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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series
A MARKET ECONOMY IN
THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE
Peter
Temin
Working Paper 01-08
February 2001
Room E52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, IVIA 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at
http://papers.ssrn. com/paper.taf?abstract_id=260995
Technology
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series
Massachusetts
Institute of
A MARKET ECONOMY
THE EARLY
ROMAN
Peter
IN
EMPIRE
Temin
Working Paper 01 -08
February 2001
Room
E52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network
Paper Collection
at
http://papers.ssrn. com/paper.taf?abstract_id=260995
MASSACHUSEnS
INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
AUG 2
2 2001
LIBRARIES
ABSTRACT
I
argue here that the
economy of the
early
Roman Empire was
market economy. The parts of this economy located
were not
tied together as tightly as
far
primarily a
from each other
markets often are today, but they
still
functioned as part of a comprehensive Mediterranean market. There are two
reasons
of the
why
this
conclusion
Roman economy
as a
is
important. First,
whole
it
brings the description
into accord with the fragmentary
evidence
we have
synthetic
view provides a platfonn on which
about individual market transactions. Second,
about the origins and eventual demise of the
this
to investigate further questions
Roman economy and about
conditions for the formation and preservation of markets in general.
A
Market Economy
in the
Peter
Early
Roman Empire
Temin
MIT
Febmary
I
13,
2001
thank Roger Bagnall, Alan
Bowman, Richard Eckaus, Joseph Manning,
Ostrow, Walter Scheidel, and the editor of this journal for
mine
alone.
helpflil
Ian Morris, Steven
comments. All
errors are
A Market Economy in the Early Roman Empire
The economy of the
early
Roman Empire has been an object of study
The discussion has been marked by continuing
century.
primitivist/modem debate and
lectures,
at
debate,
for at least the last
known sometimes
as the
other times as the Finley debate, following his famous Sather
The Ancient Economy. This paper
economist rather than an ancient
historian.
economy," and to see
evidence
if it fits the
is
a contribution to this debate, written
by an
My purpose is to define the concept of a "market
we have
for the early
Roman Empire.
Finley declared that, "ancient society did not have an economic system which
conglomeration of interdependent markets.'"'
oppose the views of Rostovtzeflf within the
Engerman
Monis
in
economic
history, but
He drew
field
1
he did not exphcitly join
tightly as
I.
and even resolve the debate
parts
of this economy located
markets often are today, but they
Finley,
still
vigorous today. ^
I
of the early
hope
Roman
to clarify the
Empire.
Roman Empire was primarily a market
each other were not tied together as
fijnctioned as part
of a comprehensive
The Ancient Economy (1973), 22-23.
K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation
I.
is still
far fi-om
(
1
944); K. Polanyi,
The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire
the Cross (1974).
'
their conceptual apparatuses.^
for the period
argue here that the economy of the early
economy. The
M.
to
suiTimarized the debate fueled by Finley's dramatic lectures in his foreword to the 25"'
issues in this debate
'
on research by Polanyi
of ancient history and those of Fogel and
anniversary edition and argued that the controversy
'
implicitly
was an enormous
Morris, 'Foreword', in
M.
I.
Finley,
( 1
The Livelihood of Man
957); R.
W.
The Ancient Economy, updated
Fogel and
(
1
977);
S. L.
M. Rostovtzeff,
Engerman, Time on
ed. (1999), ix-xxxvi.
why
Mediterranean market.'' There are two reasons
brings the description of the
evidence
Roman economy
as a
whole
we have about individual market transactions.
platform on which to investigate
Roman economy and
fiirther
conclusion
this
important.
is
First,
it
into accord with the fragmentary
Second, this synthetic view provides a
questions about the origins and eventual demise of the
about conditions for the formation and preservation of markets in general.
Models and Tests
Finley called for models of the ancient
subsequent "Further Thoughts.'* This
is
a
economy both
in his lectures
good approach. But what does
and
it
mean to use
model of the ancient economy?
A model is an abstract representation of reality.
than reaUty of necessity because
it is
created
conceptuahze a few dimensions of reality
to reach conclusions,
With
and they have
the advent of computers,
the most useful
we
to
a time.
and
natural scientists
Models
be simple enough for
a
simpler
It is
who can only
typically are manipulated in order
their formulators to manipulate.
much more complex models
than before, but
simplest.
Most economic models assume
economic forces
more
industries or, sometimes, in the
First,
it
''
social
can deal with
models often are the
institutions or other
at
by
in his
the existence
of a market economy. The models show
affect prices, quantities,
economy
as a whole.
and related variables
in
The value of the model
one or
is
two-fold.
provides a simplified description of events that can be repeated and discussed. Second,
This analysis
is
similar in spirit to K. Hopkins, 'Taxes and Trade in the
Roman
Empire", V/J^, 1980, but
concentrates on the processes by which resources were allocated, in contrast to Hopkins' concern with the
allocation
-
Finley,
how
itself,
The Ancient Economy (1999),
27, 182.
it
allows economists to
would have happened
test
counter-factual propositions. That
if the institutions
the economist can ask
is,
or other economic forces had been different than they
actually were.
The
happened;
it
a conjecture about what would have happened had history been different.
conjecture
is
is
And the
as well.
resulting counter-factual history
conditional
on the model.
conjecture
is
limited
what
model
If the
by
is
the model;
not an account of events as they
is
it
The
a poor one, the conjecture will be poor
can only track the variables in the model
in the counter-factual world.
How can we tell whether a model is poor?
generations of philosophers of science, and
I
This
a question that has energized
is
will attempt only the
most concrete answer here.
A good model fits the observed facts more closely than a poor one.
statement has three important components.
First,
new
to
not
data are discovered, models
made up
is
that
motion data searches
When there
that
is
abstract;
it
tell
This
economist
last
fields
fits
differently,
behind
it.
good models
If
are
One advantage of
of economic
the facts
modem
When the data are
less formal tests
facts
data to settle open questions and sets in
which model
an abundance of numerical data,
Roman Empire,
is better
more
have proven successful in many
provide tests that economic historians use.
for the early
be changed. Stated
often suggests the need for
it
must be a ranking by which one can
another.
any model depends on the
out of whole cloth; they are distillations of the available data.
using a model
there
may need
This apparently simple
more
statistics
history.
Second,
closely than
and econometrics
quahtative, as they generally are
have to be used. Third, no model
is
good
in the
or worse than an altemaUve.
point
who meets
is critical.
Economics
is
a comparative science.
a colleague while walking across campus.
The
story
The colleague
is
told of an
hails the
economist and asks,
"How are your children?" The economist responds, "Compared to
what?" This response, only
slightly exaggerated in this story, is typical
Economic models
are supported
"null hypothesis "
The
by showing
null hypothesis
that they are superior to another, often called the
of most economics
is
that there
market, that prices are determined by supply and demand. This
the
Roman economy,
I
Empire
propose to
in
two
because
test the
stages.
I
I
market economy,
that are fi"ee to
move
first
that
many
much of this
that
is,
economy
in the early
Roman
individual actions and interactions are seen
an economy where most resources are allocated by prices
More
technically
I
will
Roman Empire typically were equiUbrated by means of prices.
literature, is Polanyi.
He
asserted that,
we find them, reciprocity,
ways
a market
begin by presenting the altematives to which market transactions are to be compared
been used widely.
as
was
then will argue that there were enough market transactions to
and the altematives to which a market economy
as for so
a well-functioning
a problem for the study of
in response to changes in underlying conditions.
argue that markets in the early
I
is
is
precisely this typical null hypothesis that needs to be tested.
hypothesis that there
will argue
best as market transactions.
constitute a
it is
of economists.
to organize the
to
be compared. The
He provided
fianctions
logical starting point,
a taxonomy of interactions that has
"The main forms of integration
redistribution,
economic
is
in the
human economy
and exchange.'* These forms describe
of any
society. Reciprocity, as the
are,
different
term suggests,
is
a
system in which people aim toward a rough balance between the goods and services they
receive and that they give to others.
obligations
'
and
tradition,
Polanyi, The Livelihood
The
reciprocal obligations are detennined
by
social
and they change only slowly. This organization can be fomialized, as
of Man,
35-36.
in
Malinowski's Trobriand Islanders, or simply followed with informal or implicit
Redistribution
is
a system in
which goods "are collected
custom, law, or ad hoc central decision."^ This system
households, where
states.
The
services.
it is
known as
is
is
one hand and distributed by virtue of
present in units as small as
modem
householding, as well as in the taxation levied by
essential characteristic
Exchange
in
rules.
is
that a central authority collects
the famihar economic transaction
and
where people
distributes
voluntarily
goods for each other or for money. Polanyi's categories appear frequently
various aspects of classical antiquity, from Peacock and
in
goods and
exchange
books about
Wilhams on amphorae
to
Jongman on
Pompeii to Gamsey on food.^
Polanyi's definitions of these different forms of integration are appeahng, but imprecise.
They suggest
three
models of interaction; we need
choose between them. Pryor proposed
tests in
to
make them
precise
enough
that
we can
a study of primitive and peasant economies that
can be used to differentiate Polanyi's forms of integration.^ Pryor distinguished between what
he called exchanges and
services are
transfers.
Exchanges are balanced transactions where goods or
exchanged for other goods or services of equal value. This of course
is
the kind of
behavior most often observed in markets. Transfers are one-way transactions where goods
and services are given without a
direct retum.
Pryor excluded "invisibles" from
rather than
'
Ibid. 40.
*
D.
P. S.
Grants, tributes, and taxes are
this accounting,
all transfers.
so that taxes are considered to be transfers
an exchange of goods or money in order to purchase social order or military
Peacock and D.
F.
Williams,
Economy and Society of Pompeii
(
1
Amphorae and the Roman Economy (1986); W. Jongman, The
Gamsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman
988); P.
World (\999).
''
F. L. Pryor,
Economies
The Origins of the Economy: A Comparative Study of Distribution
(1977).
in Primitive
and Peasant
success. This exclusion
makes
all
necessary because one can always hypothesize an invisible gain that
is
transactions balanced. In that case, there
is
no way
to discriminate
between
different
forms of behavior.
Pryor subdivided exchanges into those in which the
exchanged can vary and those
the latter do not.
use of money
is
in
He termed the
which
it
ratio
of goods or services
The fomier may
cannot.
former, market exchange; the
or
latter,
may
not involve money;
reciprocal exchange.
The
a good index of this distinction, as are changes in the exchange ratio over time.
In the presence of money, of course, changes in exchange ratios are expressed as changes in
prices.
Pryor divided transfers into centric and non-centric ones. Centric transfers are
between individuals
role."'°
In the
authorities.
transfer.
Roman context,
If the grain to feed
If the grain
and "an
in a society
institution or
an individual carrying out a societal-wide
large-scale centric transfers
would be those with the Imperial
Rome were provided by taxes
were obtained by purchasing
it
or tribute, this would be a centric
with money, then
this
would be a market
exchange.
These categories are observable,
that
is,
they provide boxes into which activities and societies
can be placed with confidence. They also correspond closely
integration.
Polanyi's
first
form, reciprocity,
is
to Polanyi's
composed of Pryor's non-centric
reciprocal exchanges. His second form, redistribution, is accomplished
His third form, exchange,
is
characterized
Pryor's project can be seen as a
'
Ibid., 34.
way
to
forms of economic
by
transfers
centric transfers.
by what Pryor called market exchange. In
make
and
fact,
Polanyi's classification empirically testable, not
'
.
necessarily reaching Polanyi's conclusion that "price-making markets [are] the exceptional
occurrence in history."'
This
tri-part
schema corresponds
also to a division of individual behavior.
I
have
argued that people even today relay on a mixture of behavioral modes, choosing which one to
use as a resuh of internal and extemal forces.'- These forces can be represented on two
dimensions.
One dimension measures
The other dimension indexes
autonomous and change
change
is
is
autonomy
is
is,
life.
and reciprocal exchanges,
transfers, that
is,
redistribution.
high and the pace of change
is
is
moderate,
they have exphcit goals in mind and choose
actions that advance their plans. These different
types of organization used in economic
When
neither very high nor very low, then people use
people employ instrumental behavior, that
of centric
When people
slow, they typically utilize customary behavior.
command behavior. When personal autonomy
centric transfers
an index of personal autonomy.
the rapidity of change in the extemal environment.
are less
rapid and personal
internal forces along
modes of behavior correspond
Customary behavior generally
that
And
is,
in reciprocity.
is
to the three
used for non-
Command behavior is typical
instruinental behavior
is
used in market
exchanges.
There consequently are two types of tests
we
can use to discriminate between the
various kinds of integration. Prices are used in market exchanges, but not in non-centric
transfers.
They may appear in reciprocal exchanges, although they
economic conditions
"
W.
G. Neale, 'The Market
(eds.).
''
P.
in that context.
Trade and Markets
in
will not vary in response to
Variable prices then can be used as markers for the
Theory and History', in K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, and H. W. Pearson
Early Empires (1957), 371
in the
Temin, 'ModesofBehawior', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1
(1980), 175-95.
presence of market exchange. Phrased differently,
that
can infer from the existence of prices
market exchange more closely describes the interaction containing the prices than
Of course, we will need to make
reciprocity or redistribution.
over time to
that
we
is,
make
sure that these prices can vary
sure that the prices are not simply stable markers of a non-centric exchange,
a specific type of reciprocity.
In addition, people
command,
since these
wiU behave instrumentaUy
two modes of behavior
in
market exchanges, not customarily or by
are typical of reciprocal
and
redistributive
organizations. Thoughts are observed far less easily than prices, although ancient sources often
report the former
more volubly than
the
latter.
Nevertheless,
we
can ask
describe their activities if they are describing instrumental, customary or
when
ancient authors
command behavior.
We do so by comparing how well each model of behavior fits the described actions or the
imputed thoughts.
The
analysis so far tells
many market exchanges
allocated
There
is
by
are
how to
needed
prices that are free to
no general answer to
and have no need
to test
its
to
find market exchanges in the early
make
move
in
a market
economy where most resources
are
response to changes in underlying conditions?
this question, for
very existence.
Roman Empire. But how
most economists deal with market economies
It is
necessary to compare
Rome with
other
economies to see the nature and extent of market exchanges in market economies. England
and Holland
economies
in the
that
17* and
18"" century, shortly
before the Industrial Revolution, had
everyone agrees were market economies based on agriculture. Yet even
these market economies, a substantial part of marketed output
transfers rather than
by market exchanges. Taxes
10
in Britain
was
allocated
by
in
centric
were over 10 percent of national
income, and taxes in Holland were over 40 percent of the income of unskilled laborers, of
which about half came from excise taxes on goods consumed by workers. Some market
exchanges also had characteristics of reciprocity and customary behavior. Large pubUc works
and
in both countries, primarily to drain land
(in
Holland) contain the sea, were paid for by
wealthy men, mostly but not exclusively large landowners. Nominal wages stayed constant for
many years
at
a time in the market
economy of early modem England, even though
grain fluctuated widely, suggesting that the "labor market"
employment
relation often
Even though
there
in pre-industrial Britain
contrasting
economy
made
was
reciprocal exchange.
at least partly
of
an oxymoron; the
^
'
were extensive non-market
transfers
and exchanges, most resources
and Holland were allocated by markets. This can be seen by
them with economies
described by
was
the price
that
were not primarily market economies. The feudal
Marc Bloch was a customary economy.
'"*
Most
transactions
were
without prices as tenants worked on the lord's land part of the time and as vassals
entertained lords to
show
their fealty.
In addition,
many transactions were
—
tenants and vassals transferred resources
—
labor
^to
their labor or the
lords in return for protection in the chaotic
obligations
were written down and then commuted
economy developed
into early
centric transfers as
produce of their tenants'
world of the medieval period. As
into
money payments,
the customary feudal
modem market economies.
Brown andS. V. Hopkins,/^ Perspective of Wages and Prices (\9?,\)\ P. K. O'Brien, 'The
Economy of British Taxation, \66Q-\?,\5\ Economic History Review A\ (1988), 1-32; R. Floud and D.
1700-1860 (1997); J. de Vries
N. McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain since 1700, Second Ed., V.
and A. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perserx-erance of the Dutch
Economy. 1500-1815 {\99T).
'"
M. Bloch, Feudal Society (1961).
'^
H. Phelps
Pohtical
1
11
:
Centrally planned economies in 20"^ century Russia and China
were command
economies. Russian industries and Chinese famis were compelled to delivery quantities of
goods according to a
central plan. Prices in the Soviet
time. Planners expected firms to innovate out
they set a higher, but
relabeled as
new
instead
that
fixed, price for
goods, and there
in the countryside
Only now
still
of China
Union were fixed
was no
When that did not work,
of the love of sociaUsm.
"new goods." Not
surprisingly,
increase in innovation.
until quite recently, as far as
we
can
'^
for long periods of
many
old goods were
There were not even prices
see,
only production quotas.
market reforms are being introduced are farmers seUing produce for a price
of delivering a quota.
There
is
no formal
test to
decide which kind of economy
of these few economies should appear
an economy about which
in
which of course
we have fewer preconceptions we
Do the most important commodities,
many transactions
clear,
like
is
we
are observing.
why they were
will
need
The
classification
chosen. But for
to ask several questions.
food and lodging, have prices that move? Are there
which price appears to play a
large part?
Do prices move to
clear
markets?
Market Exchanges and a Market Economy
There are many sources for the history of Rome, but they are curiously
silent
on
questions of economic organization. Literary evidence does not suggest a focus on economic
affairs in ancient
Rome,
but then
modem economy came irom the
"
J. S.
Berliner,
it
does not have
files
The Innovation Decision
this focus today.
If all
we knew
of the Times Literary Supplement or the
in Soviet Industry (1976).
12
about the
New
York
Review of Books, we would be hard-pressed to understand
the
economic
enabled the authors represented in these publications to pursue their
addition to being Limited, the literary evidence
who were uninterested
Finley in
in
market
The Ancient Economy
activity.
fails to
when
literary interests. In
we have also was compiled by medieval
Greene argues
that the Uterary evidence
scholars
used by
reveal the technological progress in the ancient world
that is visible in the archeological record.'*
hterary sources
institutions that
argue that there
I
economic information
is
in the
interpreted in the proper context.
We observe isolated prices for many Roman goods, but we lack continuous series of
comparable prices for goods and services, as
many
historians
have noted. Markets do not
generate a permanent record of changing prices; price series exist only if someone or
agency had an
interest in collecting
some
them. Newspapers reported prices in pre-industrial Europe
and America, but we do not have newspapers from ancient Rome. (The most complete ancient
price series, ironically,
comes from Babylon.
goods and services had prices
.'^
'
^)
We do have abundant evidence that many
Renters paid rent on their apartments in
Rome, employers
paid wages to free workers and rent for slaves, travelers paid for food and drink for themselves
and
the
"'
their animals.'^
These are the ordinary prices of a market economy, showing
goods and services used
in the
course of ordinary
life
that
many of
were valued by price and paid
K. Greene, 'Technological Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World:
M.
I.
for
by
Finley Re-
Considered', Economic Hisloiy Review 53 (2000), 29-59.
" A.
L. Slotsky,
The Bourse of Babylon: Market Quotations
in the
Astronomical Diaries of Babylonia
(1997).
'"
A. C. Johnson,
Roman Empire:
Roman Egypt
to the
Quantitative Studies
Reign of Diocletian (1936); R. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the
982); D. Rathbone, Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in
( 1
Third Century A. D. Egypt (\99\).
'"
CIL 4.138; Cicero, An Essay about Duties,
1.42; laciXns,
13
Annals, 6.13,
12.43;
CIL 4.1679.
money. The Diocletian
was not
it
price control edict of 301 attempted to fix a
as extensive as, say, the Preisstop Decree issued
reveals that there
were
flexible
market prices
means of payment. The
issue
—
but rather whether
that coin
was used
and he asserted
money
issue here
makes sense
it
that records
to
of transactions
Even
testifies to
not the size of the
speak of a
for transactions throughout the
rather than barter.
seems obvious
is
by the Nazis
that the authorities
The abundant evidence of Roman coinage
wide variety of prices?"
the
money
It
in the 20"' century,^' but
wished
to control.
common use of coins as
—
supply
money supply at
a
a contentious
Howgego argued
all.
Roman Empire." Egypt was fiilly monetized,
in other distant areas
showed them to involve
in the countryside, people carried coin while traveling.
that they carried coin in anticipation
of spending
their
It
money buying goods and
services in market exchanges.
In addition to prices for goods and services for immediate delivery,
we have many
examples of loans. One example, from a Dacian gold-mining village in 162 CE, shows a
common
form:
Julius Alexander, the lender, required a
denarii
promise in good
of genuine and sound coin would be duly
settled
faith that the loan
on the day he requested
Alexander, son of Cariccius, the borrower, promised in good faith that
settled,
and declared
a loan, and that he
the interest
on
would be paid
that
owed them.
Julius
from
this
Alexander or
Alexander required a promise
day would be one percent per
to
whomever
it
might
Alexander, son of Cariccius, promised in good faith that
Primitius stood surety for the
20
CIL
''
Reichskommissar
it
in
good
thirty
it.
would be so
he had received the sixty denarii mentioned above,
this principal
to Juhus
it
of 60
in cash, as
faith that
days and
in the future concern.
would be so
paid. Titius
due and proper payment of the principal mentioned above
3.805-09.
fiir
Preisbildung, 'Mitteilungsblatt des Reichskommissars fur die Preisbildung', 1937-38
(BundesarchivRD13/I)
--
C.
Howgego, 'The Supply and Use of Money
in the
Roman World 200
14
B.C. to A.D. 300",
JRS
82. 1-31.
and of the
interest.
Transacted
at
Albumus Maior, October
20, in the consulship of
Rusticus (his second consulship) and Aquilinus.^-'
We have many other records of loans, not always so complete.
loaned 3500 drachmas to another
the
same
loan
is
interest rate,
woman
420 draclimas
noteworthy because
it
for a one-year loan,
by a bank
Dacian
draft
same time, 141 CE,
on a
private bank.-'' This
The Egyptian loan was between women and
suggesting an even
more
sophisticated market transaction than the
rate
but not
of interest on loans varied, showing that these loans were not
all rates
are found.
The
interest rate
at
a traditional
almost always was in the range of four
percent to 12 percent, seldom higher than the rate in these provincial loans. This range
reflect a prohibition
on loans
evidence for a legal limit
1
5 or 16 percent, but
is
at
more than 12
not strong.--
24 or 48
intermediary rates suggests that the
Andreau argued
percent, although
When the
percent.-''
reciprocal exchange at a fixed rate; they
The
interest rate
variation
was
shows
higher,
it
were multiples of twelve. Monthly
" CIL
^'
^^
our
was not
were not a
difficulty calculating rates.
They
common rates
tended to range from simple fractions to three or four
3.934-35.
P. Tebt.
J.
may
were market exchanges. The apparent absence of
Romans may have had
rates
that
typically
that these loans
quoted them on a monthly basis, as in the loan described here, and the most
^''
at
loan.
The
level,
draft,
by a
at the
woman
extends the previous example in several dimensions while
recording an essentially similar transaction.
effected
Egypt for one year
in
For example, a
II
389, quoted in Jane Rowland,
Andreau, Banking and Business
Women and Society in Greek and Roman Egypt
Roman World (1999), 90-94.
in the
Cicero, 2 Verr. 3. 165-70; Brutus' loan to Salamis in Cyprus.
15
(1998), 254-55.
percent, perhaps because lenders used
Roman numerals. Roman markets
with the precision of modem markets, but that does not
Other aspects of the Dacian loan transaction
demonstrating again that
money was used commonly
mean they
could not operate
did not operate at
market nature.
testify to its
Roman
in the early
It is
all.
a loan of coin,
Empire. Prices, in
The
other words, were not simply accounting units; they were used in economic exchanges.
loan
was guaranteed by
principals.
interest
It
a third person, showing that
it
was not a
social act
between the two
even was assignable to an unspecified person, as revealed by the statement
that
might be paid to someone other than the lender. This loan was not negotiable in our
modem sense, but it had some
The loan was
sophisticated fmancial attributes.
down to
written
provide a written record in case the lender defaulted; the effort of recording the loan only
worthwhile
if there
was recourse
to a court in that eventuality.
The loan was a binding
not a social obligation mediated by social pressure. This loan was
River, far
away from Rome, showing
that
market
activity
was not
made
north of the
was
contract,
Danube
restricted to the city
of Rome
alone.
Were
the interest rates for loans connected to other interest rates?
—
discussed the outstanding evidence on the profitabihty
employed the records of over 100 perpetual foundations
support grants (the alimenta) in
rates.
many
Italian
They ranged, with only very few
Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the
set
in the
—of Roman
word
up
to ftind
agriculture.^^
government
He
child-
second century to calculate
interest
exceptions, from five percent to twelve percent;
Duncan- Jones could not detect trends by the
-'
towns
his
Duncan- Jones
size
Roman Empire,
of foundations nor the dates from
132-38.
16
tlie
limited
data.
Andreau argued
that the interest rate
and explained the difference by the greater
The concepts of profitabihty and
these are market concepts.
he argued
if ancient
Romans
argue about interest rates in
7"^
interest
1
and
loans.
know how to
on the Roman
that there
was
money
in different
ways, that
8"^
century England.
money
in the asset that
interpret the
agricultural foundations
a capital market in ancient
does not mean that
is,
Roman
and the
Rome.
Rome had
He
presented data on the
an assertion based on the
would eam
rate
investors
of
would
the highest retum.^'
evidence on interest and profit in a
rate for
The
similarity
between the
a capital market that resembled a
way that
at least
modem banking
allowed people to
participate.
^^
Andreau, Banking and Business
^''
G. Clark, 'The Political Foundations of Modem Economic Growth: England, 1540-1800', Joi(/-«o/ of
World,
Interdisciplinary History 46 (1996), 563-88.
17
of
A prosperous ancient Roman looking to either
choose the kind of economic activity in which they wanted to
Roman
rate
monetary loans suggests strongly
system, only that there were market transactions organized in a
in the
if
or custom. Clark used exactly this kind of evidence to
lend or borrow could look either to urban loan companies or to agricultural foundations,
in Italy. This
when
but the literature on loans only
reciprocal or redistributive organization of economic activity.
interest
on land
in anachronistic reasoning
He did not need to defend the proposition that
both be able and want to put their
hard to
1
the return
makes sense within market economies;
agricultural foundations to contest
on government
It is
interest rates
was higher than
money. '^
could choose to invest their
command
of Enghsh
risk in lending
eamed higher returns,
they were not constrained by
profitabihty
typically
Andreau may have been indulging
that higher-risk investments
makes sense
on loans
94.
Can we
find evidence
of instmmental behavior
these prices? According to Plutarch, Cato "used to lend
disreputable form of speculation, that
is
nmnber of fifty,
activities,
even
many
representing as
if not reported
money
in
the underwriting of ships.
borrow money from him were obligated
to
form a large
ships,
how ancient Romans
that suggests
what
is
Those
association,
surely the
most
who washed to
and when
he would take one share
regarded
in the
this
reached the
company. "^° Cato's
completely accurately by Plutarch, presuppose a variety of
market conditions existed even before the formation of the Empire. Maritime loans were a
matter of routine; there were ship owners
lenders
who had
capital to invest.
who needed credit to
finance trade, and there were
Ship owners formed companies, and these associations
apparently could be responsible for several ships, even if not quite 50. There were multiple
investors in such companies, for Cato
was only one among an unknown number of other
investors.
Plutarch's account also reveals quite sophisticated instrumental behavior.
loans
was well known, and Cato understood
more
ships
by himself This
buying a mutual fund.
that a
is
or that he
formulated in the 20"' century.
it
was
same kind of behavior that a
Plutarch,
ships instead
of owTiing one or
modem investor uses when
knew the theories of diversification that have been
We must however conclude that his behavior was not command
instrumental as he tried to earn
money
in a
Plutarch's reference to 50 other investors suggests that Cato
'
maritime
We cannot suppose that Cato had the range of investments open to him
modem investor has
or customary;
the
risk in
He used
that diversification reduces risk.
by buying a small share of many
diversification to reduce his risk
The
Cato the Elder, XXI.5-6.
18
market context.
was not
alone.
And
We do not know
at this point
available
away
whether such investments were
more generally
restricted to the city
in the empire, although interest-bearing loans
itself or
were
were being made as
far
as Dacia.
I
conclude therefore that
we
have ample evidence of extensive market prices and
exchanges in the Principate. This view agrees with
that
of some recent histoncal research.
Rathbone provided a careful analysis and discussion of Egyptian
of extant prices made any conclusion about them
we
of Rome
tentative.
He
prices, noting that the paucity
argued nonetheless, "As far as
can judge, the prices for wheat, wine and donkeys were basically formed by the operation
of free-market
forces, that is the fiindamentals
economy. ..The prices
.
individually
prices."^'
typical
in private sales
by market bargaining
hi terms of the
of supply and demand
seem, on the whole, to be
in a
'real'
monetised
prices arrived at
rather than being standardised, customary or notional
model used
here, the prices represent extensive
market exchanges
of a market economy, not reciprocal exchanges typical of an economy based on
reciprocity.
It is
allocation
of resources
in
that prices
market economies, and
relationship as well as indications
Macedonia
show
not enough, however, to
in Hadrian's time
were widespread. Prices
we need to have
of the prices themselves.
shows
An
evidence of this causal
inscription
''
more cheaply than
the current price
Rathbone, "Prices and Price Formation
dans
les
economies antiques
from Lete
that prices equihbrated grain markets.
Manius Salarius Sabinus, a gymnasiarch and benefactor, who very often
sold grain
in
Roman
affect the
"The
in times
in
city celebrates
of shortage
and when the emperor's army was passing
Egypt',
(1997), 211.
19
Economie
antique, Prix et formation des prix
—
through, provided for the
annona 400 medimnoi of wheat, 100 of barley and 60 of beans,
plus 100 metretae of wine,
much
cheaper than the current price."^^ The inscription celebrated
an intervention in a functioning market
the
anny was passing
when prices
rose in response to the added
through. In normal times, people could
extraordinary circumstances
was unusual
activity called for
food shortages caused the price of foodstuffs to
rise,
buy food
in markets;
demand
as
only in
and celebrated. Grain and other
and the
city's benefactor sold
food
at
a
lower price to alleviate the shortage. Price equilibrated the markets for grains and other food, in
other words, but people were not always happy with the price needed to produce this
equilibration.
Even
a market price
when the price of an
today, the question
The biggest markets
posed whether government should intervene to
important commodity like
is
estimated
at
in the city
If) to
—
raUroad. Grain
was exported
was shipped over the
to
Rome
sea to
from Spain and
as
Rome
months on
either side.
would remain
from
was
far
until the
cheaper to ship
advent of the
Sardinia, Sicily, Africa
and Egypt. Oil
until
March, and dangerous for about two
There must have been a large amount of shipping coming
Quoted in Gamsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, 247^8.
" G. Rickman, The Corn Supply ofAncient Rome (1980), 10; Gamsey, Famine and Food Supply
Graeco-Roman World, 191,231.
''
"
D.
J.
year,
The Mediterranean was "closed" by bad
Africa.^''
weather for four months a year from November
additional
it
It
city's
Rome in the
40 million modii of grain a
about 150-300,000 tons, plus extensive supplies of oil and wine.^^
food across the Mediterranean than over land
of Rome. The
about a million inhabitants.
Roman Empire therefore needed a lot of supplies
offset
oil rises sharply.
were markets, were
for food, if they
population in the Principate generally
early
is
Mattingly, Tripolitania (1995).
20
in the
in
and out of Ostia during the summer, even though large ships went to Puteoli
Naples, where grain
was transshipped
If this
transfer.
directly
by Roman
movement
of market exchanges even
discussion of the
were paid
in
from
if the grain
sales
then this
was
that there
offered to
Rome
as tribute or
movement of grain was a
of grain by farmers,
was purchased from
Roman economy with the
money. He noted
If this grain
authorities,
resulted
Bay of
into smaller vessels for the coastal trip to Ostia.
How was this shipping organized?
commandeered
in the
it
centric
was composed of a
tax revenues.
Hopkins began
"unexceptional" proposition that most
were taxes of grain
in kind
had been
series
his
Roman taxes
from Egypt and Africa,
used for free distribution in Rome, the annona, but only a small part of the grain imported into
—
Rome
—was
^perhaps 15 percent
annona was purchased with
view"
for free distribution.^'
public funds, but
that grain for Imperial distribution
kind.^^
The bulk of grain
result
Gamsey and
of redistribution, the
to
Italian
annona, must have been
in
privately
Roman authorities would have had to use an extensive
oil.
There
is
no evidence
that the Imperial
requisite large bureaucratic administration.
farms were exempt from taxation, and they sold varied products to
urban consumers in market exchanges.
in the early
from other taxes and
have been arranged by customs or reciprocity. If they
bureaucracy to manage the huge flows of grain and
government had the
that the grain for the
Sirks stayed with the "prevailing
collected separately
imports, not destined for the
owned. The imports were too large
were the
was
Rickman argued
Roman Empire have
Many examples of Italian
survived.
The farmers
fanners selling their produce
sold, not to get
money
" Hopkins, 'Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire'; B. Sirks, Food for Rome (1991), 21.
" Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome, 40-42; Gamsey, Famine and Food Supply
Roman World, Til; Sirks, Foodfor Rome, 25.
21
Roman and other
to
pay
in the
taxes, but
Graeco-
to
pay
their
rent
and buy
articles
they did not produce themselves. Itahan farmers could transport
goods to an urban market and
produce to market, or
sell their
sell
them there,
hire ships or space
on ships to carry
crops to middlemen at the farm gate.^^ Cato, writing a
little
before the Principate, reported sample contracts for the sale of ohves, grapes and wine.
question of who bore the risk of wine spoilage
was addressed
These transactions were exchanges, not unidirectional
explicitly in the contract
transfers,
—
^the
price
—can
vary. There
were no
traditional or fixed rates
these cases. There were prices that could vary and payments in money.
market exchanges, that
is,
Rathbone argued
Egypt.
and
offered
that
Not only were
market
parts
is
whether the
rate
of exchanges in
The exchanges were
activity existed in rural areas as well as urban, at least in
for estates in
Egypt were
there prices for grain
replete with prices for
whose
activities
myriad goods
and for donkeys, but also prices for services
by various craftsmen and workmen. Rathbone concluded
composed of many
of sale.^^
purchases and sales.
The records he found
services.
The
and they were market
exchanges as well. The distinction between market and reciprocal exchange
of exchange
their
were coordinated
aided by a sophisticated accounting system that was in the
that the
to exploit
spirit
Appianus
estate
was
economies of scale,
of double-entry
bookkeeping.^' The estates whose records have survived were connected to and part of a
market economy.
The
were
" N.
ships used to transport grain also
not, like the
were not the property of the Imperial
army, operated directly by the
state.
The operation was
Morley, Metropolis and Hinlerland (1996), 159-74.
"Cato,/(gr., 144^8.
''^
Rathbone, Economic Rationalism and Rural Society, 396-401.
22
far too
state.
They
complex
for
—
the small bureaucracy at the head of the Empire, and ships
Rickman
stated baldly that "private enterprise
shipping grain to Rome."""
It
was
was
the
owned.
the context in which Cato operated.
tenders from the highest bidder to farm out
redemptura" Shipping
of ships, were used
privately
backbone of the whole business" of
How did one engage a ship in the early Roman Empire?
contract, a
—were
like land
"The Romans had
much or all of what the
State needed,
contracts with navicularii, people
to obtain grain for the imperial distributions, the
the habit
of inviting
by way of a
making commercial use
annona,
in
Rome.
A
navicularius could appoint a magister navis to accompany the ship in his place, and he could
form a societas which could survive the death or bankmptcy of one of its members. Contracts
usually were for five years.'"
These arrangements do not sound
like
are not following orders, and contracts are not
command behavior or centric
commands. The arrangements
appear to be reciprocal exchanges or non-centric transfers, that
with the grain
itself,
the sheer scale
transfers; bidders
of the shipping required
is,
to feed
also
do not
Polanyi's reciprocity.
As
Rome would have required
a large bureaucracy to maintain a set of fixed exchanges that would accomphsh the needed
task.
In addition, ancillary records are consistent with market exchange, not reciprocity. For
example, there were mantime loans to finance shipping with insurance provisions. The loans
had an
ship
interest rate at
was
lost.
which they were
to
be repaid, but there was no obligation to repay
In other words, the lender shared the risk of shipping with the ship
'"'
Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome, 27-28.
''
Suks,
Foodfor Rome.
25-33.
23
if the
ovmer and
the
owner of the
for bearing this
ship's contents.
risk.''^
This
The
interest rate
resemble the organization of trade in the
owners combined with others so
shares in only a
hi colonial
ships,
few
trade in the early
Roman Empire
New England colonies around
that ships
were owned by multiple
ships, three or fewer, but a
few
rich
among voyages, although the
men owned
diversification to reduce risk
financial
investors
shares in
up
to
70
We do not know if
counterparts, but conscious
can be only instrumental behavior designed for market exchanges.
system in the early
monetary system. There even was a
in,
Most
of subgroups in these
groups."*^
Roman companies had longer lives than their colonial New England
were called
700. There too ship
investors.
repetitions
combinations reveals the existence of stable investment
The
1
appears to
New England, the associations of investors typically lasted only for a single
voyage. Tlie investors varied
shifting
compensate the lender
in order to
a sophisticated economic transaction.
is
The organization of Mediterranean
owned
was high
Roman Empire also had some of the
liquidity crisis in
33
attributes
of a
CE in which interest rates rose,
and land prices collapsed. Tiberius made available a
substantial
modem
loans
sum of money
to be loaned to landowners without interest for three years to restore liquidity.'" This crisis
exposed several aspects of the
Roman economy. Members of the aristocracy were borrowing
Loans were not
pervaded
freely.
The price of land was
restricted to specific activities, but
not fixed.
It
was a market
outnumbered buyers. People with land could
Roman
price that could
sell as
Andreau, Banking and Business
"'
B. Bailyn and L. Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping, 1697-1714:
'*'*
Tacitus, Annals
in the
6,
World,
fall
ranks of Roman Ufe.
when putative
they wished, and people could
"*'
in the
all
1-3.
24
buy
if they
54.
A
Statistical Study (1959).
16-17; Cassius Dio, 58.21.1-5; Suetonius, Tiberius 4S.\; quoted in C.
Age of Tiberias {\97b),
sellers
Rodewald, A/owev
had the money. This well-documented
financial crisis demonstrates clearly that prices
were
used to equilibrate both the financial and land markets.
seems hkely
It
records fi"om the most
that abnost
aU farmers were aware of market
humble of farms, but even they do not seem
prices.
to
have been isolated
householding cocoons. They were not fliUy autarchic, whatever their aims
They paid
taxes, they sold
was of homegrown
market
activity
food.
extended
from the Heroninos and
may have
been.
produce and bought items even though most of their consumption
As
all
always, records from Egypt are
the
way down the economic
related archives
shows
more abundant; they suggest
that the rural
that
"Other incidental evidence
ladder.
poor often flmctioned
economically as family units whose members simultaneously engaged
activities,
We do not have many
in
a wide range of
including farming small plots of owned or leased land, leasing animals and
utilities
such
as presses and bathhouses, fixed-term and casual labouring, petty retailing, fishing, domestic
crafts
and so
on."*^
Wherever information on production and consumption has survived, so has evidence of
market exchanges.
It
would be
strange indeed if farmers and craftsmen operating in this
context did not take these prices into account
when
planning their
activities.
Roman
prices, in
other words, contained information about the avaUabihty of goods and even about the
advantage to be gained from selling farmers'
own produce.
This
is
the role of prices in a market
economy.
The responsiveness
Romans
"^
as well.
to prices can
be demonstrated from the actions of upper class
We do not leam about their petty purchases, as we would not hear of the
Rathbone, Economic Rationalism and Rural Society, 393.
25
Rothschilds' laundry
liquidity crisis
bills.
But
we do
them buying and
see
selling land, as illustrated
by the
of 33. These transactions clearly were market exchanges. The price of land
changed, and senators were sensitive to changes in the price. They were not engaged in
informal transfers or fixed, repetitive reciprocal exchanges
when they purchased
land.
Nor
did
they seem to be following orders from a central authority that would be typical of command
behavior and centric transfers.
A detailed land register from Italy, the Trajanic inscription from Veleia, shows that
much Itahan land was privately held and
could be valued in monetary terms. Estates typically
were composed of discrete holdings
had been acquired through
that
purchase. These parcels could be aggregated
valuation.
by summing their values
But the average value of different parcels
though the number of parcels ovmed varied a
inheritance, marriage
to get
and
an overall
in this area varied "remarkably
little,"
even
lot."*^
A roughly uniform price of land in a given region does not seem odd to us. We hve in a
market economy where arbitrage and other market
goods and services
into a
narrow range.
than others, but markets tend to bring
Roman land prices
have been the
could have
result
all
activities
Some prices
approach uniformity more completely
prices together.
come about by
of chance. Far more
tend to bring prices for similar
Remarkably small
local variation in
accident, but the uniformity does not appear to
likely,
it
was
the result of market exchanges, that
is,
of purchasers rushing to buy land that was offered cheaply and thinking long about buying
expensive land.
""
CIL
1
1,1
Of course,
land
is
not homogeneous, and there
147; R. Duncan-Jones, Structure
and Scale
in the
26
is
no reason
Roman Economy
to expect the price
(1990), 127.
of all land even
result
in a local area to
be the same. Local
variation,
of market conditions rather than of traditional or
Senators' land-holdings routinely
adjacent to his
main
from inheritance and
neither traditional
estate at
were valued
Tifumum to consohdate
marriage."*^
As
productive asset of ancient
economy of pre-industrial
Rome was
Britain
ritual forces.'*''
in
monetary terms. Phny bought land
the scattered parcels he had acquired
before, Pliny's purchases
and bound by inahenabOity
rules
allocated
were subject
however, appears to be the
show
that land
nor centrally directed. The primary
by the market. Landed
to
ownership was
more
restrictive rules
estates in the
market
than those of ancient
Rome.
Limits to a Market
It is
a
common view that prices
may not hold in any real
market.
not only apart, but uncoordinated.
even today. As a
but that
is
result,
should be equal in a market. But the law of one price
in
modem markets,
For example, residual
"The various regions may be
costly transportation keeps prices
oil is
in a
heavy and costly
common market over long periods
same slow speed
similar.
Transport, even
when
as goods in transit. There
cheap,
was slow, hiformation
was no way
P.
W. de Neeve, 'The Price of Agricultural Land
Opus 4 {\9i5), 77-109.
in
Roman
Italy
traveled at
for arbitrage to bring prices
together in short periods, perhaps even in one to three years. If there
^'
to transport
not the case in periods of one to three years."^' Most traded goods in the early
Roman Empire were
the
Even
Economy
was a market,
the levels
and the Problem of Economic
Rationalism',
"*£/;. 3.19.2-3.
''''G.J. Stigler
and R. A. Sherwin, 'The Extent of the Market', Journal of Law and Economics 28 (1985), 576.
27
.
in different regions should not
have differed from each other very
need not have moved together
in
any given month or even
The market conditions under which prices tended
the early
Roman
much on
year.
to a
common value were
of all goods to be uniform across the extensive
from
is
Roman Empire. The
no reason
speed
Rome to Egypt was highly variable, judging by the delays
correspond to a
fulfilled in
Empire. The rate of interest, as noted above, was similar across the whole
Empire. The price of land was similar in a local region. But there
traveled
average, but they
new
emperor. The delay could be as
short, as
in
at
to expect prices
which news
changing dates to
a few weeks, but
it
averaged
over a month, hi the winter, the news could take far longer to cross the sea, but there
enough surviving evidence
evidence
in
is
to confinn the expected seasonal pattern,
is
not
even though the scattered
consistent with such a seasonal pattem.^° Arbitrage could not have equalized prices
Rome and Egypt
in
any short period.
Surviving prices also tend to be for places that were accessible by water. Ships could carry
goods across the Mediterranean and up
over land.
rivers,
Roman roads were not primarily
everywhere.
but
approximation, the
were
was hard and expensive
for the transport
Wagonsoff the roads moved with
result is that inland locations
it
less firmly
to carry
them
of goods, and they did not go
far greater effort
and diminished
connected to the general market.
Roman market for bulk commodities extended only
slightly
speed.^'
To
a
The
first
beyond where
ships could go, although high-value goods could travel to land-locked destinations. In
Vindolanda, an amiy
camp
at
Hadrian's Wall,
''''
Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale
^'
R.
W.
Bulliet,
in the
The Camel and the Wheel
it
is
not surprising that there
Roman Economy,
(\975).
28
9-1
1
was
little
market
activity,
camp was connected
although accounts there were kept in denarii, showing that the
other markets, even if not very closely.^'
(ancient Kellis),
300
of touch with those
The
4""
to
century accounts at the Dakhleh Oasis
km from the Nile and far later, report valuations of bulk commodities out
in the
Mediterranean economy. The accounts clearly considered different
crops as fungible, but "did not go so far as imposing any standard accounting across the whole
of the account."^^
In addition to geographical limitations, a market
market economy,
all
limited in
its
internal extent.
transactions need not be market exchanges. In fact,
of an economy composed
entirely
of market exchanges.
market exchanges are the modal economic
economies do not channel
economic
is
activity in the
all
it is
in a
hard to conceive
A market economy is one in which
interaction, but
even full-blown
modem market
transactions through markets. Eisner calculated that one-third of
United States today takes place within households, that
householding or reciprocal
Even
activity.^''
Taxes also are large in
is,
in
modem societies, typically
reaching one-third of marketed output in advanced industrial societies. Yet these clearly are
market economies. They acquire
by
the
prominence of market exchanges
enterprises
A. K.
and
in transactions
which comparison with ancient
between unrelated private people and
in the
economy
as a whole.
These are
Rome must be made.
and Letters on the Roman Frontier: Vindolanda and its People (1998); A. K.
'New Writing Tablets from Vindolanda,' Britannia 28 (1996).
The Kellis Agricultural Account Book (1997), 57-62.
Bowman,
Bowman
not by the universality of market exchanges, but
and by the importance of these transactions
the dimensions along
"
this attribute,
J.
Life
D. Thomas,
5'
R. Bagnall,
'"'
R. Eisner, The Total
Incomes System of Accounts
(1989), 26.
29
In
modem,
industrial
economies, almost no one produces the food that he or she eats
or the clothes that he or she wears. In an agricultural economy, far more than one-third of
economic
of the
would be
activity
Roman Empire was engaged
half of production
not
carried
mean that
was
almost
carried
all
farni's activities
many of these
in farming, then
on by householding,
it
is
If about
75 percent of the population
not unreasonable to suppose that over
rather than
by market exchanges. This does
fanners were autarchic and isolated from market forces, while the
surplus to feed urban dwellers
each
on within households.
was produced by a minority of farms.
were devoted to maintaining
its
It
The
workforce.
means
that
most of
historical question is
farms were engaged in buying and selling produce, even
if these
how
exchanges
provided only a small part of the farm's income.
This
biased.
is
an exceedingly
difficult
We are much more likely to have records of farms that were engaged in economic
exchanges than those that were not,
activities.
all
question to answer, particularly since our sources are
if only
The farms whose records have
were engaged
in
because the autarchic farm had no need to record
svirvived,
however,
market exchanges, as described
tell
a uniform story. These farms
earlier.
This point about the bias of our records can be turned on
was only a minority of all productive
activity,
it
was
It is
interaction in "literate
more humble Romans.
more unfortunate
to
left
not unfair to say that market exchange
Rome," even though
It
it
may have been
would be a mistake
its
head. Although market activity
mode of activity of "literate
the dominant
Rome." People who had some wealth and education and
market contexts.
records were
was
less
the
all
throw the baby out with the bath water.
operating in
dominant mode of
apparent in the daily lives of
to ignore these less fortunate
30
its
Roman
history
Romans, but even
is
written abnost
exclusively from literate records of various sorts. For the people
exchange was a
Finally,
who
left
these records, market
way of life.
markets are not outside society. They
determined by society. Not
all
are, as
Polanyi stated, embedded in society,
market economies are the same even today, as even a casual
comparison of Japan and the United States suggests.^^ Economic exchanges did not dominate
the intellectual hfe of Rome, and there were
modem economics.
no academic analyses of these exchanges akin
But economic exchanges were an omnipresent aspect of urban
life,
to
and
they seem also to have been part of hfe in the countryside as well. They were an integral part of
the arrangements that enabled
parts
Rome to grow to
a rrdlhon inhabitants and that knit the
many
of the early Empire together.
Conclusion
-;
I
have compared the economy of the early
economic
integration described
economic
integration
the literature
Roman Empire with the three
by Polanyi and made
testable
by Pryor. The modal form of
was market exchange. This observation does not appear
on ancient Rome, but
the generalization
from
forms of
specific
examples
is
controversial in
problematical.
Confrontation of economic exchange with other forms of integration shows however that
the only form that could have
I
have argued
aUowed
fiorther that
the
the early
Roman Empire to
economy of the
early
"
P.
Temin,
albeit imperfectly coordinated ones.
'Is It
The
early
Roman Empire was a market
Roman Empire
Kosher to Talk about Culture' Journal of Economic History 57
,
31
was
ftmction.
economy. Market exchange was ubiquitous, and market prices moved together
of markets,
it
in
ways
typical
did not have the
(1997).
market economy of elementary economics textbooks, but
economy seen
in other
advanced
it
did have the type of market
agricultural economies.
There was not a single empire-wide market for
all
goods, but local markets were
connected together around the Mediterranean. Transportation and communication took time,
and the
discipline
of the market was
loose.
between even far-flung parts of the early
Rome had an economic
But there were
Roman Empire.
many economic
Finley
was
connections
exactly wrong; ancient
system that was an enormous conglomeration of interdependent
markets.
32
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