[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
W A R C A B I N E T , 1.
of a Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet held in London at 10,
Street, S.W., on Tuesday, March 20, 1.917, at 11*30 A.M.
Downing
Present:
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
Hon.
A.
BONAR L A W , M.P.,
C h a n c e l l o r of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The Right
Hon. t h e E A R L
KEDLESTON,
CCJRZON O F
K G . , G.C.S.I., G.O.I.E.,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The Right
G.C.B.,
Hon. t h e V I S C O U N T
MILNER,
G.C.M.G.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. H E N D E R S O N , M . P .
The Right Hon. S L ROBERT L. BORDEN,
P r i m s Minister of
G.C.M.G,, K . C
Canada:
The
H.
PERLEY,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of t h e
Military F o r . a n of Canada.
Overseas
T h e R i g h t Hon. W . H. L O N G , M . P . , Secre­
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
T h e R i g h t Hon. A . C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of State for I n d i a .
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
The Right Hon. W . F . MASSEY, P r i m e
Minister of N e w Zealand.
The
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. .T. B A L F O U K , O . M . ,
M . P . , Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
Chair).
R i g h t H o n . S I R J . G. W A R D ,
Bt,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
New Zealand.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t H o n . J . C.
SMUTS.
K . C . , Minister for Defence^
U n i o n of S o u t h Africa.
The Right Hon. S I R E. P. MORRIS,
K.C.M.G., P r i m e Minister of N e w f o u n d ­
land.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
Major-General
F.
B.
MAURICE,
D i r e c t o r of Military
Office.
The
Hon.
S I R J.
S.
C.B.,
Operations, W a r
Admiral S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G.C.B., O . M . ,
MESTUN,
L i e u t e n a n t - Governor
Provinces, India.
K.C.S.I.,
of t h e
United
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
S.XGU,
The Right Hon. S I R E. CARSON, K . C . ,
M.P., F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I.,
G . C . I . E . , A.D.C., M a h a r a j a of B i k a n e r .
S I R S . P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
G.C.V.O., F i r s t S e a L o r d .
T h e H o n . R . ROGERS, Minister of P u b l i c
Works, Canada. .
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , Minister of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Mr. H . C. M. L A M B E R T ,
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L . S T O R R , Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S- A M E R Y , Assistant
[1142-1]
C . B . , Colonial
Office, Secretary of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Australian
Representation at
the Imperial
War Cabinets.
1. T H E I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t d e c i d e d t h a t a t e l e g r a m s h o u l d
b e sent b y t h e S e c r e t a r y of State for the Colonies to t h e GrovernorG e n e r a l of t h e Commonwealth- of A u s t r a l i a , c o n v e y i n g a m e s s a g e
i n the following sense to Mr. H u g h e s , P r i m e Minister of t h e
C o m m o n w e a l t h :—
" T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t at its F i r s t M e e t i n g to-day
desire m e to e x p r e s s t h e i r g r e a t r e g r e t t h a t we h a v e n o t t h e
a d v a n t a g e of y o u r presence at t h e Councils of t h e E m p i r e , a n d
t h e i r sense of t h e very serious loss to t h e i r deliberations w h i c h
t h e absence of a n y A u s t r a l i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e n t a i l s . "
Aims and Probable
Continuance of the
War.
Future
Arrangements.
2. T h e P r i m e Minister of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m t h e n p r e s e n t e d
to t h e I m p e r i a l War. C a b i n e t a g e n e r a l exposition of his views as to
t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e w a r and the a i m s for w h i c h it was u n d e r t a k e n ,
a n d w h i c h would h a v e to b e realised before a stable p e a c e could be
s e c u r e d , l a y i n g s t r e s s on h i s conviction t h a t it would be unwise to
b a s e a n y calculations on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t those a i m s could b e
effectively s e c u r e d before t h e end of 1918.
Brief s t a t e m e n t s were also m a d e b y Sir R o b e r t Borden,
Mr. Massey, who, i n t h e n a m e of t h e Dominions, welcomed t h e
p r e s e n c e of t h e R e p r e s e u t a t i v e s of India, G e n e r a l Smuts, Sir E d w a r d
Morris, the Maharaja of Bikaner, who spoke on behalf of t h e
S e c r e t a r y of State for I n d i a , and r e a d a m e s s a g e from t h e R u l i n g
P r i n c e s of I n d i a , and b y t h e Secretary of State for t h e Colonies, dh
behalf of the Crown Colonies. T h e text of these various s t a t e m e n t s
w i l l be circulated in a s e p a r a t e d o c u m e n t .
3. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
.
I t s sittings s h o u l d be h e l d on T u e s d a y a n d T h u r s d a y m o r n i n g s
at 11'30, a n d on F r i d a y afternoons at 3 1 5 .
(Initialled)
2, Whitehall
Gardens,
March 20, 1917.
S.W.,
D . LL G.
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November 1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
W A R C A B I N E T , 2.
nubes of a Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, held in London at 10, Downing
March 22, 1917, at 11-30 A . M .
Street, S.W., on Thursday,
Present :
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R OF T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
Hon.
A. B O N A R
L A W , M.P.,
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The Right
Hon. the EARL
KEDLESTON,
C U R Z O N of
K . G . , G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.,
Lord P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT M I L N E R , G . C . B . ,
G.C.M.G.
The R i g h t Hon. A. HENDERSON, M . P .
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. J . B A L E O U R , O.M., M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs.
The
Right
Hon.
W.
H.
LONG,
M.P.,
Secretary of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
The Right
Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L. B O R D E N ,
G.C.M.G., K . C . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r of
Canada.
The
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
H.
PERLEY,
K.C.M.G., Minister of t h e Overseas
Military Forces of Canada.
The R i g h t H o n . W. F . MASSEY, Prime
Minister of N e w Zealand.
The Right
H o n . S I R J . G. W A R D , B t . ,
K.C.M.G., Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t H o n . J . C.
SMUTS, K . C . , Minister for Defence, U n i o n
of S o u t h Africa.
The
R i g h t H o n . Sir E. P . M O R R I S ,
K.C. M.G., P r i m e M i n i s t e r of N e w ­
foundland.
The following were also p r e s e n t :
T h e R i g h t Hon. L O R D R . C E C I L , K . C . , M . P . ,
Minister of Blockade.
The R i g h t H o n . t h e E A R L OE D E R B Y ,
K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r .
Major-General
Director
Office.
The
Hon.
F.
B.
of Military
S I R J.
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
MAURICE,
C.B.,
Operations, W a r
MESTON,
of
the
K . C . S I.,
United
The
Right
Hon. S I R E.
CARSON,
K.C.,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
A d m i r a l S I R J . R . J E L L I C O E , G . C . B . , O.M.,
G . C . V . O . , F i r s t Sea L o r d .
T h e H o n . R. ROGERS, M i n i s t e r of Public
Works, Canada.
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , Minister of Marine
and Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I.,
G . C . I . E . , A . D . C . , Maharaja of Bikaner.
S I R S. P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
Mr.
H.
C.
M.
LAMBERT,
Mr. P H I L I P
KERR.
Lieutenant-Colon el Sir M. P . A . H A N K E V , K . C . B . ,
Major L . S T O R R , Assistant
ecretary.
C a p t a i n L . S. A M E R Y , Assistant
Secretary
[1142-2]
C.B.,
Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
Secretary.
The Western
1. T H E Director of Military Operations r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e Allied
Front:
forces on t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t were now in t o u c h w i t h t h e H i n d e n b u r g
The German with-' line from , a b o u t the region of A r r a s to t h a t of St. Q u e u t i n .
draw a 1.
Manifestations similar t o those which preceded t h e recent w i t h ­
d r a w a l , such as fires a n d explosions b e h i n d t h e lines., had. l a t e l y
been observed in the region of Lens and f u r t h e r to t h e n o r t h w a r d .
T h e civil population h a d been evacuated from L e n s a n d were now
b e i n g e v a c u a t e d from Lille.
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r , who h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d from
F r a n c e , s t a t e d that t h e G e r m a n s h a d b u r n e d St. Quentin.
The
e n e m y h a d generally left t h e r o a d s in tolerable condition e x c e p t a t
t h e cross roads, which h a d been blown u p , b u t h a d e v e r y w h e r e
removed t h e rails.
P h o t o g r a p h s t a k e n from aeroplanes w e r e passed round s h o w i n g
t h e r e s u l t s of Germau destruction befjre t h e i r r e t r e a t .
Germany:
Internal situation.
2. T h e Director of Military Operations s t a t e d t h a t fairly
reliable confirmation had been received of t h e r e p o r t e d serious riots
in Berlin a n d H a m b u r g .
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r s t a t e d t h a t w h e n t h e F r e n c h
A r m y e n t e r e d Noyon t h e Mayor h a d informed t h e m t h a t t h e civil
population had not been badly t r e a t e d d u r i n g t h e G e r m a n occupation,
b n t t h a t t h e y h a d been allowed no m e a t for t w o years, a n d t h a t t h e
G e r m a n A r m y w a s not so well fed as formerly.
T h e Minister of Blockade read a communication e m a n a t i n g
from t h e American Consul-General a t H a m b u r g t o t h e effect t h a t , in
h i s opinion, t h e Germans could n o t hold out u n t i l t h e n e x t h a r v e s t
owing t o food shortage.
3. T h e F i r s t Sea Lord reported t h a t t h e hospital ship
" A s t u r i a s " h a d been s t r u c k b y a mine or t o r p e d o and beached.
T h e N a v a l Commander-in-Chief concerned h a d been told t h a t i t
w a s of t h e u t m o s t importance ( w i t h a view t o reprisals, if it should
be a t o r p e d o ) t h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y should know definitely w h a t w a s
t h e cause of t h e injury.
Mercantile
casualties.
4. T h e Imperial
w a s t h e first occasion
w a s able t o announce
h a d been s u n k in t h e
Russia:
The Czar.
5. W i t h reference t o W a r Cabinet, 100, M i n u t e 17, t h e I m p e r i a l
W a r C a b i n e t decided t h a t —
W a r Cabinet took n o t e of t h e fact t h a t t h i s
for some m o n t h s on which t h e F i r s t S e a L o r d
t o t h e W a r Cabinet t h a t n o B r i t i s h s t e a m s h i p
previous twenty-four h o u r s .
I n " t h e i n t e r e s t s of his personal safety, i t w a s of t h e first
importance t h a t t h e Tsar should leave Russia a t t h e
earliest possible d a t e .
On a r e v i e w of t h e political
considerations involved, a n d m o r e particularly of t h e
desirability of avoiding t h e risk of his being exposed t o
hostile intrigue in t h e e v e n t of residence in n e u t r a l
countries, t h e y reached t h e conclusion t h a t t h e best plan
would be to invite t h e Tsar, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e E m p r e s s
a n d t h e i r family, t o t a k e u p his residence in t h i s c o u n t r y ,
a l t h o u g h it should be distinctly understood t h a t t h e y
should not ieave t h i s c o u n t r y during-, t h e w a r except w i t h
t h e consent of t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t .
T h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t accordingly a u t h o r i s e d —
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs t o send a t e l e g r a m
in t h i s sense to t h e British A m b a s s a d o r a t P e t r o g r a d
superseding t h e telegram (No. 534) s e n t on t h e previous
d a y in accordance w i t h t h e decision of the W a r C a b i n e t
( W a r C a b i n e t , 100, M i n u t e 17).
Foreign Affairs
6. T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs gave t h e I m p e r i a l
W a r Cabinet a comprehensive roview of t h e principal considerations
of foreign policy affecting t h e conduct of t h e w a r a n d t h e d e s i d e r a t a
of t h e Allies in r e g a r d t o peace, after which he a n s w e r e d q u e s t i o n s
on various aspects of t h o e x t e r n a l situation.
T h e t e x t of
Mr. Balfour's s t a t e m e n t will be circulated in a s e p a r a t e document.
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a m a d e a brief s t a t e m e n t as to
G e r m a n aims-and a m b i t i o n s in t h e M i d d l e E a s t a n d t h e t h r e a t w h i c h
t h e y c o n s t i t u t e d t o t h e peace of I n d i a a n d to t h e communications
w i t h Australasia, E a s t Africa, a n d t h e F a r E a s t b y t h e Suez C a n a l .
H e a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e success of t h e operations a g a i n s t t h e
G e r m a n Oversea colonies would c o n c e n t r a t e G e r m a n a m b i t i o n s on
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a p r e d o m i n a n t influence overland t h r o u g h
A u s t r i a , t h e B a l k a n s , a n d Asia Minor, a n d held t h a t it was vital t o
our f u t u r e security t h a t t h i s development should be p r e v e n t e d .
(Initialled)
2, Whitehall Gardens,
March 22, 1917.
S.W.,
D . L I . G.
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL WAR CABINET, 3 .
Minutes
of a Meeting of the Impetigo
Street,
Wm Cabinet,
S.W., on Friday,
held in London
at 1 0 ,
Downing
March­ 23, 1917, at 3 1 5 K M .
Present :
THE
The Right
PRIME
THE
MINISTER
Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON,
CVCZON OF
K . G . , G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The Right Hon. S I R ROBERT L . BORDEN,
G.C.MG., K.C., Prime
Minister of
Canada..
The
Tha R i g h t H o n . VKCOUNT M I L N E R . G . C . B . ,
G.C.M.G.
-
Chair).
H.
PERLEY,
K . C . M . G . M i n i s t e r of t h e
M i l i t a r y Forces of C a n a d a .
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
Overseas
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. H E N D E R S O N , M . P .
The R i g h t Hou. W. F . MASSEY,
M i n i s t e r of N e w Z e a l a n d .
The
The R i g h t
Rig
MI'..
Hon.
A.
Secretary
J.
BALEOUU,
of S t a t e for
O.M.,
Foreign
The R i g h t Hon. W . LONG, M . P . , Secretary
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
The Right Hon. A . CHAMBBRLAIN, M.P.,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
Hon. S I R J . G .
Prime
W A R D , Bt.,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
the
Right
Hon.
Lieutenant-General
J . C. SMUTS, K . O . , M i n i s t e r for Defence,
U n i o n of S o u t h Africa.
The Right Hon. S I R E . P . MORRIS,
K . C . M . G . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r of N e w ­
foundland.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t
Major-General
F.
B.
D i r e c t o r of Militarv
Office.
The
Hon.
S I R J.
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, India.
MAURICE,
C.B.,
Operations, W a r
MESTON,
of
the
K.C.S.L,
United
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e Maharaja S I R
GANGA
G.C.I.E.,
Bikaner.
SiR
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
A.D.G.,
S . P. SINHA,
G.C.S.I.,
& c , Maharaja
of
Member-designate
of
t h e E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e Governor
of Bengal.
A d m i r a l Sr.R J . R . J E L L I C O E , G O B . , O.M.,
G.O.V.O., F i r s t S e a L o r d .
T h e H o n . R . R O G E R S , M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c
W o r k s , Canada.
T h e H o n . J . L). H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of Marine,
a n d F i s h e r i e s , a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Mr.
H. 0.
M.
LAMBERT,
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
Lieutenant-Colon el Sir M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L . S T O R R , Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S. A M E R Y , M . P . , Assistant
[ 1 1 4 2 — .31
C . B . , Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
Secretary.
Secretary.
The "Western
Front,:
The German
Withdrawal.
1. T H E Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s s t a t e d t h a t t h e G e r m a n s
w e r e offering considerable resistance as far s o u t h as St. Q u e n t i n ,
a n d the p r e s e n t indications were t h a t t h e y would m a k e a s t a n d o n
t h e H i n d e n b u r g line in t h i s sector.
S o u t h of St., Q u e n t i n t h e
position was more obscnre. Information had now b e e n received
t h a t the demolition of villages b y the G e r m a n s h a d b e g u n o n t h e
I()th March, while the actual b u r n i n g of h o u s e s a n d b l o w i n g u p of
cross-roads took place on t h e 1 6 t h March. Of t h e civil p o p u l a t i o n
all women b e t w e e n 17 a n d 3 5 h a d been t a k e n to M a u b e u g e .
Mesopotamia.
9 T h e . Directory of Military O p e r a t i o n s r e p o r t e d t h a t G e n e r a l
Maude w a s in t o u c h ' w i t h t h e T u r k s on the R i v e r Diala, 100 miles
b y river N o r t h of B a g h d a d a n d within 40 m i l e s of K h a n i k i n , from
which p l a c e t h e R u s s i a n s , on t h e i r side, w e r e believed t o be 50 m i l e s
distant, b u t t h i s w a s conjecture as i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e r e w a s
c o m i n g i n very slowly.
H e g a v e p a r t i c u l a r s of T u r k i s h s t r e n g t h s
and dispositions in this p a r t of Mesopotamia..
3. T h e Director of Military Operations r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e G r a n d
D u k e Nicholas h a d left h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s in t h e C a u c a s u s to t a k e u p
t h e Chief C o m m a n d , t h o u g h this did not necessarily signify t h a t t h e
C o m m a n d would be confirmed. Meanwhile, G e n e r a l Y u d e n i t c h h a d
t a k e n over the C o m m a n d in t h e C a u c a s u s .
Submarines.
4. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d two e n g a g e m e n t s with e n e m y
s u b m a r i n e s , i n c l u d i n g a d e t a i l e d account of a n e n g a g e m e n t b e t w e e n
t h e Decoy-ship Q. 19 a n d an e n e m y s u b m a r i n e o n t h e 12th M a r c h ,
in w h i c h Q. 19 was s u n k , a n d p r o b a b l y t h e s u b m a r i n e also. H e
further g a v e t h e m e r c a n t i l e losses for the p r e v i o u s twenty-four h o u r s ,
confirming the s i n k i n g , 2 5 miles east of T h e S t a r t , of t h e " R o t o r u a . "
Permission to send
Women and
Children to Canada.
5. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d t h a t the " O l y m p i c " was shortly
l e a v i n g for C a n a d a to b r i n g over C a n a d i a n troops. As she was
g o i n g almost e m p t y it would be possible, if the e x i s t i n g B o a r d of
T r a d e R e g u l a t i o n s ( W a r C a b i n e t 100, M i n u t e 14) w e r e waived, to
take a l a r g e n u m b e r of C a n a d i a n women a n d c h i l d r e n , m a n y of
w h o m were destitute, b a c k to t h e i r homes.
I n view of the fact t h a t t h e " O l y m p i c " is a r m e d , very well
provided with boats, a n d will b e escorted t h r o u g h t h e s u b m a r i n e
zone, the I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t decided t h a t :—
I n t h i s case permission for t h e conveyance of w o m e n
c h i l d r e n to C a n a d a s h o u l d b e given.
Possibility of
Securing Peace
in 1917.
and
6. On t h e initiative of G e n e r a l S m n t s , a full discussion took place
on t h e question of t h e possibility of exploiting s u c h m o d e r a t e degree
of m i l i t a r y success as w a s likely to be a c h i e v e d t h i s s u m m e r in
order to secure a reasonable peace, even if t h a t m e a n t some modifica­
tion of the m a x i m u m d e m a n d s w h i c h we h a d p u b l i c l y defined.
It
w a s a r g u e d , on t h e ono hand, t h a t t h e s u b m a r i n e c a m p a i g n a n d t h e
possibility of deflection a m o n g our Allies m i g h t r e n d e r t h e situation
very u n c e r t a i n a l t e r t h i s year, while G e r m a n y would fight w i t h
desperate resolution a g a i n s t a n y policy w h i c h could be r e p r e s e n t e d
to h e r p e o p l e — a s some of o u r p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s h a d b e e n — a s
a policy of the d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e G e r m a n n a t i o n . O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , it was pointed out t h a t G e r m a n y h a d s t a k e d e v e r y t h i n g o n a
s u p r e m e effort t h i s year, s h e w o u l d have few r e s e r v e s left for n e x t
year, and t h a t her allies w e r e a l r e a d y m a r k e d l y on t h e ' d o w n g r a d e ;
w h e r e a s t h e resources of t h e Entente P o w e r s , even l e a v i n g A m e r i c a
o u t of account, h a d not r e a c h e d t h e i r fullest development. I t w a s
extremely i m p r o b a b l e , moreover, t h a t a n y m o d e r a t e m e a s u r e of
success on our p a r t this y e a r would b r i n g G e r m a n y into a f r a m e of
m i n d i n w h i c h s h e would consider for a m o m e n t s u c h T e r m s of
Peace as would b e r e g a r d e d by us as of t h e most r e a s o n a b l e
character. T h e only motive t h a t would p e r h a p s compel h e r to g i v e
r e a s o n a b l e t e r m s w a s s h e e r famine, b u t i n t h a t case w e could o n l y
g a i n b y c o n t i n u i n g till t h e p i n c h of famine b e c a m e even m o r e acute.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
T h e i r e n q u i r i e s should be based o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n s that—­
(a.) T h e British E m p i r e , in conjunction w i t h our Allies,
should p u t forth t h e whole of its m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h
in 1917, with the object of b r i n g i n g t h e e n e m y t o
t e r m s in t h a t year.
(b.) T h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e should also / m a k e
such
p r e p a r a t i o n s as would e n a b l e it to p u t forth t h e
whole of its s t r e n g t h t h r o u g h o u t 1918, if t h e
desired r e s u l t s could n o t be achieved i n 1917.
Detailed ^
Consideration of
eace erms.
7. I t h e c o u r s e of t h e discussion t h e question of t h e r e l a t i v e
i m p o r t a n c e of t h e v a r i o u s desiderata
i n t h e T e r m s of P e a c e , a n d of
desirability of fixing u p o n a list of i r r e d u c i b l e m i n i m a , w a s
raised. T h e possibility of r e f e r r i n g c e r t a i n less vitally e s s e n t i a l
m a t t e r s to a E u r o p e a n Conference was also considered, t h o u g h it w a s
realised t h a t t h e conclusions of s u c h a Conference w o u l d h a v e i n fact
to b e b a s e d on t h e a c t u a l m i l i t a r y situation at t h e e n d of t h e W a r .
A p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e consideration of t h e s e a n d k i n d r e d q u e s t i o n s
affecting t h e T e r m s of P e a c e should, in t h e first instance, b e w o r k e d
o u t b y a C o m m i t t e e of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet, w a s n e g a t i v e d .
T h e Imperial W a r Cabinet decided that—
n
T h e Secretary of State for F o r e i g n Affairs should p r e p a r e , for a
s u b s e q u e n t Meeting, a full exposition of t h e . m a i n
desiderata
in t h e T e r m s of P e a c e , a n d of t h e i r r e l a t i v e
importance.
(Initialled)
D. L I . G.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
March 2 4 , 1 9 1 7 .
S.W.,
o
r
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
W A R CABINET,
IMPERIAL
Minutes
4.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 1 0 ,
Street, S.W., on Tuesday, March 27, 1 9 1 7 , at 1 P 3 0 A.M.
Downing
Present :
The P R I M E M I N I S T E R O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
Hon.
A.
L A W , M . P . , T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L. B O R D E N ,
BONAR
G.C.M.G.,
Canada.
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The Right
Hon. t h e E A R L C U R Z O N O F
KEDLESTON,
Chair).
E.G., G.C.S.I.,
The-
G.C.I.E.,
K.C.,
Hon.,
SIR
Prime
GEORGE
Minister
H.
of
PERLEY,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of Overseas Military
Forces of Canada.
L o r d President of t h e Council.
The Right H o n . A. HENDERSON, M . P .
The R i g h t H o n . W . F . MASSEY,
M i n i s t e r of N e w Zealand.
The Right H o n . VISCOUNT M I L N E R , G.C.B..
G.C.M.G.
The R i g h t
Son,
Prime
S I R J . G. W A R D ,
Bt.,
t h e Right Hon. A. j . BALFOUR, Q . M . , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs.
K . C . M . G . , Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ;
N e w Zealand.
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . LONG, M . P . , S e c r e t a r y
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t Hon. J. 0 .
SMUTS, K G . , Minister for Defence; U n i o n
of S o u t h Africa.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for India.
The R i g h t H o n . S I R E . P . M O R R I S , K . C . M . G . ,
P r i m e M i n i s t e r of Newfoundland.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t Hon. S I R E . CARSON, K . C . ,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
T h e R i g h t H o n . t h e E A R L OF D E R B Y ,
K G , G.C.V.O., C.B., S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r .
Major-General
Director
Office.
The
Hon.
F.
B.
MAURICE,
A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G.C.B., O.M.,
G . C . V . O . , F i r s t Sea Lord.
C.B.,
of M i l i t a r y Operations,
War
The
SIR J.
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
MESTON,
of
the
K.C.S.I.,
United
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
G.C
Hon.
SIR J.
S.I.,
Mr.
G.C.I.E., A.D.C., Maharaja of Bikaner.
H.
C.
M. L A M B E R T ,
Conference.
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
Mr. P H I L L I P K E R R .
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L. S . A M B R Y , Assistant
Secretary.
F l e e t P a y m a s t e r P. R o w , R . N . , Assistant
C a p t a i n . C L E M E N T J O N E S , Assistant
[L142-4]
Bt.,
C.B., Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l
S t R S. P . S I N H A . M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
Major L. S T O R R , Assistant
MACEAY,
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , Minister of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
Bight
Controller of Shipping.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
War
The Western Front.
Mesopotamia.
Naval Losses.
The Destroyer,
" Laforey."
Other Destroyer
losses since the
beginning of the
Year.
1. T H E Director of Military Operations r e p o r t e d t h a t no
considerable m o v e m e n t s or actions could be expected for t h e p r e s e n t
in t h e neighbourhood of t h e Hindenbifrg Line, as our advanced
troops had got nearly as far forwards as could be expected, and t h e
roads and communications generally would h a v e t o be placed in a
t h o r o u g h l y efficient s t a t e before a n y l a r g e bodies of infantry a n d
g u n s could be b r o u g h t u p .
2. The Director of Military Operations explained t h a t t h e
immediate object of t h e p r e s e n t operations on t h e Tigris was t o pin
.down t h e T u r k s , a n d to intercept t h e r e t r e a t of t h e enemy forces
r e t i r i n g belore t h e Russian advance t o w a r d s K h a n i k i n .
The
u l t i m a t e object of our operations was t o establish t h e Russian forces
firmly on t h e Tigris, after which t h e main p u r p o s e of our force in
Mesopotamia would be limited t o holding t h e line of t h e E u p h r a t e s ,
for which a m u c h smaller force should suffice.
H a v i n g regard t o t h e probable reduction of force and t o t h e
supplies which it is hoped t o obtain in Mesopotamia, t h e Imperial
W a r Cabinet look t o some reduction in shipping for t h e m a i n t e n a n c e
of t h i s expedition.
8. The F i r s t Sea Lord reported t h a t t h e sinking of t h e d e s t r o y e r
" L a f o r e y " ( W a r Cabinet 104, M i n u t e 7) was d u e t o her s t r i k i n g a
mine.
Since t h e beginning of t h e present y e a r several destroyers h a d
been s u n k , viz :—
B y mines
B y torpedoes...
...
D a m a g e d b y mines ...
D a m a g e d b y torpedoes
4
2
2
3
Since t h e 1st J a n u a r y , 1917, sixteen n e w d e s t r o y e r s h a d been
received from t h e builders. T h e F i r s t Lord a d d e d t h a t t h e o u t p u t
of destroyers and t h e i r repairs were continually i n t e r r u p t e d by
strikes.
Elospital Ship
Asturias."
4. W i t h reference t o W a r Cabinet 100, M i n u t e 6, t h e F i r s t
S e a L o r d s t a t e d t h a t t h e naval Commander-in-Chief had r e p o r t e d
t h a t n o s u b m a r i n e mines h a d been located in t h e neighbourhood of
t h e spot where t h e hospital ship " A s t u r i a s " h a d been damaged.
I n c l u d e d in t h e news i n t e r c e p t e d on t h e previous d a y from t h e
wireless station of t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t w a s an
official
a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t t h e hospitnl ship " A s t u r i a s , " of 12,002 tons,
h a d been sunk by a G e r m a n U-boat.
This incident a t once b r o u g h t into t h e sphere of practical
politics t h e decision of H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t to t a k e reprisals,
which decision had been communicated t o t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t
following on a decision of t h e W a r C a b i n e t on t h e 31st J a n u a r y ,
1917 ( W a r Cabinet 50, M i n u t e a).
After a full and general discussion of t h e whole question of
reprisals, the I m p e r i a l ' W a r Cabinet, while recognising t h e objection
to such a competition of o u t r a g e as has been initiated by t h e
enemy, endorsed the decision t a k e n prospectively t o meet t h i s
emergency of t h e W a r C a b i n e t on t h e 8 t h F e b r u a r y , 1917 ( W a r
C a b i n e t 57, M i n u t e 10), t h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y a n d Director of
Prisoners of W a r should a r r a n g e for t h e e m b a r k a t i o n in each
hospital ship of a sufficient n u m b e r of G e r m a n officers and men as
would ensure t h a t t h e y could n o t be r e c a p t u r e d and all e m b a r k e d
in one of t h e enemy submarines.
T h e y further decided t h a t —
H o s p i t a l ships should sail w i t h o u t lights a n d w i t h o u t
distinguishing m a r k s , a n d t h a t t h e y should be a r m e d a n d
escorted as far as practicable.
T h e Imperial W a r Cabinet agreed, however, that-—
Before action is t a k e n or any public a n n o u n c e m e n t made in
regard to reprisals, full particulars of t h e sinking of t h e
" Asturias " should be communicated to t h e public.
Enquiry into the
Hospital Accom­
modation in
France.
5. W i t h a view t o reducing t o a m i n i m u m t h e n u m b e r s of
wounded m e n exposed t o t h i s n e w a n d serious danger, t h e I m p e r i a l
W a r Cabinet r e m i t t e d t o t h e W a r Office, if necessary in consultation
with t h e A d m i r a l t y , a full examination of t h e question of r e d u c i n g
t h e n u m b e r of hospital ships b y developing t h e hospital a n d con- ­
valescent accommodation in France.
Consideration of
Peace Terms.
(5. O n t h e initiative of Sir J. W a r d a n d General S m u t s , a
further discussion took place on t h e necessity for arriving a t some
definite conclusion with r e g a r d to t h e relative importance of our
main desiderata in t h e f u t u r e Terms of Peace. I t was pointed o u t
t h a t , in t h e absence of definitely t h o u g h t - o u t conclusions on t h i s
point, t h e r e was a d a n g e r t h a t t h e B r i t i s h representatives a t a
Peace Conference, w h o would be in a m i n o r i t y among P o w e r s
primarily interested in t h e s e t t l e m e n t of affairs in Central E u r o p e ,
would be unable to defend successfully t h e vital interests of t h e
British Empire, which are primarily concerned n o t so . much w i t h
particular s e t t l e m e n t of European frontiers as with t h e effective
maintenance of t h e intercommunication between t h e different p a r t s
of t h e E m p i r e itself.
I t was further pointed out t h a t t h e British G o v e r n m e n t h a d
given definite pledges t h a t t h e Dominions should be consulted w i t h
r e g a r d to t h e Terms of Peace, and t h a t those! Terms would have t o
be defended in t h e Overseas P a r l i a m e n t s . Questions h a d already
been asked in t h e Canadian P a r l i a m e n t a s to w h e t h e r promises
m a d e to Russia w i t h regard to t h e D a r d a n e l l e s h a d been m a d e w i t h
Canada's consent. I t w a s necessary to be quite clear t h a t we w e r e
fighting first and foremost for t h e security of t h e British E m p i r e .
On t h e other h a n d , it was pointed o u t t h a t G e r m a n y ' s efficiency
as an aggressive Power in t h e future m u s t d e p e n d very l a r g e l y u p o n
t h e n a t u r e of t h e E u r o p e a n settlement, and t h a t t h e t w o problems,
were i n t i m a t e l y connected. I t was also necessary to remember t h e
e x t e n t of t h e efforts a n d sacrifices m a d e b y o u r Allies, which would
h a v e to be taken into account in t h e Terms of Peace.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
F u r t h e r documents b e a r i n g on t h i s question, including P a p e r s
previously p r e p a r e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for . F o r e i g n
Affairs, b y t h e A d m i r a l t y , a n d b y t h e General, Staff, should
be circulated, a n d t h a t , as soon as t h e Dominion Members,
of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet w e r e ready, t h e r e should be
a further discussion, when t h e m a t t e r m i g h t , if found
desirable, he r e l e g a t e d t o detailed consideration b y a
C o m m i t t e e of t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet.
[1142—4]
B 2
Shipping.
7. The I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t considered t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
contained in t h e I n t e r i m R e p o r t of t h e F i r s t L o r d ' s S h i p p i n g
Resources C o m m i t t e e , t h a t a C a b i n e t instruction should b e given
t o t h e W h e a t Commission to o b t a i n from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d
from C a n a d a all t h e w h e a t t h a t is available t h e r e , w i t h o u t r e g a r d
to a n y considerations arising o u t of t h e position of t h e American
exchange.
T h e S h i p p i n g Controller, however, explained t h a t , in fact,
action in t h i s direction had a l r e a d y been t a k e n , and t h a t shipping
on a large scale h a d been d i v e r t e d from A u s t r a l i a n a n d E a s t e r n
w a t e r s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d Canada.
The Supplementing
of Wheat by the
Use of Coarser
Grain.
8. T h e r e w a s a discussion on t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e s h o r t a g e
of w h e a t could be m a d e up by an e x t e n d e d use, e i t h e r in t h e
composition of b r e a d or otherwise, of barley, maize, a n d oats, a n d
figures were given showing t h e very large reserve of oats available
in an e m e r g e n c y if t h e feeding of horses w i t h oats were stopped,
t h o u g h it w a s realised t h a t t h i s could n o t be done a t t h e present
t i m e w i t h o u t seriously interfering w i t h a g r i c u l t u r a l operations.
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n pointed out, in t h i s connection, t h a t a g r e a t
deal could be done in i n d u c i n g t h e public t o consume more of
certain articles by a skilful campaign of p r o p a g a n d a , a n d t h a t in
this way a v e r y large and otherwise u n m a r k e t a b l e surplus of
C a n a d i a n apples had been satisfactorily disposed of in C a n a d a in
1915.
The Imperial W a r Cabinet decided—
To commend t o t h e consideration of t h e Food Controller t h e
importance of a campaign of p r o p a g a n d a for impressing on
t h e public t h e desirability of a g r e a t e r consumption of
certain a l t e r n a t i v e forms of food such as oats.
The Sinking of the
" Eotorua."
9. T h e a t t e n t i o n of the Imperial W a r C a b i n e t w a s d r a w n t o
the. fact t h a t t h e " llotoruu," b r i n g i n g a large a n d valuable cargo of
m e a t a n d o t h e r foodstuffs from N e w Zealand, h a d been torpedoed
an hour after leaving P l y m o u t h , a n d a question was p u t w h e t h e r
f u r t h e r p r e c a u t i o n s might n o t h a v e been t a k e n , or w h e t h e r t h e
vessel m i g h t n o t h a v e been unloaded at P l y m o u t h .
The F i r s t S e a Lord pointed o u t t h a t e v e r y precaution was
a l r e a d y being t a k e n , consistently w i t h t h e forces a t t h e disposal of
t h e A d m i r a l t y , a n d t h a t as a m a t t e r of fact t h e C h a n n e l was,
generally s p e a k i n g , one of t h e safest zones.
The S h i p p i n g Controller s t a t e d t h a t t h e facilities for unloading
these large cargoes of frozen m e a t w e r e n o t available a t P l y m o u t h ,
and t h a t t h e vessel would in a n y case require to g o to L o n d o n to be
loaded u p for h e r out-ward voyage.
The Release of
Admiralty Colliers.
10. T h e question was raised as to w h e t h e r t h e A d m i r a l t y could
release a n y of its colliers b y s u b s t i t u t i n g barges, h u l k s , or lighters,
in t h e i r place.
The F i r s t Sea L o r d and t h e S h i p p i n g Controller s t a t e d t h a t
t h i s proposal h a d been carefully examined, a n d t h a t t h e results of
t h i s scrutiny were u n d e r consideration, b u t t h a t no v e r y large
f u r t h e r economies could be a n t i c i p a t e d b e y o n d t h o s e a l r e a d y
carried out.
Timber and
Lumbermen.
11. T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t was d r a w n
t o t h e l a t e s t information received from t h e D i r e c t o r of T i m b e r
Supplies, which p o i n t e d o u t t h a t in o r d e r t o m e e t our t o t a l
r e q u i r e m e n t s by t i m b e r cut in E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e it w o u l d be
necessary t o secure an a d d i t i o n a l 70,000 lumbermen. Of t h e s e a t
least 20,000 to 30,000 would h a v e to be skilled m e n .
. Sir R o b e r t Borden a n d Sir J a m e s Meston u n d e r t o o k t o t e l e g r a p h
t o Canada a n d India, w i t h a -view t o securing t h e l a r g e s t
possible n u m b e r of additional l u m b e r m e n b e y o n d t h o s e
a l r e a d y applied for.
I t was also p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a considerable n u m b e r of
A u s t r a l i a n , New Zealand, a n d C a n a d i a n l u m b e r m e n were s e r v i n g
in t h e Forces in France, a n d t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet commended
to t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e W a r Office t h e desirability of releasing t h e s e
men from Active Service.
The Eelease of
Coasting Shipping.
12. T h e possibdity of securing t h e release on a large scale of
A m e r i c a n coasting ships, a n d a still further release of ships
e n g a g e d in t h e coasting t r a d e of t h e Dominions b y t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n
of n e u t r a l vessels which were a t p r e s e n t laid u p owing to t h e
unwillingness of t h e i r owners a n d crews t o cross t h e G e r m a n
Blockade Zone, was discussed.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t decided t h a t —
E n q u i r y should be m a d e b y each of t h e Dominions w i t h a
view t o a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e r e was still
room for t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of British b y n e u t r a l s h i p p i n g
in t h e i r coastal t r a d e s .
(Initialled)
2, Whitehall Gardens,
S.W.,
March 27, 1917.
D. LI.
G.
APPENDIX
I.
G.T.-290.
Sinking
of Hospital
Ship
" Asturias
" by a German
Submarine.
T H E S e c r e t a r y of t h e A d m i r a l t y p r e s e n t s his compliments to Colonel H a n k e y ,
a n d begs t o s t a t e t h a t a m o n g s t t h e n e w s which has been i n t e r c e p t e d t o - d a y from t h e
W i r e l e s s S t a t i o n s of t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t is contained an official a n n o u n c e m e n t ,
t h a t t h e H o s p i t a l S h i p " Asturias," of 12,002 tons, has been s u n k by a G e r m a n " U "
boat. This vessel w a s s t r u c k a t 11*55 P.M. on t h e 2 0 t h March w h e n s i x miles s o u t h
of S t a r t Point, arid w a s finally g r o u n d e d a t t h e e n t r a n c e t o Salcombe. U n t i l t h e
r e c e i p t of t h e G e r m a n message referred to above it was u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r s h e had
been mined or torpedoed. The vessel carried n a v i g a t i o n a l lights, illuminated R e d
Cross a n d green band required as a H o s p i t a l Ship, t h i s g r e e n b a n d being a p p r o x i m a t e l y
50 feet above t h e water: . T h e r e was loss of life.
T h e S e c r e t a j y of t h e A d m i r a l t y requests t h a t t h i s m a t t e r m a y receive t h e early
consideration of t h e W a r Cabinet.
Admiralty,
S.W.,
March 26, 1917.
o
Reprinted
for the War Cabinet.
November
191 7.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
W A R CABINET,
5.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 10, Downing
Street, S.W., on Thursday,
March 29, 1917, at 11*30 A.M.
Present:
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R O P T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The Right H o n . the E A R L
KEDLESTON,
CUKZON OF
K . C . , G.C.S.I., G . C . I . E . ,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The R i g h t Hon. VISCOUNT M I L N E R , G.C.B.,
G.C.M.G.
Chair).
The R i g h t Hon. S I R ROBERT L. BORDEN,
G.C.M.G., K . C . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r of
Canada.
The
Hon..
SIR
GEORGE
H.
PERLEY,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of O v e r s e a s MilitaryForces of C a n a d a .
The Right Hon. A . HENDERSON, M . P .
The
Right
Hon. W . F. M A S S E Y ,
Prime
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. J . BALFOTTR, O . M . , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs.
The
The R i g h t Hon. W . LONG, M . P . , Secretary
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t H o n . J . C.
M i n i s t e r of N e w Zealand.
Right
Hon.
S I R J.
G.
WARD,
Bt.,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
SMUTS,
KG,
Minister
for
Defence,
U n i o n of South Africa.
The Right
H o n , A. C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . ,
T h e R i g h t Hon. S I R E . P. MORRIS, K.C.M.G.,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
P r i m e Minister of N e w f o u n d l a n d .
The following were also p r e s e n t :
The Right Hon. the E A R L O F D E R B Y ,
K G , G.C.V.O., C.B., S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r .
The
General
G.C.B.,
A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G . C . B . , O . M . ,
K . C . V . O . , D . S . O . , Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
G e n e r a l Staff (for M i n u t e s 1 t o 7 ) .
G . C . V . O . , F i r s t Sea Lord (for M i n u t e s
1 to 9 ) .
The
S I R W . R. R O B E R T S O N ,
Hon.
S I R J.
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
MESTON,
of
the
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
Hon.
S I R E.
CARSON,
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e
United
and F i s h e r i e s , a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
G.C.S.I.,
G.O.I.E., A . D . C . , M a h a r a j a of B i k a n e r .
SIH, S. P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - D e s i g n a t e of t h e
The R i g h t Hon. S I R J. MACLAY,
Controller of Shipping.
The R i g h t H o n . L O R D D E V O N P O R T , F o o d
Controller (for M i n u t e s 1 0 a n d 1 1 ) .
S I R R. H . R E W , K . C . B . , P e r m a n e n t Secre­
t a r y t o t h e M i n i s t r y of Food.
M . P . , P r e s i d e n t of t h e B o a r d of Agri­
c u l t u r e a n d Fisheries.
Mr.
H.
C.
M.
LAMBERT,
C.B.,
Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e Imperial W a r Conference.
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R ,
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . , Secretary.
Secretary.
Major L. S T O R R , Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
(for M i n u t e s 1 t o 9 ) .
M e e t P a y m a s t e r ' P . R o w , R . N . , Assistant
Secretary
Secretary (for M i n u t e s 5 t o 1 1 ) .
C a p t a i n C L E M E N T J O N E S , Assistant
Mr. T H O M A S J O N E S , Assistant
Bt.
T h e R i g h t H o n . R. E . P R O T H E E O , M . V . O . ,
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
[1142—5]
K.C.,
K.C.S.I.,
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
Right
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y (for
Minutes 1 to 9).
Secretary
(for M i n u t e s 1 0 a n d 1 1 ) .
B
Egypt: Action
near Gaza.
1. T H E Secretary of State for W a r r e p o r t e d t h a t the troops
h a d a d v a n c e d about 15 miles from Rafa to a p o i n t 5 "miles west of
Gaza, a n d h a d there b e e n heavily attacked on the 26t-h a n d 27th
March by some 20,000 T u r k s . T h e T u r k s h a d b e e n repulsed w i t h
a loss of 0,000 to 7,000 killed a n d w o u n d e d , in addition to 900
prisoners, i n c l u d i n g t h e G e n e r a l and Staff of the 53rd T u r k i s h
Division, A u s t r i a n a n d G e r m a n Officers, a n d two A u s t r i a n
4*2 h o w i t z e r s .
T h e Chief of tbe I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff e x p l a i n e d that a r a p i d
p u r s u i t of t h e defeated. T u r k s would b e difficult, as the water­
s u p p l y of t h e F o r c e was still derived from the Suez Canal, b u t t h a t
the F o r c e would be in t h e r e g i o n of a good local w a t e r - s u p p l y w h e n
once they crossed t h e line Gaza to Beersheba.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t authorised—T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r tc send t h e i r c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s
to General Sir Archibald Murray.
"Western Front:
The German
Withdrawal.
2. T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Stafr r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r e
were also signs of an i m p e n d i n g w i t h d r a w a l of t h e G e r m a n line i n
the r e g i o n of t h e St, Mihiel salient.
Rumoured German
Peace Overtures.
3 . T h e Secretary of State for F o r e i g n Affairs r e a d a t e l e g r a m
(No. 817) d a t e d t h e 2 8 t h March, 1917, from t h e British r e p r e s e n ­
tative at W a s h i n g t o n , r e p o r t i n g a s t r o n g r u m o u r w h i c h h a d r e a c h e d
t h e A m e r i c a n State D e p a r t m e n t t h a t the G e r m a n Chancellor will,
on t h e 29th March, outline further proposals for peace i n t b e
G e r m a n Reichstag, a n d u r g i n g t h e desirability of His Majesty s
G o v e r n m e n t b e i n g r e a d y to issue a s t a t e m e n t c o m m e n t i n g on these
proposals t h e m o m e n t they a p p " ' d . in order to c o u n t e r a c t t h e i r
possible effect in America.
The United States:
Effect of Submarine
Campaign.
4 . T h e Secretary of State for F o r e i g n Affairs also r e a d a
t e l e g r a m (No. 818) from t h e B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t W a s h i n g t o n ,
r e p o r t i n g t h e b a d effect p r o d u c e d in t h e United States b y t h e
G e r m a n a n n o u n c e m e n t s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e success of their
s u b m a r i n e Avarfare, w h i c h h a d not been officially contradicted, b u t
h a d b e e n in fact s u p p o r t e d b y a r e c e n t s p e e c h m a d e by L o r d
Beresford, a n d a s k i n g for a r e a s s u r i n g s t a t e m e n t .
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t considered t h a t the G e r m a n
figures were n o t so e x a g g e r a t e d t h a t a direct contradiction of t h e m
was desirable, a n d also realised that t h e r e w e r e unsatisfactory
features i n t h e p r e s e n t situation, more p a r t i c u l a r l y connected w i t h
t h e delays d u e to i n c e s s a n t s t r i k e s in s h i p b u i l d i n g yards, w h i c h
t h r e a t e n seriously to j e o p a r d i s e t h e whole position. On t h e o t h e r
h a n d , t h e y w e r e of opinion t h a t the losses w e r e not, so far, i n
excess of t h e h i g h e s t i m a t e s g i v e n b y t h e A d m i r a l t y , w h i c h h a d
been t h e basis of t h e g e n e r a l policy of t h e W a r C a b i n e t w i t h
r e g a r d to the restriction of i m p o r t s ; moreover, t h e r e w e r e con­
siderable reserves of s h i p p i n g locked u p in overseas expeditions,
w h i c h m i g h t be released i n t h e event of a very g r e a t emergency.
I n view of the g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e of t h e decision t o b e . t a k e n by
t h e U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a on t h e 2 n d April, the I m p e r i a l W a r
C a b i n e t decided t h a t —
I t w a s desirable to g o to the furthest possible limits i n
r e a s s u r i n g p u b l i c m i n d s in the U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a ,
a n d they a u t h o r i s e d t h e Secretary of State for F o r e i g n
Affairs to a r r a n g e for a s t a t e m e n t . t o b e published in t h e
U n i t e d States on t h e aixthority of t h e F i r s t L o r d as t h e
s p o k e s m a n of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet i n t h e following
s e n s e :—
" T h e G e r m a n s t a t e m e n t s are, a s u s u a l , exag­
g e r a t e d , b u t no one s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e s u b m a r i n e
warfare is not c a u s i n g v e r y serious d a m a g e , b o t h to
n e u t r a l s a n d belligerents.
T h e losses, h o w e v e r , do
not exceed t h e estimates on w h i c h we have b a s e d our
policy, and, after t h e most careful consideration, it is
a b u n d a n t l y clear t h a t t h e G e r m a n h o p e s of s t a r v i n g
u s o u t are quite illusory.
So far, n e u t r a l s h a v e
suffered m o r e from G e r m a n m e t h o d s t h a n o u r s e l v e s . "
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t further decided t h a t —
T h e S e c r e t a r y of State for F o r e i g n Affairs should t a k e s t e p s to
p r e v e n t t h e publication of t h i s t e l e g r a m in t h i s c o u n t r y .
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t also i n v i t e d —
Lord
C u r z o n to show the above t e l e g r a m (No. 818)
W a s h i n g t o n to L o r d Beresford.
from
Timber and
Lumbermen.
5. W i t h reference to I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet 4, Minute 1 1 , a
f u r t h e r discussion took place with r e g a r d to t h e u r g e n c y of s e c u r i n g
more l u m b e r m e n , i n o r d e r to save t h e s h i p p i n g employed i n b r i n g i n g
t i m b e r from overseas to E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e .
T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e S e c r e t a r y . of State for W a r w a s a g a i n
invited to t h e n u m b e r s of C a n a d i a n , N e w Zealand, a n d A u s t r a l i a n
l u m b e r m e n who were e n g a g e d in t h e fighting line in F r a n c e .
The
S e c r e t a r y of State for W a r informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t t h a t
some of these w e r e b e i n g w i t h d r a w n from t h e t r e n c h e s i n o r d e r t o
o r g a n i s e t h e n a t i v e s who were b e i n g b r o u g h t to F r a n c e t o cut
t i m b e r , a n d p r o m i s e d to do his u t m o s t to secure all t h a t could
possibly be spared.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet were v e r y s t r o n g l y of opinion t h a t
t h e only satisfactory method of g e t t i n g forward r a p i d l y w i t h t h e
s u b s t i t u t i o n of h o m e - g r o w n F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h t i m b e r for i m p o r t e d
t i m b e r was to stop all importation a t once. I n deference, however,
to a r e q u e s t of the Secretary of State for W a r , w h o w i s h e d to
consult further w i t h t h e Director of T i m b e r Supplies, a decision on
t h i s point was p o s t p o n e d .
Lumbermen from
the- United States.
6. T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet w a s also called
to t h e possibility of s e c u r i n g a l a r g e n u m b e r of l u m b e r m e n from
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , b u t t h e I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t decided t h a t —
T h i s m a t t e r could not b e proceeded w i t h u n t i l after 2 n d A p r i l .
Firing at Lowestoft.,
7. T h e F i r s t Sea Lord r e p o r t e d t h a t
place off Lowestoft i n t h e early h o u r s of
few fragments of shells h a d fallen i n t h e
p a r t i c u l a r s were not yet available.
T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d also g a v e h i s u s u a l
' losses i n t h e last twenty-four hours.
Hospital Ships.
[1142-5]
some firing h a d t a k e n
2 9 t h March, a n d t h a t a
town, b u t t h a t f u r t h e r
s t a t e m e n t as to s h i p p i n g
8 . W i t h reference to I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t 4, M i n u t e 4, t h e
F i r s t Sea L o r d s u g g e s t e d t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e steps should be t a k e n to
notify t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t t h a t t h o s e hospital s h i p s w h i c h
w e r e being a r m e d a n d d e p r i v e d of t h e i r distinctive m a r k s w e r e
b e i n g removed from t h e list of ships previously c o m m u n i c a t e d t o
B
2
G e r m a n y as b e i n g u n d e r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e G e n e v a Convention.
H e p o i n t e d out that, failing s u c h a n a n n o u n c e m e n t , t h e r e w a s a
r i s k t h a t the G e r m a n s would a t t a c k our hospital s h i p s all over t h e
world, a n d n o t only in t h e d e c l a r e d zone. T h e seriousness of srich
action l a v in t h e fact t h a t i t would b e q u i t e impossible to p r o v i d e
escorts for all these hospital ships.
A discussion took place as to h o w far the policy of r e m o v i n g
t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g m a r k s of h o s p i t a l ships, a n d a r m i n g them, w a s
really consistent w i t h t h e policy of reprisals. I n view of t h i s , a n d
of t h e s t a t e m e n t by t h e First" Sea L o r d that, since t h e s i n k i n g of
t h e " A s t u r i a s , " t h e h o s p i t a l s h i p " St. A n d r e w , " w i t h 3 1 4 w o u n d e d
on b o a r d , h a d been allowed to p a s s b y an e n e m y s u b m a r i n e w h i c h
had undoubtedly sighted her, the Imperial War Cabinet decided—
T o hold i n s u s p e n s e t h e i r p r e v i o u s decision, a n d to postpone
action i n r e s p e c t of reprisals, t h e a r m i n g of hospital
ships, t h e p a i n t i n g out of distinctive m a r k s , a n d t h e
removal of lights.
L o r d C u r z o n ' s C o m m i t t e e , reinforced b y Sir J .
Ward,
Mr. E a z e n , a n d t h e F i r s t Sea L o r d , w a s invited to
reconsider t h e whole question in the l i g h t of this n e w
factor a n d of the discussion.
The Shipping
Situation:
Co-operation of the
Dominions and
India.
The Supply of
Cereals within the
Empire, and the
Food. Supply of the
United Kingdom
during the War.
9 T h e Imperial War Cabinet agreed t h a t T h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e D o m i n i o n s a n d I n d i a could co-operate
i n r e g a r d to m e r c a n t i l e s h i p p i n g should, i n t h e first
i n s t a n c e , be discussed in detail b y t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
w i t h t h e S h i p p i n g Controller, a t h i s Office, o n S a t u r d a y
m o r n i n g , the 31st M a r c h , at 10 A.M., t h e conclusions
r e a c h e d b e i n g s u b s e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d by t h e S h i p p i n g
Controller to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t .
10. T h e President of t h e B o a r d of A g r i c u l t u r e a n d F i s h e r i e s
s u m m a r i s e d t h e views set out by h i m in a m e m o r a n d u m on
t h e S u p p l y of Cereals w i t h i n t h e E m p i r e ( P a p e r G . T . - 2 5 2 ) .
Mr. P r o t h e r o e m p h a s i s e d t h e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e , d u r i n g and after
t h e W a r , of i n c r e a s i n g t h e s u p p l y of maize, especially from S o u t h
Africa, because of its value as h u m a n food a n d for a n i m a l
consumption.
T h e r e were also g r e a t areas in t h e S u d a n w h i c h
m i g h t g r o w wheat and cotton, b u t these d e p e n d e d on i r r i g a t i o n
schemes which w e r e held u p by t h e W a r . T h e G e z i r a Plain alone,
w h e n i r r i g a t e d , would f u r n i s h 3,000,000 acres.
T h e I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t p r o c e e d e d to discuss the food
position of the United K i n g d o m i n t h e i m m e d i a t e future.
It was
p o i n t e d ox.it t h a t t h e n o r m a l wheat c o n s u m p t i o n of this c o u n t r y
w a s 35 million q u a r t e r s , of w h i c h we g r o w between 7 a n d 8 million
q u a r t e r s , o r r o u g h l y one-fifth.
We grow
million q u a r t e r s of
barley, and 21 million q u a r t e r s of oats, equivalent in food value,
after allowing for t h e smaller q u a r t e r a n d t h e g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of
h u s k , to 12 million q u a r t e r s of w h e a t .
In extreme circumstances
it would b e possible to divert t h e b u l k of t h e barley a n d oats to
h u m a n food, l e a v i n g animals w i t h l i t t l e or no fodder except hay.
T h e c o u n t r y was t h u s secure a g a i n s t actual s t a r v a t i o n , even if no
food s u p p l i e s w h a t e v e r could b e i m p o r t e d , b u t w o u l d b e r e d u c e d to
d r a s t i c r a t i o n i n g , in which t h e r e would b e a l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e of
b a r l e y a n d oats in bread.
T h e S h i p p i n g Controller e x p l a i n e d that, while h e a g r e e d t h a t
i t was d e s i r a b l e to have, as a m i n i m u m , a t h i r t e e n w e e k s ' s u p p l y of
w h e a t i n t h e c o u n t r y as d e m a n d e d by t h e F o o d Controller, it was
not possible for t h e ports, either; i n A m e r i c a "or at h o m e , to h a n d l e
indefinite quantities of wheat.
H e hoped t h e r e would b e a
s u b s t a n t i a l increase in the i m p o r t s of w h e a t in May, after t h e
o p e n i n g of t h e St. L a w r e n c e route, b u t r e m i n d e d t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
C a b i n e t t h a t ships h a d r e c e n t l y been d i v e r t e d to t a k e coal to I t a l y .
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t took n o t e —
(a.) T h a t t h e u l t i m a t e a i m should be to b u i l d up g r a d u a l l y a
store of six m o n t h s ' supply of w h e a t in this c o u n t r y .
(h.) T h a t steps w o u l d be taken as soon as possible, as a m o s t
u r g e n t w a r m e a s u r e , to a c c u m u l a t e a reserve s u p p l y for
t h i r t e e n weeks.
(c.) T h a t , in C a n a d a a n d the U n i t e d States, t h e r e was a
considerable w h e a t s u r p l u s available for export, a n d
t h a t t h e s e countries offered the shortest sea voyage.
(d.) T h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y of State for W a r a n d t h e M i n i s t e r of
M u n i t i o n s w e r e in consultation w i t h a view to t h e
release of as m a n y ships as possible from t h e t r a n s p o r t
of m u n i t i o n s from N o r t h America in t h e next few
weeks, a n d t h e i r diversion for c a r r y i n g grain.
(e.) T h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e B o a r d of A g r i c u l t u r e a n d
F i s h e r i e s was m a k i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s with stock-breeders,
oil-crushers, a n d millers to d i s c o u r a g e t h e special
f a t t e n i n g of cattle, and t h a t A g r i c u l t u r a l S h o w s (other
t h a n b u s i n e s s Shows) were b e i n g stopped.
Danger of
Dependence on
Foreign Supplies.
1 1 . T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet w e r e informed t h a t l a r g e
q u a n t i t i e s of w h e a t a n d maize p r e v i o u s l y c o n t r a c t e d for i n
A r g e n t i n a , a n d for w h i c h t h e ships h a d a l r e a d y b e e n sent, h a d
s u d d e n l y b e c o m e u n a v a i l a b l e , owing t o a decision of t h e A r g e n t i n e
G o v e r n m e n t , a c t i n g p r o b a b l y u n d e r G e r m a n influence, t o p r o h i b i t
all exportation. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of n o t b e i n g d e p e n d e n t on f o r e i g n
c o u n t r i e s for essential s u p p l i e s was t a k e n n o t e of b y t h e I m p e r i a l
W a r Cabinet.
(InitiaUed)
D . LI. G.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
S.W.,
March 29, 1917.
o
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
W A R CABINET,
6.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 10,
Street, S.W., on Friday, March 30, 1917, at 3\15 P.M.
Downing
Present:
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R O P T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON,
K..G,
CURZON OP
G.C.S.I.
G.C.I.E.
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T M I L N E a, G . C . B . ,
GC.M.G.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. H E N D E R S O N , M . P .
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. J . B A L F O U R , O . M . , M . P . ,
Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs.
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . LONG, M . P . , S e c r e t a r y
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
The R i g h t Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for India.
Chair).
The R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L. B O R D E N ,
G.C.M.G., K . C . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r of
Canada.
The
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
H.
PERLEY,
K.C.M.G.., Minister of Overseas M i l i t a r y .
Forces of C a n a d a .
The R i g h t H o n . W . F . M A S S E Y ,
Minister of N e w Z e a l a n d .
The R i g h t
Hon.
Prime
S I R J . G. W A R D ,
Bt.,
K.C.M.G., Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t H o n . J . C.
SMUTS, K G , Minister for Defence, U n i o n
of S o u t h Africa.
The R i g h t H o n . S I R E . P . M O R R I S ,
K . C . M . G . , P r i m e Minister of N e w f o u n d ­
*
land.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t Hon. t h e E A R L OP D E R B Y ,
K G . , G.C.V.O., C.B., Secretary of S t a t e
for W a r .
G e n e r a l S I R W . R. ROBERTSON, G.C.B.,
K . C . V . O . , D . S . O . , Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
G e n e r a l Staff.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l S IR C . F . N . M A C R E A D Y ,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Adjutant-General t o
t h e Forces.
The
Hon.
S I R J . S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, India;
MESTON,
of
The
United
Hon. S I R E .
CARSON,
The H o n . J . D. H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e
and Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Mr.
H.
C. M. L A M B E R T ,
C.B.,
Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
Mr.
PHILIP KERB,
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., A . D . C . , M a h a r a j a of Bikaner.
S I R S . P . S I N HA, Member-designate of "the
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S I R M. P . A. H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Mr. G. M. Y O U N G , Assistant
Major L. S T O R R , Assistant
[1.142-6]
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L S; A M E R Y , Assistant
K.C.,
A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G . C . B . , O.M.,
G . C . V . O . , F i r s t Sea Lord.
KC.S.L,
the
Rio-ht
M.P.,"First L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
Secretary.
B
Egypt.
1. T H E Chief of t h e Imperial General Staff reported t h a t j after
t h e b a t t l e , t h e T u r k s h a d fallen back t o their prepared position E a s t
of Gaza, a n d t h a t s t e p s w e r e being t a k e n to deal w i t h t h e m t h e r e .
Mesopotamia.
2. The Chief of t h e Imperial G e n e r a l Staff r e p o r t e d t h a t ,
according to p r e s e n t indications, it a p p e a r e d probable t h a t , o w i n g
to t h e slow progress of t h e Russian force, t h e T u r k s r e t i r i n g on
K h a n i k i n would m a k e t h e i r escape.
The Portuguese
Troops.
3. The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r r e p o r t e d t h a t an excessive
proportion of P o r t u g u e s e w e r e already in hospital a n d largely from
p r e v e n t a b l e causes. H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e necessity for a s k i n g t h e
P o r t u g u e s e G o v e r n m e n t t o allow Labour Battalions to t a k e p r i o r i t y
of t r a n s p o r t from P o r t u g a l over r e g u l a r troops had. to a certain
e x t e n t , been overcome owing t o t h e m e n travelling as civilians
t h r o u g h Spain.
T h e y were being organised after crossing t h e
F r e n c h frontier.
The Military
Situation:
The Need for more
Men.
4. T h e Imperial W a r Cabinet h a d before t h e m a general
review of t h e s i t u a t i o n in all t h e t h e a t r e s of war, prepared by t h e
General Staff ( P a p e r G . T . - 2 2 9 ) .
I n summarising t h i s report, t h e
Chief of t h e Imperial G e n e r a l Staff pointed o u t t h a t t h e G e r m a n s
h a d m a d e an immense effort t o p u t e v e r y m a n into t h e firing line
for t h i s year, a n d t h a t i t w a s essential t o meet t h a t effort, t o p r e v e n t
it from a t t a i n i n g a n y success, and, if possible, to defeat it. This
involved t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a t least 500,000 m e n more b y J u l y .
It
was t r u e t h a t t h e Allies h a d 13,000,000 m e n in t h e field as corn­
pared wifh 8,000,000 on t h e p a r t of t h e enemy, b u t of t h e s e
5,000,000 were Russians, 2.000,000 Italians, in addition t o which
t h e r e were R o u m a n i a n s , Belgians, P o r t u g u e s e , a n d o t h e r t r o o p s of
comparatively small fighting value. Applications h a d been m a d e
t o each of t h e Dominions, a n d t h e r e had been a generous response,
b u t t h e n e e d for m e n was still very great. H e had hoped t h a t i t
m i g h t h a v e been possible to send t h e fifth C a n a d i a n Division t o
France.
'Canada's Effort,
5. Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n laid before t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t
figures ( A p p e n d i x I ) s h o w i n g t h e total effort made b y C a n a d a u p
t o d a t e in t h e w a r . A t o t a l of 446,330 men h a d been raised for
various purposes directly connected w i t h t h e war, of whom 327,312
h a d been sent from Canada to t h e E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force or to t h e
Forces of t h e Allies. I n addition t o t h i s , t h e r e were 305,000 m e n
w o r k i n g in t h e p r o d u c t i o n of munitions.
The t o t a l population of
C a n a d a a t p r e s e n t was a b o u t 71- millions, of whom over 2 millions
were of F r e n c h origin. More than .600,000 w e r e of enemy origin.
T h e population of British origin was less t h a n 4 millions. There h a d
been enlisted in t h e C a n a d i a n Forces some 9,000 persons, whose­
next-of-kin resided in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , b u t a majority of t h e s e
were p r o b a b l y C a n a d i a n b y b i r t h . W i t h a frontier of 3,500 miles,
a n d a l a r g e population of e n e m y origin in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , it was
necessary t o keep some m i n i m u m of t r o o p s in Canada. This h a d
been fixed a t 50,000 men, a n d 50,000 more w e r e now being called
out for H o m e Defence in order t o release those a t p r e s e n t in t r a i n i n g
in C a n a d a . R e c r u i t i n g was actively proceeding for t h e C a n a d i a n
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force. Sir R o b e r t Borden also m e n t i o n e d t h a t over
12,000,000^ h a d been raised in Canada b y v o l u n t a r y contributions
to patriotic funds.
Fifth Canadian
Division.
6. Sir G. Perley pointed o u t t h a t t h e difficulty a b o u t s e n d i n g
t h e fifth C a n a d i a n Division into t h e field was t h a t , till i t was k n o w n
w h a t t h e casualties would be in t h e other C a n a d i a n Divisions in t h e
n e x t few months, it was impossible to say w h e t h e r t h e reinforce­
m e n t s a t p r e s e n t in s i g h t could k e e p five Divisions u p to s t r e n g t h .
T h e Canadian G o v e r n m e n t were q u i t e willing t h a t t h e
fifth
Division should g o t o France, o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t one of t h e
C a n a d i a n Divisions a t a t i m e should be a r e s t i n g Division.
The
m a t t e r was also complicated b y t h e u r g e n t d e m a n d for l u m b e r m e n
to be t a k e n out of t h e p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h of t h e fifth Division.
It
was agreed t h a t :—
The
question of l u m b e r m e n should be f u r t h e r discussed
b e t w e e n t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r a n d Sir G. Perley.
Eeeruiting in the
United States.
7. Sir R o b e r t Borden informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet of
t h e steps h e h a d t a k e n , before coming over to E n g l a n d , t o sound t h e
American authorities w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e possibility of r e c r u i t i n g
Canadians a n d other British subjects in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
The
response h a d been n o t unfavourable a t t h e time, a n d h e considered
t h a t w i t h t h e development of e v e n t s it o u g h t to b e possible largely
t o increase t h e a r m e d forces of C a n a d a from t h i s source.
The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r informed t h e Imperial W a r
C a b i n e t t h a t t h e W a r Office h a d likewise informally m a d e a r r a n g e ­
m e n t s for r e c r u i t i n g in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as soon a s t h e l a t t e r were
definitely a t war with G e r m a n y .
New Zealand's
Effort.
8. The P r i m e Minister of N e w Zealand g a v e figures as t o t h e
effort m a d e by N e w Zealand ( A p p e n d i x I I ) . A t o t a l of 70,000
h a d sailed from N e w Zealand, 10,000 were in c a m p , a n d several
t h o u s a n d s more were going into camp shortly. T h e r e h a d also
been a considerable n u m b e r of N e w Zealanders who h a d entered
t h e British or A u s t r a l i a n F o r c e s . H e considered t h a t N e w Zealand
could recruit up to a limit of 100,00.0 m e n , t h o u g h t h e strain on a
I n rep^y
population of u n d e r 1,200,000 w a s a l r e a d y b e i n g felt.
to a cable from N e w Z e a l a n d e n q u i r i n g w h e t h e r t h e tieed for
reinforcements or supplies w a s more u r g e n t , he was telegraphing
t h a t , t h o u g h supplies w e r e u r g e n t , t h e
need
for soldiers
came first.
South Africa's
Effort.
Natives and
Coloured Com­
batant Troops
from South Africa.
9- General S m u t s informed t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet t h a t
S o u t h Africa had p u t into t h e field b e t w e e n 50,000 a n d 60,000 m e n
for t h e suppression of t h e rebellion a n d for t h e campaign in
G e r m a n S o u t h - W e s t Africa.
I t h a d also p u t 30,000 m e n into t h e
field in E a s t Africa, in addition tu t h e b r i g a d e n o w in F r a n c e .
He
believed t h a t practically t h e whole of t h e m e n w h o h a d been
e n g a g e d in E a s t Africa would be prepared to serve in F r a n c e or
a n y w h e r e else as soon as t h e y h a d g o t over t h e effects of t h e E a s t
African climate, a n d these would be v e t e r a n troops, m a n y of t h e m
- with an experience d a t i n g b a c k t o t h e S o u t h African W a r .
He
h a d no d o u b t t h a t t h e force a t p r e s e n t in F r a n c e would be k e p t u p
to s t r e n g t h , and could be increased b y additional u n i t s .
10. I n answer to questions by t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r ,
General S m u t s expressed t h e opinion t h a t t h e 19,000 n a t i v e a n d
coloured g u n n e r s a n d drivers asked for from S o u t h Africa, in
addition t o 8,000 for a m m u n i t i o n column purposes, would be
forthcoming w i t h o u t g r e a t difficulty, a n d t h a t , if t h e r e c r u i t i n g
w e r e spread over a considerable period, possibly 30,000 m i g h t be
secured.. H e considered t h a t t h e s e troops would do excellently for
unskilled work in t h e firing line, as t h e y were both s t r o n g a n d
personally brave.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , his experience, was t h a t
n a t i v e s could not be t r a i n e d for all-round c o m b a t a n t w o r k as
infantry in less t h a n nine to t w e l v e m o n t h s . H e considered t h e
n a t i v e troops in East, Africa a useful force, a considerable p a r t of
which might be released for service elsewhere once t h e E a s t
African Campaign was really over.
Sierra Leone
Labour Supply.
11. General S m u t s informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet t h a t
t h e Governor of Sierra L e o n e h a d s u g g e s t e d t o h i m t h e possibility
of raising 10,000 carriers a n d 10,000 krooboys for dock l a b o u r in
t h a t colony.
I t appeared, however, t h a t t h i s h a d b e e n a v e r y
sanguine estimate.
Newfoundland^
Effort.
12. Sir E d w a r d Morris informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet
t h a t Newfoundland h a d provided a p p r o x i m a t e l y four b a t t a l i o n s for
F r a n c e , a n d t h a t t h e r e was a portion of a n o t h e r battalion in C a n a d a
a w a i t i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . A f u r t h e r 2,000 h a d j o i n e d t h e R o y a l
N a v y , and Newfoundland, with Canada, w a s . m a i n t a i n i n g a j o i n t
patrol against submarines on the C a n a d i a n , Newfoundland, a n d
L a b r a d o r Coasts. H e hoped also to be able t o supply a considerable
n u m b e r of foresters.
India's Effort.
13. T h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m
papers
summarising t h e t o t a l efibrt c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e war b y I n d i a ( P a p e r s
G.T.-152, G.T.-184, G.T.-197).
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for India m e n t i o n e d t h a t I n d i a h a d
sent t o various t h e a t r e s of war some 350,000 c o m b a t a n t s , a n d a
t o t a l force of 574,000 including auxiliary services.
The Indian
A r m y h a d also grown from 250,000 t o 430,000.
Very generous
assistance, b o t h in money a n d men, h a d also been furnished b y t h e
P r i n c e s of India.
T h e Maharaja of B i k a n e r mentioned in t h i s connection t h a t
in the first week of t h e war h e h a d offered to raise 20,000 m e n , b u t
t h e offer h a d been declined, and t h e men h a d since enlisted in o t h e r
capacities.
T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t was also d r a w n t o
t h e genuine a n d deep-seated loyalty of t h e I n d i a n troops, a s s h o w n
in t h e i r l e t t e r s from t h e front, a n d it w a s a g r e e d t h a t , in view of
t h e v e r y different conditions prevailing i n I n d i a from t h o s e of t h e
Dominions, a n d of t h e difference of race, I n d i a ' s response h a d been a
remarkable one.
Labour from India.
14. T h e Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a m e n t i o n e d t h a t I n d i a w a s
ready t o send 50,000 m e n in labour b a t t a l i o n s , b u t t h a t t h e I n d i a n
G o v e r n m e n t h a d been informed b y t h e W a r Office t h a t o n l y 20,000
were t o be actually raised for t h e p r e s e n t .
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r pointed o u t t h a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n
was entirely d u e to shipping considerations.
Further Recruiting
in India.
15. T h e Imperial W a r Cabinet further considered a t e l e g r a m
No. 3457, d a t e d t h e 2 8 t h M a r c h , 1917 ( A p p e n d i x I I I ) , which t h e
Secretary of S l a t e for I n d i a h a d sent t o t h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t ,
u r g i n g t h e l a t t e r t o raise a n o t h e r 100,000 m e n , t o be r e a d y a t a n y
r a t e b y t h e spring of 1918, and, w i t h t h i s object, in view, to t a p
fresh, sources of r e c r u i t i n g a u d t o improve its r e c r u i t i n g m e t h o d s .
T h e r e was a g e n e r a l discussion as t o t h e possibility of finding
fresh sources of recruiting in I n d i a a n d as- t o r e c r u i t i n g m e t h o d s .
Sir S. Sinha expressed t h e opinion t h a t t h e y o u n g Bengal s t u d e n t s
a n d professional m e n w h o were anxious t o enlist in order t o " m a k e
good " in t h e eyes of I n d i a would m a k e v e r y serviceable troops.
Sir J . Meston considered t h a t , while a n y t h i n g s a v o u r i n g e i t h e r
of a n a t t e m p t a t indirect compulsion or of our b e i n g in d e s p e r a t e
s t r a i t s would h a v e a bad effect, a g r e a t deal more m i g h t be done b y
intelligent recruiting a n d b y enlisting t h e h e l p of influential
unofficial classes.
The Question of
Indian Officers.
16. T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t w a s d r a w n t o
t h e g r e a t difficulty of securing suitable officers for so large a n
increase in the I n d i a n A r m y .
T h e Maharaja of B i k a n e r pointed out t h a t t h e class of m e n
now in t h e I n d i a n A r m y fit for promotion was v e r y limited, a n d
t h a t competent I n d i a n officers could n o t easily be improvised.
If
L o r d C u r z o n s proposals for t h e t r a i n i n g of I n d i a n cadets, w h i c h
h a d been m a d e in 1901, h a d been carried out, t h e r e would b y n o w
h a v e been a large supply of t r a i n e d I n d i a n officers.
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a informed t h e Imperial W a r
C a b i n e t t h a t t h e question of g i v i n g commissions to I n d i a n officers
w a s being discussed w i t h t h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , a n d t h a t h e
hoped before long t o be able to lay definite proposals before t h e
W a r Cabinet.
(Initialled)
D . LI. G.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
S.W.,
March 3 1 , 1917.
APPENDIX
MEMORANDUM
I.
respecting t h e P a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e Dominion of C a n a d a in t h e
European War.
Canadian Expeditionary Force Enlistments
A c t i v e militia on garrison and guard duty . .
Permanent force
..
.­
..
Canadian naval service enlistments
..
R o y a l navy enlistments..
..
Imperial mechanical transport service
Imperial army reservists
Royal navy reservists . .
.
French reservists (Consular estimate)
Russian reservists (Consular estimate)
I t a l i a n reservists (Consular e s t i m a t e )
Munition workers sent to Great Britain
..
...
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
. . .
. .
..
..
..
..
..
...
..
. . .
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
.'.
403.000
11,000
2,470
3,310
1,600
1,200
2,750
1,000
5,000
7,500
5,000
3,000
419,780
27,050
Total number withdrawn from manhood of Canada
Total number Canadian Expeditionary Force sent overseas from Canada .
Other forces w h o have gone overseas as above
Total
446,830
300,262
27,050
327,312
March 28, 1917.
[1142-6]
C
SUMMARY
of S t r e n g t h of t h e Canadian E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force in t h e British I s l e s '
a n d in F r a n c e as a t March 28, 1917.
Total Canadian Expeditionary Force who have been sent overseas from
..
Canada
..
. . . .
-^
Total now in France
..
--*'
Total n o w in England
..
t QI
Total casualties—
T o 1st March, 1917 . .
..
v.
From 1st March t o 24th March, 1917 (estimate) . .
-To forestry units—
^
In France . .
---'
"
"'
I n England . .
Total railway u n i t s I n France . .
..
--I n England . .
."
,. "
Total troops in Near East (medical units) (estimated) . . .
.,
. Total number of Canadian Expeditionary Force n o w undergoing training
in Canada
..
7
300,262
125,465
125,278
8
7 g ) 2 9 1
2,019
4,490
5,605
4 j96
'849
^
^
P o p u l a t i o n in 1 9 1 1 . (See " Census of Canada 1 9 1 1 , " Table X I ,
Vol. 2, p. 367.)
CANADIAN
Origins.
1911.
Number per cent,
of Population, 1911.
3.896,985
1,823,150
1,050,384
997,880
24,848
723
54-08
25-30
14-58
13-85
-34
-Qi
2,054,890
393,320
129,103
42,535
9,960
35,158
11,605
29,845
28-51
5-46
1-79'
-59
-14
-49
-l(i
-41
Belgian
Belgia n
Bulgarian
Bulgaria n and
an d Roumanian
Roumania n
Chinese
Chines e
Dutch
Dutc h
. Finnish
Finnis h
Grecia
Grecian
n
Hindu
Hind u
India
Indian
n
Italia
Italian
n
Japanesee
Japanes
-..
Jewish
Jewis
h,
Negro
Polish
Polis h
..
Russian
Russia n
.. '
Scandinavian
Scandinavia
n
..
Swiss
Swis s
Turkis
Turkish
h
Variou
Variouss
Unspecifie
Unspecified
d
9,593
5,875
27,774
54,986
15,497
3,594
2,342
105,492
45,411
9,021
75,681
16,877
33,365
43,142
107,535
6,625
3,880
18,310
147,345
-13
-08
-39
-76
-20
-05
-03
1-46
-63
-13
1-05
-23
-46
-60
1-49
-09
-05
-25
2-04
Tota
Totall population
populatio n
7,206,643
Britis
British
h
English
Englis h
Irish
Iris h
Scotc
Scotch
h
Welsh
Others
Other s
..
..
French
Frenc
h
Germa n
German
..
Austro-TIuugarian
Austro-TIuugaria
n
Austria
Austrian
n ..
Bukovinian
Bukovinia n
Galicia
Galician
n
Hungaria
Hungarian
n
Ruthenian..
- . .
..
..
..
Austria
Bukowina (Austria)
Bulgaria
Galicia (Austria)
German (a.e.s.)
H e b r e w (Austria)
H e b r e w (Germany)
Hungary
Polish (Austria)
Polish (Germany)
Euthenia (Austria)
Turkey
TotalAustria-Hungary
Germany
Bulgaria
Turkev
1912.
1913.
1914.
1915.
4,871
328
3,295
1,594
4.645
269
4
482
2,773
21
13,346
.632
1,050
687
4,616
497
4,938
392
16
578
4,462
29
17,420
770
3,147
1,549
.1,727
1,698
5,525
728
20
833
4,310
46
18,372
187
502
72
4,048
36
2,470
1.60
1
218
1,272
7
5,830
33
32,260
35,455
38,142
14,649
23,663
4,670
3,295
632
25,086
4,983
4,616
770
30,637
5,591
1,727
187
8,090
2,478
4,048
33
32,260
35,455
38,142
14,649
N.B.—As the fiscal year ends the 31st March the figures for 1915, for instance, contain six
months.
Year.
Totals.
1912
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
. .
32,260
1913
35,455
1914
38,142
1915
14,649
1916
44
Total number immigrants from e n e m y countries in Europe since 1911 . .
A P P E N D I X
Copy of Cablegram
W I T H
received from
120,550
II.
the Acting Prime
April 5, 1917.
Minister^
Wellington,
dated
reference to your t e l e g r a m of 31st March.
Firstly—
Main Expeditionary Force and Reinforcements
Maories
'..
..
..
..
Engineer Tunnelling Company . .
..
Wireless Troop
..
..
..
Samoan Expeditionary Force
..
..
British section, " Philomel," R.F.C., &c. . .
Total to date
..
..
..
...
..
V.
..
..
. . . . .
.-
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
...
...
..
62,216
1 .978
758
182
1,895
816
..
67,845
Secondly—
In training
..
..
11,490
ThirdlyNurses despatched
..
'..
..
..
..
Fourthly—
No. 1 Hospital Ship, now returning from fourth v o y a g e , c r e w
Staff­
.No. 1 charter
..
..
..
..
-No. 2 charter
..
..
..
...
N o . 3 charter
..
..
..
...
No. 2 Hospital Skip, proceeding on third v o y a g e , c r e w
..
StaffN o . 1 charter
..
..
..
..
-.
N o . .1 charter
..
..
..
..
.Fifthly­
Motor-boat
Reserve, including seamen
..
pre-war
..
..
--
428
..
Ill
--
71
-.
..
77
3 86
.*
.-
"1
8
8
1
2
2
'"
80,593
SixthlyHorses despatched to t h e front
Despatched t o Samoa
..
A t present in training camps
..
..
..
..
..
..
...
...
..
-..
..
..
..
..
..
£
..23,586,022
EighthlyVoluntary contributions from all patriotic funds—
In money ..'
..
..
..
..
In goods
..
. . . .
..
..
..
..
..
..
Seventhly—
W a r expenditure to 31st March last, approximate
10,117
141
639
2,527,971
215,135
2,743,106
NinthlyBelgian Relief Fund
Belgian School Fund
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
. .
Tenthly, War Pensions—
TotaVpayments t o 31st March last
Liability on all Pensions to date . .
N e t Liability to 31st March last . .
..
..
..
Total
(Signed)
Gopy of Supplementary
.
.
.
..
.
.
..
..
..
305,124
18,364
..
..
..
323,488
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
193,500
342,000
270,000
A L L E N , Acting
Prime
Minister.
Telegram
from the Acting Prime Minister, Wellington,
dated
5th April, 1917.
M Y t e l e g r a m 5 t h April, n i n t h l y : I n addition t o v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s
G o v e r n m e n t contributed t o 31st M a r c h l a s t b y w a y of g r a n t a n d subsidy t o B e l g i a n
Relief 219,084L
.
A P P E N D I X III.
G.T.-317.
From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department,
28th March, 1917.
3457.
I N D I A N r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , Imperial W a r Cabinet, w a n t t o k n o w w h a t a d d i t i o n a l
effort t h e y can promise on behalf of I n d i a on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t whilst doing all w e
can t h i s y e a r , decisive result will n o t b e obtained till n e x t year. The most i m p o r t a n t
consideration is w h a t fighting man-power can you produce a n d t r a i n to be fit t o p u t
into t h e field in early spring of 1918 in addition t o n u m b e r s to which you a r e a l r e a d y
committed.
This fresh effort would be p r i m a r i l y directed t o t h e relief of B r i t i s h
troops now serving in I n d i a , Mesopotamia, or E g y p t .
B u t you m a y be' able to spare or raise u n i t s n o t suitable for use a g a i n s t T u r k s .
I n t h a t case i t m i g h t be possible to employ t h e m in F r a n c e .
Do you t h i n k you could, for instance, raise 100,000 m e n for these objects?
I realise t h a t t o do so you will h a v e to r e s o r t largely to e n l i s t m e n t of classes t h a t h a v e
h i t h e r t o n o t been considered t h e best for p r o v i d i n g fighting men. I n p a r t i c u l a r , I
wish you t o consider w h e t h e r e x p e r i m e n t of Bengali double company m i g h t n o t b e .
largely e x t e n d e d . Consider also p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e possibility of obtaining more J a t s
a n d M a h r a t t a s , b u t please pass in review all possible resources of India.
Present
r e c r u i t i n g m e t h o d s seem capable of considerable i m p r o v e m e n t , a n d r e c r u i t i n g
organisations would have t o be largely expanded. I s u g g e s t introduction of some
new blood in y o u r r e c r u i t i n g agencies a n d much more use t h a n h a s been m a d e u p t o
d a t e of t h e a u t h o r i t y of ruling Princes a n d Chiefs in their S t a t e s , and of our o w n civil
a u t h o r i t i e s a n d local m a g n a t e s in British I n d i a . The unofficial classes should also,
I t h i n k , b e called upon t o assist.
P e r h a p s some suitable d e v e l o p m e n t s of a d v e r t i s e m e n t
a g e n c y m i g h t also be m a d e use of. You will u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e necessity for
e x e r t i n g t h e m a x i m u m s t r e n g t h of t h e E m p i r e is so g r e a t t h a t every m e a n s t h a t can
b e devised should be employed, a n d a l l possible sources of r e c r u i t m e n t thoroughly­
e x a m i n e d afresh. I realise t h a t i t m a y n o t be possible to m a k e such a large a d d i t i o n
t o t h e A r m y u n d e r t h e conditions on which t h e I n d i a n soldier n o w serves. I s u g g e s t
t h a t you consider w h e t h e r t e m p o r a r y e n l i s t m e n t for t h e t e r m of t h e w a r m i g h t n o t
m e e t t h e case ; also t h a t a s p r e s e n t pay m a y n o t be considered sufficiently a t t r a c t i v e
b y classes who h a v e not h i t h e r t o provided many fighting m e n , some form of t e m p o r a r y
p a y or bonus m a y be necessary. P l e a s e r e p o r t fully by t e l e g r a p h w h a t you t h i n k
could he done. I will t h e n ascertain w h e t h e r arms a n d e q u i p m e n t will be available.
I assume t h a t you will be able to d r a w m a n y officers from Territorials now in I n d i a ,
as y o u will be able t o give t h e m nearly a y e a r s t r a i n i n g .
o
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
IMPERIAL
WAR CABINET,
1917.
SECRET.
Minutes
7.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 1 0 , Downing
Street, 8.W., on Tuesday, April 3 , 1 9 1 7 , at 1 1 * 3 0 A.M.
Present :
THE
The
Right
P R I M E M I N I S T E R O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
H o n . , A. B O N A R
L A W , M.P.,
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The Right
Hon. the E A R L CURZON OF
KEDLESTON,
K.G.,
G.C.S.I.,
T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L. B O R D E N ,
G . C . M . G . , K G , P r i m e Minister of
Canada.
The
G.C.I.E.,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
T h e R i g h t Hon. V I S C O U N T M J L N E R , G . C . B . ,
G.CM.G.
PERLEY,
Overseas
The
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
Right
Hon.
SIR J . G. WARD,
Lieutenant-General
R i g h t H o n . A. C H A M B E R L A I N , M . F . ,
Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a .
Prime
Bt.,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
the . Right
Hon.
J . C. SMUTS, K . C . , M i n i s t e r for D e f e n c e ,
T h e R i g h t Hon. W . LONG, M.P., Secretary
of State for t h e Colonies.
The
H.
K . C . M . G . , Minister of t h e
Military Forces of C a n a d a .
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . ' F . MASSEY,
Minister of N e w Z e a l a n d .
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. J . B A L F O U R , O.M., M.P.,
Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs.
Chair).
U n i o n of South Africa.
The
Right Hon. S I R E. P . MORRIS,
K.C.M.G., P r i m e Minister of N e w ­
foundland.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t :
The Right Hon. the E A R L OF DERBV,
K G , G.C.V.O.,-C.B., Secretary of S t a t e
for W a r (Minutes I t o 8 ) .
Major - G e n e r a l F . B . M A U R I C E , C.B.,
Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s , W a r
Office (Minutes 1 to 8 ) .
The
Hon.
SIR J.
S.
Lieutenant - Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
MESTON,
of
the
SINGH,
BAHADUI:,
S.
P.
SINHA,
Minister of M u n i t i o n s (for M i n u t e s l O
and 1 1 ) .
The
G.C.S.I.,
Member-Designate
Hon.
SIR J.
Mr.
H.
C.
M. L A M B E R T ,
C.B.,
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
[1142-7]
Bt.,.
1
Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L. S T O R R , Assistant
MACLAY,
T h e Hon. J . D. H A Z E N , Minister of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
of
t h e E x e c u t i v e Council of the G o v e r n o r
of B e n g a l .
Right
C o n t r o l l e r of S h i p p i n g (for M i n u t e s
to 8 ) .
United
G.C.I.E., A . D . C . , Maharaja of B i k a n e r .
SIR
T h e R i g h t Hon. C. ADDISON, M.D., M.P.,
K.C.S.I.,
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e Maharaja S I R
GANGA
A d m i r a l S I R J . R . J E L L I C O E , G.C.B., O.M.,
G . C . V . O . , F i r s t Sea L o r d (Minutes 1 t o 8 ) .
Secretary.
Secretary.
The United States
of America.
.1. T H E P r i m e Minister r e a d to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t a
t e l e g r a p h i c s u m m a r y of P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t to Congress.
H e suggested t h a t a Special Mission s h o u l d be sent to W a s h i n g t o n
to explain in detail t h e n e e d s of t h e Allies. H e also r e a d a
p r e l i m i n a r y draft, p r e p a r e d b y t h e Secretary, as a b a s i s for a
c o m m u n i c a t i o n to t h e G o v e r n m e n t of t h e U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a ,
s u g g e s t i n g in order t h e various directions in w h i c h t h e y could w a g e
most effective war on G e r m a n y , a n d d w e l l i n g m o r e especially on
t h e i m p o r t a n c e of s h i p p i n g .
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet a g r e e d t h a t —
T h e Secretary of State for F o r e i g n Affairs should, i n t h e same
afternoon, sound t h e U n i t e d States A m b a s s a d o r in L o n d o n
as to t h e desirability of s e n d i n g a Special Mission to
W a s h i n g t o n , a n d should, in addition, explain to h i m t h e
views of t h e W a r Cabinet as t o t h e most effective form
which the co-operation of t h e U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a
could . t a k e , l a y i n g special stress on t h e i m p o r t a n c e of
p u t t i n g into service t h e e n e m y ships in t h e i r p o r t s , a n d of
s t i m u l a t i n g s h i p b u i l d i n g to t h e u t m o s t possible extent,
The Western Front.
2. T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e recent
m i l i t a r y operations b e t w e e n C a m b r a i a n d A r r a s h a d b e e n completely
successful.
The Hedjaz.
3. T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s reported t h a t a n u m b e r
of additional A r a b t r i b e s h a d joined Faisal, t h e son of t h e K i n g of
t h e Hedjaz, which should g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e the effectiveness of t h e
operations for t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n of t h e H e d j a z Railway.
Eoumania.
4. T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s r e p o r t e d t h a t n e w s h a d
b e e n received from t h e Military A t t a c h e in R o u m a n i a to t h e effect
t h a t , as the result of f u r t h e r investigation, it h a d b e e n s h o w n t h a t
t h e supply situation w a s b e t t e r t h a n h a d b e e n estimated, maize
b e i n g t h e p r i n c i p a l article i n which a serioxts s h o r t a g e existed.
Aerial Warfare.
5. A t t e n t i o n w a s d r a w n to t h e r e c e n t heavy casualties i n t h e
R o y a l F l y i n g Corps, a n d t h e anxiety o n t h i s subject in P a r l i a m e n t .
I t was decided t h a t —
A special discussion on this s u b j e c t s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e a t t h e
next m e e t i n g of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet.
P e n d i n g t h i s discussion, a n d in view of t h e very h e a v y aerial
fighting now i n p r o g r e s s on t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t , w h i c h necessitated
t h e concentration of every available m a c h i n e , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e which
could be spared by t h e R o y a l N a v a l A i r Service, t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
C a b i n e t decided t h a t — "
T h e question of a t t a c k i n g from t h e a i r open G e r m a n towns as
an act of retaliation for t h e i r s i n k i n g h o s p i t a l ships should b e held
over u n t i l t h e A d m i r a l t y h a d a s c e r t a i n e d definitely w h e t h e r t h e
" G l o u c e s t e r C a s t l e " (see Minute 7 below) h a d b e e n m i n e d o r
torpedoed.
Submarines.
6. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d i n j u r i e s to a " Q " s h i p i n t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n i n an action w i t h a n e n e m y s u b m a r i n e , a n d a n a c t i o n
b e t w e e n an a r m e d t r a n s p o r t a n d a n e n e m y s u b m a r i n e . H e m a d e
his u s u a l statement of m e r c a n t i l e casualties.
The Hospital Ship
" Gloucester
Castle " :
Eeprisals.
7. W i t h reference to W a r C a b i n e t 110, Minute 6, t h e F i r s t
Sea L o r d reported t h a t no definite information h a d y e t b e e n
received, as t o w h e t h e r t h e hospital ship " G l o u c e s t e r C a s t l e " h a d
been m i n e d or torpedoed. H e s t a t e d t h a t b e h a d now received full
p a r t i c u l a r s of the a c c u s a t i o n s m a d e by t h e G e r m a n s of t h e m i s u s e
of h o s p i t a l ships, some of which, it m i g h t b e considered difficult, o n
t e c h n i c a l g r o u n d s , to refute entirely. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t
decided t h a t —
T h e whole q u e s t i o n of reprisals s h o u l d b e r e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e
light of the l a t e s t information at a n early d a t e .
Technical Breaches
of The Hague
Convention.
8. T h e Secretary of State for I n d i a r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e
a r m e d g u a r d s which t h e I n d i a n M a r i n e h a v e always k e p t on t h e i r
h o s p i t a l s h i p s for the p u r p o s e of m a i n t a i n i n g order.
T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d also m e n t i o n e d t h a t c e r t a i n o t h e r t e c h n i c a l
b r e a c h e s of t h e r e g u l a t i o n s with r e g a r d t o hospital s h i p s h a d b e e n
discovered, which m a y h a v e p r o v i d e d t h e foundation for t h e u n t r u e
c h a r g e s m a d e b y the G e r m a n s on o u r use of h o s p i t a l s h i p s .
The Imperial W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
This
The Financial
Situation.
question s h o u l d also be held over and considered- i n
connection w i t h t h e question of r e p r i s a l s .
9. T h e Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r p r e s e n t e d to t h e I m p e r i a l
W a r Cabinet a g e n e r a l s u r v e y of t h e F i n a n c i a l S i t u a t i o n , which will
be r e p r o d u c e d in a s e p a r a t e document.
H e pointed out t h a t , as r e g a r d s t h e r a i s i n g of m o n e y i n t h e
U n i t e d K i n g d o m , h e foresaw no difficulty d u r i n g t h e W a r , t h o u g h
h e r e a l i s e d that if t h e W a r c o n t i n u e d for considerably m o r e t h a n a
y e a r longer, a n d the t o t a l i n d e b t e d n e s s were raised from the p r e s e n t
figure of 4,000,000,0007, t o such a possible figure as 8,000,000,OOOL,
t h e r e m i g h t be g r e a t difficulty in m e e t i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n after t h e
War. . Moreover, in t h a t event, t h e c a p a c i t y of our Allies t o r e p a y
t h e i r i n d e b t e d n e s s to u s m i g h t be so i m p a i r e d as to t h r o w p r a c t i c a l l y
t h e whole b u r d e n on o u r s h o u l d e r s .
On the other h a n d , as r e g a r d s p u r c h a s e s outside t h e United
K i n g d o m a n d the e x c h a n g e situation, h e h a d to a d m i t t h a t t h e
position would in a s h o r t t i m e have b e c o m e v e r y difficult i n d e e d ,
a n d t h a t it would h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l e to m a i n t a i n t h e gold
s t a n d a r d very m u c h l o n g e r . T h e G o v e r n m e n t had, i n fact, b e e n
advised b y the E x c h a n g e C o m m i t t e e i n t h e p r e v i o u s N o v e m b e r t h a t
t h e gold s t a n d a r d could n o t be m a i n t a i n e d any longer. I n spite of
t h i s t h e Government h a d gone s t e a d i l y a h e a d , p r e p a r e d t o r e s o r t
to whatever e x p e d i e n t s m i g h t become necessary before
finally
a b a n d o n i n g t h e gold s t a n d a r d ; a n d t h e i r boldness h a d n o w b e e n
justified b y t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of the U n i t e d States of A m e r i c a , w h i c h
w o u l d ease t h e whole e x c h a n g e situation.
A g e n e r a l discussion followed, i n w h i c h special s t r e s s Was laid
on t h e desirability of i n d u c i n g the A m e r i c a n s to take over directly
t h e b u r d e n of financing t h e Allies, w h i c h h a d h i t h e r t o devolved
u p o n us, so t h a t after t h e war w e s h o u l d n o t be t h e only l a r g e
creditor of our p r e s e n t Allies,
,
I n view of the s u s p i c i o n which t e n d e d to be aroused t h a t w e
w e r e m a k i n g a profit o u t of t h e war, t h e opinion w a s , in fact,
e x p r e s s e d t h a t it m i g h t be desirable, w h e r e feasible, to l i q u i d a t e
p a r t of t h e debt owed u s b y our Allies for other t a n g i b l e assets.
A t t e n t i o n was also d r a w n to t h e fact t h a t the p r e s e n t r e s t r i c ­
tions on i m p o r t s a n d t h e r e d u c t i o n of s h i p p i n g w o u l d exercise a
p r e j u d i c i a l effect u p o n sitbsequent B u d g e t s .
The Financial
Efforts of the
Dominions and
India.
10. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t took n o t e t h a t a very l a r g e
e x p e n d i t u r e i n c u r r e d by t h e D o m i n i o n s in p r o v i d i n g for t h e e q u i p ­
m e n t a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e i r o w n c o n t i n g e n t s was n o t i n c l u d e d
in Mr. Bonar L a w ' s s t a t e m e n t , so t h a t t h e total effort of t h e B r i t i s h
E m p i r e was considerably in excess of t h e l a r g e t o t a l s g i v e n in t h a t
statement. T h e Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r m e n t i o n e d t h a t t h e
whole of t h e a d v a n c e s m a d e t o C a n a d a in connection w i t h w a r
e x p e n d i t u r e h a d b e e n m e t b y loans r a i s e d by t h e C a n a d i a n Govern­
m e n t or t h e C a n a d i a n b a n k s .
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n a d d e d t h a t C a n a d a w a s s p e n d i n g for w a r
p u r p o s e s 500,000,000 dollars a y e a r above h e r o r d i n a r y e x p e n d i t u r e ,
which w a s a very g r e a t effort. H e observed t h a t C a n a d a h a d n o t
b e e n i n a p o s i t i o n to pay t h e s a m e p r o p o r t i o n o u t of t a x a t i o n as h a d
been done b y t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , whose effort in t h i s direction
h a d been m o s t i m p r e s s i v e .
Mr. Massey a d d e d that, in r e g a r d to t h e p r o p o r t i o n of
population a n d resources, N e w Z e a l a n d h a d also m a d e efforts
c o m p a r a b l e with those of C a n a d a .
Sir J. M e s t o n gave some details as to the special e x p e n d i t u r e
of I n d i a in connection w i t h t h e w a r , a n d t h e d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n
m a d e b y I n d i a in h e r o r d i n a r y e x p e n d i t u r e .
T h e Control of
M e t a l Production.
11. A r i s i n g out of a s t a t e m e n t by t h e Minister of Munitions,
t h e r e w a s a short dibcussiom as to t h e desirability of a l t e r i n g t h e
p r e - w a r p r a c t i c e by w h i c h m a n y of t h e r a w m a t e r i a l s p r o d u c e d i n
t h e British E m p i r e w e r e sent a b r o a d for m a n u f a c t u r e , or for some
s t a g e in the m a n u f a c t u r e .
I t was d e c i d e d t h a t T h i s question, t h o u g h one t h e p r i n c i p l e of w h i c h m u s t b e
finally decided b y t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t , should, i n
t h e first instance, be discussed at t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
(Initialled)
D. LI. G.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W.,
April 3 , 1917.
o
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty^ Government.]
Printed
for the Committee
of Imperial
Defence.
May 1 9 1 7 .
SECRET.
SIR J. MESTON'S S T A T E M E N T
IMPERIAL
WAR
OF INDIAN
CABINET
FINANCE
AT
THE
O N A P R I L 3, 1917.
S I R J. M E S T O N said t h e first p o i n t w i t h r e g a r d to I n d i a to w h i c h h e w i s h e d . t o
call t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e C a b i n e t w a s the relative smallness of its r e v e n u e , w h i c h w a s
a b o u t 85,000,OOOZ. to 90,000,0001. a year. O u t of t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y n e t e x p e n d i t u r e
w a s n o w 26,O00,000Z. T h i s a m o u n t e x c l u d e d a l t o g e t h e r certain smaller s u m s for
m a r i n e e x p e n d i t u r e a n d s u m s w h i c h were n e c e s s a r y for t h e services of loans r a i s e d
for w a r operations. Altogether, d u r i n g t h e y e a r e n d i n g t h e 31st March, 1917, t h e
I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d r e m i t t e d to E n g l a n d 71,500,000L
Out of t h a t ' a m o u n t
38,500,OOOZ. was w a r e x p e n d i t u r e , w h i c h t h e y themselves h a d a d v a n c e d to t h e H o m e
G o v e r n m e n t . T h e balance of 33,000,OOOZ. was r e m i t t e d in response to t r a d e d e m a n d s ,
a n d it m i g h t b e t a k e n that t h e g r e a t b u l k of t h a t w a s t r a d e w h i c h w a s essential for t h e
c o n d u c t of t h e I m p e r i a l m a c h i n e r y , s u c h as w h e a t , j u t e , m i n e r a l s , a n d other s u p p l i e s
of n a t i o n a l i m p o r t a n c e . As r e g a r d s a c t u a l i n v e s t m e n t s , t h e y h a d u p to t h e end of t h e last financial y e a r
p u t a l t o g e t h e r 46,500,000Z. i n t o E n g l i s h w a r s e c u r i t i e s ; some of t h a t w a s s i m p l y
r e n e w a l s , b u t 35,000,0001. w a s entirely n e w m o n e y .
T h e a c t u a l e x p e n d i t u r e u p to t h e e n d of l a s t y e a r in r e s p e c t of t h e E x p e d i t i o n a r y
F o r c e w h i c h left I n d i a to assist i n t h e w a r w a s 11,500,000/!. n e t . I t w a s a g r e a t d e a l
m o r e i n fact, b u t as the B r i t i s h G-overnment u n d e r t o o k to p a y for t h e T e r r i t o r i a l
r e g i m e n t s w h i c h were sent to I n d i a t h e i r net e x p e n d i t u r e was ll,5O0,O0OZ., a n d t h e y
p r o p o s e d to s p e n d t h i s year a n o t h e r 4,000,000Z., w h i c h would m a k e 15,000,000Z. for t h e
p a y m e n t of forces o p e r a t i n g o u t s i d e India. A p a r t from t h a t t h e r e was a t least 6,000,000Z.
to 8,000,000Z. a d d i t i o n a l outlay on account of t h e e x t r a cost of m a i n t a i n i n g ' p e a c e on t h e
N o r t h - W e s t F r o n t i e r a n d in P e r s i a . T h e e x p e n d i t u r e of t h i s a m o u n t h e l p e d to
m a i n t a i n p e a c e a n d order in a n otherwise t r o u b l e s o m e area a n d relieved responsibilities
i n o t h e r directions. AH this was b o r n e b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a .
PRINTED AT T H E FOREIGN OFFICE B Y C. R. HARRISON.
18y5/1917.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
Printed
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
April
1917.
SECRET.
MR.
B O N A B L A W S STATEMENT ON F I N A N C E AT T H E
SEVENTH
MEETING
OE
T H E IMPERIAL
WAR
CABINET
HELD
AT
10, D O W N I N G S T R E E T , S.W., O N T H E 3 R D A P R I L , 1917.
v
M R . B O N A R L A W said h e w o u l d t r y to p u t t h e o u t s t a n d i n g features of o u r
financial position as clearly as h e could in a very brief s t a t e m e n t . T h e r e w e r e t w o
p r o b l e m s w h i c h we had a l w a y s t o face, one w a s t h e raising of m o n e y a t h o m e , w h i c h
h a d h i t h e r t o proved simple, a n d t h e other, w h i c h w a s m o r e difficult, was t h e necessity
of m a k i n g p u r c h a s e s a b r o a d . D e a l i n g first with t h e h o m e s i t u a t i o n , h e said t h a t l a s t
y e a r t h e t o t a l a m o u n t of o u r votes of credit was 2,010,000,000?., which r e p r e s e n t e d
a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e a m o u n t s p e n t on t h e war. Since t h e o u t b r e a k of w a r our expendi­
t u r e h a d been 4,317,000,000?. This a m o u n t had been raised b y h o m e loans to t h e
e x t e n t of 1,761,000,0007,. T h a t did n o t i n c l u d e Consols converted, b u t was n e w m o n e y
w h i c h h a d b e e n raised by t h e s e loans. I n a d d i t i o n to this, h e t h o u g h t it was w o r t h
m e n t i o n i n g , for t h e sake of t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t which it n a t u r a l l y created, t h a t
74,000,0007. h a d b e e n s u b s c r i b e d i n W a r S a v i n g Certificates, a n d as t h e s e w e r e o n l y
for 15s. 6d each i t showed t h e e n o r m o u s i n t e r e s t w h i c h h a d been t a k e n by t h e g e n e r a l
p u b l i c in t h e s e loans. T h e b a l a n c e h a d b e e n raised b y l o a n s . abroad, m a i n l y i n
A m e r i c a , t o t h e e x t e n t of 419,000,0007. T h e n t h e r e were E x c h e q u e r B o n d s w h i c h
a m o u n t e d t o 500,000,0007., a n d in r e g a r d to t h e s e he w o u l d like to p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e y
were n o t m e r e l y a floating d e b t because the first fell d u e in 1 9 1 9 a n d t h e m a j o r i t y did
n o t fall d u e till 1 9 2 1 , so t h a t o u r real floating debt w a s s m a l l a n d was r e p r e s e n t e d b y
a b o u t 400,000,0007. in T r e a s u r y Bills.
,
W e h a d a d v a n c e d to t h e Allies a n d t h e D o m i n i o n s a b o u t 970,000,0007. Of t h i s
a m o u n t a v e r y s m a l l p a r t had b e e n given to t h e D o m i n i o n s . T h e total a m o u n t
a d v a n c e d t o t h e D o m i n i o n s w a s 141,000,0007.
O n e satisfactory f e a t u r e i n t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r was t h a t t h e r e h a d been n o increase in t h e a m o u n t s we h a d advanced to t h e
D o m i n i o n s . W h e n w e c a m e t o t h e Allies t h e position was v e r y different. A l l o u r
earlier E u r o p e a n wars h a d been carried on b y o u r subsidising o t h e r nations, b u t t h a t
h a d n e v e r b e e n carried o n to t h e s a m e e x t e n t or a n y t h i n g like i t a s in t h e p r e s e n t
war. A t t h i s m o m e n t we p r a c t i c a l l y paid for e v e r y t h i n g b o u g h t b y our Allies outside
Allied c o u n t r i e s . W e s u p p l i e d t h e m w i t h w h e a t , maize, m e t a l s , a l m o s t e v e r y t h i n g ,
a n d t h e r e s u l t was t h a t t h e total a m o u n t of o u r a d v a n c e s to t h e Allies was, as h e h a d
previously said, 828,000,000?., a n d i t had b e e n g r o w i n g . I n t h e first y e a r o u r a d v a n c e
to F r a n c e h a d only been 20,000,000?. ; last y e a r it was 171,000,0007. To R u s s i a in
t h e first y e a r o u r a d v a n c e was 174,000,0007.; last y e a r it was 226,000,0007. T o I t a l y
the" a m o u n t i n t h e first y e a r w a s 49,000,000?. ; last y e a r i t w a s 107,000,0007.
M r . B o n a r L a w said t h a t a s r e g a r d s our a b i l i t y t o carry on t h e w a r at h o m e he did n o t
t h i n k t h e r e was a n y doubt. T h e C e n t r a l P o w e r s found no difficulty i n raising m o n e y
for t h e i r o w n production. W e ourselves w e r e in t h e s a m e position. A l l p a y m e n t s b y
t h e G o v e r n m e n t w e r e m a d e b y d r a w i n g Bills on t h e B a n k of E n g l a n d . T h e s e drafts
found t h e i r way i n t o t h e j o i n t stock b a n k s a n d swelled t h e i r b a l a n c e s ; t h e y t h e n
c a m e back to t h e G o v e r n m e n t e i t h e r i n t h e f o r m of loans f r o m t h e i r j&ustomers or in
direct a d v a n c e s from t h e b a n k s themselves.
As r e g a r d s t h e loans, Mr. B o n a r L a w said h e would l i k e t o p o i n t o u t h o w closely
o u r h o m e finance was m i x e d u p w i t h t h e necessity of k e e p i n g u p t h e e x c h a n g e . T h e
necessity of k e e p i n g u p t h e e x c h a n g e h a d m e a n t a n e n o r m o u s b u r d e n n o t only u p o n
u s now, b u t u p o n posterity in t h e y e a r s to follow, i n r e g a r d t o t h e r a t e w h i c h w e h a d
t o fix. W e r e it n o t for t h e necessity of k e e p i n g u p t h e e x c h a n g e , m o n e y a t h o m e
w o u l d be u n u s u a l l y c h e a p . O u r first loan was 3 ^ per cent., a n d t h e second loan w a s
4 J p e r c e n t . H e . s a i d h e t h o u g h t i t was safe to say t h a t t h e r a t e b u t for t h e necessity
of k e e p i n g u p t h e e x c h a n g e would n o t be m o r e t h a n 3-1- p e r cent, t o 4 per c e n t , ; t h a t
[495]
r
m e a n t t h a t for t h e s a k e of k e e p i n g u p t h e e x c h a n g e we were p a y i n g in i n t e r e s t
( i n c l u d i n g conversions) s o m e t h i n g like 8O,00O,0O0Z. a n n u a l l y m o r e t h a n i t w o u l d
o t h e r w i s e be n e c e s s a r y for us t o pay. This was really one of t h e troubles t h a t every
C h a n c e l l o r of t h e E x c h e q u e r b a d to face. On t h e one h a n d t h e r e w e r e m a n y people
w h o wish c h e a p m o n e y and w h o p a i d n o a t t e n t i o n t o t h e e x c h a n g e at all. O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d t h e r e w e r e those w h o , he t h o u g h t , were inclined to k e e p t h e r a t e
i u n n e c e s s a r i l y h i g h w i t h t h e idea of a d d i n g to our security. M r . B o n a r L a w said t h a t
i n h i s j u d g m e n t i t w a s necessary t o keep u p t h e e x c h a n g e , a n d i t w a s therefore
necessary to h a v e t h e r a t e of m o n e y a t h o m e h i g h e n o u g h to m a k e c e r t a i n t h a t t h e r e
s h o u l d b e no t e m p t a t i o n to send m o n e y t h a t was h e r e n o w , abroad. H e said t h a t we
h a d k e p t t h e e x c h a n g e for a l o n g t i m e with A m e r i c a at 2 p e r c e n t , below par. T h a t
w a s done b y our m a k i n g p u r c h a s e s w h e n e v e r necessary in order to k e e p i t a t t h a t
figure, a n d t h e r e w a s n o d o u b t t h a t if we allowed t h e r a t e of m o n e y a t h o m e to g e t
l o w t h e e x c h a n g e would break d o w n a n d we should h a v e t o d e p a r t from t h e gold
s t a n d a r d . Mr. B o n a r L a w said t h a t t h e r e w a s n o difficulty a b o u t f i n a n c i n g a t h o m e ,
b u t he t h o u g h t it w ould be i n t e r e s t i n g to t h e Cabinet to consider n o t o n l y
w h a t t h e position was now, b u t wmat t h e b u r d e n was going t o be w h e n t h e
w a r was over, a n d t o consider also o u r ability to p a y f r o m this p o i n t of view.
I t seemed to h i m t h a t so l o n g as o u r B u d g e t provided, i n a d d i t i o n to t h e
o r d i n a r y expenses of t h e c o u n t r y , leaving t h e war out of a c c o u n t , a s u r p l u s
w h i c h was sufficient t o p a y off t h e d e b t w i t h a s i n k i n g fund i n a reasonable n u m b e r
of years, t h e position was n o t a b a d one. I n t h i s connection, of t h e t o t a l a m o u n t
raised for t h e w a r , l,137,00O,O0OZ.'had b e e n raised b y t a x a t i o n ; t h a t is to say, n e a r l y
o n e - q u a r t e r of t h e t o t a l a m o u n t expended. H e said he need n o t p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e r e
w a s no b e l l i g e r e n t c o u n t r y w h i c h h a d s h o w n financial s t r e n g t h a t a l l c o m p a r a b l e to
t h i s . M r . B o n a r L a w said t h a t looking a t it from t h e p o i n t of view w h i c h he had
i n d i c a t e d o u r ability t o cover by r e v e n u e t h e b u r d e n of t h e debt, t h e position now was
not unsatisfactory.
T h e a m o u n t of t h e N a t i o n a l D e b t a t p r e s e n t was 3,900,000,OOQZ.
T h e financial y e a r e n d e d on t h e 31st of last m o n t h , so t h a t h e had t h e figures u p to
d a t e . Of t h a t , 969,O00,O00Z. r e p r e s e n t e d a d v a n c e s t o t h e Allies a n d D o m i n i o n s .
He
said t h a t if we w o n t h e w a r h e t h o u g h t it safe t o a s s u m e t h a t w e should recover
a l m o s t t h e w h o l e of t h a t , a g r e a t p a r t of it, a t all events: T a k i n g t h a t basis t h e
position last y e a r was as follows : O u r t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e i n c l u d i n g t h e sinking*fund
for t h i s debt, a n d i n c l u d i n g also t h e addition of c h a r g e s for P e n s i o n s a n d other i t e m s
w h i c h h a v e i n c r e a s e d since t h e war, o u r t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e was 368,000,000Z.
Our
t o t a l r e v e n u e w a s 573,OOO,000Z. Of t h a t 573,000,OOOZ., 140,000,000Z. was represented
b y excess profits, w h i c h of c o u r s e could n o t c o n t i n u e after t h e w a r ; t h i s r e d u c e d t h e
r e v e n u e to 433,.000,000Z., l e a v i n g a b a l a n c e in o u r f a v o u r of 65,000,000Z., after p a y i n g
s i n k i n g fund, sufficient- to discharge t h e d e b t in a b o u t t h i r t y - s e v e n y e a r s . If, how ever,
we looked a t t h e position a t t h e e n d . of the p r e s e n t financial year, it was n o t so
satisfactory. B y t h a t t i m e t h e N a t i o n a l D e b t w o u l d a m o u n t to 5,750,000,OOOZ. T a k i n g
t h e p r e s e n t t a x e s , a n d d e d u c t i n g a g a i n t h e a d v a n c e s t o t h e Allies a n d to t h e
D o m i n i o n s on t h e p r e s e n t basis of t a x a t i o n , i n s t e a d of h a v i n g a s u r p l u s w e s h o u l d
h a v e a deficit of 37,000,000Z, ; t h a t is to say, we should b e 37,000,000Z. s h o r t of
t h e a m o u n t n e c e s s a r y to provide for t h e s i n k i n g fund.
M r . B o n a r L a w said
t h a t . h e did n o t wish t o be pessimistic a t all, he took r a t h e r a n optimistic view,
a n d t h e r e was t h i s t o c o m f o r t u s i n this connection, t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e
B a t t l e of "Waterloo t h e N a t i o n a l D e b t was 80O,00O,000Z., w h i l e t h e income of t h e
c o u n t r y w a s e s t i m a t e d a t 250,000,OOOZ. T h e i n c o m e t o - d a y was a t least t e n t i m e s
g r e a t e r t h a n it w a s a t t h e t i m e of t h e B a t t l e of W a t e r l o o . A l t h o u g h t h e r e w a s a
l a r g e m a r g i n , i t m u s t b e e v i d e n t t h a t , if t h e w a r lasted for t w o m o r e years—-if our
N a t i o n a l D e b t i n c r e a s e d to 8,000,000,000Z.—the p r o b a b i l i t y of o u r recovering from
t h e Allies t h e m o n e y s a d v a n c e d w o u l d be diminished.
r
r
M r . B o n a r L a w said t h a t h e r a t h e r e x p e c t e d to t a k e u p a good deal of t i m e i n
d i s c u s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of p a y m e n t s abroad, b u t h e was glad t o t h i n k t h a t t h e
t e l e g r a m w h i c h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d read from P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n h a d m a d e i t
u n n e c e s s a r y for h i m to go i n t o t h i s question in so m u c h detail as he w o u l d otherwise
h a v e done. H e t h o u g h t it w o u l d b e i n t e r e s t i n g if h e told t h e C a b i n e t w h a t was t h e
a m o u n t of o u r e x p e n d i t u r e i n A m e r i c a a n d . C a n a d a l a s t year. T h i s a m o u n t e d t o
3,031,000,000, dollars a n d w a s raised b y loans, of which C a n a d a provided t h e
B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t w i t h 275,000,000 dollars. H e w a s s u r e t h e C a b i n e t would b e
g l a d to k n o w t h a t since t h e w a r we had n o t had t o a d v a n c e a p e n n y to C a n a d a .
Our
a d v a n c e s t o h e r , w h i c h were a b o u t 60,000,OOOZ., w e r e m e t p a r t l y by t h e C a n a d i a n
G o v e r n m e n t a n d p a r t l y by t h e C a n a d i a n h a n k s , w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e a m o u n t u p t o
e x a c t l y t h e s a m e a s w e h a d a d v a n c e d to C a n a d a . A p a r t from loans, t h e only o t h e r
m e t h o d of p a y i n g d e b t s a b r o a d w h e n t h e b a l a n c e of t r a d e w a s a g a i n s t u s w a s b y gold
a n d b y securities. T h e a m o u n t of gold w h i c h w e h a d s e n t a b r o a d last y e a r w a s
826,000,000 dollars, a n d t h e a m o u n t of securities sold w a s 420,000,000 dollars. T h a t
w a s t h e position last year. T h e position now, a p a r t from t h e c h a n g e w h i c h h a d b'een'
created b y A m e r i c a e n t e r i n g t h e w a r , w a s a very serious oue. M r . B o n a r L a w said he
t h o u g h t t h e C a b i n e t w o u l d p e r h a p s realise how p r e c a r i o u s it was before if h e told t h e m
of a n incident t h a t h a p p e n e d a t t h a t t a b l e t o w a r d s t h e e n d of l a s t N o v e m b e r .
H i s o w n e x p e r i e n c e , a n d he t h o u g h t t h a t of m o s t of his colleagues, bore o u t w h a t w a s
t h e universal e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t m e n w i t h m o n e y , a n d especially t h e b a n k i n g class,
w e r e t h e m o s t t i m i d of all h u m a n c r e a t u r e s . T a k e , for instance, o u r l a s t loan raised
a t h o m e ; t h a t l o a n w a s s i m p l y prodigious, a n d a n a l m o s t i n c r e d i b l e success, p r o d u c i n g
1,000,000,0001., a n d w h a t h e t h o u g h t was of n o less consequence was t h e n u m b e r of
people i n one w a y or a n o t h e r w h o participated, w h i c h was n o t m u c h s h o r t of S,000,000.
A t t h e t i m e t h a t loan was a b o u t t o b e issued t h e b a n k e r s sent a r e s o l u t i o n u r g i n g t h a t
t h e r a t e of i n t e r e s t should b e 6 p e r c e n t , a n d o n e of t h e i r n u m b e r , a n d p e r h a p s t h e
best k n o w n of t h e m , l e c t u r e d h i m for s o m e t h i n g like half a n h o u r on t h e c e r t a i n t y of
its being a c o m p l e t e failure u n l e s s i t was 6 p e r cent. T h e r e s u l t s of t h a t loan s h o w
how unnecessarily timid t h e y were.
M r . B o n a r L a w added t h a t t h e E x c h a n g e
C o m m i t t e e had- c o m e t o t h e C a b i n e t of t h e l a t e G o v e r n m e n t i n N o v e m b e r last a n d
advised t h e r e w a s n o a l t e r n a t i v e b u t to go off t h e gold s t a n d a r d o w i n g t o t h e a c t i o n
of t h e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e B o a r d . T h e politicians, w h o , h e t h o u g h t , were .more
a c c u s t o m e d t o l i v i n g from h a n d t o m o u t h , were n o t t o b e i n d u c e d to t a k e s u c h a s t e p ,
a n d declined t o do it. B u t for t h e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e A m e r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t ,
M r . B o n a r L a w r e m a r k e d , h e h a d n o d o u b t w h a t e v e r t h a t o u r g o i n g off t h e g o l d
s t a n d a r d w a s only a q u e s t i o n of t i m e . T h e r e h a d been ever since t h i s w a r b r o k e
. o u t g r e a t difference of o p i n i o n i n t h e C a b i n e t as t o t h e possibility of o u r
b e i n g stopped for w a n t of m o n e y .
H e w a s o n e of those w h o a l w a y s believed
t h a t if o u r c r e d i t w a s good as a whole i n some Avay or o t h e r m e t h o d s w o u l d
b e found b y w h i c h t h e n e c e s s a r y business a b r o a d would be financed.
But though
h e believed t h a t , t h e r e w a s n o d o u b t t h a t to give u p t h e gold s t a n d a r d a t t h e
o u t s e t w ould p r o d u c e such a shock to all o u r Allies as t o m a k e a position w h i c h
w o u l d b e v e r y d a n g e r o u s . A n i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s m i g h t be f o u n d i n t h e position
now in regard to Russia a n d Italy.
T h e R u s s i a n E x c h a n g e was s o m e t h i n g like
76 p e r cent, below p a r , a n d t h e I t a l i a n E x c h a n g e w a s 4 0 p e r cent., a n d i n b o t h cases
i t was h a v i n g a v e r y disastrous political a n d social effect o n b o t h these c o u n t r i e s . A t
t h a t m o m e n t o u r position i n A m e r i c a w a s as follows : W e h a d A m e r i c a n securities
u n r e a l i s e d of 490,000,000 dollars, w e h a d an o v e r d r a f t of 358,000,000 dollars, l e a v i n g
a b a l a n c e of 132,000,000 d o l l a r s ; we h a d gold i n A m e r i c a t o t h e e x t e n t of 87,000,000
dollars, m a k i n g a t o t a l of 219,000,000 dollars n o w a c t u a l l y a v a i l a b l e i n N e w Y o r k ,
b u t o u r e x p e n d i t u r e was a t t h e r a t e of 75,000,000 dollars a w e e k , so t h a t would only
l a s t t h r e e w e e k s . W e h a d on t h e w a y assets w h i c h r e p r e s e n t 244,000,000 dollars,
w h i c h would h a v e carried u s o n for a n o t h e r t h r e e or p e r h a p s four w e e k s ; beyond
t h a t , t h e only assets visible were gold i n t h e B a n k of E n g l a n d a n d t h e J o i n t Stock
B a n k s t o t h e e x t e n t of 114,000,000Z. s t e r l i n g .
Russia a n d F r a n c e had about
107,000,0001. a n d 130,000,0002. of gold respectively, b u t n e i t h e r of t h e m could b e
. i n d u c e d to p a r t with i t unless s o m e a c t u a l n e c e s s i t y arises. I n b o t h t h e s e c o u n t r i e s
F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s told us t h a t t h e shortage of gold was a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e loss of
t h e e x c h a n g e . M r . B o n a r L a w said t h a t he d i d n o t t h i n k we could c o u n t on r e c e i v i n g
a n y serious s u p p o r t i n t h e w a y of gold from e i t h e r of these*two c o u n t r i e s .
!
r
A s r e g a r d s o u r other AllieSj t h e n u m b e r of A m e r i c a n securities w h i c h were now
saleable o n t h e N e w Y o r k m a r k e t w h i c h were i n o u r h a n d s w a s very small, a n d t h i s
i n spite of t h e fact t h a t we were n o w r e q u i s i t i o n i n g all securities. T h e C a b i n e t would
t h e r e f o r e see t h a t o n t h e face of i t our position w a s a very black one indeed. T h e
British G o v e r n m e n t h a d b e e n deliberately g o i n g a h e a d w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t d a n g e r
i n this direction w a s i n front of t h e m which w e m i g h t be u n a b l e t o face. W e h a d felt
t h a t t h e use of o u r gold and all o u r other resources would carry u s o n as l o n g as possible.
H e m i g h t say t h a t , t h o u g h we h a d a t p r e s e n t n o t h i n g like t h e n u m b e r of assets w e
f o r m e r l y had, t h e r e were m a n y others w h i c h , i n case of necessity, w e could m a k e
available. I n , this connection t h e y h a d sent out t o A m e r i c a , a b o u t a m o n t h a g o , t h e
F i n a n c i a l S e c r e t a r y t o t h e T r e a s u r y , Sir S. H . L e v e r , to t r y t o discover e x p e d i e n t s t o
l e n g t h e n t h e t i m e to w h i c h we could carry o n t h e s e financial o b l i g a t i o n s . O n e of
these e x p e d i e n t s , i n w h i c h Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n w o u l d be p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d , a n d
"which was on a "very l a r g e scale, was to c h a n g e t h e d e b e n t u r e s of t h e C a n a d i a n
Pacific R a i l w a y w h i c h were now s t e r l i n g securities i n t o d o l l a r securities w h i c h w o u l d
b e negotiable i n N e w Y o r k , a n d from t h i s source w e h o p e d to g e t a v e r y l a r g e s u m ,
s o m e t h i n g like 30 or 40 millions s t e r l i n g . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t , a p a r t from o u r h o m e
assets, railways a n d t h i n g s of t h a t k i n d , for w h i c h t h e r e w a s no m a r k e t in t h e U n i t e d
States, we possessed a large n u m b e r of S o u t h A m e r i c a n securities w h i c h w e r e n o t
d e a l t w i t h on t h e A m e r i c a n m a r k e t , b u t for which, g i v e n t i m e , h e t h o u g h t a m a r k e t
could b e created. A t t h e same t i m e h e observed t h a t he h a d said e n o u g h t o s h o w t h a t
o u r financial position was a source of g r e a t a n x i e t y n o t o n l y to h i m b u t , h e t h o u g h t ,
t o the w h o l e G o v e r n m e n t , a n d n o t h i n g t h a t day h a d pleased h i m m o r e t h a n t h e n e w s
from A m e r i c a a n d t h e relief w h i c h we m i g h t e x p e c t t o receive f r o m t h a t c o u n t r y .
In
t h e m e a n t i m e w e s h o u l d n o t r u n i n t o t h e rocks w h i c h s e e m e d to be i n front of u s ,
a n d h e t h o u g h t we m i g h t hope t h a t , as A m e r i c a g o t m o r e a n d m o r e involved i n t h e
w a r , she would p u t all her resources into t h e scale, and, if so, we should h a v e n o
d a n g e r of r u n n i n g t h e risk of b e i n g u n a b l e to pay for o u r c o m m i t m e n t s abroad.
P R I N T E D AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY C. R. HARRISON.
20/4/1917.
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
AVAR
CABINET,
8.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 10,
Street, S.W., on Thursday,
April 5, 1917, at 11.30 A.M.
Downing
Present :
THE
The Right
PRIME
MINISTER OF T H E U N I T E D KINGDOM
Hon. A . BONAR
Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON,
Chair).
L A W , M . P . , The Right Hon. S I R ROBERT L . BORDEN,
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The Right
(in the
CURZON
K G . , G.C.S.I.,
OF
G.C.I.E.,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The R i g h t Hon. VISCOUNT MILNER, G.C.B.,
G.C.M.G.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. H E N D E R S O N , M . P .
G.C.M.G.,
Canada.
The
Hon.
K.C.,
SIR
Prime
GEORGE
Minister
H.
of
PERLEY,
K.C.M.G., Minister of t h e Overseas
Military Forces of Canada.
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . F. M A S S E V , P r i m e
Minister of N e w Zealand.
The Right Hon.
S I R J . G. W A R D ,
Bt.,
K.C.M.G., Minister of F i n a n c e a n d Posts,
N e w Zealand.
Lieutenant-General
the
Right
Hon.
J. C. SMUTS, K.C., Minister for Defence,
The R i g h t Hon. W . LONG, M . P . , Secretary
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
U n i o n of S o u t h Africa.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . , T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R E . P . M O R R I S ,
K . C . M . G . , P r i m e Minister of New­
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for India.
foundland.
T h e following were also present :
T h e R i g h t H o n . A . J . BALFOTJR. O . M . ,
M . P , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
The R i g h t Hon. t h e E A R L OF D E R B Y ,
K . G . , G.C.V.O., C . B . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r .
The Right Hon. S I R E . H. CARSON, K . C . ,
M.P."", First Lord of t h e A d m i r a l t y
(Minutes 1 t o 9).
G e n e r a l S I R W . R.
A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G . C . B . , O.M.,
G . C . V . O . , F i r s t S e a Lord ( M i n u t e s 1 t o 9).
ROBERTSON,
G.C.B.,
K . C . V . O . , D.S.O., Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
G e n e r a l Staff ( M i n u t e s 1 t o 5).
Lieutenant-General
S I R D.
HENDERSON,
K . C . B . , D.S.O., D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l
M i l i t a r y Aeronautics ( M i n u t e 12).
of
M r . J . I. M A C P H E R S O N , M . P . , P a r l i a m e n t a r y
U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r
( M i n u t e 12).
Brigadier- General
W .
S. B R A N C K E R ,
Director of A i r O r g a n i s a t i o n ( M i n u t e 12).
Mr. A. W E I R , S u r v e y o r - G e n e r a l of S u p p l y ,
W a r Office ( M i n u t e 12).
The
Right
Hon.
S I R J.
MACLAY,
Bt.,
Controller of S h i p p i n g (for Minutes 1
t o 10).
Major J . L . B A I R D , C.M.G., D.S.O., M . P . ,
P a r l i a m e n t a r y M e m b e r of t h e A i r
B o a r d ( M i n u t e 12).
Mr.
H.
C. M.
LAMBERT,
C.B., Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l
Conference.
War
Commodore G. M. P A I N E , C.B., M . V . O . ,
Fifth S e a L o r d ( M i n u t e 1.2).
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
The
Hon.
S I R J.
of
the
K.C.S.I.,
United
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA.
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I.,
G . C . I . E . , A.D.C., Maharaja.of Bikaner.
S i r S. P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e Governor of
Bengal.
T h e R i g h t H o n . C. A D D I S O N , M . D . , M . P .
Minister of M u n i t i o n s ( M i n u t e 12).
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K.C.B.,
Secretary.
Major L . -STORR, Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
- [1142-8]
S . MESTON,
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
Secretary.
The Western
Front.
1. T H E Chief of t h e Imperial General Staff r e p o r t e d a
successful advance b y t h e F r e n c h t o t h e south of S t . Q u e n t i n .
A
d o c u m e n t h a d been captured indicating t h a t t h e last B r i t i s h
advance had been considerably more rapid t h a n t h e e n e m y h a d
anticipated, and t h a t t h e villages t a k e n on t h e 2 n d April were t o
h a v e been held till t h e 18th. T h e railway construction across t h e
e v a c u a t e d g r o u n d h a d been carried out v e r y successfully, a n d h a d
reached a point 2 miles beyond B a p a u m e .
Two additional G e r m a u Divisions h a d been located in B e l g i u m ,
bringing t h e t o t a l up t o 148 as a g a i n s t 119 last s u m m e r .
Russia:
Concentration of
German Transports
in the Baltic.
2. The Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff r e p o r t e d a con­
centration of troops, R h i n e boats, a n d other craft, in t h e G e r m a n
Baltic ports. According t o t h e latest information from t h e F i r s t
Sea Lord, t h e R u s s i a n Baltic F l e e t was in a most inefficient condition
as a result of t h e Revolution, a n d h a d practically no officers left.
U n l e s s t h e minefield were reinforced t h e m o m e n t t h e ice m e l t e d ,
t h e r e was n o t h i n g t o p r e v e n t t h e G e r m a n s l a n d i n g either b e h i n d
R i g a or on t h e coast of F i n l a n d .
The I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
The F i r s t Sea Lord a n d t h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l General Staff
should draft a t e l e g r a m , to be sent from t h e P r i m e Minister
to t h e h e a d of t h e Prussian G o v e r n m e n t , impressing u p o n
him t h e importance of laying mines a t t h e earliest possible
moment, in order to provide against t h e danger of a
G e r m a n landing: behind t h e Russian lines.
The United States
of America:
Telegram to
President Wilson.
3. The Imperial W a r C a b i n e t authorised t h e P r i m e Minister,' "
a s soon as official information is received of acceptance by Congress
of t h e resolution in favour of w a r w i t h G e r m a n y , t o send a t e l e g r a m
t o P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n , on behalf of t h e whole E m p i r e assembled in
t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet, cordially welcoming t h e co-operation of
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d laying special stress on t h e fact t h a t we too
r e g a r d e d t h e war as one not a g a i n s t t h e German people, b u t a g a i n s t
t h e s y s t e m of P r u s s i a n autocracy.
Distribution of
President Wilson's
Speech to the
German Army.
4 . T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r s t a t e d t h a t t h e W a r Office
h a d already t a k e n in h a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s for d i s t r i b u t i n g a t r a n s ­
lation of P r e s i d e n t Wilsoifs speech over t h e G e r m a n lines b y
aircraft.
3
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs u n d e r t o o k t o reply in
t h i s sense to W a s h i n g t o n telegram No. 870.
Yisit of British
Representative.
o. T h e P r i m e Minister informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t of
t h e decision t a k e n b y t h e W a r C a b i n e t on t h e p r e v i o u s d a y ( W a r
Cabinet, 113, M i n u t e 13), t h a t a R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e British
G o v e r n m e n t of t h e h i g h e s t s t a t u s , accompanied b y N a v a l , Military,
a n d Financial e x p e r t s , should proceed as soon a s possible t o t h e
United States.
T h e Prime Minister of C a n a d a u n d e r t o o k t o w a r n his colleagues
in Canada t h a t some C a n a d i a n Minister m i g h t be required
t o meet t h e British R e p r e s e n t a t i v e at W a s h i n g t o n , b u t t h e
precise selection was to be left until after t h e arrival "of t h e
British R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , w h e n he h a d formed an idea of t h e
n a t u r e of t h e C a n a d i a n advice most needed.
* Inconsequence of the decision at the War Cabinet on the following day that the King should be
asked to send a message, this decision was not carried out.
T h e r e w a s also some discussion as t o t h e selection of t h e
principal Military e x p e r t t o accompany t h e British R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,
a n d a s t o t h e a c t u a l a r r a n g e m e n t s for t h e j o u r n e y .
Enemy Shipping in
South American
Ports.
6. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet discussed a proposal b y t h e
S h i p p i n g Controller t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s should be asked t o b r i n g
pressure on t h e S o u t h A m e r i c a n Republics in order t o requisition
i m m e d i a t e l y and p u t i n t o commission, or a t t h e disposal of t h e
Allies, all t h e e n e m y ships in t h e i r ports, some 300 in n u m b e r , w i t h
a total t o n n a g e of over 800,000 tons. A n y possible fear of G e r m a n
reprisals after t h e w a r could be m e t by a joint g u a r a n t e e of t h e
Allies.
*
I n view of r e c e n t communications f r m i H i s M a j e s t y ' s represen­
t a t i v e s in S o u t h American S t a t e s d e p r e c a t i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
intervention in t h e m a t t e r , t h e r e was a general opinion t h a t i m m e d i a t e
action as s u g g e s t e d would be of doubtful expediency.
Sir R. Borden, from his general k n o w l e d g e of t h e situation a n d
h i s experience of t h e s e n t i m e n t s of a S o u t h American M i n i s t e r w h o
h a d visited C a n a d a after a t t e n d i n g t h e P a n - A m e r i c a n Congress,
conni-med t h e view t h a t t h e interference of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would
probably be r e s e n t e d in S o u t h America.
A t t e n t i o n was d r a w n t o t h e fact t h a t t h e seizure of these ships
would be construed by t h e enemy as a n a c t of war, so t h a t t h e issue
really was one, as in t h e case of P o r t u g a l , of p u t t i n g pressure on
t h e m t o join t h e Allies. I t was decided t h a t —
T h e question should be discussed w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
G o v e r n m e n t a t W a s h i n g t o n by t h e British R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
referred t o above.
Mine-laying.
7. T h e F i r s t S e a Lord m a d e his usual s t a t e m e n t of mercantile
losses. H e f u r t h e r r e p o r t e d t h e r e t u r n of t w o mine-laying s u b ­
marines from t h e H e l i g o l a n d Bight. A t h i r d h a d n o t y e t r e t u r n e d .
A b o u t 2,000 mines h a d also been laid in t h e B i g h t d u r i n g t h e last
week b y surface craft.
Submarines:
Difficulty of
Destroying.
8. I n order to i l l u s t r a t e t h e difficulty of d e s t r o y i n g submarines
t h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e a d t h e reports, s e n t i n b y b o t h sides, of a recent
e n c o u n t e r in which B r i t i s h destroyers h a d a t t a c k e d a British
s u b m a r i n e by mistake.
T h e submarine, which r e t u r n e d safely,
r e p o r t e d receiving several h i t s a n d b e i n g violently s h a k e n by t h e
d e p t h - c h a r g e s which were dropped i m m e d i a t e l y over her. The
destroyers, on t h e o t h e r hand, r e p o r t e d t h e sinking of t h e s u b m a r i n e
as a c e r t a i n t y .
British Bigid
Airship.
9. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e first B r i t i s h rigid
airship, equipped w i t h engines t a k e n from a G e r m a n - Zeppelin, h a d
m a d e a successful flight on t h e previous d a y . S h e was only useful
for t r a i n i n g purposes.
New Zealand.
10. T h e P r i m e Minister of N e w Z e a l a n d d r e w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e
v e r y large n u m b e r of i n s u l a t e d ships, e n g a g e d i n t h e N e w Z e a l a n d
m e a t t r a d e , which h a d been w i t h d r a w n . T h e total, including five
which h a d j u s t been t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e R i v e r P l a t e t r a d e by t h e
S h i p p i n g Controller, was seventeen. This involved n o t only v e r y
serious t e m p o r a r y loss t o N e w Z e a l a n d ' s l a r g e s t i n d u s t r y , b u t m i g h t
involve its p e r m a n e n t dislocation. T h e feeling in N e w Z e a l a n d on
t h e m a t t e r w a s v e r y s t r o n g , a n d , t h o u g h i t would m a k e n o difference
t o t h e i r efforts, t h e y m i g h t consider t h a t t h i s w a s a s o r r y requital
for all N e w Z e a l a n d ' s sacrifices in t h e common cause.
I t was pointed out t h a t it w a s a m a t t e r of sheer necessity t o
save t r a n s p o r t w h e r e v e r possible. The voyage from t h e A r g e n t i n e
took t w e n t y d a y s as against f o r t y - t w o d a y s from N e w Zealand, so
t h a t t h e same ships could carry t w i c e t h e a m o u n t of m e a t for t h i s
c o u n t r y a n d for t h e A r m y . Lancashire, h a d h a d to suffer i n t h e same
way. I t s facilities for sending goods t o its m o s t i m p o r t a n t market—'­
t h e E a s t — h a d been cut down t o one ship a week, which involved
on an a v e r a g e a closing down of t w o d a y s a w e e k t h r o u g h o u t
Lancashire.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , it was s u g g e s t e d t h a t , if America's e n t r y
i n t o t h e war b r o u g h t a b o u t a r e a l l y s u b s t a n t i a l addition t o our t o t a l
t o n n a g e , our position m i g h t to some e x t e n t be reconsidered.
Mr. Massey fully appreciated t h e difficulties of t h e s i t u a t i o n ,
b u t expresssed t h e hope t h a t t h e m a t t e r s h o u l d be r e v i e w e d a t t h e
first possible o p p o r t u n i t y .
Proposed
Formation of a
Jewish Corps for
Service in
Egypt and
Palestine.
11. The I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet h a d under consideration a
l e t t e r t o t h e Prime Minister, d a t e d t h e 2 4 t h J a n u a r y , 1917, from
M. J a b o t i u s k y ( P a p e r G . T . - 3 5 3 ) , a d v o c a t i n g t h e formation of a
J e w i s h r e g i m e n t for service in P a l e s t i n e and E g y p t .
Sir R Borden mentioned t h a t t h e r e h a d been a m o v e m e n t in
t h e same direction in C a n a d a , b u t t h a t t h e proposal h a d been
d e p r e c a t e d by t h e J e w s there, who preferred to fight as Canadians.
The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r r e p o r t e d t h a t , similarly, pro­
posals to form special J e w i s h u n i t s a t a n earlier s t a g e of t h e w a r
h a d not m e t w i t h a favourable reception on t h e p a r t of t h e J e w i s h
c o m m u n i t y , a n d his information, did not s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t a n y
v e r y large n u m b e r of J e w i s h r e c r u i t s could be obtained.
I t was, however, p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e objection h a d originally
come from E n g l i s h J e w s , a n d t h a t t h e question was of raising a
Special U n i t a m o n g t h e l a r g e n u m b e r ' of alien, more particularly
Russian, J e w s now in t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m .
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for W a r u n d e r t o o k to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e
whole m a t t e r and t o p r e s e n t a scheme t o t h e Imperial W a r
Cabinet a t an early d a t e .
The Air Services.
12. I n view of t h e discussion, b o t h in t h e press a n d in t h e
H o u s e of Commons, of t h e increased n u m b e r of casualties in t h e
R o y a l F l y i n g Corps, General Sir D a v i d H e n d e r s o n read t o
t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t a m e m o r a n d u m (Appendix) giving a
full s t a t e m e n t , b o t h as to the g e n e r a l causes of casualties in t h e
, field a n d t h e i r comparison with t h o s e of t h e enemy a n d our own
casualties of t h e preceding year, as well a s a detailed analysis of t h e
proportion of casualties in t h e different t y p e s of machines.
He
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e R o y a l F l y i n g Corps w a s double
w h a t it h a d been a y e a r before, t h a t w e used our m a c h i n e s t o a
very m u c h g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n t h e G e r m a n s for c a r r y i n g o u t
a r t i l l e r y observation, even u n d e r t h e most difficult a n d d a n g e r o u s
conditions, and t h a t t h e recent G e r m a n r e t i r e m e n t h a d involved an
enormous a m o u n t of dangerous long-distance reconnaissance. The
casualties had, in consequence, been considerable, t h o u g h by no
m e a n s in an excessive degree as compared w i t h those of t h e
preceding y e a r ; b u t t h e y h a d been far more t h a n compensated for
by t h e saving of loss of life in t h e r e s t of t h e A r m y , r e s u l t i n g from
t h e free use we made of our airmen.
In h i s opinion, t h i s continuous
q u e s t i o n i n g in t h e House of Commons a n d criticism in t h e press of
particular t y p e s of aeroplanes h a d a v e r y bad effect on t h e nerves of
y o u n g officers, w h o could not help being- influenced b y w h a t t h e y
read, a n d h e considered t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of accidents w a s in
consequence g r e a t l y increased.
After considerable discussion, t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t agreed
that—
T h e question should, in t h e first instance, be d e b a t e d a t a Secret
Session of P a r l i a m e n t , w h e r e full information should be
given, a n d a f u r t h e r offer m a d e t o t h e H o u s e of Commons
t h a t the m e m b e r s of t h e Air Board a n d o t h e r e x p e r t s would
be willing t o m e e t M e m b e r s of P a r l i a m e n t a t a p r i v a t e
interview a n d a n s w e r a n y questions p u t to t h e m .
I n view of t h e fact t h a t a S e c r e t Session could n o t t a k e place
for some weeks, a n d t h a t t h e campaign a g a i n s t t h e A i r Services was
b o u n d t o do considerable h a r m in t h e i n t e r v a l ,
Sir R. Borden a n d General S m u t s undertook t o m a k e r e a s s u r i n g
s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e i r forthcoming speeches on W e d n e s d a y
n e x t , t h e 1 1 t h April, 1917.
(Initialled)
2, Whitehall
April
Gardens,
5, 1 9 1 7 .
S.W.,
D. LI. G.
APPENDIX.
Casualties
in the
Field.
T H E increased number of casualties in t h e Held lately are due to several causes.
I n t h e first place, t h e retirement, of t h e G e r m a n s over a large section of t h e front
necessitated a g r e a t a m o u n t of lon^-distance reconnaissance and of p h o t o g r a p h y .
This
is always d a n g e r o u s work, a n d w a s especially d a n g e r o u s in this case because of t h e
special efforts m a d e by t h e G e r m a n s t o stop it.
I u n d e r s t a n d , however, t h a t t h e
information supplied by t h e R o y a l F l y i n g Corps, as to t h e G e r m a n m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e
G e r m a n p r e p a r a t i o n s in front of our a r m y , has been absolutely complete. This could
be ascertained b y reference to Sir Douglas H a i g .
Probably, in view of t h i s r e t i r e m e n t , t h e G e r m a n s h a d concentrated a v e r y large
proportion of t h e i r available forces in front of t h e British. There h a s n o t been nearly
so m u c h fighting in t h e T r e n c h p a r t of t h e line, a n d t h i s m a y also be d u e t o t h e fact
t h a t t h e F r e n c h Air Service has h a r d l y been pulling its w e i g h t of late. I was informed
a t G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s t h a t t h e information obtained by t h e F r e n c h Air Service, w i t h
r e g a r d to t h e i r front, was very incomplete, so much so t h a t a considerable portion of
t h e G e r m a n line in. front of t h e F r e n c h h a d to be p h o t o g r a p h e d by t h e British F l y i n g
Corps.
T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t t h e G e r m a n s have produced, within t h e l a s t few m o n t h s , a
considerable n u m b e r of fast single-seater Scouts, of which the best is t h e Albatross.
T h e aeroplanes which we have on our front which are equal to, or b e t t e r t h a n , t h e
Albatross Scout, a r e t w o F r e n c h t y p e s — t h e S p a d a n d t h e N i e n p o r t — a n d t h e E n g l i s h
S o p w i t h t r i p l a n e ; of these we have 7 squadrons in all. N e x t to t h e m , a n d still able
t o hold their own, a r e t h e small S o p w i t h s and t h e M a r t i n s y d e , 4 squadrons. O u r first­
class two-seater machines capable of being used for offensive fighting, are t h e D e
H a v i l l a n d 4, a n d t h e Bristol F i g h t e r ; t h e r e are a t t h e m o m e n t 1 s q u a d r o n of each.
T h e F . E . 2D., w i t h t h e Rolls-Royce, is a two-seater fighter, which will n o t be outclassed
for some time ; of these t h e r e a r e 2 squadrons. T h e machines principally used for
reconnaissance are Sopwith 1^- s t r u t t e r s ; of these t h e r e are 3 squadrons. * A squadron
of S.E. 5 single-seater fighters, which are believed t o be superior to a n y G e r m a n
m a c h i n e , is d u e to leave E n g l a n d t h i s week.
T h e delay in producing l a r g e r .numbers of t h e s e fighting machines is d u e almost
entirely to t h e delays in engine production. W e a r e only now beginning t o g e t
B r i t i s h - m a d e engines equal to t h o s e which t h e G e r m a n s have, h a d for t h e last
e i g h t e e n m o n t h s , w i t h t h e exception of t h e Rolls-Royce engine, of which t h e supply
h a s a l w a y s been limited.
The high-powered British engines, however, have now
r e a c h e d t h e production stage, a n d t h e q u a n t i t i e s delivered are expected t o increase
w e e k b y week, which will enable us t o provide for t h e E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force first-class
fighting machines in good q u a n t i t i e s .
I n addition t o long reconnaissance, a very large a m o u n t of A r t i l l e r y observation
w o r k is always going on, much more in our A r m y t h a n in either t h e F r e n c h or t h e
G e r m a n . This certainly adds t o our casualty list w i t h o u t inflicting on t h e e n e m y
p r o p o r t i o n a t e losses in t h e air. I t does, however, enable our Artillery to inflict m u c h
m o r e serious losses on t h e G e r m a n forces on t h e g r o u n d , a n d this m u s t be t a k e n i n t o
a c c o u n t in considering w h e t h e r w e get sufficient value for t h e casualties we suffer.
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e losses inflicted on t h e G e r m a n s , t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t s which are
m a d e in t h e official communiques do n o t show their full e x t e n t ; so m u c h of t h e
f i g h t i n g t a k e s place on t h e G e r m a n side of the line t h a t very often t h e r e is no
information w h a t e v e r about t h e actions of our aeroplanes which are r e p o r t e d missing,
b u t it is k n o w n t h a t frequently in these unseen fights serious losses are inflicted on t h e
G e r m a n s . T h e G e r m a n casualties which are r e p o r t e d in our official communiques are
only those which are seen a n d vouched for by our F l y i n g Corps in t h e course of t h e i r .
work, b u t from t i m e to time rights h a v e been witnessed from t h e g r o u n d in which both
G e r m a n a n d B r i t i s h aeroplanes fell, in German, territory.
B u t , considering even
t h e published accounts of fighting in t h e air, t h e losses on e a c h side a r e not
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e , considering t h e different employment t h a t is m a d e of t h e air forces ;
t h a t is to say, t h a t t h e German aeroplanes are merely employed in t r y i n g t o b r i n g d o w n
o u r aeroplanes, w h e r e a s ours are m a i n l y employed in doing work required b y t h e A r m y .
I t was noticeable last year t h a t u p to t h e beginning of J u n e t h e r e w a s no m a r k e d
superiority in t h e air..pn e i t h e r side, a n d t h a t t h e losses on each side appeared to be
a b o u t equal. A f t e r t h a t date, in t h e continuous good w e a t h e r , our superiority became
m o r e a n d more m a r k e d , b u t o u r losses d i d n o t dimmish t o a n y g r e a t e x t e n t , for t h e
reason t h a t o u r superiority on t h e battlefield was only maintained b y continuous
fighting a t a distance b e h i n d t h e G e r m a n lines.
I f w e would c o n s e n t t o a d o p t t h e s a m e policy a s t h e Germans, t h e r e is n o doubt
t h a t o u r casualties in t h e a i r could b e diminished. H i t h e r t o , w h e n t h e G e r m a n h a s
found himself inferior, he h a s g i v e n u p reconnaissance entirely, a n d h a s confined
himself t o defensive fighting on his o w n g r o u n d ; b u t if we w e r e n o w t o follow these
tactics, t h e effect on t h e A r m y generally would be most serious ; w e would be able t o
show a n a d m i r a b l e balance-sheet of casualties in t h e a i r , b u t t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d h a v e
information of o u r m o v e m e n t s , a n d w e would have n o n e of t h e i r m o v e m e n t s ; t h e y
would h a v e observation for t h e i r g u n s , a n d o u r g u n n e r s would be blind. Such a policy
a t this period would be disastrous. T h e casualties m u s t be faced.
TYPES
of Aeroplanes on which Casualties h a v e occurred d u r i n g March 1917, a n d
percentages of Casualties t o Total N u m b e r of each T y p e employed.
5 squadrons
3,
,, '
3
,,
1
,,
Sopwith (single-seater and 2-seater)
De Havilland2
..
..
Nieuport (single-seater and 2-seater)
Morane
..
..
-
1
Martinsyde
,,
1
..
..
- -'
..
--
--­
--
27
ji
^
- ­
v
'
..
.­
­­
**
P.E. 2D
..
. .
-­
De H a v i l l a n d i
..
Bristol Fighter (not in action).
Average percentage
..
-­
-­
­:
.­
1
"
2.
*
Observers.
4
6
8
10
2
12
9-5
. 4-9
9-2
150
160
170
i
2
5
4
4
8
2
6
8-6
4-3
7-5
21
32
46
11
18
41
5-6
7-9
12-8
480
520
690
3
10
15
1
8
11
3
9
15
1-5
5-2
5-9
a
0
O
fclb
;g
03
.S
"55
Pe
Per
r cent
cent..
%
CD
1
Total
Total Observers
Observers..
Month
Month..
Pilots.
Pe
Per
r cent
cent..
Total
Total Pilots
Pilots..
J
,,
,,
,,
..
..
Armstrong-Whitwortn
2
1
.]
..
CD
CO
3
fl
a
o
m
1916.
Jannary
February
March
..
..
..
180
225
250
3
3
3
770
850
950
11
17 '
35
1917. '
January
February
March
Tie-printed for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
W A R CABINET,
9.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 10, Downing *]
Street, S.W., on Thursday,
April 12, 1917, at 1 1 3 0 A . M .
Present:
T h e P E T M E M I N I S T E R O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n A. B O N A R L A W , M . P . , j T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L . B O R D E N ,
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
C . C . M . G . , K . C . , P r i m e Minister of
Canada.
T h e R i g h t H o n . VTSCOUNT M I L N E R , G.C.B.,
The
Hon. , S I R GEORGE
H.
PERLEY,
G.C.M.G.
K.O.M.G., Minister of Overseas MilitaryThe Right Hon. A . HENDERSON, M . P .
Forces of Canada.
T h e R i g h t Hon. W . LONG, M . P . , S e c r e t a r y
The R i g h t Hon. W - F . M A S S E Y , P r i m e
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
M i n i s t e r of N e w Zealand.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . ,
The R i g h t H o n . S I R J . G. W A R D , B t . ,
Secretary of S t a t e for India.
K . C . M . G . , Minister of Finance a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t H o n , J . C.
S M U T S , K . C . , Minister for Defence, U n i o n
of S o u t h A frica.
The R i g h t H o n . S I R E . P . M O R R I S ,
K . C . M . G . . P r i m e M i n i s t e r of N e w f o u n d ­
land.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t H o n . S I R E . C A R S O N , K . C . ,
M . P . , " F i r s t Lord of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
T h e Right H o n . L O R D R. CECIL, K . C . ,
Minister of Blockade.
The Right Hon. the E A R L OF DERBY,
K.G., G.C.V.O., C.B., S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r ( M i n u t e s 1 t o 12).
A d m i r a l S I R J . R . J E L L I C O E , G.C.B., O.M.,
G.C.Y.O., F i r s t Sea L o r d (Minutes 1 t o
13).
Major - G e n e r a l F . B . M A U R I C E , C.B.,
Director of M i l i t a r v Operations, W a r
Office (Minutes 1 t o 1 2 ) .
The R i g h t H o n S I R J . MAOLAY, Bt., C o n ­
The
Hon. S I R J . S . MESTON,
N
L i e u t e n a n t - Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
K.C.S.I.,
of t h e
United
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e Maharaja S I R
GANGA
SINUH
BAHADUK,
G.C.S.I.,
G . C . I . E . , A.D.C., Maharaja of Bikaner.
troller of S h i p p i n g ( M i n u t e s 10 t o 13).
The H o n . R . R O G E R S , Minister of P u b l i c
Works, Canada.
The H o n . J . D. H A Z E N , Minister of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l , S e r v i c e ,
Canada.
Mr.
S I R S. P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
Executive
Bengal.
H . C. M. L A M B E R T ,
Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Mr. P H I L I P K E R B .
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L . S T O R R , Assistant
Secretary.
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
j 1142—9]
C.B., Colonial
Oflice, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e Imperial W a r Conference.
Secretary.
B
The Air Service.
1. T H E S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e -for W a r informed t h e Imperial
W a r Cabinet t h a t H i s Majesty t h e K i n g h a d done t h e R o y a l F l y i n g
Corps t h e honour of becoming i t s Colonel-in-Chief.
W i t h reference to Imperial W a r Cabinet 8, M i n u t e 12, the
P r i m e Minister, on behalf of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t , t h a n k e d
Sir R o b e r t Bordeii a n d General S m u t s for t h e clear a n d Useful
s t a t e m e n t s m a l e b y t h e m in t h e i r speeches a t E d i n b u r g h on t h e
1 Lth April.
T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s read t h e following com­
munication from Field-Marshal Sir D o u g l a s H a i g w i t h reference t o
t h e Air Service : ­
" I n r e p l y t o your t e l e g r a m of t h e 1 0 t h i n s t a n t , your
s t a t e m e n t t h a t aircraft operations last week were necessarily
. p r e l i m i n a r y a n d y e s t e r d a y ' s results largely a t t r i b u t a b l e t h e r e t o
w a s correct. Also t h a t results achieved prove correctness of
principles on which A i r Service h a s worked a n d superiority of
our a i r m e n . I r e g r e t t h a t same cannot be said of o u r equip­
m e u t . Difficulties to be overcome w e r e increased by n u m b e r of
out-of-date machines, a n d n e w t y p e machines came too late for
pilots to become accustomed to t h e m . I have n o d o u b t g r e a t
efforts w e r e m a d e a t home, a n d h a v e no desire t o complain, b u t
"
wish t o avoid g i v i n g a n y false impression."
;
The Western
Front.
2. T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s r e p o r t e d t h a t further
positions b a d been occupied n o r t h of t h e Vimy R i d g e , a n d t h a t
h e a v y c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s b y t h e e n e m y h a d been repulsed.
French Military
Policy : '"
3. T , D i r e c t o r of Military O p e r a t i o n s reported t h a t t h e Chief
of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff h a d received information of a Conference
which h a d t a k e n place at F r e n c h G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s a b o u t t e n
d a y s ago b e t w e e n t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t , General Nivelle, a n d t h e
C o m m a n d e r s of t h e different F r e n c h Armies, in which t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t h a d expressed d o u b t s a b o u t General Nivelle's plan, a n d
h a d u r g e d its a b a n d o n m e n t . I n t h e e n d General Nivelle's view h a d
prevailed, b u t i t w a s u n d o u b t e d l y a n unsatisfactory feature t h a t his
policy was questioned, a n d t h a t he felt himself to some e x t e n t on
his trial.
The P r i m e Minister informed t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t t h a t
t h e question h a d been raised in t h e course of h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h
M. R i b o t on t h e previous d a y , w h e n M. R i b o t h a d asked for t h e
opinion of H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t a n d of t h e B r i t i s h General
Staff w i t h r e g a r d to General Nivelle, on which point t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r h a d assured M . R i b o t t h a t b o t h t h e Government a n d t h e
G e n e r a l Staff h a d e v e r y confidence in G e n e r a l Nivelle. T h e P r i m e
Minister f u r t h e r explained t h a t his information w a s t h a t t h e
difficulty was n o t between the G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e A r m y , b u t
b e t w e e n t w o m i l i t a r y schools of t h o u g h t , of which t h e one h e a d e d by
General Pdtain, w h o had considerable influence w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t
a n d M. Painleve", was in favour of a defensive policy.
Russia
4. W i t h reference t o W a r C a b i n e t 116, Minute 7, t h e Director
of Military Operations read t h e following telegram s e n t b y FieldM a r s h a l S i r Douglas H a i g to G e n e r a l Alexeieff: ­
1
ne
" On behalf of all officers a n d men of t h e British Armies in
F r a n c e I desire t o offer y o u o u r w a r m e s t c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s on
y o u r a p p o i n t m e n t t o t h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d of t h e A r m i e s
of Russia
W i t h a lively recollection of all t h a t our Russian
comrades-in-arms h a v e a l r e a d y done, we look with confidence
for further t r i u m p h s by t h e glorious R u s s i a n A r m y u n d e r your
able leadership. W e b e g you t o convey to all r a n k s of t h e
forces u n d e r your Command t h e assurance of t h e firm
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e British Forces u n d e r m y C o m m a n d t o do
all t h a t is in our power to assist our R u s s i a n comrades to over­
t h r o w our common e n e m y . I would ask you a n d all r a n k s in
your A r m y tu accept t h e success w e h a v e lately won as a proof
of our ability t o defeat t h e picked troops of t h e G e r m a n A r m y ,
as well as a h e a r n e s t of our i n t e n t i o n t o persist in t h e s t r u g g l e
till t h e aims of t h e Allies h a v e been a t t a i n e d , a n d t h e territories
of Russia and of our o t h e r Allies h a v e been freed from t h e
invader."
The Director of Military Operations also read a t e l e g r a m from
G e n e r a l H a n b u r y - W i l l i a m s , describing a serious s t a t e of affairs both
in t h e A r m y a n d in t h e Munition W o r k s , very l i t t l e w o r k b e i n g
d o n e in e i t h e r case.
There? were, however, some signs t h a t t h e
A r m y m i g h t become i r r i t a t e d w i t h t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e w o r k m e n ,
and insist on t h e re-establishment of order.
O t h e r information
from t h e N a v a l A t t a c h e a n d t h e British A m b a s s a d o r w a s s o m e w h a t
m o r e reassuring.
The Prime Minister mentioned t h a t t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t
w e r e s e n d i n g M. Thomas t o Russia.
Mesopotamia.
5. The Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s reported an enquiry
from G e n e r a l Alexeieff a s t o w h e t h e r General M a u d e could help
w i t h provisions for t h e Russian A r m y in t h e P e r s i a n - T u r k i s h
t h e a t r e of operations, a n d explained t h a t , t h o u g h t h e r e was a certain
a m o u n t of supplies available in t h e B a g h d a d area, t h e r e w a s no
m e a n s of t r a n s p o r t i n g it t o t h e Russians. H e expressed t h e view
t h a t our previous hopes a s to t h e e x t e n t of Russian s u p p o r t likely
to b e received in t h i s area would have to be considerably modified.
Salonica.
6. The Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s s t a t e d t h a t he had
received a t e l e g r a m from General Milne r e p o r t i n g a further post­
p o n e m e n t of t h e offensive on t h e Salonica F r o n t b y G e n e r a l Sarrail,
from t h e 5 t h April t o t h e 2 5 t h April. T h e reason g i v e n b y General
Sarrail w a s t h e necessity for g e t t i n g up more a m m u n i t i o n .
The
delay w a s serious, in v i e w of t h e fact t h a t 1,700 cases of malaria
h a d already occurred.
The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r informed t h e Imperial W a r
C a b i n e t t h a t , in t h e opinion of t h e Medical A u t h o r i t i e s , w e would
h a v e t o reckon w i t h t h e possibility of h a v i n g 100,000 m e n down
w i t h malaria at Salonica t h i s summer.
France and the
Greek Situation.
[1142-9]
7. The P r i m e Minister r e p o r t e d a conversation which h e had
t h e Greek s i t u a t i o n , which s u g g e s t e d to
him t h a t General. SarraiFs delay was more probably connected with
his desire t o occupy Larissa. M. R i b o t h a d urged t h e desirability
of t h i s step, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t it could be d o n e . w i t h t w o or t h r e e
battalions. The P r i m e Minister had p o i n t e d out t o M. R i b o t t h a t
t h i s modification of t h e policy a g r e e d upon a t t h e R o m e Conference
could n o t be decided upon w i t h o u t previous consultation w i t h t h e
I t a l i a n Government, a n d M. Ribot h a d s u g g e s t e d t h a t he would,
i n v i t e B a r o n Sonnino. t o P a r i s .
M. R i b o t h a d f u r t h e r a d d e d t h a t F r e n c h public opinion was
v e r y d i s t u r b e d a b o u t t h e whole question of Greece. T h e r e w a s an
i n t e n s e feeling a g a i n s t t h e K i n g of Greece, and; in h i s opinion,
s o m e t h i n g drastic would h a v e t o be done when t h e F r e n c h
C h a m b e r m e t on t h e 2 4 t h May, as o t h e r w i s e no F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t
.
B 2
h
a
d
w
i
t
h
M
R
i
b
o
t
a
D
o
u
t
would be able to survive t h e s t o r m of i n d i g n a t i o n t h a t would be
raised a g a i n s t it.
A discussion followed, in which it w a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e
was i n t h i s c o u n t r y also a feeling t h a t M. Venizelos h a d n o t
received sufficient support, a n d t h a t t h e K i n g of Greece w a s being
supported by R o y a l influence here. On t h e o t h e r hand, s t r e s s w a s
laid on t h e fact t h a t t h e real difficulty w a s t h e d i s t r u s t felt in I t a l y ,
a n d also in t h i s country, of F r e n c h ambitions in G r e e c e ; a n d it was
also u r g e d t h a t t h e action advocated b y t h e F r e n c h would involve
a fresh m i l i t a r y e n t a n g l e m e n t , a n d d i v e r t troops, who o u g h t t o be
used a g a i n s t t h e G e r m a n s a n d Bulgars, t o chasing G r e e k irregulars.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t decided—
T o postpone t h e discussion of t h e subject t o its n e x t M e e t i n g .
T h e S e c r e t a r y was i n s t r u c t e d to circulate Memoranda recently
p r e p a r e d by t h e Foreign Office w i t h r e g a r d t o F r e n c h
policy in Greece.
Corfu.
8. T h e P r i m e Minister further s t a t e d t h a t M. R i b o t h a d
expressed his a n x i e t y t h a t t h e British G o v e r n m e n t should send a
small garrison t o join t h e F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n garrison a t Corfu, in
order t o c o u n t e r a c t Italian political activities in t h e island. A
suggestion was m a d e t h a t a M i l i t a r y Convalescent Depdt m i g h t be
established a t Corfu, b u t t h e m a t t e r was left over for further
consideration.
Archangel.
9. The F i r s t Sea L o r d r e a d a telegram from t h e N a v a l T r a n s p o r t
Officer a t A r c h a n g e l , describing t h e situation a s very unsatisfactory.
This confirmed and justified t h e decision of t h e W a r C a b i n e t on t h e
previous d a y ( W a r Cabinet 117, M i n u t e s 15 a n d 22).
Submarines.
10. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d described an action in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
b e t w e e n t h e d e s t r o y e r " Racoon " a n d an e n e m y submarine, in
which t h e submarine a p p e a r e d t o have been destroyed. H e gave
t h e usual list of mercantile casualties.
The Sinking of
Hospital Ships.
1 1 . T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r r e p o r t e d t h a t h e feared
m b e r of nurses had been lost in t h e hospital ship " Salta," which
h a d s t r u c k a mine off H a v r e .
T h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t was d r a w n to t h e
fact t h a t v e r y little h a d been said in t h e press a b o u t t h e G e r m a n
campaign a g a i n s t hospital ships.
a
n U
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t i n s t r u c t e d .the S e c r e t a r y t o d r a w
t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e Information D e p a r t m e n t of t h e
Foreign Office to t h e importance of full a n d r e p e a t e d
s t a t e m e n t s in the press of this c o u n t r y and of t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s of America on t h i s subject, more p a r t i c u l a r l y in
connection with reprisals t h a t would h a v e t o be t a k e n .
The question of
Reprisals.
12. H a v i n g r e g a r d to t h e public a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t reprisals
would he t a k e n , a n d to t h e impossibility of p r o t e c t i n g our
hospital ships in - any o t h e r way, t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t
were a g r e e d t h a t reprisals in some form or a n o t h e r would
now h a v e to be t a k e n . ' I n view- of t h e conclusions of t h e
C o m m i t t e e which had been enquiring into t h e question, t h a t
t h e only practicable form of reprisals, a n d t h e one t h a t had proved
most effective in t h e p a s t , was t h e aerial b o m b a r d m e n t of a n open
G e r m a n town, t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet, t h o u g h most r e l u c t a n t
to e m b a r k u p o n a policy which m i g h t involve t h e killing of women
and children, were agreed t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r alternative.
It
was explained t h a t the t o m b i r I n e n t which would s h o r t l y t a k e
place would bs definitely anhoUhoed as a r-eprisal for t h e sinking of
the hospital ship " A s t u r i a s . " T h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t decided
that—
This m e a s u r e of reprisal should ha followed by a carefully
p r e p a r e d s t a t e m e n t of justification b y t h e Admiralty,
explaining t h a t no f u r t h e r reprisals w o u l d be t a k e n a s
soon as t h e G e r m a n s ceased t h e i r a t t a c k s upon our hospital
ships.
I n view of t h e importance of giving t h e G e r m a n s no excuse
for continuing t h e sinking of hospital ships, t h e Imperial W a r
Cabinet decided t h a t —
T h e I n d i a n m i l i t a r y g u a r d on hospital ships conveying I n d i a n
troops should be removed, a n d t h a t t h e necessary action
should be t a k e n by t h e I n d i a Office a n d t h e A d m i r a l t y .
The Protection of
Shipping i n the
annel.
13. Mr. Massey informed t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t t h a t h e
h a d received a cable from N e w Zealand e n q u i r i n g a s t o t h e
measures of special protection- which h a d been afforded t o t h e
" R o t o r u a , " which h a d been r e c e n t l y s u n k off P l y m o u t h .
T h e F i r s t Sea Lord explained t h a t t h e r e were n o t e n o u g h
destroyers t o m a k e it possible t o give more protection t o individual
ships t h a n t h e g e n e r a l protection afforded b y t h e C h a n n e l patrols.
The S h i p p i n g Controller a d d e d t h a t it would n o t h a v e been
possible to l a n d the cargo of t h e " R o t o r u a " a t P l y m o u t h , a s
n e i t h e r t h e p o r t nor t h e r a i l w a y facilities a r e s u c h a s t o a d m i t of
t h e suggestion b e i n g adopted.
Terms of Peace.
14. On t h e suggestion of t h e P r i m e Minister, t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Cabinet decided—.
To set u p t w o S u b - C o m m i t t e e s to consider t h e question of t h e
future t e r m s of peace, a n d report t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Cabinet.
The I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
One of t h e s e S u b - C o m m i t t e e s should deal w i t h t h e question of
t h e t e r r i t o r i a l desiderata in t h e T e r m s o'f Peace, a n d s h o u l d
be composed as follows :—
L o r d Curzon
(Chairman),
Sir R. Borden (or a n o t h e r C a n a d i a n Minister),
General Smuts,
Mr. Massey (or Sir J . W a r d ) ,
Sir E. Morris,
Mr. A u s t e n Chamberlain,
Sir S. Sinha,
Mr. Long,
L o r d R. Cecil (or L o r d H a r d i n g e ) ,
C a p t a i n L. S. AmeryJ as S e c r e t a r y .
The
o t h e r Sub-Commifctee should deal w i t h economic and
o t h e r non-territorial desiderata
in t h e T e r m s of Peace, and
should be composed as follows :—
L o r d Milner
(Chairman),
Mr. Henderson,
Sir R. Borden (or a n o t h e r C a n a d i a n Minister),
General Smuts,
Sir J . W a r d (or Mr. M a s s e y ) ,
Sir E. Morris,
S i r J . Meston,
T h e Maharaja of Bikaner,
Mr. H . A.. L. Fisher,
Mr. Thomas J o n e s , as S e c r e t a r y .
(Initialled)
2, Whitehall
April
Gardens, S.W.,
12, 1917.
D. LI. G.
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL W A R CABINET,
Minutes
10.
of a Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, held in London at 10,
Street, S.W., on Friday, April 1 3 , 1 9 1 7 , at 3 T 5 P . M .
Downing
Present;
THE
(in the
P R I M E MINISTER, O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M
Chair).
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. BONAR. L A W , M . P . ,
Chancellor of' t h e E x c h e q u e r .
T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L. B O R D E N ,
G.C.M.G., K . C . , P r i m e
Minister of
Canada.
T h e R i g h t Hon. V I S C O U N T M I L N E R , G.O.B.,
The
G.C.M.G.
Hon.
. SIR
GEORGE
H.
K . C . M . G . , Minister of t h e
M i l i t a r y Forces of C a n a d a .
PERLEY,
Overseas
The R i g h t H o n . W . F . M A S S E Y ,
Minister of N e w Zealand.
The R i g h t Hon. A. HENDERSON, M. P.
T h e R i g h t Hon. A. J . B A L F O U R , O.M., M . P .
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs.
The R i g h t
Hon.
Prime
S I R J . G. W A R D ,
Bt.,
K . C . M G , Minister of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
N e w Zealand.
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . LONG, M . P . , S e c r e t a r y
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
Lieutenant-General
the
Right
Hon.
J . C. S M U T S , K . C . , M i n i s t e r for Defence,
Union of S o u t h Africa.
The R i g h t Hon. A . CHAMBERLAIN, M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r v of S t a t e for India.
T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R E . P. M O R R I S ,
K.C.M.G., P r i m e Minister of Newfound­
land.
The following were also p r e s e n t :
The Right Hon. LORD ROBERT CECIL, K.C.,
M . P . , Minister of Blockade.
The R i g h t H o n . t h e E A R L O F D E R B Y ,
K . G , G . C . V . O . , O.B., S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r .
Major-General
Director
Office.
The
Hon.
F.
B.
of M i l i t a r y
SIR J.
S.
MAURICE,
C.B.,
Operations, W a r
MESTON,
K.C.S.I.,
The R i g h t H o n . S I R E . H . C A R S O N , K . C . ,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y
(Minutes 1 to 7).' .
A d m i r a l S I R J . R . J E L L I C O E , G.C.B.,
O.M., G.C.V.O., F i r s t S e a Lord (Minutes
1 to 6).
T h e R i g h t H o n . C. A D D I S O N , M.D., M . P . , .
Minister of Munitions ( M i n u t e s 5 t o 9).
The
Right
Hon.
SIR J.
MAOLAY,
Bt.,
United
Controller of S h i p p i n g ( M i n u t e s 5 a n d 6 ) .
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
The H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , Minister of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, I n d i a .
GANG A
SINGH,
of
the
BAHADUR,
G O .ST.,
G.C.I.&., A.O.C., Maharaja of Bikaner.
Mr.
S f R S. P . S I N H A , M e p b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e Governor of
Bengal.
H.
C.
M.
LAMBERT,
Office, S e c r e t a r y
Conference.
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H ^ N f j E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L. S T O R R , Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
[1142-10]
C.B., Colonial
t o t h e Imperial W a r -
Secretary.
Secretary.
1. T H E D i r e c t o r of Military O p e r a t i o n s read t h e m i d d a y
communique describing a n advance on a 6-mile front b e t w e e n
S t . Q u e n t i n and Cambrai.
H e also read a t e l e g r a m from
F i e l d - M a r s h a l Sir D o u g l a s Han/, giving t h e following list of c a p t u r e s
from t h e 9fh t o t h e 1 2 t h April, 1917 : ­
12,200* prisoners t h r o u g h collecting stations.
160 g u n s , i n c l u d i n g —
6—8-inch howitzers,
2 4 — 5 9 - i n c h howitzers,
130 field g u n s a n d howitzers.
85 trench m o r t a r s .
250 m a c h i n e - g u n s .
-
I n addition, a considerable n u m b e r of g u n s a n d t r e n c h m o r t a r s
a n d m a c h i n e - g u n s h a d been demolished a n d b u r n t by shell fire.
O u r casualties for t h e first four d a y s were 35,000, including
8,000 Canadians, a m o n g
24 divisions, as compared w i t h a
corresponding figure of 80,000 in t h e equivalent period in t h e Somme
action, w h e r e t h e r e s u l t s were much smaller.
Mesopotamia.
2. The Director of Military Operations r e p o r t e d a successful
operation by General M a u d e against t h e Turks, in t h e course of
which, m a k i n g use of interior lines, he h a d driven t h e e n e m y back
a distance of 4 miles w i t h heavy losses. General M a u d e h a d f u r t h e r
reported t h a t t h e action w a s still in progress, a n d t h a t good r e s u l t s
w e r e anticipated.
A t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e Chief of t h e Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, t h e
I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t i n s t r u c t e d :—
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs t o t e l e g r a p h on t h e i r
behalf a message t o be given t o t h e R u s s i a n P r e s i d e n t of
t h e Council u r g i n g t h e importance of a R u s s i a n effort
against T u r k e y .
Submarines.
3. The F i r s t Sea L o r d reported t h e probable sinking of a n
e n e m y submarine off Z e e b r u g g e , and m a d e his usual s t a t e m e n t
of mercantile losses. H e g a v e t h e following figures for t h e a v e r a g e
d a i l y gross t o n n a g e lost d u r i n g J a n u a r y , F e b r u a r y , March, a n d
-April respectively :—
January
February
March
April
Prisoners of War : '
Stoppage of Parcels,
British.
Allied.
4,050
10,000
lo,000
10,000
2,000
2.700
2,300
5,100
!
j
!
Neutral.
Totals.
4,000
4,XOO
5,100
5,100
10,050
17,500
17,400
20,200
4 . The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r reported t h a t information
e m a n a t i n g from t h e F r e n c h Consul-General at R o t t e r d a m h a d been
received to t h e effect t h a t prisoners of war in G e r m a n y were no
longer receiving their parcels.
T h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t decided t h a t : —
T h e Secretary of S t a t e for Foreign Affairs should t e l e g r a p h t o
ascertain w h e t h e r t h e D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t (who are in
charge of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s in G e r m a n y ) h a v e received a n y
information on t h e subject.
* The^full total of prisoners was believed to exceed 13,000.
The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r u n d e r t o o k to m a k e enquiries
in t h e Prisoners of W a r D e p a r t m e n t , a n d t o r e p o r t t h e
r e s u l t to t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet.
Spain:
Possible Co-opera­
tion.
5. W i t h reference to W a r C a b i n e t 9 1 , M i n u t e 10, t h e Imperial
W a r Cabinet h a d under consideration certain Personal a n d S e c r e t
telegrams from t h e British R e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t M a d r i d , indicating t h e
possibility t h a t Spain m i g h t j o i n t h e Allies, a n d asking for
instructions a s to w h e t h e r t h e Allies do or do n o t desire t h a t S p a i n
should a b a n d o n her neutrality. I n t h i s connection t h e y h a d before
them m e m o r a n d a by t h e G e n e r a l Staff a n d t h e A d m i r a l t y W a r
Staff (Paper G . T . - 1 S 1 ) ; b y t h e Minister of M u n i t i o n s ( P a p e r
G . T . - 1 6 4 ) ; b y t h e S h i p p i n g ' C o n t r o l l e r ( P a p e r G . T . - 1 5 1 ) ; a n d by
t h e Foreign Office (Paper G . T . - 1 9 8 ) .
T h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s of S p a n i s h co-operation are t h a t they would
undoubtedly lead t o a drain on t h e Allies in one form or another,
; t h a t we should lose t h e considerable protection of Spanish t e r r i t o r i a l
waters, which is particularly valuable in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , a n d
t h a t S p a i n would probably require compensation in Morocco.
As a g a i n s t this, t h e a d v a n t a g e s of Spanish co-operation would
be very considerable, including t h e probable effect on t h e S o u t h
American S t a t e s ; t h e use of G e r m a n m e r c h a n t ships in Spanish
p o r t s ; t h e use of Spanish m e r c h a n t ships, m a n y of which h a v e been
laid u p ; a n assurance t h a t we should obtain our essential supplies
of Spanish ore ; t h e denial of t h e use of Spanish p o r t s as bases for
enemy submarines ; t h e i n t e r n m e n t of t h e large n u m b e r of active
German a g e n t s in Spain ; t h e provision of g r e a t reserves of labour
and man-power, a l t h o u g h t h e S p a n i s h a r m y would a t first b e of only
slight value, owing to its i n a d e q u a t e e q u i p m e n t ; and, finally, t h e
g r e a t moral effect, particularly in Scandinavia, of t h e a d h e r e n c e to
the cause of t h e Allies of t h e only remaining G r e a t Power.
On a review of these considerations t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet
authorised t h e Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs—
(1.) To inform t h e B r i t i s h A m b a s s a d o r in M a d r i d t h a t t h e
B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t would welcome t h e co-operation of
Spain, which should be encouraged a s far as possible;
and, further, t o ask t h e British Ambassador to t a k e
a d v a n t a g e of e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t m i g h t occur of
' impressing on t h e S p a n i s h G o v e r n m e n t , if t h e y contem­
p l a t e joining t h e Allies, t o t a k e precaution a g a i n s t
d a m a g e being caused t o G e r m a n ships in t h e i r ports.
(2.) To inform t h e French G o v e r n m e n t t h a t we have i n s t r u c t e d
our Ambassador to e n c o u r a g e Spanish i n t e r v e n t i o n .
Greece.
6. T h e discussion on t h e s i t u a t i o n in Greece (Imperial W a r
Cabinet 9, Minute 7) was continued.
The Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s read to t h e Imperial W a r
Cabinet a P a p e r prepared b y t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff
( G . T . - 4 3 0 ) , expressing his s t r o n g conviction t h a t t h e r e m n a n t s of
t h e G r e e k troops a n d reservists now in Thessaly could n o t be a n y
serious menace to t h e communications of t h e Salonica Force, a n d
t h a t a military occupation of Larissa would therefore be a q u i t e
unnecessary diversion of m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h in itself, a n d would,
probably lead u p t o further incidents, involving a campaign for t h e
complete s u b j u g a t i o n of Greece, t h e consequence of which would be
to deprive t h e Sal mica Force of a n y usefulness which it now
possessed.
The I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet also b a d before t h e m a memorandum;
by t h e A d m i r a l t y (Paper G . T . - 4 3 3 ) laying s t r e s s on t h e difficult
iing position t h a t would be c r e a t e d by a n e n l a r g e m e n t of t h e
"
sphere of operations to Greece, a n d a series
of Foreign Office
B 2
Til 4 2 - 1 0 i
m e m o r a n d a ( G . T . - 4 1 9 , G-.T.-420, a n d G . T . - 4 2 1 ) i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e
difficulties which h a d arisen owing t o t h e divergence b e t w e e n F r e n c h
and British policy in t h e t r e a t m e n t of G r e e k affairs.
I n t h e course of t h e discussion, Lord R o b e r t Cecil u r g e d t h a t
t h e unsatisfactory situation in Greece o u g h t to be cleared u p a t a
Conference w i t h t h e Allies as soon as possible. H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t
t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d b e definitely m a d e a w a r e of the
unfavourable r e s u l t s of t h e i r m e t h o d s h i t h e r t o , a n d of t h e suspicions
t o which t h e y g a v e rise, a n d informed t h a t if a n y active steps w e r e
t o be t a k e n in order t o set G r e e k affairs in order, t h i s could only be
done if t h e whole conduct of diplomatic affairs in Greece were
e n t r u s t e d t o t h e British G o v e r n m e n t , whose motives were n o t
suspected, a n d t h a t in t h a t case t h e British G o v e r n m e n t would
replace t h e p r e s e n t British Minister in A t h e n s by a Special R e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e of t h e h i g h e s t public position.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t : —
A s t r o n g l y worded telegram should be sent b y t h e S e c r e t a r y of
S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs, on behalf of t h e Imperial W a r
Cabinet, t o t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t , u r g i n g t h a t t h e
a d v a n c e against t h e B u l g a r i a n s on t h e Salonica F r o n t
should b e carried o u t w i t h o u t delay.
The Imperial W a r Cabinet also i n s t r u c t e d L o r d R o b e r t Cecil t o
t e l e g r a p h to t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t t h a t n o steps should
be t a k e n as r e g a r d s Greece u n t i l t h e I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t
h a d been consulted.
Enlistment of
United States
Citizens In the
Canadian Expedi­
tionary Force.
7. T h e discussion on t h i s subject w a s resumed ( W a r Cabinet
116, M i n u t e 19 (iv)).
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet considered a M e m o r a n d u m from t h e
J u d g e - A d v o c a t e - G e n e r a l , e x p r e s s i n g t h e opinion t h a t Americans
enlisting u n d e r t h e t e r m s s u g g e s t e d by t h e C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t
would be subject t o Military L a w until discharged, b u t would have
t h e r i g h t t o claim discharge a t a n y time.
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , f o r W a r pointed o u t t h a t t h i s w a s a n
unsatisfactory position, a n d t h a t difficulties enough h a d a l r e a d y b e e n ,
created by t h e anomaly arising o u t of t h e difference between t h e
A u s t r a l i a n a n d t h e Imperial A r m y Acts. I t was, however, s u g g e s t e d
t h a t , a s t h e m e n of t h e C a n a d i a n Forces i n F r a n c e were governed b y
t h e conditions of t h e C a n a d i a n A r m y A c t , j u s t a s t h e A u s t r a l i a n s
were g o v e r n e d by t h e conditions of t h e A u s t r a l i a n A r m y A c t , a n y
difficulties m i g h t be overcome by such C a n a d i a n legislation a s m i g h t
b e found n e c e s s a r y —
T h e Imperial W a r Cabinet referred t h e m a t t e r for further
consideration by Sir R o b e r t Borden, the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r a n d t h e A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , whowere t o r e p o r t t h e i r
decisions t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet also decided t h a t : —
I f t h e legal difficulties could be satisfactorily overcome, Sir
R o b e r t B o r d e n should i n s t r u c t Sir J . P o p e t o visit
W a s h i n g t o n on behalf of t h e C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t a n d
ascertain w h e t h e r t h e G o v e r n m e n t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
would r e g a r d t h e proposed e n l i s t m e n t of A m e r i c a n s in t h e
Canadian a r m y w i t h favour.
Sir R o b e r t B u r d e n undertook a t t h e same t i m e t o l e t t h e Foreign
Office k n o w when Sir J . PopVs mission w a s decided on, in
order t h a t t h e l a t t e r m i g n t be able t o inform t h e British
A m b a s s a d o r a t W a s h i n g t o n accordingly.
Proposed American
Unit in the United
Kingdom.
8. The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
C a b i n e t t h a t t h e r e w a s a m o v e m e n t a m o n g Americans r e s i d e n t in
t h i s c o u n t r y t o raise a battalion for service on t h e continent.
Imperial War
Cabinet Agenda.
9. The Imperial W a r Cabinet decided, in order t o find t i m e for
^
t i n g s of t h e sub-committees a p p o i n t e d t o consider t h e t e r m s
of peace (Imperial W a r Cabinet 9, M i n u t e 14),—
n e
m e e
To suspend its s i t t i n g s till T h u r s d a y , 19th April, on which d a y
it w a s proposed to discuss Sir R o b e r t Borden's Resolution
for t h e Imperial Conference w i t h r e g a r d to t h e utilisation
of t h e n a t u r a l resources of t h e E m p i r e , a n d M r . Massey's
Resolution w i t h r e g a r d to I m p e r i a l preference.
W i t h reference t o Imperial W a r Cabinet 9, M i n u t e 14, t h e
I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet decided t h a t —
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Foreign Office a n d Colonial Office should
also sit on Lord Milner's sub-committee.
(Initialled)
2 , Whitehall Gardens,
Aprit 1 3 , 1 9 1 7 .
S.W.,
D. LI. G.
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
W A R CABINET,
11.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 10,
Street, S.W., on Tuesday, April 24, 1917, at 11-30 A.M.
Downing
Present :
THE
The R i g h t
P R I M E M I N I S T E R OE T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The R i g h t H o n . S I R R O B E R T L . B O R D E N ,
G.C.M.G.,
K . C . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r of
Canada. -
Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON,
CURZON OF
G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.
KG.,
Chair).
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The
The R i g h t Hon. VISCOUNT M I L N E R , G . C . B . ,
G.C.M.G.
H.
PERLEY,
K . C . M . G . , M i n i s t e r of t h e
Militarj'- F o r c e s of Canada.
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
Overseas
The R i g h t H o n . W . F . M A S S E Y , P r i m e
Minister of N e w Zealand.
The R i g h t Hon. A. H E N D E R S O N , M.P.
The R i g h t
H o n . S I R J . G. W A R D . B t . ,
K . C . M G . , M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e a n d P o s t s ,
New Zealand.
The R i g h t Hon. W . LONG, M.P., Secretary
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies.
the
Right
Hon.
Lieutenant-General
J . C. S M U T S , K . C . , Minister for Defence,
U n i o n of S o u t h Africa.
The Right Hon. S I R E. P . MORRI3,
K.C.M.G., P r i m e Minister of N e w ­
foundlaud.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P .
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
T h e following were also p r e s e n t
The R i g h t Hon. LORD ROBERT CECIL, K.C.,
M.P., Minister of Blockade.
A d m i r a l S I R J . R . JELLTCOE, G . C . B . ,
First Sea Lord (for
O.M., G . C . V . 0
M i n u t e s 1 t o 8).
General S I R W . R. R O B E R T S O N , G.C.B.,
K . C . V . O . , D.S.O., Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
Genei-al Staff (for M i n u t e s 1 t o 8).
The
Hon.
SIR J.
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, India.
MESTON.
of
the
The
SINGH.
BAHADUR,
R.
R O G E R S . M i n i s t e r of
United,
The Right Hon.
Sir A. S T A N L E Y ,
G.C.I.E., A.D.C:, M a h a r a j a of B i k a n e r
(for M i n u t e s 1 t o 8).
Mr.
H.
C. M .
L A M B E R T , C . B . , Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
S I R S . P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e Governor of
Bengal.
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M . P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
Mr. T H O M A S J O N E S , Assistant
M.P.,
P r e s i d e n t of t h e Board of Trade.
G.C.S.I.,
Major L . S T O R R , Assistant
Public
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
K.C.S.I.,
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
Hon.
Works, Canada.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
The Western
Front.
1. T h e Chief of t h e Imperial General Staff r e p o r t e d t h a t , a s
t h e result of t h e fighting on t h e previous d a y , t h e B r i t i s h forces h a d
succeeded at first in occupying all their objectives ; t h a t t h e e n e m y
h a d t h e n c o u n t e r - a t t a c k e d w i t h several r e s e r v e divisions a n d h a d
t e m p o r a r i l y recovered some of t h e s e positions, which, however, w e r e
e v e n t u a l l y regained a n d secured by our troops. T h e n u m b e r of
enemy prisoners w a s e s t i m a t e d at 1,800.
During the recent
operations t h e e n e m y h a d been compelled t o employ 31 of h i s
reserve divisions, 13 on t h e B r i t i s h a n d 18 on t h e French front,
leaving 16 divisions in reserve t h a t had n o t as y e t been engaged.
Russia:
The Baltic Fleet.
2. T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff communicated t h e
contents of a t e l e g r a m from R u s s i a to t h e effect t h a t t h e condition
of t h e R u s s i a n F l e e t in t h e Baltic continued t o be m o s t unsatisfactory,
a n d t h a t i t could n o t be relied upon t o p r e v e n t a hostile l a n d i n g .
T h e telegram also embodied a request t h a t t h e British A d m i r a l t y
would a r r a n g e for a n a v a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n n e x t week, w h e n t h e
dangerous period would commence, owing t o t h e b r e a k i n g of t h e ice.
Coal for Italy.
The
received a
supply of
possibility
paralysed.
Mesopotamia.
4. T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff r e a d a t e l e g r a m
from General M a u d e describing t h e severe fighting which h a d
r e s u l t e d in t h e successful capture of S a m a r r a .
General Maude
r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e 1 3 t h T u r k i s h Corps on h i s r i g h t w a s a d v a n c i n g
along t h e r i g h t b a n k of t h e S h a t t - e l - A d h a i m , a n d t h a t he proposed
t o e n g a g e i t a t once.
Submarines:
Harwich.
5. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d s t a t e d t h a t our seaplanes had s i g h t e d
a n d a t t a c k e d a n e n e m y s u b m a r i n e off H a r w i c h on t h e previous d a y .
T h e submarine w h e n last seen h a d a heavy list.
The F i r s t Sea L o r d also reported an e n g a g e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e
sloop " Q . - 2 2 " a n d a n e n e m y submarine, as t h e result of w h i c h
t h e sloop h a d been d a m a g e d and t h e s u b m a r i n e h a d s u n k b o t t o m
upwards.
Palestine.
6. The F i r s t Sea L o r d s t a t e d t h a t t h r e e ships h a d r e n d e r e d
assistance d u r i n g t h e recent m i l i t a r y operations a g a i n s t Gaza.
The
F r e n c h coast-defence ship " R e q u i n " h a d been unsuccessfully
a t t a c k e d b y a n enemy submarine, which h a d been driven off b y
patrols. H e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e l a n d i n g of stores on t h e o p e n
beach was proceeding.
German Output.
7. T h e F i r s t S e a Lord r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y had received.
reliable information t o t h e effect t h a t t h e average monthly o u t p u t of
G e r m a n submarines since S e p t e m b e r 1916 a m o u n t e d t o 13, of which
10 were m i n e - l a y i n g vessels a n d 3 oceanic submarines.
Naval Losses.
8. The F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d t h e loss of one of our m i n e ­
sweeping t r a w l e r s .
3
Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l General Staff said t h a t h e h a d
t e l e g r a m from G e n e r a l Oadorna pressing for t h e e a r l y
more coal, in default of w h i c h t h e r e was a serious
of t h e railways a n d t h e o u t p u t of m u n i t i o n s b e i n g
Production, Trans­
portation, Control,
and Utilisation of
Food Supplies and
other Natural
Resources of the
Empire.
9. Sir R o b e r t Borden b r o u g h t before t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet
t h e following resolution :—
" H a v i n g r e g a r d to t h e experience obtained in t h e p r e s e n t war,
t h i s Conference records i t s opinion t h a t t h e safety of t h e
E m p i r e a n d t h e necessary development of its component
p a r t s r e q u i r e prompt a n d a t t e n t i v e consideration, as well a s
concerted action w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e following m a t t e r s :—­
" (1.) T h e production of an a d e q u a t e food supply a n d
a r r a n g e m e n t s for i t s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . when a n d
where required, u n d e r a n y conditions t h a t may
reasonably b e anticipated.
" (2.) T h e control of n a t u r a l resources available w i t h i n
t h e E m p i r e , especially t h o s e t h a t are of a n
essential c h a r a c t e r for necessary national purposes,
w h e t h e r in peace or in war.
" (3.) The
economical utilisation
of
such n a t u r a l
resources t h r o u g h
processes of
manufacture
carried on w i t h i n t h e E m p i r e .
" The Conference commends to t h e consideration of t h e
G o v e r n m e n t s summoned t h e r e t o t h e e n a c t m e n t of such
legislation as m a y assist t h i s p u r p o s e . "
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e Dominion m e m b e r s were all
agreed on t h e resolution, a n d , as t h e r e was g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t
a m o n g t h e m e m b e r s of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t present, t h e
P r i m e Minister expressed t h e opinion t h a t a discussion was h a r d l y
required.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet a g r e e d u p o n t h e resolution.
Imperial Preference
and Emigration.
10. The following resolution w a s s u b m i t t e d b y Mr. Massey for
discussion b y t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet : ­
" T h a t t h e t i m e has a r r i v e d w h e n all possible encouragement
should b e given to t h e development of Imperial resources,
a n d (consistent with t h e resolutions of t h e P a r i s Conference)
especially to making- t h e E m p i r e i n d e p e n d e n t of o t h e r
countries for t h e food supplies of its population a n d r a w
m a t e r i a l for its manufactures.
W i t h t h e s e objects in view
t h i s Conference expresses itself in favour of:—
" ( 1 . ) A s y s t e m b y which each c o u n t r y of t h e E m p i r e
will give preference t h r o u g h its C u s t o m s to t h e
goods produced or m a n u f a c t u r e d in a n y o t h e r
British c o u n t r y ; a n d
" (2.) A n a r r a n g e m e n t b y which, in t h e case of i n t e n d i n g
e m i g r a n t s from t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , i n d u c e m e n t s
m a y be offered t o such e m i g r a n t s t o settle in
countries u n d e r t h e B r i t i s h F l a g . "
Mr. Massey pointed o u t t h a t t h e question of I m p e r i a l
Preference h a d been considered on m a n y occasions, more par­
- ticularly a t previous I m p e r i a l Conferences, w h e r e it h a d been
twice agreed to w i t h o u t opposition, so far a s t h e Dominions
w e r e concerned. T h e difficulty h a d been due t o t h e views of t h e
electorate of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . B u t in t h a t respect a v e r y
i m p o r t a n t change in public opinion h a d t a k e n place, a s t r i k i n g proof
of which w a s afforded by t h e recent report of L o r d Balfour of
Burleigh's sub-committee. T h e W a r h a d u n d o u b t e d l y m a d e people
realise t h e d a n g e r o u s e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m h a d
been d e p e n d e n t on foreign countries.
This d e p e n d e n c e w a s u n ­
necessary, as t h e E m p i r e could produce all it required, so long as i t
r e t a i n e d control of t h e sea. The Dominions already h a d adopted
Preference as far as t h e y were concerned, and N e w Z e a l a n d was
p r e p a r e d to go f u r t h e r if necessary. H e did not t h i n k t h a t it was
fair or possible t o go back to t h e condition of t r a d e w i t h enemy
countries as it e x i s t e d before t h e W a r . Moreover, o w i n g to t h e g r e a t
additional b u r d e n of t a x a t i o n which t h e W a r would leave behind,
t h e r e were certain to be considerable increases in Customs D u t i e s ,
a n d these two factors would facilitate t h e establishment of Preference.
H e did not consider, in view of t h e productive capacities of t h e
E m p i r e , t h a t a n y measure of Preference in this c o u n t r y would a d d
t o t h e cost of living.
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e second p a r t of his resolution, Mr. Massey
p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e r e w a s p l e n t y of room in t h e Dominions for
emigration. The population in t h e U n i t e d Kingdom was 370 to t h e
s q u a r e mile, w h e r e a s in N e w Zealand it -was 10, in Canada 2, a n d
i n A u s t r a l i a l^-. T h e S o u t h African W a r h a d been followed b y a
v e r y large wave of emigration, a n d t h a t experience a n d his own
conversations w i t h soldiers convinced him t h a t t h e r e would be a
l a r g e emigration after t h e W a r , which i t was very desirable t o guide
i n t o British channels. I n t h e Dominions t h e y would welcome n o t
only farmers, who w e r e t h e most useful t y p e of settlers, b u t immi­
g r a n t s of every suitable class. H e pointed o u t t h a t between t h e period
1 8 7 6 - 1 9 1 3 , of a t o t a l n e t emigration from t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m of
5,149,000, over 2,770,000 (i.e., 53 per cent, of t h e t o t a l ) h a d gone to
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d h a d been lost to t h e British E m p i r e . I t was
impossible for us to expect t h a t o t h e r countries should be content to
see t h e British E m p i r e possessing v a s t areas which i t w a s n o t
properly occupying. E m i g r a t i o n could not be forced to s t a y within
t h e E m p i r e ; w h a t w a s necessary w a s t o give inducements, a n d h e
urged t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e E m p i r e should j o i n t o g e t h e r to
a r r a n g e a scheme of financial assistance.
Sir R o b e r t Borden s t a t e d t h a t t h e whole fiscal s y s t e m of
C a n a d a had been designed for national and Imperial purposes,
a n d it was largely owing to its fiscal system t h a t C a n a d a was now
a portion of t h e British Empire.
H e considered Preference a
v a l u a b l e and fundamental principle. H e also realised, however, t h a t
i t was not only a n I m p e r i a l , b u t also a domestic question. I n so
far as i t was t h e l a t t e r , he h a d always avoided interfering with it.
T h e Dominions would be resentful of interference in t h e i r own
i n t e r n a l affairs, a n d were n o t disposed t o interfere in controversies
w h i c h t h e United K i n g d o m h a d t o settle for itself. N o one in
C a n a d a would desire a Preference t h a t was felt t o be oppressive or
unjust b y the population of these islands. A n y such feeling would
injure t h e Imperial aspect of Preference. H e considered t h a t t h e
E m p i r e could produce all t h e food it required. A s r e g a r d s C a n a d a
m o r e particularly, whose chief exports were wheat, cheese, a n d
bacon, a Preference which did not deal with t h e question of food
supplies would be illusory a n d unsatisfactory. One of t h e difficulties
which h a d confronted C a n a d a in t h e past, a n d raised the g r e a t e s t
m e a s u r e of outcry from her farmers, h a d been t h e increased cost of
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n across t h e Atlantic, a n d h e suggested t h a t it m i g h t
be possible for t h e U n i t e d Kingdom a n d t h e Dominions t o g e t
t o g e t h e r in some g r e a t enterprise which would restrict t h e cost
of transportation w i t h i n t h e Rmpire. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n was q u i t e as
i m p o r t a n t to all t h e Dominions as C u s t o m s Preference.
W i t h r e g a r d to t h e second p a r t of Mr. Massey's resolution h e
e n t i r e l y agreed, t h o u g h he considered t h a t emigration t o t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s , b o t h from t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a.nd from Canada, h a d not
Jbeen wholly a loss in so far as it h a d affected t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s '
feeling t o w a r d s t h e B r i t i s h Esnpire. H e was p r e p a r e d t o s u p p o r t
a n y I m p e r i a l scheme of emigration.
T h e P r i m e Minister, speaking n o t in his official capacity, b u t as
one who h a d t a k e n a leading p a r t in discussions on t h i s question,
b e g a n b y declaring t h a t his general a t t i t u d e h a d been altered by
t h i n g s which h a d h a p p e n e d since t h e W a i \
The W a r h a d
u n d o u b t e d l y revealed certain f u n d a m e n t a l facts which i t was
necessary to t a k e cognisance of in our Imperial a n d domestic
a r r a n g e m e n t s . T h e r e w e r e industries essential t o defence which we
h a d been compelled t o build u p a t g r e a t cost in t h e middle of t h e
W a r , a n d which m i g h t n o t be able to hold their o w n unassisted a t
t h e end of t h e W a r .
[t would be g r e a t folly, in view of t h e
e x p e n d i t u r e we should still have to incur upon t h e A r m y a n d N a v y ,
if we neglected t o m a i n t a i n i n d u s t r i e s essential t o t h e efficiency of
t h o s e Forces.
A g a i n , t h e r e w a s t h e I m p e r i a l point of view. The value of
cohesion a n d co-operation between the nations of t h e B r i t i s h Com­
m o n w e a l t h h a d been revealed in an e x t r a o r d i n a r y w a y ; i t h a d been
t h e g r e a t surprise of t h e W a r t o our enemies a n d largely t o
ourselves, a n d h a d m a d e us t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in t h e W a r .
Consequently, from t h e selfish p o i n t of view, of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
alone, t h e development of t h e E m p i r e would: be a n essential point in
B r i t i s h policy. T h e figures Mr. Massey h a d quoted showed t h a t if
m o r e trouble h a d b e e n t a k e n over t h e development of t h e E m p i r e in
t h e p a s t , t h e Dominions m i g h t possibly h a v e had double t h e i r p r e s e n t
population and proportionately increased t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e British
contribution to t h e p r e s e n t W a r .
These were f u n d a m e n t a l facts
w h i c h were bound to produce an essential change in t h e policy of
t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e Dominions, a n d vice versa.
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e methods t o be adopted, he wished t o point
o u t t h a t t h e w a r h a d revealed, more p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e case of
R u s s i a , t h e peril which m i g h t arise from dear food. T h a t issue was
one w h i c h had somehow or o t h e r obsessed t h e minds of t h e w o r k i n g ­
classes in t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, ever since t h e Corn L a w s , a n d t h e
memories of t h e p r e s e n t w a r would revive t h a t dread. H e concurred
i n S i r R o b e r t B o r d e h s s t a t e s m a n l i k e view, t h a t i t would n o t do
for t h e prosperity of C a n a d a to be based on t h e w a n t of the work­
m e n of E n g l a n d .
H e wished t h e working-classes to r e g a r d t h e
E m p i r e as something t h a t m e a n t n o t only glory, b u t also m a t e r i a l
advantage.
H e was all for Preference, a n d would personally a s s e n t t o a n y
resolution laying d o w n t h e principle, b u t he asked Mr. Massey t o
leave out t h e t h r e e w o r d s " t h r o u g h its Customs," which specified a
p a r t i c u l a r method.
H e was inclined t o consider t h a t Sir R o b e r t
B o r d e h s m e t h o d of subsidised t r a n s i t t h r o u g h t h e E m p i r e would
give a more s u b s t a n t i a l Preference. H e w a s all for t h e old R o m a n
m e t h o d of binding a n E m p i r e t o g e t h e r by i t s r o a d s — i n our case by
shipping. A n o t h e r a r g u m e n t in favour of this p a r t i c u l a r m e t h o d
was t h a t t h e principal w h e a t - and meat-producing countries besides
t h e E m p i r e were n o t o u r p r e s e n t enemies, b u t our Allies, R u s s i a a n d
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d a declaration in favour of a C u s t o m s
P r e f e r e n c e m i g h t look as if we were a t t e m p t i n g t o do t h e m a n
injury. I t was q u i t e t r u e t h a t improved shipping would also t a k e
t r a d e a w a y from t h e m , but t h a t was a m a t t e r w h i c h could be
justified on g r o u n d s of Imperial defence, a n d w a s a recognised
m e t h o d of development employed b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Russia, a n d
France.
H e did not r u l e o u t t h e remission of dues on t h e Suez Canal,
or t h e possibility of subsidy on t h e a c t u a l goods sent over, b u t
t r u s t e d t h a t for t h e m o m e n t t h e precise method should b e left open
for f u t u r e discussion. T h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m h a d g o t to consider t h e
question of its own i n d u s t r i e s after t h e W a r . This was n o t a m a t t e r
of F r e e T r a d e or Protection, b u t of s t e r n Imperial necessity for
defence.
Subject to this, h e would personally agree t o t h e
resolution.
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil a g r e e d w i t h t h e resolution as a m e n d e d by
t h e P r i m e Minister, b u t suggested t h a t , a s it would h a v e t o be
published in some form or a n o t h e r , a n d as t h e r e was a real feeling
(more particularlv in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) t h a t we m i g h t m a k e use of
C
[1142-iij
'
1
our victory to injure A m e r i c a n t r a d e , it m i g h t be desirable to p u t in
some phrase such as " H a v i n g d u e r e g a r d to t h e l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s
of our Allies."
Mr. Massey said t h a t h e was p r e p a r e d t o accept t h i s
suggestion, a n d in t h a t case to o m i t t h e reference in his resolution
t o the P a r i s resolutions.
Mr. A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n s t a t e d t h a t I n d i a would certainly
endeavour t o conform t o a n y g e n e r a l s y s t e m of Preference a d o p t e d
t h r o u g h o u t t h e E m p i r e , t h o u g h t h e p a r t i c u l a r -methods would
h a v e to be m a t t e r s of special consideration.
W h i l e I n d i a would
u n d o u b t e d l y welcome low r a t e s of shipping freight, he wished t o
p o i n t out t h a t she h a d not t h e r e v e n u e which would provide large
subsidies.
S h e h a d also i m p o r t a n t m a r k e t s in foreign countries
which she could n o t afford to lose w i t h o u t securing fully e q u i v a l e n t
m a r k e t s elsewhere.
L o r d Milner wished to m a k e it clear t h a t Preference on C u s t o m s
D u t i e s was not excluded by t h e resolution as a m e n d e d . H e did not
absolutely accept Sir "Robert B o r d e n ' s contention t h a t Preference on .
foodstuffs would b e t h e only one of value t o t h e Dominions, for i t
certainly did n o t apply to all p a r t s of t h e E m p i r e , and h e doubted if
i t applied wholly even as r e g a r d s C a n a d a . H e r e g r e t t e d t h a t t h e
p a t h of Preference h a d been m a d e difficult by t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
it w a s necessary t o put on d u t i e s which w e r e not required in
themselves in order to g r a n t Preference. All he h a d ever contended
for w a s t h a t , w h a t e v e r duties should be imposed in a n y p a r t of the
E m p i r e for its own interests, t h e r e s t of t h e E m p i r e should be
t r e a t e d differently in respect of those d u t i e s from foreign countries.
H e placed t h e principle of Preference as s o m e t h i n g much h i g h e r
t h a n either tariffs or shipping, i t was an absolutely vital m a t t e r :
Artieulus
stantis aut eadentis imperil.
H e could imagine a policy
of Preference w i t h o u t tariffs or w i t h o u t shipping subsidies, b u t h e
could not, in h i s conception of t h e E m p i r e , imagine a policy t h a t
h a d tariffs a n d g a v e no Preference on t h e s e tariffs.
T h e P r i m e Minister q u i t e accepted t h a t v i e w ; t h e only
stipulation he wished t o m a k e w a s t h a t it should be made clear,
w h e n t h e resolution was published, t h a t we h a d n o t actually
c o m m i t t e d ourselves to t a x e s on food.
The Secretary of S t a t e for t h e Colonies expressed his a g r e e m e n t
w i t h L o r d Milner.
H e was q u i t e c o n t e n t w i t h t h e a m e n d e d
resolution, as long as it did n o t preclude a n y of t h e m e t h o d s b y
which Preference could be g r a n t e d .
H e was continually being
pressed in this m a t t e r , n o t only b y t h e Dominions, b u t b y people in
t h i s c o u n t r y of v e r y ' v a r y i n g political views.
I t would create
profound dissatisfaction if it became k n o w n t h a t t h e utilisation of
tariff Preference w a s to be excluded from t h e Cabinet scheme
of Imperial Preference. W i t h r e g a r d t o C a n a d a , he felt sure t h a t
Sir R o b e r t Borden would agree w i t h h i m t h a t t h e e x p o r t s of C a n a d a
would in t h e n e a r future or a t no d i s t a n t d a t e include a g r e a t volume
of manufactures. All h e wished w a s to m a k e s u r e t h a t t h e door
r e m a i n e d open.
Mr. Henderson e n t i r e l y a g r e e d with t h e views expressed b y t h e
P r i m e Minister a n d Sir R o b e r t Borden. H i s o w n personal views
differed from t h o s e of some of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e Cabinet, b u t he
was p r e p a r e d to go t o t h e e x t e n t s u g g e s t e d b y t h e P r i m e Minister,
a n d considered t h a t t h e value of t h e resolution as a m e n d e d w a s t h a t
i t would secure a g r e e m e n t between t h o s e who differed as t o t h e
p a r t i c u l a r m e t h o d s of carrying it out.
Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n wished t o r e g i s t e r t h e fact t h a t he w a s still
a n u t t e r l y i m p e n i t e n t a d h e r e n t t o t h e policy of food duties, which
h e . b e l i e v e d - t o be t h e right one for t h e country. H e considered
t h a t t h e question of food supplies was now b e i n g t a k e n b y t h e
c o u n t r y far more seriously t h a n before t h e war.
Mr. Massey wished to m a k e i t clear t h a t he h a d b r o u g h t
forward t h i s m a t t e r n o t on behalf of N e w Z e a l a n d only, b u t in t h e
:
g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t of t h e E m p i r e , a n d t h a t , he c e r t a i n l y would n o t
h a v e b r o u g h t i t up if b e t h o u g h t t h a t i t . could possibly p u t t h e
w o r k i n g classes of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m in a worse position.
T h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t accepted t h e resolution in principle,
subject t o s e t t l e m e n t of its precise wording.
The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e Colonies was r e q u e s t e d to
convene a small S u b - C o m m i t t e e , consisting of-—
Lord Milner,
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n ,
Mr. Massey,
Mr. H e n d e r s o n ,
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil,
Mr. A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n ,
t o settle upon t h e wording a n d b r i n g t h e m a t t e r u p before
t h e n e x t M e e t i n g of t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet.
The British Empire
3618
"
" "'
action" '
0l
0 r g a n i
t
1 1 . T h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t had before t h e m a r e q u e s t by
British E m p i r e P r o d u c e r s ' O r g a n i s a t i o n to receive a d e p u t a t i o n
to explain t o t h e Imperial W a r Cabinet t h e objects a n d m e t h o d s of
the organisation.
n
e
The
S e c r e t a r y was i n s t r u c t e d to inform the s e c r e t a r y of
t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e Producers' Organisation t h a t t h e i r
memorial w a s being circulated to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Cabinet, b u t t h a t it w a s impossible t o receive t h e
deputation.
(Initialled)
D. LI. G.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
S.W.,
April 24, 1 9 1 7 .
o
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
WAR CABINET,
12.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 1 0 , Downing
April 2 6 , 1 9 1 7 , at 1 L 3 0 A.M.
Street, S.W., on Thursday,
Present :
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R o r T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
L A W , M . P . , T h e R i g h t Hon. S I R R O B E R T L. B O R D E N ,
Hon. A. B O N A R
Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The
G.C.M.G.,
Canada.
Right Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON,
Chair).
CURZON OF
K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.,
Lord P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T M I L N E R , G.C.B.,
G.C.M.G.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. H E N D E R S O N , M.P. (for
latter p a r t of Minute 1 6 ) .
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . L O N G , M . P . , Secretary
of State for t h e Colonies.
Prime
Minister
of
T h e R i g h t Hon. S I R G E O R G E H. P E R L E Y ,
K.C.M.G., Minister of t h e Overseas
Military Forces of C a n a d a .
T h e R i g h t H o n . W . F . M A S S E Y , P r xme
Minister of N e w Z e a l a n d .
T h e R i g h t H o n . S I R J . G. W A R D , Bt.,
K . C . M . G . , Minister of F i n a n c e and
Posts, N e w Z e a l a n d .
Lieutenant-Greneral t h e R i g h t H o n . J . C.
SMUTS, K . C . , Minister for Defence, U n i o n
of S o u t h Africa.
The
T h e R i g h t Hon. A. C H A M B E R L A I N ,
K.C.,
M.P.,
Right
K.C.M.G.
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
Hon. S I R E. P . M O R R I S ,
P r i m e Minister of Newfound­
land.
^he following were also p r e s e n t :
T h e R i g h t H o n . L O R D R. C E C I L , K . C . , M . P . ,
A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of State for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G.C.B., O.M.,
G.C.V.O., F i r s t Sea L o r d (for M i n u t e s 1
to 1 5 ) .
T h e R i g h t Hon. the E A R L OP D E R B Y ,
K . G . , ^ G . C V . O . , C . B . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for W a r (for Minutes 1 to 1 5 ) .
T h e R i g h t Hon. S I R A. H . S T A N L E Y , M.P.,
F . B. M A U R I C E , C . B . ,
Major-General
Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s , W a r
Office (for Minutes 1 to 1 5 ) .
STR
The
Hon.
STR J .
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, India.
MESTON,
of
the
K.C.S.I.,
United
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I.,
G . C . I . E . , A . D . C . , M a h a r a j a of Bikaner.
SIR
S. P.
SINHA,
Member-Designate
P r e s i d e n t of t h e B o a r d of T r a d e
Minutes 1 6 to 1 9 ) .
H.
LLEWELLYN
SMITH,
K.C.B.,
P e r m a n e n t Secretary to t h e B o a r d of
T r a d e (for Minutes 1 6 to 1 9 ) .
T h e Hon. R. R O G E R S , Minister of P u b l i c
W o r k s , Canada.
T h e Hon. J . D . H A Z E N , Minister of Marine
a n d Fisheries, a n d of t h e N a v a l S e r v i c e ,
Canada.
Mr.
H.
C.
M. L A M B E R T ,
Mr. P H I L I P
[1142-12]
Secretary
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L. S . A M E R Y , Assistant
Mr. T H O M A S J O N E S , Assistant
Colonial
KERR.
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L. S T O R R , Assistant
C.B.,
Office, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Conference.
of
the E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r
of B e n g a l .
(for
Secretary.
Secretary.
B
Shipping:
Proposals ot
'Con^oUer
j . T H E Secretary s t a t e d t h a t t h e S h i p p i n g Controller h a d
asked h i m t o p r e s s t h a t t h e w h o l e of t h e W a r C a b i n e t s h o u l d
^ P
afternoon at t h e m e e t i n g b e t w e e n t h e P r i m e
Minister a n d Sir J o s e p h Maclay's S h i p p i n g C o m m i t t e e , as he h a d
i m p o r t a n t proposals to b r i n g forward.
e
r e s e n t
m
t n e
It was a g r e e d t h a t t h e decision on these m a t t e r s should b e left
to t h e P r i m e Minister a n d Lord Curzon.
The Western
3* ron t .
Comparison of
British and
German Captures
of Hostile Guns.
2. T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s r e p o r t e d t h a t F i e l d Marshal Sir Douglas H a i g h a d h e l d a conference w i t h G e n e r a l
JNiiveile, a n d h-id reached c o m p l e t e a g r e e m e n t in r e g a r d to f u t u r e
p l a n s of operations.
H e s t a t e d t h a t information, was now c o m i n g to h a n d w i t h
reference to t h e G e r m a n casualties sustained in t h e r e c e n t fighting,
a n d it was clear t h a t they exceeded those i n c u r r e d b y t h e e n e m y
in any p r e v i o u s battle of t h e same duration.
T h e B r i t i s h casualties d u r i n g these o p e r a t i o n s n o w totalled
60,000, of w h i c h 3.000 had. o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e last twenty-four
hours.
T h e B r i t i s h offensive had s t a r t e d on t h e 9 t h April, a n d
t h e total of 60,000 i n c l u d e d all casualties u p to t h e p r e s e n t from
t h a t date, as compared w i t h .112,000 d u r i n g t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g
period of t h e S o m m e Battle. T h e F r e n c h offensive h a d c o m m e n c e d
on. the 10th A p r i l , and their casualties totalled 82,000.
T h e G e r m a n claim to h a v e c a p t u r e d 650 p r i s o n e r s in the
course of t h e i r r e c e n t c o u n t e r - a t t a c k was p r o b a b l y correct.
T h e G e r m a n divisions i n r e s e r v e a n d n o t yet e n g a g e d h a d , at
t h e outset of t h e battle, n u m b e r e d 49.
T h e s e h a d now b e e n
r e d u c e d to 15 divisions, 10 of which were opposed to t h e B r i t i s h
a n d 5 to t h e F r e n c h front. T h e British A r m y still h a d 12 divisions
i n reserve w h i c h h a d n o t yet been employed, a n d t h e F r e n c h
h a d 29.
T h e P r i m e Minister c o m m u n i c a t e d t h e following figures, w h i c h
h a d been f u r n i s h e d to h i m b y t h e W a r Office :—.
British c a p t u r e s of German g u n s since t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e w a r . .
German c a p t u r e s of British g u n s since t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e w a r . .
409
84
T h e Director of Military Operations s t a t e d t h a t since A p r i l
1915 only 4 B r i t i s h g u n s h a d been- lost on t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t ; h e
considered 8 4 to be an o u t s i d e e s t i m a t e of the G e r m a n captures.
G e n e r a l Maurice u n d e r t o o k to c h e c k t h e s e figures for t h e P r i m e
Minister.
, ­
Mesopotamia.
3. T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s s t a t e d t h a t the only
b a r to t h e exploitation of G e n e r a l Maude's successive victories in
Mesopotamia, to t h e extent of t h e complete c r u s h i n g of t h e T u r k i s h
power in t h e s e r e g i o n s , w a s t h e r e g r e t t a b l e i n a b i l i t y of t h e
R u s s i a n s to t a k e the offensive, a n d i n s t a n c e d t h e fact t h a t
G e n e r a l M a u d e h a d n o w sticcessfully r e p u l s e d t h e a d v a n c e of
t h e 13th T u r k i s h Corps. Plad t h e R u s s i a n s b e e n in a position to
e n g a g e and hold t h i s corps, i n all p r o b a b i l i t y G e n e r a l M a u d e w o u l d
h a v e been able to h a v e a n n i h i l a t e d t h e 1 8 t h Corp?.
The Balkans.
4. T h e D i r e c t o r of Military Operations r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
offensive i n the B a l k a n s h a d begun, and t h a t two divisions h a d
been l a u n c h e d to t h e attack, one of which h a d r e a c h e d a n d held its
objective, while the other h a d been unsuccessful.
T h e s e operations
comprised t h e first incident in G e n e r a l S a r r a i P s offensive in t h a t
region, t h e F r e n c h attacks h a v i n g still to b e l a u n c h e d .
Heavy Loss of
Merchant Ships.
5. T h e I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t observed w i t h c o n c e r n the very
heavy losses from mines a n d s u b m a r i n e d on t h e p r e v i o u s day,
a g g r e g a t i n g nearly 40,000 g r o s s tons of British a n d n e a r l y 9,000
g r o s s tons of Allied a n d N e u t r a l S h i p p i n g .
Convoying of
Merchant Yessels.
6. With reference to W a r C a b i n e t 124, Minute 8, t h e F i r s t Sea
L o r d stated t h a t , as the convoy s y s t e m r e q u i r e d a n elaborate
organisation a n d a large n u m b e r of destroyers, t h e A d m i r a l t y h a d
n o t yet been a b l e to adopt it.
T h e m a i n difficulty w a s t h a t t h e r e
w e r e no d e s t r o y e r s available at t h e p r e s e n t time.
If h a d even been
necessary t e m p o r a r i l y to r e d u c e t h e destroyers w i t h the G r a n d
F l e e t to a figure far below the s a e t y limit, in o r d e r to afford some
protection to t r a d e . He stated, h o w e v e r , that the p r e s e n t i n t e n t i o n
of t h e A d m i r a l t y was to i n t r o d u c e a system w h e r e b y g r o u p s of
m e r c h a n t s h i p s would be convoyed b y a cruiser a c r o s s t h e Atlantic,
if t h e necessary c r u i s e r s could b e p r o v i d e d , and as t h e y e n t e r e d t h e
s u b m a r i n e d a n g e r zone ( w h e t h e r o u t w a r d or homeward, b o u n d ) ,
they would be escorted by d e s t r o y e r s when the r e q u i r e d n u m b e r
b e c a m e available.
f
Destroyers from
the United States.
7. T h e F i r s t Sea Lord s t a t e d t h a t t h e United S t a t e s w e r e as yet
only s e n d i n g six destroyers to E u r o p e a n waters. H e e s t i m a t e d t h a t
t h e maximum, n u m b e r w h i c h t h e y could p r o v i d e would be thirty-six.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet d e c i d e d t h a t —
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil should send a t e l e g r a m to Mr. Balfour,
i m p r e s s i n g u p o n h i m as a m a t t e r of t h e u t m o s t u r g e n c y
the i m p o r t a n c e of i n d u c i n g P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n t o exercise
his p e r s o n a l authority i n o r d e r to s e c u r e t h e desjjatch of
all available destroyers.
Construction of
Destroyers.
8. T h e F i r s t Sea Lord s t a t e d t h a t destroyers w e r e b e i n g built a s
r a p i d l y as possible, b u t t h e o u t p u t , for reasons w h i c h h e explained
t o t h e Cabinet, d i d not exceed six a m o n t h , a n d t h e r e were
considerable losses from mines, b e l l i g e r e n t action, a n d collision.
British Sea Power:
Demand for
Reduction of
Overseas
Commitments.
9. T h e F i r s t Sea Lord d r e w t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
C a b i n e t to w h a t h e r e g a r d e d as a f u n d a m e n t a l e r r o r in "making a
d e m a n d on o u r m a r i t i m e r e s o u r c e s w h i c h could n o t b e m e t w i t h
t h e p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h of the N a v y . W e w e r e still p r o c e e d i n g on t h e
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t w e h a d complete c o m m a n d of t h e sea, w h e r e a s i n
fact we h a d not, o w i n g to t h e s u b m a r i n e menace. T h e provision
of escorts for s h i p s c a r r y i n g coolies a n d l a b o u r e r s b e i n g b r o u g h t
from China a n d elsewhere, the e s c o r t i n g of h o s p i t a l s h i p s r e n d e r e d
necessary by r e c e n t G e r m a n action, a n d , above all, t h e provision of
escorts for t h e p u r p o s e s of our v a r i o u s overseas E x p e d i t i o n s , w e r e
t h r o w i n g an i n t o l e r a b l e s t r a i n on t h e A d m i r a l t y a n d w e r e d i s s i p a t i n g
o u r naval forces i n a m a n n e r w h i c h entirely p r e c l u d e d our being­
i n s ufiicient s t r e n g t h a n y w h e r e to e n s u r e r e a s o n a b l e safety for o u r
oversea communications.
A d m i r a l Jellicoe s t r o n g l y u r g e d t h e
p a r a m o u n t a n d i m m e d i a t e necessity of r e d u c i n g our. c o m m i t m e n t s
in d i s t a n t seas, a n d more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e B a l k a n s .
Prisoners of War:
Stoppage of
Parcels.
10. W i t h reference to W a r C a b i n e t 124, M i n u t e 12, t h e
Secretary of State for W a r reported, t h a t a r e p l y had n o w b e e n
received from our R e p r e s e n t a t i v e w i t h t h e D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t t o
t h e effect t h a t t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t did not i n t e n d t o stop t h e
t r a n s m i s s i o n of p a r c e l s to p r i s o n e r s of w a r in G e r m a n y , b u t t h a t
the inspection of such parcels was now m o r e s t r i c t l y c o n d u c t e d t h a n
formerly, owing to their discovery t h a t the F r e n c h h a d s m u g g l e d
i n s t r u m e n t s of sabotage t h r o u g h these parcels.
L o r d Derby said that h e would circulate a p a p e r in t h e c o u r s e
of a day or two e m b o d y i n g his proposals,
Bombardment of
Dunkirk.
Loss of a French
Destroyer.
I I . T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d a t e n - m i n u t e s ' b o m b a r d m e n t
of D u n k i r k t h e previous n i g h t .
He further r e p o r t e d t h e s i n k i n g of
a F r e n c h destroyer.
Star Shell.
12. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d s t a t e d t h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y h a d n o w
succeeded in r e p r o d u c i n g the G e r m a n s t a r shell, w h i c h was
i m m e a s u r a b l y superior to a n y t h i n g of t h e k i n d i n o u r service. H e
h o p e d t h a t t h e A r m y would also benefit from this fact, w h i c h w a s
due to t h e recovery of a n u n e x p l o d e d G e r m a n star s h e l l a t
R a m s g a t e , a n d to o u r c o p y i n g it.
Seaplane Attack
on German
Destroyers.
13. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d gave details of a r e c e n t a t t a c k by­
seaplanes on G e r m a n destroyers, one of w h i c h was believed to h a v e
been s u n k .
Torpedoing of
Transport
" Ballarat."
14. T h e F i r s t Sea Lord r e p o r t e d t h e t o r p e d o i n g of the t r a n s p o r t
" B a l l a r a t " n e a r t h e Scilly I s l a n d s , with some 1,600 A u s t r a l i a n
troops on b o a r d .
All the t r o o p s h a d been saved, and, w h e n last
h e a r d of, t h e t r a n s p o r t was still afloat.
Seaplanes against
Submarines.
15. T h e F i r s t Sea L o r d r e p o r t e d several actions w i t h e n e m y
s u b m a r i n e s , i n c l u d i n g one i n w h i c h a B r i t i s h s e a p l a n e h a d b e e n
e n g a g e d . A d m i r a l Jellicoe s t a t e d t h a t t h e provision of t w o - e n g i n e d
seaplanes, some of which were now available, h a d enabled t h e
A d m i r a l t y to extend t h e u s e of t h e s e aircraft.
Imperial
Preference and
Emigration.
16. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t considered Mr. Massey's
resolution on I m p e r i a l P r e f e r e n c e a n d E m i g r a t i o n as a m e n d e d
b y Mr. L o n g ' s Drafting C o m m i t t e e ( I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t 1 1 ,
Minute 10).
T h e a m e n d e d resolution was i n t h e following
t e r m s :—
T h e t i m e has a r r i v e d w h e n all possible e n c o u r a g e m e n t s h o u l d
b e given to the d e v e l o p m e n t of I m p e r i a l resources, a n d
especially to m a k i n g t h e E m p i r e i n d e p e n d e n t of o t h e r
countries in respect of food s u p p l i e s , r a w m a t e r i a l s , a n d
essential i n d u s t r i e s . W i t h these objects i n view t h i s
Conference expresses itself i n favour of—
" (1.) A system b y w h i c h each p a r t of t h e E m p i r e ,
h a v i n g d u e r e g a r d to t h e i n t e r e s t s of o u r Allies,
will give specially favourable t r e a t m e n t a n d
facilities to t h e p r o d u c e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e s of
o t h e r p a r t s of t h e E m p i r e .
" (2). A r r a n g e m e n t s b y w h i c h i n t e n d i n g e m i g r a n t s from
t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m may b e i n d u c e d to settle
i n c o u n t r i e s u n d e r the B r i t i s h F l a g . "
G e n e r a l S m u t s p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s with w h i c h
h e h a d come to the p r e s e n t Conference h a d not i n c l u d e d t h e settle­
m e n t of a definite I m p e r i a l Tariff system on t h i s occasion, a n d h e
considered t h a t t h e w o r d i n g of t h e resolution w e n t f u r t h e r t h a n
really w a s i n t e n d e d . All t h a t w a s r e q u i r e d , i n h i s opinion, w a s to
recognise t h e p r i n c i p l e , n a m e l y , t h a t in a n y future a r r a n g e m e n t
which i n c l u d e d tariffs, P r e f e r e n c e should h e g r a n t e d , a n d not to lay
down a policy. South Africa certainly h a d no objection to t h e
p r i n c i p l e of Preference, i n a s m u c h as she h a d a l r e a d y a p p l i e d it
herself. H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t it m i g h t be possible to draft t h e resolu­
tion in a form w h i c h more clearly expressed t h e situation.
T h e P r i m e Minister s u g g e s t e d t h a t a n e w draft resolution
m i g h t be d r a w n u p , e m p h a s i s i n g , first of all, t h e complete freedom
of each G o v e r n m e n t in t h e E m p i r e to a d o p t a n y economic s y s t e m
it chose ; secondly, t h a t w h e r e t h e r e are c u s t o m s duties t h o s e
duties should b e m o r e favourable to t h e p r o d u c e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e s
of other c o u n t r i e s in t h e E m p i r e ; and, t h i r d l y , t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e
of P r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d b e carried out in any a r r a n g e m e n t s for the
i m p r o v e m e n t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , or in any o t h e r
w a y in w h i c h it could be usefully applied.
I t was p o i n t e d out t h a t a draft on these lines h a d been before
t h e Committee, b u t h a d been o b j e c t e d to b y Mr. H e n d e r s o n on t h e
g r o u n d t h a t it recalled too vividly p a s t controversies.
T h e discussion was i n t e r r u p t e d i n order t h a t a draft resolution
should be d r a w n u p on t h e lines s u g g e s t e d b y t h e P r i m e Minister,
a n d to e n a b l e Mr. H e n d e r s o n to b e p r e s e n t .
On Mr. I i e n d e r s o n ' s a r r i v a l t h e discussion w a s r e s u m e d on the
draft resolution so d r a w n u p . Mr. H e n d e r s o n stated t h a t if t h e
resolution w e r e a d o p t e d i n t h i s form h e would be obliged to r e c o r d
h i s dissent, as h e could not c o u n t e n a n c e t h e G o v e r n m e n t h o l d i n g
out t h e h o p e of a n extension of a w i d e r r a n g e of d u t i e s , w h i c h t h e
a m e n d e d resolution did b y implication.
I t was also pointed out t h a t the a m e n d e d resolution, in so far
as it s t a t e d t h e situation i n m o r e definite t e r m s , m i g h t not only
evoke m o r e direct controversy i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , b u t also
create anxiety a m o n g o u r Allies, more p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e U n i t e d
States.
Mr. Massey also drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e possibility of a n i n t e r v a l
o c c u r r i n g i m m e d i a t e l y on t h e conclusion of t h e w a r , d u r i n g w h i c h
t h e p r i n c i p l e of Preference m i g h t n o t yet b e in o p e r a t i o n ; b u t it
was p o i n t e d out in reply to t h i s t h a t the provisions of t h e P a r i s
resolutions, as w ell as the g e n e r a l situation t h a t was likely to
c o n t i n u e for some t i m e after t h e i m m e d i a t e conclusion of hostilities,
would p r e c l u d e s u c h a possibility.
Lord R o b e r t Cecil s u g g e s t e d t h a t G e n e r a l S m u t s ' objection
would really be m e t if for t h e words " a s y s t e m b y w h i c h , " at t h e
b e g i n n i n g of sub-head (i) of t h e resolution, were s u b s t i t u t e d " t h e
p r i n c i p l e t h a t . " T h i s would m a k e it clear t h a t w h a t was contern­
p l a t e d was not t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a r i g i d system, b u t t h e
application b y t h e different G o v e r n m e n t s , in t h e i r own fashion, of
a common principle.
I n view of t h e desirability of s e c u r i n g a u n a n i m o u s decision,
G e n e r a l S m u t s stated t h a t , t h o u g h he still p r e f e r r e d t h e m o r e
explicit draft, he would not s t a n d on h i s objection, m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y
if L o r d R o b e r t Cecil's s u g g e s t e d a m e n d m e n t were a d o p t e d .
The Imperial War Cabinet agreed that—
r
T h e resolution as f r a m e d b y t h e Colonial Secretary,^ Com­
m i t t e e should be a m e n d e d so t h a t s u b - h e a d (i) should
read—
" T h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t each p a r t of t h e E m p i r e ,
h a v i n g due r e g a r d t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of our Allies, shall,
give specially favourable t r e a t m e n t a n d facilities to­
the p r o d u c e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e s of o t h e r p a r t s of t h e
Empire."
' [1142-12]
C
Report of Lord
Milner's
Committee on the
Paris Resolutions.
17. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t considered t h e R e p o r t of L o r d
Milner's C o m m i t t e e on T e r m s of P e a c e (Economic a n d N o n - T e r r i ­
torial
Desiderata).
AVith reference to Conclusion . 1 , dealing w i t h t h e P a r i s reso­
lutions. t h e Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r p o i n t e d o u t t h a t n o
reference was m a d e to t h e p e r i o d of continued p r o h i b i t i o n of enemy­
t r a d e for a p e r i o d after t h e w a r , w h i c h was i m p o r t a n t to p r e v e n t
our s l i p p i n g b a c k into the old situation, d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v a l w h i c h
m i g h t p r e c e d e o u r m a k i n g o u r own fiscal a r r a n g e m e n t s . H e also
considered t h a t t h i s m i g h t be t a k e n as a g o i n g b a c k on t h e policy
previously a g r e e d u p o n . I t was, however, p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e r e
was no i n t e n t i o n of m a k i n g t h e R e p o r t of t h e C o m m i t t e e p u b l i c .
Indemnities.
18. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t also discussed Conclusion 4,
w i t h reference t o i n d e m n i t i e s , a n d t h e s u g g e s t i o n was m a d e that
insufficient stress h a d p e r h a p s b e e n laid on t h e idea of i n d e m n i t y
i n cash. I t w a s p o i n t e d out t h a t a cash i n d e m n i t y w o u l d certainly
b e r e q u i r e d for B e l g i u m , and t h a t s u c h a form of i n d e m n i t y , t h o u g h
p e r h a p s not most useful from t h e point of view of t h e Allies, would
b e very effective in c r i p p l i n g G e r m a n y . I t was p o i n t e d out, how­
ever, t h a t t h e a m o u n t of p e c u n i a r y i n d e m n i t y p a y a b l e b y G e r m a n y
was relatively small, i n a s m u c h as t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g b u l k of h e r
c a p i t a l was fixed i n t h e shape of i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t a n d other m e a n s
of p r o d u c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g some 3,000,000 tons of s h i p p i n g still i n
G e r m a n ports.
T h e s u g g e s t i o n w a s also m a d e t h a t some of "the G e r m a n
colonies, w h i c h m i g h t otherwise be given back, could b e h e l d as
a p l e d g e for t h e p a y m e n t of a n i n d e m n i t y ; b u t it w a s p o i n t e d
out t h a t the R e p o r t of Lord C u r z o n ' s Committee on T e r r i t o r i a l
Desiderata w a s not likely to favour the idea of t h e restoration of
a n y of t h e G e r m a n colonies.
Limitation of
Armaments, and
League of Nations.
19. W i t h reference to Conclusion 6 of L o r d Milner's Com­
m i t t e e , t h e P r i m e Minister expressed t h e view t h a t t h e C o m m i t t e e
h a d r a t h e r t h r o w n cold water on t h e idea of a L e a g u e of Nations,
a n d h a d n o t dealt at all w i t h the question o f d i s a r m a m e n t or
l i m i t a t i o n of a r m a m e n t s , or of t h e sanctions b y w h i c h t h e conclu­
sions of a L e a g u e of Nations, or t h e provisions of a n y a g r e e m e n t for
t h e l i m i t a t i o n of a r m a m e n t s , should b e enforced. H e t h o u g h t t h a t
t h e r e would be g r e a t d i s a p p o i n t m e n t if it were t h o u g h t t h a t a t t h e
e n d of the war n o t h i n g could b e done in these directions.
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e limitation of a r m a m e n t s , L o r d R o b e r t Cecil
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t h e h a d s u b m i t t e d a M e m o r a n d u m in w h i c h t h i s
w a s advocated, b u t confessed t h a t h e h a d b e e n d r i v e n o u t of his
position by t h e criticisms contained in an examination of t h a t
M e m o r a n d u m b y Sir E y r e Crowe.
I n t h e discussion w h i c h e n s u e d it was p o i n t e d o u t t h a t one of
t h e first difficulties in the way w a s t h a t of the s t a n d a r d to be
established.
T h e existence of o u r own d o m i n a t i n g sea-power,
c o u p l e d w i t h t h e sea-power of A m e r i c a , was u n d o u b t e d l y t h e best
g u a r a n t e e for p e a c e ; b u t it was p r o b a b l y one of t h e v e r y first t h i n g s
which the m e m b e r s of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l body would a g r e e should b e
c u t down.
T h e n , a g a i n , t h e r e w a s t h e difficulty of the m a n n e r i n w h i c h
a n y l i m i t a t i o n could be p r e s c r i b e d . Napoleon's a t t e m p t to l i m i t t h e
P r u s s i a n a r m y to a definite n u m e r i c a l s t r e n g t h h a d b e e n directly
r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e creation of t h e P r u s s i a n military system.
F u r t h e r , it w a s impossible to d r a w t h e line as to w h a t
c o n s t i t u t e d a r m a m e n t s . I n t h e p r e s e n t war G e r m a n y h a d been
able for t w o y e a r s a n d m o r e to hold h e r own a g a i n s t t h e rest of t h e
world, in a r m a m e n t s , o w i n g t o h e r effective i n d u s t r i a l organisation.
T h a t organisation h a d n o t b e e n p u r e l y p l a n n e d for w a r ; its a d a p ­
tation to m i l i t a r y purposes h a d b e e n a m a t t e r of i m p r o v i s a t i o n i n
G e r m a n y as well as in Allied c o u n t r i e s . B u t t h e fact r e m a i n e d
t h a t it was a n essential p a r t of G e r m a n y ' s m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h .
Lastly, t h e r e was t h e difficulty t h a t t h e P o w e r s who were m o s t
likely to u s e t h e i r a r m a m e n t s in o r d e r to forward t h e i r a m b i t i o n s
were the ones who would be least willing to fall in whole-heartedly
and honestly w i t h any s c h e m e of limitation of a r m a m e n t s t h a t
m i g h t be agreed u p o n .
W i t h r e g a r d to t h e q u e s t i o n of a L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , Lord
R o b e r t Cecil pointed out t h a t t h e r e w e r e really t w o m a i n a l t e r n a ­
tives, namely, an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of A r b i t r a t i o n or a
system of. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference a n d Consultation. H e did n o t
believe t h a t m a t t e r s affecting t h e vital interests of t h e British
E m p i r e could possibly be s u b m i t t e d to t h e decisions of a n I n t e r ­
national T r i b u n a l . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e did believe t h a t a g r e a t
deal could b e effected if the h a b i t of conference a n d consultation
could once be firmly established. H e t h o u g h t one of t h e chief
causes of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conflict lay in t h e fact t h a t t r e a t y t e r m s
a t t e m p t e d to settle for all t i m e m a t t e r s t h a t were i n h e r e n t l y subject
to variation a n d development.
U n d e r a s y s t e m of I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Conferences t h e situation could be periodically r e v i e w e d . T o b e g i n
with, at any rate, t h e . m o s t hopeful p l a n p r o b a b l y w a s to say t h a t n o
one should d e c l a r e w a r till a Conference of all t h e P o w e r s h a d been
s u m m o n e d , t h e s u m m o n i n g a n d decision of s u c h a Conference
t a k i n g place w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time.
I n t h e discussion w h i c h e n s u e d it was p o i n t e d out t h a t a
periodical Conference to r e a d j u s t t h e m a p of E u r o p e m i g h t possibly
create causes of friction a s well as allay t h e m .
T h e r e w a s t h e f u r t h e r difficulty that, u n d e r any p r o c e d u r e
w h i c h could b e s u g g e s t e d for a L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , or for a Confer­
ence of Nations, called t o g e t h e r to deal w i t h s u c h p r o b l e m s a s t h o s e
of nationality, a u n i t e d Italy could n e v e r h a v e come into being, o r
t h e subject races' of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e delivered from T u r k i s h
oppression.
L o r d Milner said t h a t h e did not believe t h a t a n y a t t e m p t t o
establish an I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t would be successful or be a good
t h i n g in itself; b u t h e did believe t h a t a g r e a t a d v a n c e could b e
m a d e if the n a t i o n s w h o e n t e r e d into t h e n e x t T r e a t y of Peace
b o u n d themselves not to go to war w i t h o u t s u b m i t t i n g t h e i r case t o
a Conference. F a i l u r e to do so should be a c a u s e of w a r for all
t h e P o w e r s who w e r e p a r t y t o t h e T r e a t y . T h e Conference, h o w ­
ever, could n o t b e a Court b i n d i n g t h e n a t i o n s who took p a r t in i t
to enforce its decisions
S u c h a Conference, in h i s opinion, would,
i n all probability, have p r e v e n t e d t h e o u t b r e a k of t h e p r e s e n t war.
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n expressed the view t h a t t h e real basis of
f u t u r e peace m u s t b e t h e p u b l i c opinion of t h e w o r l d . ' T h e p r e s e n t
w a r h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e futility of - treaties a n d conventions w h e n
n a t i o n s were d e t e r m i n e d to violate t h e m . He l a i d p a r t i c u l a r stress
on t h e last s e n t e n c e i n Conclusion 6 of L o r d M i l n e r ' s C o m m i t t e e —
t h a t which referred to discussion with our Allies a n d w i t h t h e
U n i t e d States.
H e considered t h a t t h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e
B r i t i s h E m p i r e in a g r e e m e n t could do m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g else to
m a i n t a i n t h e p e a c e of t h e world.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t decided t h a t T h e m i m r t e s of L o r d M i l n e r ' s C o m m i t t e , as "well a s
L o r d R o b e r t OeciPs a n d ' Sir E y r e C r o w e ' s m e m o r a n d a , a n d
other p a p e r s b e a r i n g on t h e subject, should be circulated, a n d
the discussion r e s u m e d a t t h e i r next- m e e t i n g .
(Initialled)
D . LI. G.
'2, Whitehall-Gardens,
S.W.,
April 26, 1917.
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
W A R CABINET,
IMPERIAL
Minutes
13.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London
Street, S.W., on Tuesday, May 1 , 1 9 1 7 , at 5 P.M.
at 1 0 ,
Downing
Present:
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R O F T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
H o n . t h e E A R L C U R Z O N OF
KEDLESTON,
K . G . , G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
Chair).
The Right Hon. S I R ROBERT L. BORDEN,
G . C . M . G . , K . C . , P r i m e Minister of
Canada.
The
T h e R i g h t Hon. V I S C O U N T M I L N E R , G . C . B . ,
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
H.
K . C . M . G . , Minister of t h e
Military F o r c e s of C a n a d a .
G.C.M.G.
The Right
T h e R i g h t H o n . A. H E N D E R S O N , M . P .
Hon.
W . F.
PERLEY,
Overseas
MASSEY,
Prime
Minister of N e w Z e a l a n d .
The Right
Hon. S I R J .
G.
WARD,
Bt.,
K.C.M.G., Minister of F i n a n c e a n d Posts,
New Z e a l a n d .
T h e Right Hon. W . LONG, M . P . , Secretary
of State for t h e Colonies.
Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. J . C .
The Right Hon. A. CHAMBERLAIN, M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
SMUTS,
K.C,
Minister
for
Defence,
Union of S o u t h Africa.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t :
The Right Hon. the E A R L OF DERBY,
K . G . , G.C.V.O.. C.B., S e c r e t a r y of State
for W a r (for Minutes 1 a n d 2).
Major-General
F.
B.
MAURICE,
C.B.,
Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s , W a r
Office (for Minutes 1 a n d 2).
The
Hon.
SIR J .
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, India.
MESTON,
of
the
K.C.S.I.,
United
The Right Hon. LORD ROBERT CECIL, K . C . ,
A c t i n g S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
The
SINGH,
BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I.,
G . C . I . E . , A.D.C., Maharaja of B i k a n e r .
a n d F i s h e r i e s , a n d of t h e Naval Servicf .
Canada.
.
Mr.
H.
C.
M.
Secretary.
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L . S . A M E R Y , Assistant
[1142-13]
Colonial
Mr. P H I L I P K E R R .
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L . S T O R R , Assistant
LAMBERT, C.B.,
Office, Secretary t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r \
Conference.
S I R S . P . S L N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of t h e
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
R . R O G E R S , M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c
T h e H o n . J . D . H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of Marin
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
GANGA
Eon.
Works, Canada.
Secretary.
B
The Western Front.
1. T H E D i r e c t o r of Military. O p e r a t i o n s s t a t e d t h a t h e h a d
n o t h i n g to a d d t o t h e r e p o r t m a d e to t h e W a r C a b i n e t b y t h e Chief
of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff t h a t m o r n i n g . I n r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n
b y the P r i m e Minister, he said t h a t i n t h e i r l a t e s t a t t a c k s t h e
F r e n c h h a d s e c u r e d t h e w e s t e r n half of t h e i r objectives, b u t t h a t
t h e y h a d not y e t c a p t u r e d t h e whole of t h e h e i g h t s s o u t h of
Moronvilliers, to t h e possession of w h i c h t h e y a t t a c h e d c o n s i d e r a b l e
importance.
Mesopotamia.
2. T h e D i r e c t o r of Military O p e r a t i o n s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e
1 3 t h T u r k i s h A r m y Corps h a d b e e n e n t r e n c h i n g for some days in a
s t r o n g position on b o t h b a n k s of t h e S h a t t - e l - A d h a i m .
On t h e
n i g h t of t h e 2 9 t h - 3 0 t h G e n e r a l M a u d e h a d t r a n s f e r r e d t h e b u l k of
h i s troops to t h e left b a n k , and h a d a t t a c k e d p a r t of t h e e n e m y ' s
position t h e r e a t d a w n . T h e a t t a c k came as a s u r p r i s e , a n d t h e
e n e m y ' s first t w o lines, as well as a village h e l d b y t h e m , w e r e
c a p t u r e d by o u r troops. As t h e r e s u l t of a s t r o n g c o u n t e r - a t t a c k
t h e village p a s s e d t e m p o r a r i l y into t h e e n e m y ' s h a n d s , b u t w a s
speedily r e g a i n e d by us. F i g h t i n g w a s still i n p r o g r e s s .
League of Peace.
3. T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r e d t h e R e p o r t of
L o r d Milner's C o m m i t t e e .
W i t h r e g a r d to t h e possibility of a
L e a g u e of Peace, L o r d Milner a g a i n expressed t h e v i e w t h a t the
most t h a t could b e d o n e would be for t h e P o w e r s c o n c e r n e d i n t h e
T r e a t y of Peace to b i n d t h e m s e l v e s n o t to g o to w a r w i t h o u t
p r e v i o u s conference, a n d all to g o to w a r a g a i n s t a n y P o w e r t h a t
violated t h i s a g r e e m e n t .
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil read to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t a
s u g g e s t e d clause in t h e T e r m s of P e a c e b y w h i c h it w a s a g r e e d
t h a t , in case of a n y difference or controversy, a Conference should
b e f o r t h w i t h s u m m o n e d , and no action t a k e n u n t i l t h a t Conference
h a d considered t h e m a t t e r , or for t h r e e m o n t h s after t h e m e e t i n g of
t h e Conference.
E a c h of t h e h i g h c o n t r a c t i n g P o w e r s should b i n d
itself to enforce this a g r e e m e n t by c u t t i n g off all financial a n d
c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e from an offending Power.
G e n e r a l S m u t s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e precise n a t u r e of t h e sanction
to be i m p o s e d would h a v e to be w o r k e d out later. I t w o u l d be
sufficient if the I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t expressed itself in g e n e r a l
t e r m s in favour of t h e principle of a sanction,
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet c o n c u r r e d i n this v i e w .
Disarmament.
4. L o r d R o b e r t Cecil briefly explained to t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
C a b i n e t t h e difficulties i n t h e way of a n y a g r e e m e n t , e i t h e r b e t w e e n
t h e Powers collectively or b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l P o w e r s , with r e g a r d
to d i s a r m a m e n t .
T h e s e difficulties, as set forth in Sir E y r e Crowe's
M e m o r a n d u m , h a d convinced h i m t h a t d i s a r m a m e n t was n o t a
hopeful line of p r o g r e s s
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r w a s n o t convinced t h a t S i r E y r e C r o w e ' s
a r g u m e n t s q u i t e e x h a u s t e d t h e subject:
I n h i s opinion, t h e
w a r h a d b e e n l a r g e l y due to t h e existence of a g r e a t , h i g h l y
professionalised
a r m y exciting p u b l i c opinion, a n d e a g e r to
test its s t r e n g t h .
Pie t h o u g h t it m i g h t b e p o s s i b l e to h a v e an
a g r e e m e n t in favour of setting u p , in place of t h i s provocative
s y s t e m b a s e d on t h e s p i r i t of offensive, a militia s y s t e m essentially
non-provocative, a n d based on t h e idea of defence.
A g a i n s t this it was argtied t h a t it w a s e x t r e m e l y difficult to
g e t rid of t h e professional e l e m e n t a l t o g e t h e r , a n d t h a t the
conditions of different countries differed so w i d e l y t h a t it w o u l d i n
p r a c t i c e be i m p o s s i b l e to find a s y s t e m o n w h i c h everyone could
be a g r e e d . Moreover, t h e g r e a t e s t e x i s t i n g g u a r a n t e e of p e a c e —
t h e British N a v y — w a s u n d o u b t e d l y a h i g h l y professionalised
i n s t i t u t i o n , a n d it would be impossible to a s k for a g e n e r a l r e d u c t i o n
of m i l i t a r y efficiency on l a n d w i t h o u t raising t h e question of n a v a l
d i s a r m a m e n t . I t was, indeed, s u g g e s t e d b y General S m u t s t h a t if
t h e E u r o p e a n P o w e r s by a g r e e m e n t d e b a r r e d t h e m s e l v e s from
s p e n d i n g m o n e y on their land defence t h e y would have m u c h m o r e
t o s p e n d on big navies.
Mr. H e n d e r s o n considered t h a t L o r d Milner's C o m m i t t e e , in
f r a m i n g p a r a g r a p h 6 of their R e p o r t , while t h e y h a d excluded
complete d i s a r m a m e n t as a counsel of perfection, w e r e q u i t e
p r e p a r e d t o consider a n y reasonable m e a n s for reducing a r m a m e n t s
a n d p r e v e n t i n g t h e recurrence of war. Personally, h e held v e r y
s t r o n g views on t h e subject of disarmament., b u t w a s convinced
t h a t i t was necessary first of all t o see w h a t r e s u l t could b e
a c h i e v e d in t h e direction of a L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . T h e policy w i t h
r e g a r d to d i s a r m a m e n t would h a v e t o d e p e n d on t h e n a t u r e of t h e
i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations set up after t h e conclusion of peace.
Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n confessed to feeling t h a t a n y a t t e m p t t o
l a y down restrictions on a r m a m e n t s was b o u n d t o give rise to
o p p o r t u n i t i e s for fraud.
P u b l i c opinion in t h i s c o u n t r y w o u l d
insist t h a t a n y B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be bound, b o t h in t h e
l e t t e r and in t h e spirit, b y t h e restrictions. I n a c o u n t r y such as
G e r m a n y , public opinion would be e n t i r e l y in favour of t h e
r e s t r i c t i o n s being t a c i t l y broken or evaded.
H e considered,
however, t h a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n contained in L o r d Milner's R e p o r t , of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h America, m i g h t be followed up, a n d t h a t we
m i g h t e n d e a v o u r t o see w h e t h e r A m e r i c a n s , who h a d g i v e n a g r e a t
deal of t i m e to discussing t h e s e subjects, could formulate a n y
workable scheme.
Sir R o b e r t Borden said h e was c e r t a i n l y q u i t e willing t h a t t h e
q u e s t i o n of limitation of a r m a m e n t s should be included in t h e
details for discussion w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , which h a d been
s u g g e s t e d in t h e l a s t sentence of p a r a g r a p h 6 of t h e C o m m i t t e e ' s
R e p o r t . H e a d h e r e d to his opinion t h a t really t h e public opinion
of t h e world w a s t h e only sure g u a r a n t e e of peace.
The
Report of
Lord Curzon's
Committee.
[1142-13]
I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t w e r e of t h e opinion t h a t t h e
question of t h e limitation of a r m a m e n t s should also be
discussed w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in connection w i t h a n y
discussion of this question of a L e a g u e of P e a c e .
5. The I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet considered t h e R e p o r t of L o r d
Curzon's C o m m i t t e e on Territorial Desiderata
in t h e T e r m s of
Peace.
L o r d C u r z o n e x p l a i n e d t o t h e I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet t h a t t h e
Conclusions of t h e C o m m i t t e e h a d been u n a n i m o u s after A^ery
m i n u t e a n d careful discussion.
Those in t h e first a n d most
i m p o r t a n t c a t e g o r y were based on v e r y definite principles, shared
b y all his colleagues on t h e C o m m i t t e e , as t o t h e importance, of
s e c u r i n g t h e f u t u r e safe-ty of t h e British E m p i r e by r e m o v i n g t h e
menace, which t h e G e r m a n colonial s y s t e m a n d t h e G e r m a n a m b i t i o n
for expansion t o w a r d s t h e Suez Canai a n d t h e Persian Gulf, created t o
t h e sea communications of t h e E m p i r e , a n d t o its peaceful deyelop­
ment.
H e washed to differentiate v e r y sharply b e t w e e n t h e
t e r r i t o r i a l question, as it affected G e r m a n y ' s colonial possessions,
a n d t h e question of o t h e r a n n e x a t i o n s in E u r o p e or elsewhere.
T h e s e G e r m a n colonies w e r e not in a n y sense a p a r t of G e r m a n y
p r o p e r ; t h e y were i n h a b i t e d b y n a t i v e populations w h o felt no
desire t o r e v e r t to G e r m a n rule ; t h e y w e r e held by G e r m a n y as p a r t
of a policy p u r s u e d b y h e r for aggressive purposes, which, in t h e
main, w e r e directed a g a i n s t t h e existence of t h e British E m p i r e .
This e n t i t l e d u s to look a t t h e m from t h e point of view of t h e
s e c u r i t y of t h e E m p i r e . O n t h i s subject, t h e R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e
'
B
2
Dominions a n d I n d i a held t h e v e r y strongest views. Personally, t h e
more he h a d gone into t h e m a t t e r a t t h e m e e t i n g s of t h e C o m m i t t e e ,
t h e more h a d h e been impressed b y t h e w e i g h t of t h e broad
considerations of I m p e r i a l security, which m a d e i t desirable to r e t a i n
b o t h G e r m a n E a s t Africa, P a l e s t i n e , a n d Mesopotamia.
West
Africa t h e C o m m i t t e e h a d definitely p u t on a, lower scale of
importance, as t e r r i t o r y which, in t h e last resort, m i g h t conceivably
be given b a c k t o G e r m a n y .
T h e P r i m e Minister expressed t h e view t h a t t h e R e p o r t , while
u n d o u b t e d l y embodying w h a t we o u g h t t o aim a t in t h e case of
complete victory, was not a n a d e q u a t e i n s t r u c t i o n t o B r i t i s h
D e l e g a t e s if t h e y h a d t o face a Conference u n d e r conditions which
left G e r m a n y still in possession of a g r e a t deal of Allied t e r r i t o r y .
I t h a d n o t q u i t e faced t h e difficulty which would arise if F r a n c e
or Russia asked us t o s u r r e n d e r some of our conquests in order to
release t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . W e h a d t o consider t h e position of Bxitish
D e l e g a t e s a t t h e Peace Conference.
R u s s i a would come after
h a v i n g suffered more t h a n seven million casualties, a n d F r a n c e w i t h
nearly t w o million d e a d ; could we, u n d e r such conditions, claim
t h a t t h e y should g e t n o t h i n g a n d we should h a v e practically
e v e r y t h i n g ? T h e question m i g h t arise even w i t h i n a few weeks.
T h e t e l e g r a m s from Russia showed t h a t t h e p a r t y of n o n - a n n e x a t i o n
seemed t o be g e t t i n g t h e u p p e r h a n d , a n d it would be v e r y difficult
if our only response was a d e m a n d for all t h e t e r r i t o r i e s m e n t i o n e d
in t h e R e p o r t .
L o r d Curzon pointed o u t t h a t t h e C o m m i t t e e h a d definitely
contemplated t h e possible r e s t o r a t i o n of certain t e r r i t o r y , such as
t h e Cameroons a n d Togoland, which m i g h t , in c e r t a i n contingencies,
enable F r a n c e t o secure w h a t she desired most, namely, AlsaceLorraine. The idea of n o n - a n n e x a t i o n raised v e r y g r e a t difficulties
when t h e concrete cases were considered. H e h a d a l w a y s been a
s t r o n g opponent of an extension of I n d i a ' s responsibilities, b u t t h e
course of t h e w a r had compelled us t o occupy Mesopotamia.
Was
it possible to h a n d t h a t coun t r y back t o T u r k i s h r u l e ? I n a n y
case, h e wished t o m a k e it clear t h a t t h e R e p o r t did n o t embody
British d e m a n d s to be laid on t h e t a b l e of a P e a c e Conference,
but a brief for t h e guidance of our D e l e g a t e s which would enable
t h e m to j u d g e w h a t points t h e y should c o n c e n t r a t e u p o n in
t h e discussions, a n d w h a t concessions should be m o s t vigorously
contested.
Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n wished t o emphasise t h e conviction which
h a d been impressed upon t h e Committee t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
submarine warfare, as well as t h e future developments of wireless
t e l e g r a p h y a n d aviation, would make it a v e r y serious danger t o
leave a n y overseas possessions in G e r m a n y ' s h a n d s . H e p o i n t e d
out t h a t t h e C o m m i t t e e did c o n t e m p l a t e t h a t t h e question of t h e
satisfaction of t h e E u r o p e a n claims of our Allies should be correlated
w i t h t h e satisfaction of our claims.
I t was clear t h a t F r a n c e
could n o t t a k e Alsace-Lorraine a n d t h e n claim equal shares w i t h u s
in Africa,
On t h e o t h e r hand, our claims also t o a certain e x t e n t
were c o n t i n g e n t on our Allies g e t t i n g w h a t t h e y w a n t e d in E u r o p e .
I t was not quite correct to s a y t h a t we h a d e v e r y t h i n g a n d our
Allies n o t h i n g . T h e French, for instance, h a d practically t h e whole
of t b e Cameroons a n d t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of Togoland, while t h e
Russians h a d Armenia. N e i t h e r of t h e m were likely t o give t h e s e
hack, except, perhaps, for an equivalent elsewhere.
General S m u t s said t h a t if it were a question of no a n n e x a t i o n
except b y t h e wishes of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s , he w a s q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o
submit the q u e s t i o n of t h e f u t u r e g o v e r n m e n t of E a s t Africa t o t h e
vote of t h e 8,000,000 natives, which he h a d no d o u b t would be
unanimously in favour of B r i t i s h rule. The whole question of t h e
difficulties t h a t m i g h t arise a t a Peace Conference h a d been in t h e
m i n d s of t h e C o m m i t t e e , a n d t h e last clause of t h e R e p o r t h a d
been p u t in w i t h t h e specific object, as a s a v i n g clause in v i e w
1
of t h e possibility t h a t the a t t a i n m e n t of o u r objects m i g h t
h a v e to be modified, in accordance w i t h t h e a c t u a l m i l i t a r y situation
a n d t h e claims of our Allies. H e was n o t in favour of w e a k e n i n g
the Report any further.
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n c o n s i d e r e d t h a t it w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y to
m e e t t h e p o i n t of view of our Allies. T h e C o m m i t t e e h a d c a r r i e d
out a very e x h a u s t i v e and able survey of - t h e field, b u t t h e i r
conclusions d i d u n d o u b t e d l y involve a v e r y l a r g e a d d i t i o n t o t h e
B r i t i s h Empire.
T h i s q u e s t i o n w a s i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h
t h e questions considered b y L o r d Milner's C o m m i t t e e , a n d it w o u l d
be necessary to k e e p in m i n d t h e relation b e t w e e n t h e l a r g e
a n n e x a t i o n s w e considered essential for our s e c u r i t y a n d t h e
proposals for p e r m a n e n t p e a c e a n d a r e d u c t i o n of a r m a m e n t s w h i c h
we m i g h t wish to b r i n g forward.
Mr. L o n g said t h a t we h a d a l r e a d y g o n e t o t h e limit of
concession in w h a t w e h a d y i e l d e d to t h e F r e n c h in W e s t Africa.
H e did n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t it w a s possible to s u g g e s t g r e a t e r con­
cessions t h a n w e r e c o n t e m p l a t e d i n t h e R e p o r t . If our victory
were n o t complete, a n d we w e r e t h e r e f o r e u n a b l e t o exact our own
t e r m s , was it. at all likely t h a t G e r m a n y w o u l d r e g a r d t h e offer of
a p o r t i o n of some Colony, or an, i s l a n d or t w o in t h e Pacific, as
w o r t h y of c o n s i d e r a t i o n ? She would refuse a n y offer of t h e k i n d ,
a n d d e m a n d t h e whole. He felt v e r y strongly t h a t G e r m a n SouthE a s t a n d S o u t h - W e s t Africa w e r e of vital i m p o r t a n c e to t h e
E m p i r e — a n d if w e failed to k e e p w h a t w e h a d won i t would b e
r e g a r d e d as a defeat for u s in those p a r t s of t h e world,
Mr. Massey w i s h e d to lay stress on t h e fact t h a t t h e R e p o r t
h a d only b e e n a d o p t e d after t h e m o s t e a r n e s t consideration a n d
w i t h a full sense of responsibility. I t was b a s e d on considerations
of t h e future security of t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e a n d on t h e idea of
p r e v e n t i n g occasions of f u t u r e w a r as m u c h as possible. He q u i t e
a g r e e d t h a t t h e p r e c i s e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e objects i n d i c a t e d could
b e a t t a i n e d w ould d e p e n d on our position a t t h e e n d of t h e W a r .
All h e asked for was t h a t o u r Delegates s h o u l d m a k e t h e b e s t
b a r g a i n possible on the lines of the C o m m i t t e e ' s R e p o r t .
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil p o i n t e d o u t t h a t h e d i d n o t r e g a r d t h e
R e p o r t as g o i n g f u r t h e r t h a n m a k i n g out in e a c h specific i n s t a n c e
t h e case t h a t t h e r e w a s for t h e r e t e n t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y .
B u t it was all s u b j e c t to t h e final clause, a n d h e himself h a d n e v e r
t h o u g h t it p r o b a b l e t h a t we s h o u l d b e able to s e c u r e t h e whole of
the t e r m s m e n t i o n e d . It was also w o r t h p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t w e w ere
not p u t t i n g forward a claim for a n y t h i n g in E u r o p e .
T h e P r i m e Minister said t h a t h e quite a c c e p t e d t h e detailed
a r g u m e n t s a d d u c e d i n t h e R e p o r t i n favour of t h e r e t e n t i o n of
E a s t Africa or of other territories. All he p l e a d e d for w a s t h a t t h e
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of t h e R e p o r t should n o t b e r e g a r d e d as
i n s t r u c t i o n s from w h i c h our D e l e g a t e s could n o t d e p a r t . H e also
s u g g e s t e d t h a t it was d e s i r a b l e to m a k e it clear t h a t our Delegates
would have to t a k e into consideration t h e claims of o u r Allies as
well as British i n t e r e s t s .
After some discussion, t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t a g r e e d
u p o n t h e following Conclusion, d r a f t e d b y L o r d C u r z o n a n d
Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n :—
r
T
l
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t , i n a c c e p t i n g t h e R e p o r t of t h e
C o m m i t t e e as an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e objects to b e s o u g h t
by t h e B r i t i s h R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at the P e a c e Conference
a n d of t h e i r relative i m p o r t a n c e , r a t h e r t h a n as definite
i n s t r u c t i o n s from w h i c h t h e y are not i n t e n d e d in a n y
c i r c u m s t a n c e s to d e p a r t , n o t e s t h a t t h e d e m a n d s of t h e
British E m p i r e will r e q u i r e to . be correlated at t h e
Conference with those of o u r Allies.
;
M r H e n d e r s o n r e g r e t t e d t h a t h e felt compelled to dissent from*
t h i s Conclusion. T h e Conclusion, t h o u g h q u a l i f y i n g t h e R e p o r t i n
;
the i n t e r e s t s of our Allies, still c o n t e m p l a t e d t h e desirability of
c e r t a i n a n n e x a t i o n s if they could b e secured. S p e a k i n g n o t a s
r e p r e s e n t i n g himself, b u t t h e P a r t y w h i c h h a d sent h i m to the
I m p e r i a l W a r Cabinet, b e was b o u n d to vote a g a i n s t a n y a n n e x a t i o n
of territory.
T h e Prime Minister read to t h e Imperial W a r C a b i n e t a Draft
Conclusion w h i c h he h a d p r e p a r e d to cover b o t h t h e aspects of the
T e r m s of P e a c e dealt with b y L o r d Milner's C o m m i t t e e a n d those
dealt w i t h by L o r d Curzon's Committee.
After some discussion, m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h reference t o
allusions i n t h e original draft t o previous declarations b y the
B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t , t h e Allies, a n d P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n , t h e following
Conclusion w a s agreed u p o n :—
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t considers t h a t t h e policy of t h e
E m p i r e should h a v e t h e following e n d s in view :—
(a.) T h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of liberty a n d p u b l i c r i g h t i n
E u r o p e a n d on t h e h i g h seas, t h e s e t t l e m e n t of
the political b o u n d a r i e s of E u r o p e i n accordance
with t h e wishes of i t s peoples, a n d t h e l i b e r a t i o n
of t h e o p p r e s s e d nationalities of t h e T u r k i s h
E m p i r e from, t h e T u r k i s h y o k e .
(6.) T h e security a n d i n t e g r i t y of t h e British E m p i r e
a n d of t h e n a t i o n s of which i t is composed.
(c.) T h e f r a m i n g of m e a s u r e s for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of
lasting p e a c e i n concert w i t h o u r Allies.
I t w a s decided that this Conclusion should n o t b e n a d e p u b l i c
for t h e p r e s e n t , b u t m i g h t be p u b l i s h e d on some later occasion when
a s t a t e m e n t of British policy w a s r e q u i r e d .
2, Whitehall Gardens,
May 2, 1917.
8.W.;
Reprinted
for the Imperial
War
Cabinet.
November
1917.
SECRET.
IMPERIAL
Minutes
WAR
CABINET,
14.
of a Meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet, held in London at 10,
Street, S.W., on Wednesday, May 2, 1917, at 3 T 5 P.M.
Downing
Present :
T h e P R I M E M I N I S T E R O P T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M (in the
The
Right
Plon.
KEDLESTON,
the
K.G.,
Lord President
M i n u t e s 1 to 3).
EARL
CURZON
G.O.S.I.,
of
the
T h e R i g h t Hon. S I R R O B E R T L . B O R D E N ,
K.C.,
P r i m e M i n i s t e r of
G.C.M.G.,
Canada.
of
G.C.I.E.,
Council
(for
The
T h e R i g h t Hon. V I S C O U N T M I L N E R , G . C . B . ,
G.C.M.G.
R i g h t Hon.
A. C H A M B E R L A I N ,
H.
PERLEY,
K.O.M.G., Minister of t h e
Military F o r c e s of C a n a d a .
Hon.
SIR
GEORGE
Overseas
T h e R i g h t Hon. W. F . MASSEY,
Minister of N e w Z e a l a n d .
T h e R i g h t Hon. W . L O N G , M.P., S e c r e t a r y
of State for t h e Colonies.
The
Chair).
The
Right
Hon.
Prime
S I R J . G. W A R D ,
Bt.,
K.C.M.G., M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e a n d Posts,
New Zealand.
M.P.,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a .
L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l t h e R i g h t Hon. J . C.
S H U T S , K . C . , Minister for Defence, U n i o n
of S o u t h Africa.
T h e R i g h t Plon. S I R E . P . M O R R I S ,
New­
K . C M G . , P r i m e Minister of
foundland.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t
T h e R i g h t Hon. L O R D R. C E C I L , K G , M. P.,
A c t i n g Secretary of State for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
General S I R W. R . ROBERTSON, G.C.B.,
K.C.V.O.,
D.S.O., Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l
G e n e r a l Staff (for M i n u t e s 3 a n d 4 ) .
The
United
T h e Hon. R . ROGERS, Minister of P u b l i c
Works, Canada.
Colonel H i s H i g h n e s s t h e M a h a r a j a S I R
T h e Hon. J . D. H A Z E N , M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e
a n d F i s h e r i e s , a n d of t h e N a v a l Service,
Canada.
Hon.
S I R J.
S.
Lieutenant-Governor
Provinces, "India.
GANGA
SINGH,
MESTON,
of
the
BAHADUR,
KO.S.L,
G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E., A.D.C , Maharaja of B i k a n e r .
S I R S. P . S I N H A , M e m b e r - d e s i g n a t e of
Mr.
II.
C.
M.
LAMBERT,
the
E x e c u t i v e Council of t h e G o v e r n o r of
Bengal.
Mr. P H I L I P
KERB.
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K . C . B . ,
Major L. STORR, Assistant
Secretary.
C a p t a i n L. S . A M E R Y , Assistant
[1142-14]
C.B.,
Colonial
Office, S e c r e t a r y to the I m p e r i a l
Conference.
Secretary.
Secretary.
War
Future Sessions
of Imperial
Cabinet.
1. T H E P r i m e M i n i s t e r wished to say a w o r d a b o u t t h e g r e a t
e x p e r i m e n t of s e t t i n g u p a real I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t w h i c h h a d
j u s t been concluded.
F r o m t h e p o i n t of v i e w of the B r i t i s h
m e m b e r s , t h e e x p e r i m e n t h a d b e e n a n unqualified success. T h e
presence of t h e Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had proved not m e r e l y a n
e n c o u r a g e m e n t b u t a real h e l p to t h e B r i t i s h m e m b e r s , a n d had
enabled t h e m t o g e t h e r to c o m e to very i m p o r t a n t conclusions.
The
e x p e r i m e n t h a d worked e v e n b e t t e r t h a n he h a d anticipated ; t h e
I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t h a d , i n fact, been a real C a b i n e t , which h a d
discussed t h i n g s i n t i m a t e l y a n d w i t h t h e fullest k n o w l e d g e of all
t h e m a t e r i a l facts.
I n t h e view of t h e B r i t i s h m e m b e r s , it w o u l d b e a g r e a t m i s t a k e
a n d a g r e a t m i s f o r t u n e if t h e e x p e r i m e n t w e r e not r e p e a t e d a n d
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e m a c h i n e r y of t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e . To effect
t h i s , they c o n s i d e r e d t h a t Sessions of t h e I m p e r i a l Cabinet, a s
distinct from t h e B r i t i s h Cabinet, should be convened annually, a n d
t h a t as a n i n s t i t u t i o n t h e I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t should h a v e an A n n u a l
Session, t h o u g h t h a t did not p r e c l u d e t h e s u m m o n i n g of a Special
Session if q u e s t i o n s of u r g e n c y a r o s e i n the i n t e r v a l . W h i l e t h e
w a r was in p r o g r e s s the m a i n b u s i n e s s of s u c h a Session would b e to
review the position of the w a r ; a p a r t from that, it would n a t u r a l l y
review q u e s t i o n s of foreign policy, I m p e r i a l defence, and o t h e r
m a t t e r s of common, concern. I t was to h i m inconceivable t h a t i n
t h e future t h e Dominions s h o u l d b e n e i t h e r fully informed n o r
consulted o n questions which m i g h t lead t o war.
As r e g a r d s t h e constitution of t h e f u t u r e I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t s ,
h e wished to p o i n t out t h a t in t h e p r e s e n t case t h e Dominion
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s sat t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e m e m b e r s of t h e small B r i t i s h
W a r Cabinet, w h i c h was also an e x p e r i m e n t
I t was not c e r t a i n
w h e t h e r t h a t e x p e r i m e n t w o u l d last.
If t h e r e w e r e to be a
resurrection of t h e old British C a b i n e t system it w o u l d b e obviously
impossible to graft a n I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t on to a C a b i n e t of t w e n t y
or more m e m b e r s . T h e I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t would h a v e to b e con­
stituted differently, a n d the only B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would b e
t h e P r i m e Minister a n d the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of those D e p a r t m e n t s
w h i c h were directly concerned w i t h I m p e r i a l affairs, s u c h as t h e
F o r e i g n Office, t h e Colonial Office, t h e I n d i a Office, a n d , p e r h a p s ,
t h e War Office a n d A d m i r a l t y . I t would, in fact, be a delegation
of t h e British C a b i n e t m e e t i n g t h e P r i m e Ministers of t h e
Dominions. T h e Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s should be t h e P r i m e
Ministers.
If, however, t h e r e were a special reason w h i c h p r e ­
v e n t e d a P r i m e Minister from a t t e n d i n g , h e should have t h e
exceptional r i g h t of n o m i n a t i n g a d e p u t y ; b u t it should be clearly
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e d e p u t y s h o u l d be one who w o u l d a t t e n d w i t h
t h e same a u t h o r i t y as t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r w h o m h e r e p r e s e n t e d .
I t w a s also clear to h i m t h a t it was a n essential p a r t of a n y con­
stitution of t h i s k i n d t h a t t h e r e should be a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of I n d i a
i n addition to the Secretary of S t a t e .
H e wished, on behalf of t h e B r i t i s h C a b i n e t a n d on behalf of
t h e people of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , to t h a n k t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
of t h e Dominions a n d of I n d i a for t h e g r e a t assistance t h e y h a d
r e n d e r e d i m d e r t h e t r y i n g c o n d i t i o n s of the p r e s e n t s t r u g g l e .
T h e i r presence h a d b e e n a real s o u r c e of s t r e n g t h .
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n , in t h a n k i n g t h e P r i m e Minister for h i s
references to t h e h e l p r e n d e r e d b y t h e D o m i n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,
w i s h e d to say t h a t t h e Session h a d been a h e l p a n d education to all
of t h e m . F o r t w e n t y years he h a d e n d e a v o u r e d to realise w h a t was
m e a n t by t h e task of g o v e r n i n g the B r i t i s h E m p i r e , a n d on m a n y
occasions b o t h i n C a n a d a a n d in t h e U n i t e d States ho h a d
g i v e n p u b l i c expression to h i s conception of t h e m a g n i t u d e
of t h a t task and its complexity as well.
H e h a d , however,
o b t a i n e d a clearer c o m p r e h e n s i o n since h e h a d t a k e n a n a c t u a l
p a r t i n t h e deliberations of t h e B r i t i s h Cabinet. rHe considered
t h e step of. s u m m o n i n g an I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t h a d been
a very r e m a r k a b l e one, w h i c h h a d m e t t h e national consciousnee.
of t h e Overseas Dominions in a w a y i n which it, h a d n e v e r beei
m e t before. S p e a k i n g for Canada, he wished to lay stress on th
t r e m e n d o u s p o w e r with which the sense of nationhood h a d developei
t h e r e in t h e last t h r e e years, a n d h e was confident t h a t it w o u l d be
m o s t u n f o r t u n a t e if t h e step i n a d v a n c e now t a k e n were not
r e p e a t e d . T h e P r i m e Mini sterV. view of t h e constitution of future
I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t s corresponded v e r y m u c h with w h a t h a d been in his
own mind. H e a g r e e d t h a t the Dominion representatives should
be t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s , if possible, or deputies invested for t h e
t i m e b e i n g w i t h e q u a l a u t h o r i t y ; otherwise it could not b e a
C a b i n e t in any r e a l sense. It also s e e m e d to h i m entirely reasonable
a n d , indeed, n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e I m p e r i a l Cabinet should b e quite
distinct from t h e B r i t i s h Cabinet, a n d should not i n c l u d e B r i t i s h
Ministers whose portfolios did not p e r t a i n to m a t t e r s of common
concern. T h e I m p e r i a l Cabinet s h o u l d clearly consist of m e m b e r s
qualified to discuss s u c h m a t t e r s , a n d able to i m p l e m e n t the
decisions a g r e e d u p o n in t h e i r respective P a r l i a m e n t s . H e suggested
t h a t it m i g h t b e a d v a n t a g e o u s for t h e Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to
h a v e other Ministers a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e m , such as, for instance,
t h e i r Ministers of F i n a n c e or D e f e n c e — n o t as m e m b e r s of the
I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t , b u t available to be consulted or called in on
m a t t e r s of. w h i c h t h e y h a d special knowledge.
H e considered
t h a t t h e step t a k e n h a d been a very r e m a r k a b l e advance, a n d
one w h i c h would b e looked u p o n as s u c h i n future years if it
b e c a m e a convention of our Constitution, a C o n s t i t u t i o n founded
on-usage. He h e a r t i l y welcomed it.
Mr. Massey considered that the experiment h a d been an
unqualified success from t h e point of v i e w of t h e Dominions, a n d
h e welcomed t h e idea of a n I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t as a p e r m a n e n t insti­
tution. H e w o u l d like to suggest, however, that d u r i n g the p r e s e n t
w a r if any P r i m e Minister, or Minister authorised b y him, should
visit E n g l a n d , t h e courtesy of being allowed to a t t e n d m e e t i n g s of
t h e W a r Cabinet should be extended to h i m , in order to avoid any­
t h i n g in t h e n a t u r e of an interregnum
at this time. H e wished also,
,incidentally, to refer to a suggestion h e h a d m a d e a t t h e W a r
Conference w i t h r e g a r d to the Special Conference w h i c h w a s to
consider t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l position in the E m p i r e after t h e war,
t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h a t case should b e extended to representatives
of t h e Oppositions as well as to Ministers, w i t h t h e object of g e t t i n g
aw ay from p a r t y . W i t h r e g a r d t o the proposal before t h e m , h e
agreed t h a t it w a s an i m p o r t a n t advance. T h e D o m i n i o n s h a d b e e n
willing to share t h e b u r d e n of E m p i r e , b u t h a d h a d no voice. T h a t
would not occur a g a i n , a n d they w e r e n o w i n a position to go b a c k
a n d say to t h e i r people t h a t the E m p i r e w a s m o r e closely u n i t e d
t h a n w h e n t h e Overseas R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a d a r r i v e d in G r e a t
B r i t a i n for t h e s e m e e t i n g s .
Much still r e m a i n e d to be done,
a n d every step w o u l d have to b e v e r y carefully t h o u g h t out.
Meanwhile, on behalf of N e w Zealand, h e appreciated to t h e full
t h e step t h a t h a d been taken.
G e n e r a l S m u t s , i n t h a n k i n g t h e "Prime Minister for t h e w a r m t h
of h i s reference to t h e h e l p r e n d e r e d b y t h e Dominions, said that
t h e y would go b a c k to t h e i r o w n countries, w h e r e t h e y were
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e i r own p r o b l e m s a n d developing on t h e i r own lines,
w i t h t h e i r m i n d s seized with the p o i n t of view of t h e centre of
t h e E m p i r e , and t h e effect of that w o u l d be felt a m o n g t h e m i n t h e
futureW i t h r e g a r d to t h e a c t u a l proposal before t h e m , it seemed to
h i m tentatively to be t h e best, solution. T h e whole question would
r e q u i r e a g r e a t deal of consideration after the war. T h e r e were
difficulties d u e to t h e g r e a t distances a n d t h e u r g e n c y of local
p r o b l e m s which h a d to be faced in c o n s i d e r i n g t h e suggestion of a n
A n n u a l Session. On t h e whole, he t h o u g h t t h e proposal r e p r e s e n t e d
all t h a t could be done a t present, a n d t h a t m u c h would have t o be
T
left to f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t .
I n t h i s sense he expressed t e n t a t i v e
a g r e e m e n t , t h o u g h r e a l i s i n g t h a t t h e whole m a t t e r would r e q u i r e a
g r e a t d e a l m o r e consideration.
Sir E d w a r d Morris considered t h a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n w o u l d m e e t
with, t h e approval of t h e whole E m p i r e , a n d w a s t h e only w a y of
s a t i s f y i n g a real w a n t . T h e r e h a d b e e n m a n y p e o p l e who t h o u g h t
t h a t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e n a t u r e of an I m p e r i a l Council or P a r l i a m e n t
should be created, b u t t h e m o r e t h a t question was discussed t h e
Mean­
m o r e t h e g r e a t difficulties in t h e w ay would b e a p p r e c i a t e d .
w h i l e w h a t they h a d d o n e in the way of c o m m o n discussion of
p r o b l e m s of Defence a n d F o r e i g n Relations was g e t t i n g v e r y near­
w h a t w o u l d satisfy t h e Dominions. He w i s h e d to e n d o r s e Mr.
Massey's s u g g e s t i o n t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e D o m i n i o n s who
visited E n g l a n d d u r i n g t h e w a r m i g h t be p r i v i l e g e d to a t t e n d t h e
m e e t i n g s of t h e W a r C a b i n e t .
Sir S. S i n h a expressed his h e a r t y c o n c u r r e n c e in the s u g g e s t i o n
t h a t I n d i a shoidd b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e future. T h e m a n n e r a n d
m e t h o d - of t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n would r e q u i r e discussion a t t h e
p r o p e r time.
Meanwhile, h e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be a
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of I n d i a as d i s t i n c t from the Secretary of State.
The
Conference, as h e realised, was one of G o v e r n m e n t s , and, as such,
the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a would be r e p r e s e n t e d . C o n s t i t u t e d as
I n d i a w a s a t present, t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d
obviously h a v e to be left to t h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a .
But he
foresaw t h a t g r e a t c h a n g e s wOuld soon take p l a c e i n t h e G o v e r n ­
m e n t of I n d i a , a n d t h a t t h e people of I n d i a would h a v e a l a r g e r
voice.
H e looked forward to t h e t i m e wdien t h e G o v e r n m e n t of
I n d i a would h a v e a n I n d i a n P r i m e Minister, b u t till t h a t d a y h e
was q u i t e content t h a t I n d i a should be r e p r e s e n t e d i n s u c h a
m a n n e r as t h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a t h o u g h t best.
T h e M a h a r a j a of B i k a n e r h e a r t i l y endorsed w h a t his colleague
h a d said a b o u t t h e feelings of I n d i a , a n d especially a p p r e c i a t e d t h e
proposal t h a t I n d i a s h o u l d h a v e a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a p a r t from t h e
Secretary of State.
H e was not p r e p a r e d to m a k e a definite
proposal as to t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I u d i a w o u l d
appreciate a n d g r e a t l y recognise the step t h a t h a d b e e n taken.
L o r d Ourzon wished to m a k e it clear t h a t t h e m e m b e r s of t h e
B r i t i s h C a b i n e t , in c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of I n d i a ,
certainly h a d in view t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e should n o r m a l l y b e a n
I n d i a n , a n d n o t a E u r o p e a n - b o r n m e m b e r of t h e G o v e r n m e n t service.
H e realised, of course, the difficulty of finding t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of
I n d i a , b u t he t h o u g h t t h a t t h e a n n u a l m e e t i n g s would g i v e a n
o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e different c o m m u n i t i e s in I n d i a to b e r e p r e s e n t e d
in different years.
Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n a g r e e d t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e would, i n all
p r o b a b i l i t y , b e an I n d i a n in every case ; b u t h e d i d n o t wish t o lay
down a n absolute r u l e to t h a t effect, as t h e r e m i g h t be a Special
Session w h e r e the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e most qualified h a p p e n e d to b e a
E u r o p e a n - b o r n m e m b e r of t h e G o v e r n m e n t service.
Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n w i s h e d t h a t it should b e m a d e clear i n
a n y p u b l i c a n n o u n c e m e n t t h a t m i g h t b e m a d e w i t h r e g a r d to t h e
f u t u r e I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t s t h a t t h e proposal i n no sense s u p e r s e d e d
or i n t e r f e r e d w i t h t h e p r o p o s e d special I m p e r i a l Conference t o
consider c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a d j u s t m e n t .
r
The Imperial
Conference.
2. L o r d Milner t h o u g h t t h a t it was w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r
t h e p r e c e d e n t of t h e p r e s e n t occasion should not be followed, a n d
' a n Imperial. Conference m e e t c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y w i t h the I m p e r i a l
C a b i n e t every year. T h e p r e s e n t I m p e r i a l W a r Conference o u t s i d e
t h e C a b i n e t h a d p r o v e d v e r y useful, a n d if t h e Ministers Avho w e r e
coining to I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t s in future were b r i n g i n g advisers a n d
olleagues who were n o t to be m e m b e r s of t h e I m p e r i a l C a b i n e t , it
w o u l d b e a p i t y n o t to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e i r presence for c o m m o n
consultation at a conference.
T h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t c o n c u r r e d i n t h i s view.
L o r d Milner f u r t h e r p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e
E m p i r e m i g h t , i n t h e i n t e r v a l before the n e x t Conference, consider
w h e t h e r t h e Conference in f u t u r e m i g h t not i n c l u d e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
of t h e Oppositions. T h i s w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y m a k e t h e Conference
a somewhat l a r g e r body. H e h a d , d u r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s s u m m e r ,
a t t e n d e d a series of discussions h e l d b y t h e P a r l i a m e n t a r y d e l e g a t e s
of t h e E m p i r e P a r l i a m e n t a r y Association, a t w h i c h B r i t i s h a n d
Dominion M e m b e r s of P a r l i a m e n t of all p a r t i e s h a d been p r e s e n t ,
and these discussions h a d b e e n most serious a n d useful. H e t h o u g h t
this proposal would also g e t over some very r e a l difficulties w i t h
r e g a r d to I n d i a .
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil c o n s i d e r e d t h a t this w a s a very i m p o r t a n t
suggestion, a n d h o p e d it w o u l d n o t b e allowed to d r o p w i t h o u t full
consideration.
Mr. C h a m b e r l a i n c o n c u r r e d in t h i s view, a n d h o p e d t h a t t h e
G o v e r n m e n t s r e p r e s e n t e d w o u l d consider i t before t h e n e x t
Conference.
Mr. L o n g t h o u g h t t h e p r o p o s a l d e s e r v e d t h e m o s t careful
consideration, b u t pointed o u t t h a t it w a s a g r e a t step, involving t h e
complete r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e Conference. H i s experience at t h e
S p e a k e r s Conference was t h a t a g r e e m e n t could n e v e r h a v e b e e n
reached u n l e s s all g r o u p s i n t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s h a d b e e n r e p r e ­
sented. T h i s would m e a n a g r e a t e n l a r g e m e n t of t h e Conference,
a n d would r a i s e n e w p r o b l e m s , s u c h a s those of o r d e r a n d secrecy,
w h i c h were a t p r e s e n t left to t h e goodwill a n d discretion of a small
a n d r e s p o n s i b l e b o d y . T h e r e was also t h e difficulty of h a v i n g
D e p a r t m e n t a l Ministers a n d p e r m a n e n t officials cross-examined b y
m e m b e r s of t h e Opposition. T h e p o i n t h a d been r a i s e d at t h e W a r
Conference, b u t h e d o u b t e d if t h e r e h a d b e e n a majority, i n favour
of t h e suggestion. H e considered t h a t it w a s a m a t t e r for discussion
a t t h e next Conference r a t h e r t h a n at t h e W a r Conference.
Lord C u r z o n t h o u g h t t h a t t h e proposal w e n t r a t h e r far, a n d
t h a t t h i n g s w e r e still in too e m b r y o n i c a stage to deal w i t h it. I t
involved little less t h a n a revolution in t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e
E m p i r e . H e would d e p r e c a t e t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t p a s s i n g
a n y resolution to t h e effect t h a t this suggestion s h o u l d be c o m ­
m u n i c a t e d to t h e G o v e r n m e n t s of t h e Dominions a n d to India.
T h e P r i m e Minister referred to h i s own experience, at t h e
S h i p p i n g Conference of 1907, w h e r e t h e Australian Opposition w a s
r e p r e s e n t e d , a n d where Mr. H u g h e s , as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e
Opposition,, really r a n t h e Conference.
Sir R o b e r t Borden c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l really m e a n t
t h a t t h e Conference would b e c o m e one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of P a r l i a ­
m e n t s , a n d n o t of G o v e r n m e n t s . It would, i n fact, be a C o m ­
mittee of all t h e P a r l i a m e n t s . If t h a t was so, it w a s n o t to b e
expected t h a t i t s discussions or decisions would b e of quite t h e s a m e
c h a r a c t e r as those of t h e p r e s e n t Conference, a n d certain m a t t e r s
n o w dealt with b y t h e Conference w o u l d t h e n b e dealt w i t h in t h e
I m p e r i a l Cabinet.
B u t t h e p r o p o s a l would h a v e t h e g r e a t
a d v a n t a g e of b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r m e n of all p a r t i e s from all p a r t s
of the Empire in contact w i t h e a c h other.
H e considered t h e
proposal w a s e n t i t l e d t o a t t e n t i v e consideration, a n d ought' t o c o m e
before t h e n e x t Conference, as i t could h a r d l y b e t a k e n u p b y t h e
Cabinet,
Lord Milner entirely a g r e e d t h a t t h e m a t t e r could n o t be settled
off-hand, a n d he h a d n o idea of a t t e m p t i n g to ' j u m p " t h e C a b i n e t
i n t o a decision. T h e chief object of his proposal was t h a t t h e b e s t
m i n d s of t h e E m p i r e , i r r e s p e c t i v e of p a r t y , should b e b r o u g h t t o
b e a r u p o n I m p e r i a l questions. P a r t y activities, if confined to local
affairs, would b e far less mischievous, p e r h a p s even beneficial. H e
saw no reason w h y a L e a d e r of Opposition, if h e w e r e t h e b e t t e r
:
m a n , should not be more influential at a Conference t h a n t h e L e a d e r
of the Majority.
^S?'-,;
Mr. Plazen expressed t h e ' f e a r t h a t t h e Oppositions m i g h t u s e
t h e Conference for p a r t y p u r p o s e s .
Mr. Massey r e m i n d e d t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t t h a t t h i s w a s
n o t an entirely n e w proposal. H e r e m e m b e r e d h a v i n g b e e n i n v i t e d
o n a preAdous occasion, w h e n h e was L e a d e r of t h e Opposition, to
come to a Conference with the P r i m e Minister, t h o u g h h e had not
b e e n able at the time to accept t h e invitation.
Staff
"Appointments for
Canadian Officers.
Greece.
3. Sir R o b e r t B o r d e n w i s h e d to raise t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e g r e a t
i m p o r t a n c e t o C a n a d a of h a v i n g a sufficient p r o p o r t i o n of officers
ho h a d r e c e i v e d Staff t r a i n i n g . O p p o r t u n i t i e s for this h a d , i n h i s
opinion, not b e e n sufficiently p r o v i d e d . H e d i d n o t w i s h t o b l a m e
anyone in p a r t i c u l a r , b u t d e s i r e d to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to t h e m a t t e r
a n d to e m p h a s i s e it.
T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff said h i s a t t e n t i o n h a d
only recently been drawm to t h e m a t t e r , b u t h e fully a g r e e d t h a t
a n a d e q u a t e p r o p o r t i o n of C a n a d i a n Officers should receive Staff
training.
T h e P r i m e Minister a g r e e d that t h e m a t t e r w a s one of g r e a t
importance.
w
4. T h e P r i m e Minister informed t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t
t h a t he a n d L o r d R o b e r t Cecil were g o i n g to P a r i s t h e following
d a y to a t t e m p t to arrive at a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e F r e n c h
G o v e r n m e n t on t h e subject of Greece.
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, e x p l a i n i n g the g e n e r a l situation i n Greece,
p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e British G o v e r n m e n t h a d n o u l t e r i o r object i n
view b e y o n d t h e effective j)rosecution of t h e war.
H e w a s not
q u i t e so sure w h a t t h e object of successive F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s
h a d b e e n . T h e r e certainly seemed to be a section i n F r a n c e w h i c h
a i m e d at u t i l i s i n g t h e w a r in order to s e c u r e for F r a n c e s o m e
special political or financial position in Greece
It did a p p e a r as if
t h e r e had b e e n a real u n w i l l i n g n e s s to restore peace a n d h a r m o n y
i n Greek affairs, a n d w h e n e v e r t h e r e seemed to b e a n o p p o r t u n i t y of
g e t t i n g t h i n g s back on to a b e t t e r p l a n e it w a s somehow p r e v e n t e d .
Matters h a d consequently g o n e from b a d to worse : we h a d s t a r t e d
w i t h an o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y of the G r e e k people on our side,
b u t now it w a s extremely doubtful w h a t t h e r e a l s e n t i m e n t s of t h e
p o p u l a t i o n of Royalist Greece w e r e . T h e c o u n t r y w a s divided, its
p r o s p e r i t y destroyed, a n d t h e r e w a s considerable doubt w h e t h e r t h e
K i n g m i g h t n o t now, if a f a v o u r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y offered, u s e s u c h
forces as he h a d a g a i n s t us.
T h e r e were only two p r a c t i c a l proposals, in h i s opinion, to d e a l
with the s i t u a t i o n . T h e first was t h e one favoured by t h e F r e n c h :
that, h a v i n g g o n e so far, w e should go f u r t h e r a n d aim at t h e
d e t h r o n e m e n t of K i n g Constantino, and p u t i n h i s place t h e p r e s e n t
C r o w n P r i n c e , w i t h M. Venizeios or some Venizelist as P r i m e
Minister. T h e difficulty was w h e t h e r t h e K i n g would fall i n w i t h
t h i s proposal. If h e resisted, i t m i g h t be necessary to d i v e r t a
considerable force to overcome h i m , and t h e c o u n t r y m i g h t fall i n t o
a state of a n a r c h y and b r i g a n d a g e , w h i c h would necessitate a n a r m y
of occupation for some time. Personally, for these reasons, h e h a d
g r a v e doubts a s to t h e F r e n c h p l a n b e i n g feasible. T h e o t h e r p l a n
w a s to give t h e K i n g one m o r e chance, on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t
he was to p u t in office a Ministry friendly to t h e Entente,
under
M. Zaimis, a n d dismiss from Greece t h e p r e s e n t p r o - G e r m a n
advisers, such as MM. G o u n a r i s a n d Streit a n d G e n e r a l D o u s m a n i s ,
m a k i n g it p l a i n to h i m at t h e same time t h a t a n y f u r t h e r i n t r i g u e
on his p a r t w o u l d compel t h e Allies to insist on his abdication.
Such a policy could not be c a r r i e d out effectively if it were left to
four r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i t h d i v e r g e n t policies. Tt would b e essential
in t h a t case to unify t h e political control, a n d that, as h e h a d
originally s u g g e s t e d , could best b e done if t h e political control w a s
placed u n d e r a special B r i t i s h envoy.
T h e r e were, however, c e r t a i n difficulties. I n the first place,
t h e r e was t h e s t r o n g feeling a g a i n s t K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e i n F r a n c e ,
.which would m a k e t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t object to a n y policy
w h i c h t h e j ' believed m e a n t l e t t i n g t h e K i n g off lightly.
Even
t h o u g h h e believed himself t h a t u n d e r his p l a n the K i n g would b e
u n d e r m u c h m o r e effective supervision, this would p r o v e a formid­
able objection. B u t t h e r e was also t h e difficulty c r e a t e d b y t h e
Salonica situation.
O u r naval a n d m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r s w e r e q u i t e
clear t h a t o u r force could not b e m a i n t a i n e d at Salonica, for
s h i p p i n g reasons. T h e r e d u c t i o n or w i t h d r a w a l of o u r force from
a n expedition to w h i c h t h e F r e n c h h a d always attached s u c h a g r e a t
value would b e looked u p o n very u n f a v o u r a b l y by t h e m , a n d u n l e s s
we cotild give t h e m some satisfaction on t h e o t h e r side of t h e G r e e k
question it m i g h t create a n e s t r a n g e m e n t a n d react on t h e g e n e r a l
p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e war. H e felt that i t w a s objectionable to do
a n y t h i n g w h i c h m i g h t be construed as h a r s h or unfair to a small
P o w e r , b u t h e felt the i m m e n s e i m p o r t a n c e of not d o i n g a n y t h i n g
to w e a k e n t h e alliance. H e a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e alliance m i g h t b e
even m o r e i n j u r e d if a n y t h i n g w h i c h t h e F r e n c h did b r o u g h t t h e m
into a c u t e conflict w i t h t h e I t a l i a n s .
Tentatively, however, h e
s u g g e s t e d t h a t h e m i g h t modify h i s p r o p o s a l as to t h e second line
of policy b y offering to the F r e n c h t h e c o m p l e t e political control a t
Athens.
B u t t h i s would h a v e to be s u b j e c t to a definite u n d e r ­
t a k i n g on t h e p a r t of t h e F r e n c h t h a t t h e y would e m b a r k on n o
e x t r e m e or wild policy w i t h r e g a r d to G r e e c e . I t would t a k e some
m o n t h s to r e m o v e t h e Salonica force, a n d it would n o t do to leave
t h e F r e n c h i n a position to c r e a t e a m i l i t a r y e n t a n g l e m e n t from
w h i c h we should be compelled to help t h e m out, a n d so be p r e ­
v e n t e d from c a r r y i n g out t h e w i t h d r a w a l .
He thought that by
p u t t i n g t h e whole responsibility on t h e F r e n c h , w i t h a clear
u n d e r s t a n d i n g as to t h e k i n d of policy to b e p u r s u e d , it m i g h t
b e possible to g e t a m o r e m o d e r a t e a n d successful policy from t h e m
t h a n u n d e r p r e s e n t conditions.
T h e m o s t serious difficulty h e
foresaw was t h a t Italy would p r o b a b l y refuse to give h e r a s s e n t to
t h e proposal.
T h e P r i m e Minister p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e r e were c e r t a i n o t h e r
considerations w h i c h should be i n t h e m i n d s of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Cabinet.
I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e r e w a s t h e fact t h a t b o t h
G e n e r a l S a r r a i l a n d M. Venizelos were v e r y anxious t h a t Royalist
Greece should n o t b e m a d e i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e b l o c k a d e b y s e c u r i n g
t h e whole of t h e Thessalian harvest, w h i c h would feed t h e m for
over s e v e n m o n t h s .
M. Venizelos u r g e d t h a t T h e s s a l y was
Venizelist, a n d t h a t w e h a d p r e v e n t e d h i m from b r i n g i n g a b o u t
a r i s i n g there. Secondly, I t a l y was now, as a r e s u l t of a p r i v a t e
b a r g a i n w i t h F r a n c e over Asia Minor, willing to assent to t h e
F r e n c h occupation of Thessaly. T h i s did not m e a n an occupation
b y t h e Venizelists, b u t by F r e n c h troops to safeguard t h e crops
a n d p r e v e n t t h e i r b e i n g utilised by the Royalist G o v e r n m e n t to
free t h e m s e l v e s from Allied control.
F r e n c h opinion would not
tolerate any G o v e r n m e n t l e a v i n g t h e T h e s s a l i a n h a r v e s t i n t h e
h a n d s of K i n g Constantine, who, b y his action in t h e m a t t e r of
t h e cession to t h e B u l g a r i a n s of F o r t R u p e l a n d the- s u r r e n d e r of
t w o divisions w i t h t h e i r g u n s to t h e G e r m a n s , and by t h e c o n s t a n t
c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e G r e e k a n d G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staffs, h a d
clearly s h o w n h i s t r e a c h e r o u s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e Allies. I t w a s
no u s e t r e a t i n g t h e F r e n c h as wholly u n r e a s o n a b l e in t h e i r a t t i t u d e ,
which, after all, was shared by p u b l i c opinion in this c o u n t r y
as well.
F o r these reasons h e did n o t t h i n k t h a t it was any u s e u r g i n g
t h e p r o p o s a l of unified control u n d e r a B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
The
s
m a t t e r should be left.to the F r e n c h , and it s h o u l d be m a d e clear t o
t h e m that, if trouble resulted, it w o u l d b e t h e i r t r o u b l e . H e w a s b y
no m e a n s s u r e , however, that" t h e r e would b e s u c h serious t r o u b l e ,
the a p p r e h e n s i o n s with r e g a r d to w h i c h were, h e t h o u g h t , b a s e d o n
an e x a g g e r a t e d belief in G r e e k courage. If G e n e r a l Sarrail o n c e
secured the Thessalian h a r v e s t , the b l o c k a d e s h o u l d b e m a d e
absolutely effective.
Lord Milner expressed h i s e n t i r e a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e p r a c t i c a l
conclusion a r r i v e d a t by L o r d R o b e r t Cecil a n d t h e P r i m e Minister,
t h a t our w i t h d r a w a l from Salonica should be coupled w i t h h a n d i n g
over u n d i v i d e d political control t o t h e F r e n c h . , H e r e g a r d e d i t a s
impossible t h a t we should w i t h d r a w our forces, a n d at t h e s a m e
t i m e claim a g r e a t e r political a u t h o r i t y . On t h e other h a n d , h e
felt t h a t it w a s necessary to let t h e m e m b e r s of t h e I m p e r i a l W a r
Cabinet u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e r e w a s a very different view of t h e facts
w i t h r e g a r d to t h e conduct of K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e t h a n t h a t w h i c h
h a d been p r e s e n t e d by the P r i m e Minister. P e r s o n a l l y h e w a s of
opinion t h a t t h e K i n g could over a n d over a g a i n h a v e b e e n b r o u g h t
i n on o u r side by better m a n a g e m e n t , a n d t h e real m a r v e l was t h a t
h e was not m o r e hostile. All our r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Greece took a
m o r e favourable view of h i s c o n d u c t t h a n t h a t w h i c h t h e P r i m e
Minister had taken, and at R o m e Sir F . Elliot h a d vigorously
denied t h a t t h e K i n g was p r o - G e r m a n . B u t h o w e v e r t h a t m i g h t
be, even if h e h a d been badly t r e a t e d , and we were t u r n i n g a g a i n s t
h i m after h e h a d fulfilled every p r o m i s e , the s u p r e m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
w h i c h h a d to b e k e p t in view was the m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e Alliance.
H e considered t h e F r e n c h policy a bad one, a n d one whose object
was l o o t ; b u t if h e h a d to g o to P a r i s h e could only t a k e t h e s a m e
line as t h a t w h i c h t h e P r i m e Minister a n d L o r d R o b e r t Cecil w e r e
advocating.
Sir R o b e r t Borclen raised t h e question w h e t h e r t h e A m e r i c a n
A m b a s s a d o r i n P a r i s m i g h t h o t b e of assistance in d e a l i n g w i t h t h e
F r e n c h ; b u t i t was s u g g e s t e d that, on g r o u n d s b o t h of A m e r i c a n
policy a n d of the American A m b a s s a d o r s own personality, it w a s
not likely t h a t m u c h assistance w o u l d be afforded from t h a t q u a r t e r .
I n a n s w e r to a further question from Sir R o b e r t Borden, t h e
Chief.of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff stated t h a t t h e r e were o n l y
2,000 to 3,000 Greek troops left i n Thessaly, a n d t h a t t h e r e o u g h t
t o b e e n o u g h troops i n the 650,000 m e n of G e n e r a l S a r r a i l s a r m y t o
occupy it without g r e a t difficulty.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
May 3, 1917.
S.W.,
Note.— Lord Curzon, who was not p r e s e n t in t h e c o n c l u d i n g s t a g e
of t h e m e e t i n g , desired t o p l a c e on r e c o r d t h a t h e could n o t
have assented to the p r o p o s a l to place t h e tindivided p o l i t i c a l .
control at A t h e n s in t h e h a n d s of t h e F r e n c h , a n d t h a t h e
hoped it would n o t b e a d o p t e d at the P a r i s Conference.
o
[f Mb Document is the Property of His Britaaaie Majesfcy's Government.]
Printed
for the Imperial
War Cabinet.
October 1 9 1 7 .
SECRET.
do
IMPERIAL
WAR
( M a r c h 2 0 to May
SUBJECT I N D E X TO
CABINET.
2,
1917.)
MINUTES OE
MEETINGS.
NOTE.—The numbers of the Minutes, &c., are printed within parentheses after the number of the
meeting, e.g., 4 (10) indicates 4th Imperial War Cabinet Paper and 10th Minute.
A.
Admiralty, release of colliers by the 4 (10).
Aerial warfare; casualties in Royal Flying Corps, press and parliamentary discussion of ; memorandum
by General Sir D. Henderson on the causes of casualties and comparison with those of the
enemy; bad effect of questions in Parliament and criticisms in the press; question to be
debated in a secret session of Parliament 7 (5), 8 (12 and Appendix).
Agricultural shows, stoppage of 5 (10).
Agriculture, Board of; Presidents memorandum on the supply of cereals within the Empire 5 (10).
Aircraft, concentration of all available machines on the Western front 7 (5).
,, Sir D. Haig's comment on obsolete types in use on the Western front 9(1).
,, raids on German towns in retaliation for sinking of hospital ships 7 (5), 9 (12).
,, services; casualties in the Boyal Flying Corps, press and parliamentary discussion of; memorandum
by General Sir D. Henderson on the causes of casualties and comparison with
those of the enemy; bad effect of questions in Parliament and criticisms in the
press ; question to be' debated in a secret session of Parliament 7 (5), 8 (12 and
Appendix).
,,
,,
His Majesty the King, Colonel-in-chief of the Boyal Flying Corps ; Sir R. Borden and
General Smuts thanked for statements made in their speeches at Edinburgh; com­
munication from Sir D. Haig commending the work of the Air Service during
recent fighting, but criticising its equipment 9 (1).
,, ship, British rigid, successful flight of 8 (9).
Alexeieff, General, enquiry from, as to supply of provisions by British Army in Mesopotamia to Russian
Army in Persian-Turkish area 9 (5).
,,
,,
telegram from Sir D. Haig to, on his appointment to command of Russian Armies
9 (4), W.C. 116 (7).
Allies, co-operation of the United States with the 7 (1).
,, financial indebtedness of tbe, to Great Britain. (See " Financial Situation.")
America and German peace overtures; British Minister to the United States reports rumours of
further German proposals ; urges British Government to be ready to issue a statement
to counteract their effect in America 5 (3).
American battalion, raising-of, among residents in the United Kingdom proposed 10 (8).
[1061]
"
^
B
American coasting ships, release of, by substitution of neutral ships laid up through the blockade 4 (12).
Arabia; the Hedjaz ; additional Arab tribes join Faisal 7 (3).
Argentina; prohibition of export of wheat and maize 5' (11).
Armaments, limitation of; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms; Sir Eyre Crowe's
memoranda 12 (19) ; Imperial War Cabinet of opinion that the question should be
discussed with the United States 13 (4).
"Asfcurias," hospital ship, torpedoing of., (See " Hospital ships.")
Australian representation at the Imperial War Cabinet; message to Mr. Hughes expressing regret at
the absence of Australian representatives 1 (1);
B.
" Ballarat," transport, torpedoed near the Seilly Isles 12 (14).
Balkans; the Allied offensive; British attack begun . 12 (4).
Baltic fleet (Bussian), unsatisfactory condition of; not to be relied on to prevent a hostile landing;
request from Bussia for a British Naval Demonstration 11 (2).
,, ports (German), concentration of troops and transports i n ; danger of a landing behind the
Bussian lines 8 (2).
Barley as human food. (See " Food ; Cereals.)
Berlin, riots reported in 2 (2).
Bombardment of Dunkirk; French destroyer lost 12 (11).
Borden, Sir B . ; resolution on the production, transport, control, and utilisation of the food supplies,
and other natural resources of the British Empire, agreed upon 11 (9).
,,
,,
thanked for statements regarding the Air Service in his speech at Edinburgh 9 (1).
British Empire Producers' Organisation, request to Imperial War Cabinet to receive a Deputation
from 11 (11).
,,
Sea Power; overseas commitments, demand for reduction of 12 (9).
Bulgarians, advance against, from Salonica, urged upon the French Government 10 (6).
Canada, wheat from. (See " Wheat Commission.")
Canada's effort in the war; numbers of men raised for various purposes of the war; sum raised for
patriotic funds 6 (5 and Appendix I) ; question of a fifth division for France; lumber­
men, demand for, to be farther discussed by War Secretary and Sir G. Perley 6 (6).
financial effort 7 (10).
Canadian coasting ships, release of, by substitution of neutral ships laid up through the blockade
4(12).
,,
Expeditionary Force, enlistment of United States citizens in 10(7); W.C. 116 (19).
Fifth Division, question of sending it to France 6 (6).
,,
officers, Staff training and appointments for 14 (3).
,,
representative with the mission to the United States, question of 8 (5).
,.
women and children ; permission for conveyance home 3 (5) ; Board of Trade regulations.
(See W.C. 100 (14).)
Canadians, recruiting of, in the United States 6 (7).
Casualties, British, French, and German in the April offensive on the Western front 12 (2).
Cattle, feeding of, diversion of barley and oats from; special fattening of cattle to be discouraged;
stoppage of Agricultural Shows 5 (10).
Cereals, supply of, within the Empire; memorandum by President of Board of Agriculture 5 (10).
Channel route, protection of 4 (9), 9 (13).
Coal for Italy, telegram from General Cadorna pressing for early supply of 11 (3).
Coasting ships (American and Dominion), release of, by substitution of neutral ships laid up through
- '
the blockade 4 (12).
Colliers, release of, by the Admiralty 4 (10).
Colonies, efforts of the, in the war 6(5-12).
.
*
Command of the Sea; overseas commitments, demand for the reduction of 12 (9).
Control of metal production. (See " Metal Production .'
Convoying of merchant vessels 12 (6).
Corfu, M. Ribot desirous that a small British garrison should join the French and Italian garrisons
at, to counteract Italian political activities in the island 9 (8).
Cotton production in the Soudan 5 (10).
Crowe, Sir Eyre ; memoranda on limitation of armaments 12 (19), 13 (4).
Curzon, Lord; Greece, undivided political control by the French, dissent to 14 (Note).
,,
Terms of Peace ; Chairman of Sub-Committee on Territorial Desiderata 9 (14); report
. of Committee considered 13(5).
Czar, the, importance of his leaving Russia; residence in a neutral country undesirable ; invitation to
reside (with Empress and children) in this country; telegram to British Ambassador
2 (5). (See also W.C. Minute 100 (17).)
D.
Decoy-ship Q. 19 sunk 3 (4).
Destroyer, French, lost off Dunkirk 12 (11).
Destroyers, building and repair of, interrupted by strikes 4 (3).
construction of 4 (3), 12 (8).
from the United States 12 (7).
,,
losses of 4 (3).
Disarmament, difficulties in the way of agreement; Imperial War Cabinet of opinion that the question
of limitation of armaments should be discussed with the United States 13 (4).
Dominions, co-operation in regard to mercantile shipping. (See " Shipping Situation.")
,,
efforts of, in the war 6 (5-12).
financial efforts of 7 (10).
,,
pledges to, in regard to consultation on Peace Terms 4 (6).
Dunkirk, bombardment of : French destroyer lost 12 (11).
Dutch Government asked for information as to stoppage of parcels for prisoners of war in Germany
10(4).
E.
Egyptian Expeditionary Force; action near Gaza; Turks defeated with heavy loss ; congratulations to
General Sir Archibald Murray 5 (1).
,,
,,
,,
Jewish corps for service in, proposed formation of 8 (11).
Emigration of women and children to Canada, permission for conveyance 3 (5) (Board of Trade
regulations. (See W.C. Minute) 100 (14).)
,,
to countries within the Empire ; inducements to intending emigrants to settle under the
British flag; Mr. Massey's resolution on Imperial Preference and Emigration
11 (10).
Empire, British, food supplies and other natural resources of the ; their production, transport, control,
and utilisation ; Sir R. Borden's resolution agreed upon 11 (9).
- ,,
,,'
interests of the, in the settlement of Peace Terms 4 (6).
,,
,,
supply of cereals within. (See " Food; cereals.")
Exchange. (See "Financial Situation.")
F.
Financial efforts of the Dominions and India 7 (10).
,,
situation, general survey of, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer ; raising of money in the
United Kingdom during the war; difficulties after the war; indebtedness of our Allies
and their capacity to repay; purchase abroad, and the exchange situation; gold
standard, maintenance of, eased by the intervention of the United States; burden of
financing our Allies, its assumption by the United States; future Budgets; effect of
restriction of imports and reduction of shipping upon 7 (9).
Food ; alternatives to wheat 4 (8), 5 (10).
­
cereals, supply of, within the Empire ; memorandum by President of the Board of Agriculture;
value of maize as human and animal food; supply from South Africa ; the Soudan and
wheat and cotton production 5 (10).
Food; foreign supplies, danger of dependence on 5 (11).
,,
shortage of in Germany 2 (2).
supplies and other natural resources of the Empire, production, transport control and utilisation
of; Sir R. Borden's resolution agreed upon 11 (9).
,,
supply of the United Kingdom during the war; normal consumption of wheat; home products
of wheat, barley, and oats; equivalent food value of barley and oats; diversion of barley
and oats from animal to human food ; accumulation of reserve supplies of wheat; supplies
of wheat available in Canada and the United States ; release of ships for the carriage of
grain; special fattening of cattle to be discouraged; stoppage of. Agricultural Shows
5 (10).
Foreign affairs, Foreign Secretary's review of, in regard to the war and peace aims of the Allies;
statement by Secretary of State for India on German aims and ambitions in the Middle
East 2(6).
'
,, manufactures from British raw material; alteration of pre-war practice 7 (11).
,, supplies, danger of dependence on ; wheat and maize, exportation of, prohibited by Argentina
5 (11).
France and the Greek situation. (See " Greece.")
hospital accommodation for the British in, development of 4 (5).
French military policy; Western front, conference at French General Headquarters; French Govern­
ment question the policy of General Nivelle and urge its abandonment; confidence of
British Government and General Staff in General Nivelle ; divergent schools of thought
in the French Army ; General Petain in favour of a defensive policy 9 (3).
G.
Gaza, action near ; Turks defeated with heavy loss; water supply ; congratulations to General Sir A.
Murray 5 (1).
,, Turks retire to a position east of 6 (1).
German aims and ambitions in the Middle East; statement by Secretary of State for India 2 (6).
,,
Army, distribution of President Wilson's speech to, by our aircraft
8 (4).
,,
landing behind the Russian lines, danger of. (See " Baltic")
,,
peace overtures, rumoured ; British Minister to the United States reports rumour that German
Chancellor is about to outline further proposals ; urges Government to be ready to issue
a statement to counteract their effect in America 5 (3).
- ,,
reinforcements in Belgium 8 (1).
,,
reserves on the Western front 11 (1), 12 (2).
,,
ships in Spanish ports, Spanish Government asked to take precautions against damage to
10(5).
,,
submarine blockade; its effect on American opinion. (See "United States.")
* ,,
withdrawal on Western front; Hindenburg line, Allies in touch with; further signs of
withdrawal at, and north of Lens; evacuation of civil population at Lens and Lille;
St. Quentin burned; state of roads and railways in evacuated area 2 (1).
,,
withdrawal on Western front; Hindenburg line, indications of enemy stand on; destruction
of villages; removal of civil population 3 (1).
,,
,,
,,
signs of impending withdrawal in St. Mihiel salient 5 (2).
Germany ; internal situation; riots in Berlin and Hamburg; food shortage, statement of American
consul at Hamburg as to 2 (2).
" Gloucester Castle." (See "Hospital ships.")
Gold standard, maintenance of. (See " Financial Situation.")
Greece, British and French policy in; discussion in view of Paris Conference ; withdrawal of our force
from Salonica ; French occupation of Thessaly ; undivided political control by the French,
Lord Curzon's dissent to (see Note); divergent opinions as to the King's conduct;
maintenance of the Alliance the supreme consideration 14 (4 and Note).
,, Corfu; M. Bibot desirous that a small British garrison should join the French and Italian
garrisons to counteract Italian political activities in the island 9 (8).
France and the situation in; M. Bibofs conversation with the Prime Minister; General
Sarraifs desire to occupy Larissa; Italian Government to be consulted; French public
opinion disturbed on the Greek question; feeling against the King; necessity for drastic
action; public feeling in Great Britain ; British and Italian distrust of French ambitions ;
memorandum by Foreign Secretary to be circulated 9 (7); Greek troops in Thessaly no
longer a serious menace to the Salonica force, occupation of Larissa therefore unnecessary
(paper prepared by C.I.G.S.); memorandum by Admiralty on shipping difficulties involved
by enlargement of our sphere of operations; Foreign Office memoranda on difficulties
arising from divergence of French and British policy; Lord B. Cecil suggests that British
Government should be entrusted with the whole conduct of diplomatic affairs in Greece;
decision to send telegram to French Government urging an advance against the Bulgarians
without delay; French Government to be informed that no steps should be taken as
regards Greece until the Italian Government have been consulted 10(6).
Guns, captured ; comparison of British and German captures since the beginning of the war 12 (2).
Hague Convention, technical breaches of, by hospital ships 7 (8), 9 (12).
Haig, Field-Marshal Sir D., communication from, commending the work of the Air Service in the
fighting on the Western front, but criticising its equipment 9 (1).
,,
,,
,,
telegram from, to General Alexeieff on his appointment to the command of
the Bussian Armies 9 (4); W.C. Minute 116(7).
Hamburg, riots reported in 2 (2).
Hedjaz, the. (See " Arabia.")
Heligoland Bight, mine-laying in, by British 8 (7).
Hindenburg line. (See " Western Front: German Withdrawal.")
Hospital accommodation in France, development of, in view of German menace to hospital ships 4 (5).
,,
ship " Asturias" mined or torpedoed, and beached ; importance of ascertaining cause of
injury 2 (3).
,,
,, " Gloucester Castle" mined or torpedoed 7 (7); W.C. 110 (6).
,, " Salta " sunk by a mine off Havre 9 (11).
,,
ships, attacks on; "Asturias" torpedoed by a German submarine; German-official wireless
announcement; discussion on reprisals ; German prisoners (officers and
men) to be embarked; hospital ships to sail without lights- and distin­
guishing marks, and to be armed and escorted; full particulars of
torpedoing to be made public before taking action 4 (4 and
Appendix I). (See also W.C. 50 (5), 57 (10), 100 (6).)
,,
,,
.
discussion on precautions and reprisals; previous decision- of Imperial War
Cabinet (Minute 4 (4) ) suspended 5 (8), 7 (5, 7, and 8), 9 (12).
,,
,,
and reprisals; German open town to be bombarded from the air, in reprisal
for sinking of the " Asturias " ; military guards to be
withdrawn from Indian hospital ships 9 (12).
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
importance of full statements in the press in Great Britain
and the United States 9 (11).
,,
,,
German accusations of misuse of 7 (7).
,,
,,
Hague Convention, technical breaches of; armed guards in hospital ships of the Indian
Marine 7 (8), 9 (12).
,,
question of reducing number by developing hospital accommodation in France 4 (5).
Hughes, Mr., Prime Minister of Australian Commonwealth, message to, expressing regret at the
absence of Australian representatives 1 (1).
v
I.
Imperial Cabinet, future sessions of; general discussion on the constitution of future Imperial Cabinets
14 (1).
,,
Conference; proposal for a conference each year, to meet simultaneously with the annual Imperial C a b i n e t s t h e Conference an institution distinct from the Imperial Cabinet;
question of the representation of Oppositions raised by Lord Milner 14 (1 and 2).
,,
preference and emigration; Mr. Massey's resolution, discussion on; resolution accepted in
principle 11 (10); resolution as amended by Mr. Long's drafting committee; further
amendment (suggested by Lord B. Cecil) adopted 12(16).
",, War Cabinet agenda; suspension of sittings ; Terms of Peace ; meetings of sub-committees
10(9).
,,
,,
arrangements of; days and hours of meetings 1 (3).
Inaugural statements 1 (2).
Indemnities; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms 12 (18).
India and German aims and ambitions in the Middle East; statement by Secretary of State 2 (6).
co-operation in regard to mercantile shipping. (See " Shipping Situation.")
[1061]
.
C
India, labour from; number of men limited by shipping considerations 6 (14).
' .,, recruiting i n ; telegram from Secretary of State to. Indian Government, dated the 28th March'
1917. (Appendix I I I ) ; question of fresh sources and methods of recruiting discussed;
Bengali students, &c. 6 (15 and Appendix III).
,, Ruling Princes of, message from 1 (2).
Indian officers, difficulty in obtaining ; Lord Curzon's 1901 proposals; commissions for Indian officers,
question discussed with Indian Government 6(16).
India's effort in the war; number of men sent to various theatres; growth of the Indian Army;
Native Princes, assistance by, in men and money; loyalty of the Indian troops 6 (13).
,, financial effort 7(10).
Itahan Government and Greece; consultation of Italian Government before any steps are taken in
Greece 10 (6).
,, political activities in Corfu 9 (8).
Italy, coal for ; telegram from General Cadorna pressing for an early supply 11 (3).
J.
Jewish Corps for service in Palestine and Egypt, letter from M. Jabotinsky advocating the formation
of 8(11).
K.
Khanikin, Turkish force retiring on, probability of its escape 6 (2).
King, His Majesty the, Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Flying Corps 9 (1).
L.
Labour from India 6 (14).
,,
,, Sierra Leone 6 (11).
" Laforey" destroyer, mined and sunk 4(3). (See also W.C. 104(7).)
League of Nations; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms 12 (19), 13 (3).
League of Peace; report of Lord Mi'Ter's Committee on Peace Terms 12 (19), 13 (3).
Lens, civil population evacuated 2 (1).
Lille, civil population evacuated 2 (1).
Limitation of Armaments ; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms 12 (19) ; Imperial
War Cabinet of opinion that the question should be discussed with the United States
13(4).
Loans, future, in the United Kingdom. (See " Financial Situation.")
,, to our Allies. (See " Financial Situation.")
Lowestoft, First Sea Lord reports firing at 5 (7).
Lumbermen from the United States. 5 (6). ­
,,
in the Canadian force; question to be further discussed by War Secretary and Sir G.
Perley 6 (6); foresters from Newfoundland 6 (12).
,,
numbers required in England and France : lumbermen from Canada and India; release of
lumbermen serving with the forces in France 4 (11), 5 (5).
v
M.
Maize, export of, from Argentina, prohibited 5 (11).
,, value of, as food. (See " Food; cereals.")
Man-power; American battalion, raising of, among residents in the United Kingdom 10 (8).
,,
Canada: men raised for various purposes of the war 6 (5 and Appendix I) ; a fifth
division for France; lumbermen 6 (6); recruiting of Canadians in the United
States 6 (7).
India, labour from 6 (14) ; recruiting in 6 (15 and Appendix III) ; number of men
sent to various theatres of the war; growth of the Indian Army; Native Princes,
assistance in men 6(13).
, ,­
[ ;
Man-power; Jewish Corps for service in Palestine and Egypt 8 (11).
;,'
lumbermen from the United States 5 (6) in the Canadian force 6 (6); from New­
foundland 6(12); numbers required in England and Prance; lumbermen from
Canada and India; release of men serving with the forces in France 4 (11)
5 (5).
,,
military situation; need for' more men ; aggregate numbers of Allies' and enemies' forces
6(4).
Newfoundland; number of men raised for the Army and Navy; foresters, supply of
6 (12).
,,
New Zealand; number of men raised ; reinforcements from 6 (8 and Appendix II).
,,
Portuguese contingent; organisation as labour battalions 6 (3).
,,.
Sierra Leone, labour supply from 6 (11).
,,
South Africa, native and coloured troops from 6 (10) ; number of men put in the field
iii Africa and France; reinforcements for France 6 (9).
,,
United States, recruiting of Canadians and other British subjects in 6 (7) ; enlistment
of United States citizens in the Canadian Expeditionary Force 10 (7); lumbermen
from the United States 5 (6).
,,
"Western -front; British reserves 12 (2).
Manufacturers in foreign countries from raw material produced in the British Empire; alteration of
pre-war practice 7 (11).
Massey, Mr., Imperial preference and emigration, resolution on 11 (10).
Meat, frozen; no facilities for landing at Plymouth 4 (9).
,, trade (New Zealand), shipping engaged in, withdrawal of; strong feeling in New Zealand
8(10).
Merchant vessels, convoying of 12 (6).
Mesopotamia; Diala river, operations on 3 (2).
,,
further success in; message to Russian Government urging the importance of efforts
against Turkey 10(2).
,,
immediate and ultimate object of our operations in; respective roles of the British and
Bussian forces ; possible reduction in the amount of shipping required 4 (2).
,,
inability of Bussians to take the offensive, the only bar to the crushing of the Turkish
power in that region; General Maude successfully resisting the 13th Turkish
Corps 12 (3).
,,
operations against the 13th Turkish Corps on the Shatt-el-Adhaim on April 29-30,1917
13(2)..
',,
Samarra, capture of; telegram from General Maude describing the operations; intended
attack on 13th Turkish Corps advancing on. right bank of Shatt-el-Adhaim
' H ( 4 ) . ..
,,
supply of provisions by British Army in Mesopotamia to Bussian Army in PersianTurkish area; enquiry from General Alexieff; no means of transport available;
our hopes of Bussian support modified 9 (5).
,,
Turkish force retiring on Khanikin, probability of its escape 6 (2).
Metal production, control of; manufactures in foreign countries from raw material produced in the
British Empire; alteration of pre-war practice 7(11).
Military expert with the mission to the United States, selection of 8 (5). ­
,,
situation in all the theatres of the war; review by General Staff; the need of more men;
aggregate numbers of Aflies' and enemies' forces 6 (4).
Milner, Lord; (Terms of Peace) Chairman of sub-committee on economic and other non-territorial
desiderata 9 (14); Foreign and Colonial Offices to be represented on sub­
committee
10 (9); report of sub-committee 12 (17-19); report further
considered 13 (3).
Mine-fields, Bussian, in the Baltic, importance of reinforcing 8 (2).
Mine-laying by British in the Heligoland Bight 8 (7).
Murray, General Sir Archibald, congratulated on success near Gaza 5 (1).
N.
Nations, League of; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms
Naval Air Service, aeroplanes from, for the Western front 7 (5).
,, demonstration (British), request for, by Bussia 11 (2).
12 (19), 13 (3).
V. - ,
8
,
;
.
Naval losses; destroyer " Laforey " mined and sunk; other destroyer losses since the 1st January,
. . . " .' ,.' 1917.; building of destroyers interrupted by strikes 4 (3); loss of a mine-sweeping
trawler 11(8). .
Newfoundland^ effort in the war; number of men raised for the Army and Navy; patrol against
submarines ; foresters, supply of 6 (12).
New Zealand meat trade, shipping engaged in, withdrawal of; strong feeling in New Zealand 8 (10) ^
,, Zealand's effort in the war; number of men raised ; reinforcements or supplies, enquiry as to
which is the more urgent need 6 (8 and Appendix II).
,,
,, financial effort 7 (10). '
Nivelle, General, military policy of; conference at French General Headquarters ; French Government
urge abandonment of his plans ; confidence of British Government and General
Staff in General Nivelle ; his views prevail; divergent schools of thought in the
French Army 9 (3).
Noyon, treatment and food of civil population of, during German occupation .2 (2).
O.
Oats as human food (See " Food ; cereals.")
,, consumption of, by horses, effect of stopping 4 (8), 5 (10).
Oppositions, representation of, at Imperial Conferences 14 (2).
Overseas expeditions; British sea power; First Sea Lord's demand for reduction of overseas
commitments 12 (9).
P.
Palestine; action near Gaza; Turks defeated with heavy loss; water supply; congratulations to
Sir A. Murray 5 (1) ; Turks retire to a position east of Gaza 6 (1).
,,
naval co-operation at Gaza 11(6).
Paris Economic Conference, resolutions of; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms
(economic and non-territorial desiderata) 12 (17).
Parliament; secret session, to debate the question of the Air Services 8 (12).
Peace Conference, British representatives in a minority at 4 (6).
in 1917, possibility of securing, discussion on; Terms of Peace : preparations for 1918 3 (6).
League of; report of Lord Milner's Committee on Peace Terms considered 12 (19), 13 (3).
,, Terms; economic and non-territorial desiderata; report of Lord Milner's committee; Paris
Conference resolutions 12(17); indemnities 12 (18); limitation of armaments
and League of Nations 12 (19) ; League of Peace; report of committee further
considered; Terms of Peace, suggested clause dealing with settlement of differences
or controversies 13 (3).
Foreign Secretary to prepare an exposition of the main desiderata 3 (7).
,,
,,
our desiderata, necessity for arriving at a conclusion as to their relative importance ;
danger of British representatives being in a minority at Peace Conference;
interests of the Empire ; our pledges to the Dominions as to consultation on
terms; problem of European settlement; efforts and sacrifices of our Allies;
question to be further discussed at Imperial War Cabinet 3 (7), 4 (6).
,, * sub-committees appointed to consider future.Terms of Peace; 1. (Lord Curzon,
Chairman) on territorial desiderata; 2. (Lord Milner, Chairman) on economic and
other non-territorial desiderata 9 (14).
,,
sub-committees, meetings of; Foreign and Colonial Offices to be represented on Lord
Milner's sub-committee 10 (9).
,,
,,
territorial desiderata; report of Lord Curzon's Committee considered ; general question
of annexations discussed ; draft conclusion for guidance of British representatives
at Peace Conference; Mr. Henderson's dissent; conclusion as to policy of the
Empire 13 (5).
Petain, General, in favour of a defensive military policy in France 9 (3).
Portuguese contingent; large proportion reported in hospital; men, travelling as civilians, entering
France through Spain ; their organisation as labour battalions 6 (3).
President Wilson's speech, distribution to the German Army by our aircraft 8 (4).
Prisoners of war in Germany, stoppage of parcels for; Dutch Government asked for information
10 (4), 12 (10);' W.C. 124(12).
Propaganda, Department of; its attention drawn to importance of publicity in the press in Great
Britain and the United States with regard to attacks on hospital ships and the
reprisals to be made 9 (11).
­
,,
in regard to forms of food other than wheat 4 (8).
Q-19 sunk
3 ( 4 ) ; Q-22, engagement with enemy submarine
11(5).
R.
" Racoon," destroyer, in action with a submarine in the Mediterranean 9 (10).
Eaw material (British) sent to foreign countries for manufacture ; alteration of pre-war practice 7 (11).
Becruiting in India. (See " India.")
,,
of Canadians and other British subjects in the United States 6 (7).
Reprisals for attacks on hospital ships 4 (4), 5 (8), 7 (5, 7 and 8), 9 (11 and 12).
Ribot, M. (French military policy); visit to London; interview with the Prime Minister; asks for the
opinion of the British Government and General Staff in regard to General Nivelle 9 (3).
Biots in Berlin and Hamburg 2 (2)..
" Rotorua " sunk in the Channel 3 (4) ; question whether sufficient precautions were taken ; First Sea
Lord on the steps taken to safeguard the Channel route; reasons for not discharging
cargo at Plymouth 4 (9), 9 (13)..
Boumania; food supplies better than estimated; shortage of maize 7 (4).
Royal Flying Corps, casualties in 7 (5), 8 (12 and Appendix).
,. .
,,
His Majesty the King Colonel-in-Chief of 9 (1).
Russia; Archangel, unsatisfactory situation at; telegram from Naval Transport Officer 9 (9) ; W.C.
117 (15 and 22).
Army and munition works ; telegram from General Hanbury-Williams describing serious state
of affairs ; other information from British Ambassador and Naval Attache more reassuring ;
, M. Thomas sent by French Government to Russia 9 (4). , .
,,
Baltic, concentration of German troops and transports in; menace to Riga or Finland;
inefficient state of the Fleet as a result of the revolution; importance of reinforcing the
minefield at once 8 (2).
,,
Baltic Fleet, inefficient state of, as a result of the revolution 8 (2); not to be relied on to
prevent a hostile lauding; request for a British naval demonstration 11 (2). .
,,
Caucasus, the, General Yudenitch takes over the command in 3 (3).
Czar, the; importance of his leaving Bussia; residence in a neutral country undesirable;
invitation to reside i (with Empress and children) in this country; telegram to British
Ambassador. 2 (5) ; W.C. 100(17).
,,
Grand Duke Nicholas and the Chief Command 3 (3).
,,
telegram from Sir D. Haig to General Alexeieff on his appointment to the command of the
Russian Armies 9 (4) ; W.C. 116 (7),
Russian Army in Persian-Turkish area, supply of provisions to, by British Army in Mesopotamia 9 (5).
,, * effort against Turkey, message to President of Council urging the importance of 10 (2).
,,
revolution, bad effect of, on the efficiency of the Baltic Fleet 8 (2).
Russians, their inability to take'the offensive against the Turks in Mesopotamia the only bar to the
complete crushing of the Turkish power there 12 (3).
S.
St. Mihiel salient, signs of impending German withdrawal 5 (2).
St. Quentin burned 2 (1).
Salonica; advance against the Bulgarians urged upon French Government 10 (6).
,,
General Milne reports further postponement of the offensive by General Sarrail; seriousness
of the delay in view of increase of malaria among the troops 9 (ti); M. Ribpt of
opinion that delay is connected with General Sarrail's desire to occupy Larissa 9 (7).
,,
withdrawal of British force 14 (4).
" Salta," hospital ship sunk by a mine off Havre 9 (11).
Sarrail, General; postponement of offensive on the Salonica front 9 (6 and 7).
Seaplanes; attack on enemy submarine off Harwich 11 (5); attack on German destroyers 12 (13);
action with enemy submarine ; two-engined seaplanes available 12 (15).
. [1061]
D
Sea power (British); First Sea Lord's demand for reduction of overseas commitments 12 (9).
Secret Session of Parliament to debate the question of the Air Services 8 (12).
Shipbuilding in America, stimulation of 7(1).
'
,,
(Naval) ; construction of destroyers 12 (8).
Shipping; American and-Canadian coasters, release of, by substitution of neutral ships laid up through
the blockade 4 (12).
,,
(British Sea-power): First Sea Lord's demand for reduction of overseas commitments
12 (9).
,,
conveyance home of Canadian women and children 3 (5); Board of Trade Begulations.
(See W.C. 100 (14).)
,,
convoying of 12 (6).
,,
diverted from Australian and Eastern waters for conveyance of wheat from the United
States and Canada 4 (7).
,,
(enemy) in American ports, utilisation of 7 (1).
,,
(enemy) in South American ports, requisitioning of; pressure on South American Republics
inexpedient at present 8 (6).
engaged in the New Zealand meat trade, withdrawal of 8 (10).
,,
for Mesopotamia, possible reduction in the amount required 4 (2).
,,
(German) in Spanish ports, Spanish Government asked to take precautions against damage
to 10 (5).
,,
losses from submarines; average daily tonnage (British, Allied, and Neutral) lost in
January, February, March, and April, 1917 1 0 ( 3 ) ; heavy losses on April 25
...... 12 (5).
,,
(mercantile) casualties 2 (4).
,,
proposals of the Shipping Controller, full attendance requested at the meeting to consider
12. (1).
,,
protection of; in the Channel; sinking of the " Rotorua " 4 (9); enquiry from New Zealand
as to protection afforded; explanations of First Sea Lord and Shipping Controller
9(13).
,,
release of colliers by the Admiralty 4 (10).
,,
shortage of, and the supply of labour from India 6 (14),
,,
situation;'co-operation of the Dominions and India ; to be discussed by their representa­
tives with the Shipping Controller 5 (9).
Sierra Leone, labour supply from 6 (11).
Smuts, General, thanked for statements regarding the Air Service, in his speech at Edinburgh 9 (1).
Soudan, the, and wheat and cotton production 5 (10).
South Africa, maize from. (See "Pood; cereals.")
,,
native and coloured troops from ; numbers which might be forthcoming; their qualities
and defects 6 (10).
South Africa's effort in the war ; number of men put in the field in Africa and Prance ; reinforcements
for France 6 (9).
South American ports, enemy shipping in, requisitioning of 8 (6).
,,
Republics and enemy shipping in their ports; their adverse feeling towards the
intervention of the United States; pressure inexpedient at present 8 (6).
Spain, co-operation of; memoranda by Admiralty and General Staff, Minister of Munitions, Shipping
Controller, and Foreign Office; - advantages and disadvantages considered; British
Ambassador to intimate that British Government would welcome co-operation; French
Government to be informed of the instructions to our Ambassador 10 (5).
,, German shipping in ; Spanish Government asked to take precautions against damage to 10(5).
Staff training and appointments for Canadian officers 14 (3).
Star shells; Admiralty succeed in reproducing the German type 12 (12).
Submarine blockade (German), its effect on American opinion. (See " United States.")
Submarines, difficulty of destroying; experience of a British submarine 8(8).
,,
(enemy); attack by seaplanes on enemy submarine off Harwich; engagement between
Q 22, and enemy submarine 11 (5) ; submarine engaged by a seaplane 12 (15).
(enemy) engagements with 3 (4), 7 (6), 9 (10), 10 (3), 11 (5), 12 (15).
,,
German output of 11 (7).'
,,
Palestine ; unsuccessful attack on French coast defence ship " Requin " off Gaza 11(6).
,,
patrol against, Canadian and Newfoundland 6 (12).
,;
shipping losses from. ' (See " Shipping Losses.")
Suez Canal, German aims and ambitions in the Middle East constitute a threat to our communications
by 2(6).
,
.
1
K
T.
Thomas, M., sent by French Government to Eussia 9 (4).
Timber and lumbermen; number of men required in England and France; lumbermen from Canada
and India; release of lumbermen serving with the forces in France -4(11); saving of
shipping employed in transport; lumbermen from the Dominions in the fighting line;
substitution of British and French for imported timber ; stoppage of imports 5 (5).
Transport " Ballarat" torpedoed near Scilly Isles 12 (14).
Turks, defeat of, near Gaza ; their losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners 5 (1).
retirement of, to a position east of Gaza 7 (1).
TJ.
United Kingdom, food supply of, during the war. (See " Food Supply.")
United States Ambassador in London, views of the War Cabinet as to the most effective form of
co-operation with the Allies, to be explained to 7 (1).
,,
,,
and questions of Limitation of Armaments and League of Peace; discussion with the
United States 13 (4).
,,
,,
citizens, enlistment of, in the Canadian Expeditionary Force: legal difficulties; United
States Government to be sounded 10 (7); W.C. 116 (19).
destroyers from 1 2 ( 7 ) ; W.C. 128(7).
,,
,,
German submarine blockade, effect of : British Minister reports bad effect of German
announcements of its success, and absence of British official contradiction ; Lord
Beresford's speech; our shipping losses not in excess of Admiralty estimates ;
desirability of reassuring public opinion in America ; message discounting German
statements to be sent 5 (4).
,,
,,
intervention of; adverse feeling of the South American Bepublics 8 (6).
,,
,,
,,
,, financial effect. (See " Financial Situation.")
,,
,,
,,
,, President Wilson's statement to Congress; mission to Washington
suggested; draft of communication to United States Government
on the most effective form of co-operation with the Allies;
enemy shipping in American ports, utilisation of; shipbuilding
7 (1); Prime Minister to send a telegram to President
welcoming the co-operation of the United States 8 (3);
President^ speech, - distribution over the German lines by
aircraft 8 (4).
,,
lumbermen from ' 5 (6).
,,
,,
mission to; decision of War Cabinet (W.C. Minute 113 (13)) announced; question
of a Canadian representative ; selection of the principal military expert 8 (5).
,,
,,
recruiting of Canadians and other British subjects in 6 (7).
,,
,,
wheat from. (See" Wheat Commission.")
W.
War, aims and probable continuance of the; views of the Prime" Minister of the United Kingdom
1 (2).
,, efforts of the Colonies, Dominions, and India, in the; Canada 6 ( 5 - 7 and Appendix I ) ; New
Zealand 6 (8 and Appendix I I ) ; South Africa 6 (9 and 10); Sierra Leone 6 (11);
Newfoundland 6 (12);"India 6(13-16).
Cabinet, full attendance of, requested, at a meeting to consider Shipping Controllers proposals
12 (1).
Western front, aerial warfare on; need for all available machines 7 (5).
,,
,, Air Service on, commended by Sir D. Haig 9 (1).
,,
,, Belgium, German reinforcements in ; two additional divisions located 8 (1).
,,
,, British advance on a 6-mile front between St. Quentin and Cambrai; number of
German prisoners and guns captured ; number of British casualties in the first four
days compared with corresponding period in the Somme battle 10 (1). ­
,,
,, British, French, and German casualties during the April offensive ; comparison with
the Somme battle 12 (2).
,,
,, British, French, and German reserves 12 (2).
Western front; Cambrai and Arras, successful operations between 7 (2).
,,
,, French advance south of St. Quentin; rapidity of British advance disconcerts enemy's
plans; successful railway construction 8 (1).
,, French attacks, partial success of 13.(1).
,, \ French mihtary policy; conference at French G-.BE.Q. 9 ( 3 ) .
,,
,, ' - ,, German reserves ; thirty-one divisions drawn into action 11 (1).
,, German^ withdrawal; Hindenburg line ; Allies in touch with; further signs of
/
withdrawal at, and north of Bens; evacuation of civil population at Lens and
Lille; St. Quentin burned; state of roads and railways in evacuated area
2 (1) ; indications of enemy stand on Hindenburg line ; destruction of villages ;
^.
removal of civil population 3 (1); signs of impending withdrawal in St. Mihiel
salient 5 (2).
'
,,
,, Hindenburg line, no considerable operations to be expected at present owing to state
of roads and communications 4 (1).
,,
,, operations on April23, result of ; estimated number of prisoners taken 11 (1).
,,
Sir D-. Haig and General ISTivelle, conference between; complete agreement on future
plan of operations ,.12(2).
. ..
,, Vimy, further positions occupied nortli of ; heavy counter-attacks repulsed 9 (2). .
Wheat Commission instructed to obtain all available wheat from United States and Canada; shipping
diverted from Australian and Eastern waters for that purpose 4 (7).
export of, from Argentina prohibited 5 (11).
normal consumption and production of, in the United Kingdom ; production in the Soudan;
accumulation of reserve supplies; supplies available in Canada and the United States,
release of ships for conveyance of 5 (10). '
,, supplementing of, by use of other grain; propaganda on the use of alternative forms of food
'
4(8). Women and children (Canadian), permission for their conveyance hofne 3 (5); Board of Trade
regulations. (See W.C. Minute 100(14).)
:
1
Z.
Zeppelin engines (captured) used in a British airship
8 (9).
P R I N T E D AT T H E FOREIGN O F F I C E B Y C . E . HARRISON.
30/10/1917.