LookingAheadtoaPossible2017NuclearPostureReview
BradRoberts
IntroductoryRemarkstoahearingoftheArmedServicesCommittee,
UnitedStatesSenate,January26,2016
Thankyoufortheopportunitytoparticipateinthispreliminarydiscussionofa
possible2017NuclearPostureReview.IwouldliketounderscorethattheviewsI
ampresentingherearemypersonalviews,followingonmyserviceasDeputy
AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforNuclearandMissileDefensePolicyfrom2009to
2014(inwhichcapacityIwasco‐directorofthe2009‐10NPR)andonmy
authorshipofarecentlypublishedbookonU.S.nuclearpolicy(TheCaseforU.S.
NuclearWeaponsinthe21stCentury,StanfordUniversityPress,December2015).
Pleasedonotattributemyviewstomynewemployerasoflastspring,Lawrence
LivermoreNationalLaboratory.
YouhaveaskedustohighlightelementsofcontinuityandchangeinU.S.nuclear
policy.Surveyingthenuclearpoliciesofallfourpost‐coldwaradministrations,the
continuitiesarestriking.EverypresidenthaswantedtomoveawayfromColdWar
approaches,toreducenucleararsenals,andtoreducetheroleandsalienceof
nuclearweaponsinU.S.deterrencestrategies.Everypresidenthasalsowantedto
ensurethatnucleardeterrencewouldbeeffectivefortheproblemsforwhichitis
relevantinachangedandchangingsecurityenvironment.Eachadministrationhas
decidedtomaintaintheTriad.Eachhasworkedtoensurestablestrategic
relationshipswithRussia,China,andU.S.allies.Eachhasrejectedmutual
vulnerabilityasthebasisofthestrategicrelationshipwithnewnuclear‐armedor
armingregionalchallengers.
Letmealsohighlighttwoconspicuouschangesoverthethreenuclearposture
reviews.Oneistherisingsalienceofextendeddeterrenceandtheassuranceofour
allies—whichhasreturnedtoascentralaplaceinournuclearstrategyasithadat
theheightoftheColdWar.Theotherchangerelatestothescopeofthereviews.
The1994reviewwasthenarrowestoftheset,focusedlargelyonforcestructure
decisions.The2001reviewwasbroader,linkingstrategiesformodernizing
deterrencetoachangingdefensestrategy.The2009reviewwasthebroadest.As
mandatedbyCongress,itwasDoD‐ledbutinteragencyincharacterandfully
elaboratedthe“balancedapproach”recommendedbythePerry‐Schlesinger
StrategicPostureCommission(balancingpoliticalmeanstoreducethreatswith
militarymeanstodeterthemsolongastheyexist).Suchabroadreviewhelpedto
ensureleadershipfocus,leadership“ownership”ofmainmessages,andeffective
interagencyimplementation.Theseareimportantbenefitsofcontinuingvalue.
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FromthevantagepointofJanuary2016,whatarethekeyelementsofchangeand
continuitybearingontheU.S.nuclearposture?Iwillbrieflyhighlightherefourkey
changes.
1. WiththeabruptturninRussiansecuritypolicyinspring2014,itisnolonger
possible,asitwasin2009,tocharacterizetherelationshipwithRussiaas
improvingandpresentingminimumrisksofarmedconflict.Butasthenew
threatisprincipallytoourNATOallies,ournationalresponseneedstofocus
onadaptingandstrengtheningdeterrenceinEurope.Thisprocessbegan
withthe2013Walessummitandwillbeacceleratedattheupcoming
Warsawsummit.DoesthisrequireachangeinU.S.nuclearpolicyorposture,
separateandapartfromNATO’sposture?Thecurrentpostureissizedand
structuredtomaintainstrategicstabilitywithRussia.TheObama
administration,likeitspredecessors,hasmaintained“secondtonone”asa
guidingprincipleandhasmaintainedtheresilienceoftheforcesothatitis
notvulnerabletoapreemptivestrike.Theargumenthasbeenmadethat
Russia’snuclearassertivenessrequiresaparallelnuclearassertivenessby
theUnitedStatesandthatitslargeanddiversetheaternuclearforcerequires
asymmetricNATOnuclearforce,alongwithanewgenerationofultralow‐
yieldweapons.ThedeficienciesinNATO’snuclearposturearenotinits
hardware,however,whichisrobustforthedeterrenceofRussiande‐
escalationstrikes.Thedeficienciesareinitssoftware—inthewaysinwhich
theAllianceexpressesitsconvictionsabouttheroleofnucleardeterrence
(andwhichwillbeaddressedinWarsaw).
2. Intheperiodsince2009,wehavelearnedthattheconditionsdonotnow
exist—andarenotproximate—thatwouldallowustotakeadditional
substantialstepstoreducetheroleandnumberofU.S.nuclearweapons.The
Obamaadministrationsetoutapracticalagendaforseekingcooperation
withothernuclear‐armedstatestomoveinthisdirection.Whatarethe
results?Russiahasprovenunwillingtotakeanadditionalone‐third
reduction.Chinahasprovenunwillingtoembracenewtransparency
measures—oreventodiscussstrategicstability.NorthKoreahascontinued
itsnuclearbuildup.OuralliesareunwillingtoabandontheU.S.nuclear
capabilitiesuniquelyassociatedwithextendeddeterrence(i.e.,non‐strategic
nuclearweaponsforward‐deployedordeployable).Thisdoesnotmeanthat
theUnitedStatesshouldabandonthearmscontrol,nonproliferation,and
disarmamentprojects.Doingsowouldonlyfurtheraggravatetheproblem.
Weshouldnotabandonthe“balancedapproach.”ButtheUnitedStates
shouldtemperitsexpectations.Anditshouldrefrainfromunilateralsteps
thatsupposedlyputpressureonotherstojoinus.Ifitmadenosensein2009
totakeunilateralactiontoeliminatealegofthetriad,itmakesevenless
sensetoday.
3. Intheperiodsince2009,themoremultidimensionalnatureofstrategic
conflicthascomemoreclearlyintofocus.Nuclearweapons,missiledefense,
cyber,andspacemaybeseparatedomains,buttheyareallpartofthesame
strategiclandscape.Thisputsafocusonthechallengeofensuringthe
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neededdegreeofintegrationinpolicy,strategy,andexecution.Thisinvites
animportantquestionaboutthescopeofapossible2017review.The
Obamaadministrationconductedasetofseparatebutlinkedreviewsof
thesedifferentpostureelements.Mightanalternativeapproachenablemore
effectiveintegration?Possibly.Butasingle,comprehensivestrategicreview
wouldbedifficulttodoonaninteragencybasis,whereasthe2009NPR
benefitedsignificantlyfromthatinteragencyaspect.
4. Afinalkeydifferenceisinthepoliticalcontext.IntheleaduptotheObama
administration,executive‐legislativegridlockhadpreventedany
modernizationdecisions.TheStrategicPostureCommission(SPC)helpedto
remedythatproblem,withitsbipartisanadvicetotheObamaadministration
topursuemodernizationbylifeextension,whichtheadministration
accepted.Intheinterim,wehavenotrecoveredabroadanddeepbipartisan
consensusonnuclearmodernization.Butwehaveachievedsufficient
agreementwithinandacrossthepartiestoenableaseriesofpositive
decisionstosupportmodernizationwithsteadilyincreasinginvestments.
Thisneedstobepreservedandnurtured.RepeatingtheSPCwouldnotbe
usefulornecessarytowardthatend.Aprivatebi‐partisaninitiativecould,
however,helpsettherightcontextandprovidetherightmarkersforthe
journeyahead.
Letmeroundoutmyintroductoryremarksbyhighlightingthreekeyelementsof
continuitysince2009.
1. AsiaisasrelevanttotheU.S.nuclearpostureasisEurope.China’snuclear
futurehasnearlyasmanylargequestionmarksasdoesRussia’s.Ourpursuit
ofstrategicstabilitywithbothneedstocontinuetoadapt.OurNortheast
Asianalliesareasanxiousaboutextendeddeterrenceinachangingsecurity
environmentasareourCentralandNorthernEuropeanallies.Don’tletthe
Russiaproblemdistractusfromthisstrategictruth
2. Westilldon’thavethehedgewesaywewant.Eachadministrationsincethe
ColdWarhaswantedtoensurethatwehaveastrongnationalcapacityto
respondtobothgeopoliticalandtechnicalsurprises.Eachhaswantedto
reducerelianceonalargeandexpensive‐to‐maintainstockpileofaging
nuclearweaponsasahedgeagainstuncertaintybyincreasingrelianceona
responsiveandadaptivenuclearweaponscomplex.TheStrategicPosture
Commissionputspecialemphasisonthispoint.Fixingthisproblemwiththe
properinvestmentandgovernancestrategiesshouldbeakeypriority.I
knowofnoonewhothinksthattherisksofgeopoliticalandtechnical
surprisearedeclining.
3. Eachadministrationhasdebatedwhethernewnuclearweaponsareneeded
–andwearecertaintohavethisdebateagain.TheGeorgeW.Bush
administration’spursuitofnewweaponscametoapoliticaldeadend.The
Obamaadministration’spursuitofamodernarsenalthroughthelife
extensionofexistingcapabilitieshasbeenmoresuccessful.Therearetwo
argumentsfornewweapons—thatweneedthemfordeterrenceandthatwe
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needthemtosustainournationaldesigncompetence.Bothargumentshave
somemerit.Butthereisnogoodreasontothinkthatanewefforttobuild
newweaponsfornewmilitarypurposeswouldnottoocometoapolitical
deadend.Moreover,thereareothermeanstostrengthendeterrenceand
sustaindesigncompetence.
Thankyoufortheopportunitytojoininthisdiscussion.Ilookforwardtoyour
questions.
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