n t r y on t h e s e
securing
lines.
emphasis had b e e n l a i d on t h e importance
of
a success t o t h e League o f N a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y
as a
w a r n i n g t o Germany, t h e d i s c u s s i o n r e v e r t e d
the
possible
effect
of
s a n c t i o n s on S i g n o r
I t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t i f
to
Mussolini.
t h e peace t a l k s
failed
and
s a n c t i o n s w e r e a p p l i e d , S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i would s e e
t h a t he was bound t o be b e a t e n .
might
In t h a t
e v e n t he
d e c i d e t h a t he would not y i e l d t o t h e League
N a t i o n s and a t t a c k t h i s c o u n t r y
necessity-
In t h i s
i n order to avoid
c o n n e c t i o n t h e q u e s t i o n was
as t o whether we had r e a l l y , made s a t i s f a c t o r y
b i n d i n g arrangements w i t h P r a n c e .
of
that
raised
and
U n t i l such arrange-?
ments had b e e n made i t was u r g e d o n c e more t h a t we
ought not
to f i x
the negotiations
co-operate,
the d a t e o f
the o i l
sanctions-
If
showed t h a t " r a n e e was not w i l l i n g
to
t h e w h o l e m a t t e r would have t o be r e ­
considered The S e c r e t a r y o f
to
State for
Foreign Affairs
agreed
this.
So f a r
as t h e French Navy was c o n c e r n e d ,
however,
t h e C a b i n e t w e r e informed, t h a t we c o u l d h a r d l y
a c c e p t i n g the u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
Although the French port
situation vis-a-vis
defences
ask Prance
m o b i l i s e when we had not. done so o u r s e l v e s .
a c c e p t e d , however,
a t once w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y
whole matter
of
State for
and. c l e a r
conversations.
War s a i d t h a t t h e
as t o t h e n e c e s s i t y
The C a b i n e t w e r e
h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e y v.-ere i m p o r t a n t
view.
was
t h a t we ought t o go ahead
conversations
S t a f f w e r e somewhat d o u b t f u l
of
It
to
the
up.
The S e c r e t a r y
military
France.
c o u l d n o t be manned
without, m o b i l i s a t i o n , we c o u l d h a r d l y
generally
avoid
General
of
informed,
from an A i r
point
The s u g g e s t i o n was made t h a t
a week was a v e r y
s h o r t t i m e t o e s t a b l i s h w h e t h e r t h e peace
conversa­
t i o n s w e r e g o i n g w e l l o r not and t o c l e a r up t h e
military
position.
I t was hoped t h a t
the
S e c r e t a r y would take a generous v i e w o f
Foreign
the
Italian
attitude .
The S e c r e t a r y
that
the
of
State
for f o r e i g n A f f a i r s
peace t a l k s must be g i v e n t h e b e s t
agreed
possible
chance.
A s u g g e s t i o n was made t h a t ,
i n the event o f
peace c o n v e r s a t i o n s h o l d i n g out reasonable
of
success,
prospects
t h e F r e n c h D e l e g a t e a t Geneva s h o u l d be
asked t o t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e
ment o f
i n p r o p o s i n g an a d j o u r n ­
t h e d e c i s i o n on t h e o i l
sanction.
Some d i s c u s s i o n t o o k p l a c e as t o t h e b e s t
for
the f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y
The S e c r e t a r y o f
would be b e s t
State for
"oreign Affairs
thought
f o r him t o open up t h e s u b j e c t
of
the meeting o f
the
fth..
allowed
Committee
E i g h t e e n a t Geneva on December 1 2 t h , b e f o r e
t i m e t h e C a b i n e t w i s h e d t o be c l e a r on t h e
The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
o u t , however,
that
troubles
to begin conversations
5th.
that
State's
difficult
December
the Secretary
s u g g e s t i o n was a d o p t e d , on t h e
the
their
it. would, be
i n any e v e n t b e f o r e
On t h e w h o l e , t h e r e f o r e ,
pointed
was t h a t
French Government was so p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h
internal p o l i t i c a l
which
subject.
for Foreign A f f a i r s
the main d i f f i c u l t y
it
with
December
I t was s u g g e s t e d , however,. t h a t t h i s h a r d l y
time b e f o r e
procedure
conversations with France.
M. L a v a l when he saw him on S a t u r d a y ,
but the q u e s t i o n was l e f t o p e n .
sufficient,
the
of
understanding
t h a t he would p r e s s t h e m a t t e r forward, as r a p i d l y
as
possible.
The Prime M i n i s t e r
was g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t ,
If
said, t h a t
on broad
as p r o v e d by t h e
by any chance h o s t i l i t i e s
should
lines
there
discussion..
a r i s e out o f
these
events
the situation, for
t h e Government would be a
had one u n l e s s e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e had been done
a v o i d them, e s p e c i a l l y when t h e d e t a i l e d
our d e f e n s i v e
facts
p r e p a r a t i o n s became known.
If
occurred i n dealing with Signor Mussolini,
would be w i l l i n g
if,
at
to t a c k l e Herr H i t l e r .
t h e next m e e t i n g o f
of
that
no-one
Consequently
t h e Committee o f
Eighteen,
t h e d a t e c o u l d be postponed and t i m e c o u l d be
f o r pe-sce t a l k s
arrangements
and f o r
If
gained
with a view to working
enquiries
as t o whether t h e
s a n c t i o n c o u l d be made e f f e c t i v e ,
the good.
to
oil
i t would b e a l l
to
t h e c l a i m t h a t had b e e n made t h a t
s a n c t i o n s meant war p r o v e d by e x p e r i e n c e t o b e t r u e ,
i t would be a d i s a s t e r o f
the f i r s t
magnitude.
t o be remembered t h a t i n d e a l i n g w i t h S i g n o r
we w e r e not
d e a l i n g w i t h a normal k i n d o f
It
Mussolini
intellect.
He t h o u g h t , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e C a b i n e t was r i g h t
supporting
the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ' s
hoped t h a t
t h e C a b i n e t would h a v e an o p p o r t u n i t y
re-examine the p o s i t i o n i n the
developments
prospect
of
i t was t h i s
the f i r s t
if
t h e peace t a l k s
success.
country
shock o f
to sanctions.
light
of
the
to
latest
d i d not h o l d out a
I t had t o be remembered
t h a t would have t o
an I t a l i a n f o r c i b l e
that
withstand
reaction
He h i m s e l f was not w i l l i n g
the a p p l i c a t i o n o f o i l
in
p r o p o s a l s , but he
sanctions.
to
t o be
committed a t t h i s moment t o t h e 2 1 s t December as
date o f
had
the
The Cabinet
agreed
—
(a)
That i n p r i n c i p l e t h e c o n t i n u a n c e
o f t h e p o l i c y adopted on October 9 t h
( C a b i n e t 45 ( 3 5 ) , C o n c l u s i o n 6 ( v ) )
s h o u l d he a p p r o v e d , namely, t o j o i n
i n an embargo on e x p o r t s o f o i l
provided that other o i l - p r o d u c i n g
o r s u p p l y i n g Member S t a t e s were
p r e p a r e d t o do s o , but t h a t e v e r y
p r e c a u t i o n must be t a k e n t o s a f e g u a r d
our s e c u r i t y :
(b)
That i n a p p l y i n g t h i s p o l i c y we should
aim at s e c u r i n g a d e c i s i o n as t o t h e
d a t e i n two s t a g e s , w i t h a view' to
g i v i n g t i m e f o r the n e g o t i a t i o n d f
a peaceful settlement, i f possible:
(c)
That i n t h e meanwhile t h e S e c r e t a r y
S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s should
i n i t i a t e the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n : ­
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(d)
of
P r e s s i n g on by e v e r y u s e f u l
means w i t h d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h
t h e count r i e s conc e r n e d , w i t h
a v i e w , i f p o s s i b l e , to a
peaceful settlement:
An e a r l y c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e
m i l i t a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s which
had a l r e a d y begun between t h e
A d m i r a l t y and t h e French M i n i s t r y
o f M a r i n e , and which should now
be extended, t o t h e A i r F o r c e and,
i f n e c e s s a r y , t o t h e Army, on t h e
l i n e s w h i c h t h e French Government
t h e m s e l v e s had s u g g e s t e d , f o r
ensuring f u l l co-operation
between the N a v a l , M i l i t a r y
and A i r a u t h o r i t i e s o f t h e
two c o u n t r i e s :
Similar conversations with other
M e d i t e r r a n e a n Powers at the
a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e and p l a c e :
Further to t e s t the a t t i t u d e o f
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America and
the p r o b a b i l i t y of e f f e c t i v e
a c t i o n being taken i n that country
t o s t o p t h e supply o f o i l to
Italy :
That i f the c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h a v i e w
t o a s e t t l e m e n t w e r e found b e f o r e
December 12th t o a f f o r d r e a s o n a b l e
p r o s p e c t s o f s u c c e s s , t h e Committee
o f E i g h t e e n at Geneva, a t i t s m e e t i n g
on December 1 2 t h , should be a s k e d ,
p r e f e r a b l y by t h e French as w e l l as
t h e B r i t i s h D e l e g a t e , t o postpone
f i c i n g t h e d a t e u n t i l a. f u r t h e r
m e e t i n g ( a p r e f e r e n c e was e x p r e s s e d
f o r French i n i t i a t i v e ) :
(e)
That t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n
A f f a i r s should b r i n g the q u e s t i o n back
f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e C a b i n e t i n
e i t h e r o f the f o l l o w i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
(i)
(ii)
I f t h e peace t a l k s d i d not
o f f e r any r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t
o f a se111 ernent:
I f the m i l i t a r y conversations
showed t h a t F r a n c e was not
w i l l i n g to co-operate e f f e c t i v e l y :
(f)
" h a t , pending the d e c i s i o n on t h e d a t e
o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the o i l s a n c t i o n ,
the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n
A f f a i r s should t a k e such s t e p s as he
thought f i t t o secure that the n a t i o n s
e x p o r t i n g o i l should l i m i t t h e i r e x p o r t s
t o I t a l y t o t h e i r normal f i g u r e s :
(g)
That the P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Board o f Trade
s h o u l d ask t h e A n g l o - I r a n i a n and S h e l l
O i l Companies w h e t h e r they w e r e w i l l i n g
to co-operate i n applying Conclusion
( f ) a b o v e , and i n f o r m t h e S e c r e t a r y
o f State for Foreign A f f a i r s o f the
result of his enquiries:
(h)
That t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r Dominion
A f f a i r s should a r r a n g e f o r an e a r l y
m e e t i n g o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f theDominions i n London w i t h a v i e w t o
s e c u r i n g t h e i r agreement i n t h e above
policy.
2 , W h i t e h a l l Gardens,
S.W.1,
December 2 , 193 5 .