P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Archives of Sexual Behavior, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
Aaron S. Greenberg, JD,1 and J. Michael Bailey, PhD1,2
As we learn more about the causes of sexual orientation, the likelihood increases
that parents will one day be able to select the orientation of their children. This
possibility (at least that of selecting for heterosexuality) has generated a great
deal of concern among supporters of homosexual rights, with such selection being widely condemned as harmful and morally repugnant. Notwithstanding this
widespread condemnation, and even assuming, as we do, that homosexuality is
entirely acceptable morally, allowing parents, by means morally unproblematic
in themselves, to select for heterosexuality would be morally acceptable. This is
because allowing parents to select their children’s sexual orientation would further parent’s freedom to raise the sort of children they wish to raise and because
selection for heterosexuality may benefit parents and children and is unlikely to
cause significant harm.
KEY WORDS: homosexuality; sexual orientation; genetics; abortion; eugenics; genetic selection.
INTRODUCTION
Science continues to gain insight into the origins of particular sexual orientations (Bailey et al., 1993; Bailey and Pillard, 1991; Hamer et al., 1993; LeVay,
1991, 1993; Meyer-Bahlburg, 1993) and to provide us with more and more effective ways of controlling our environments and our genetic endowments. The
combination of these two factors, knowledge and technology, will in all likelihood
lead, at some point, to the ability of parents to control, or at least greatly influence,
their children’s sexual orientation. One would expect that the vast majority of parents inclined to attempt to influence the orientation of their children will wish to
do so in the direction of heterosexuality. Are such parents little, if any, better than
1 Department
of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
2 To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of Psychology, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Illinois 60208.
423
C 2001 Plenum Publishing Corporation
0004-0002/01/0800-0423$19.50/0 °
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
424
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Greenberg and Bailey
Nazi advocates of eugenics or can such actions be morally justified? In general,
how should we evaluate such parental actions from an ethical standpoint?
Our purpose here is not to propose or defend any general ethical system.
Instead, we will attempt to evaluate certain actions within the framework of what
we perceive to be factors that are, in actuality, commonly taken into account
in secular moral decision making. These include the action’s costs and benefits
(broadly construed) and the motives of the actor. Again, we will not attempt to
provide a theoretical justification of the relevance of these factors to issues of
morality. Rather, we will determine how selection of a child’s sexual preference
should be viewed if one accepts (as we believe a great many people do) that those
factors, applied consistently and rationally, are crucial in making moral judgments.
The first question to confront is that of the ethical status of homosexuality
itself. Certainly, whether homosexuality is good, bad, or neutral will be an important factor in our evaluation of attempts to avoid having homosexual children.
Our position, which we will take as axiomatic for purposes of this discussion,
is that homosexuality, like heterosexuality, is ethically neutral. Because homosexuality causes no direct harm to others (other than those who take offense at
it on irrational and/or inhumane grounds) and because homosexual behavior is
crucial to the ability of homosexual people to enjoy their lives (as heterosexual
behavior is to heterosexuals), homosexuality should not be morally condemned or
proscribed.
The proposition, however, that there is nothing morally wrong with homosexuality by no means entails the proposition that there is something morally wrong
with trying to avoid having homosexual children. To proscribe homosexuality is
to do direct serious harm to a group of people with little countervailing benefit. In
contrast, to avoid having homosexual children does no direct harm to anyone, as
it involves no condemnation or proscription of anyone’s behavior or status. (By
definition, if a child is kept from being homosexual, he or she will not have homosexual status or engage in homosexual behavior.) The ethical status of avoiding
homosexual children depends instead on its indirect harms, if any, on its benefits,
if any, and on the motives of those engaging in it.
Methods of Avoiding Homosexual Children and Grounds for Objection
There are, at least in theory, several possible ways in which having homosexual children could be avoided. These include refusal to conceive (for couples whose
genetic characteristics make having a homosexual child likely), genetic manipulation, changes in pre- or postnatal environments, and abortion of fetuses likely to
become homosexual children. Our purpose here is not to address the moral acceptability of any particular method but to focus on the propriety of parental selection
of children’s sexual orientation, quite apart from the method used to achieve that
end. The analysis in this paper applies equally to any method of selection (ignoring
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
425
those that are obviously morally unacceptable, such as infanticide) and for purposes of our analysis we assume that all such methods are, in themselves (that
is, ignoring the particular purposes for which they are being employed), morally
acceptable. In particular, we take no position on the moral status of abortion. If the
reader has any moral question at all about abortion, we ask that he or she assume
that some other, morally acceptable, method of selection (perhaps an intrauterine
injection that alters the relevant genetic makeup of the fetus) will be used. We will,
however, at certain points, devote particular attention to abortion, as it seems often
to be perceived as the most ethically problematic method.
Recent scientific studies have presented evidence that the chances that a child
will be homosexual are greatly influenced by his or her genetic makeup (Bailey
et al., 1993; Bailey and Pillard, 1991; Hamer et al., 1993; Whitam et al., 1993).
Researchers have in fact claimed to have identified the general location of the gene
that appears to affect sexual orientation (Hamer et al., 1993; Hu et al., 1995). These
studies have provoked widespread reactions based on (in addition to their scientific
implications) their perceived implications for law, ethics, and social policy (Burr,
1993; Hamer and Copeland, 1994). Indeed, in their initial scientific report, Hamer
and colleagues took the step, unusual in a scientific research report, of explicitly
opposing what they considered to be possible misuse of their findings (Hamer
et al., 1993). One response to the evidence that sexual orientation has an important
genetic component has been the speculation that knowledge of the genetic origins
of sexual orientation could lead to a prenatal test for homosexuality (Allen, 1992;
Campbell, 1992; Hamer and Copeland, 1994; Holtz, 1994; Knox, 1993). Parents
who did not wish to have homosexual children could then abort fetuses likely to
become homosexual. This possibility was even the premise of a controversial play
(written prior to Hamer’s finding), Twilight of the Golds, in which an expectant
mother wrestled with the dilemma of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,
which was likely to produce a homosexual child.
The prospect of selective abortion to avoid having a homosexual child is
considered by many to be morally repugnant (Bancroft, 1993; Cashman, 1993;
Hamer et al., 1993; Hamer and Copeland, 1994; Murphy, 1990). One may object
morally to aborting a fetus because it is genetically destined to become homosexual,
or more generally, to using any method that enables selection for heterosexuality,
on one or more of the following grounds:
1. All uses of the method, for any purpose, are morally wrong (e.g., all
abortions are wrong).
2. Although some uses of the method may be morally acceptable, use of the
method for the purpose of selecting the child’s characteristics is morally
wrong.
3. Although some uses of the method, including some for the purpose of
selecting certain characteristics, may be morally acceptable, use of the
method for the purpose of selecting heterosexuality is morally wrong.
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
426
Greenberg and Bailey
Ground 1—Any Use of a Particular Method Is Wrong
It is not our purpose in this paper to address the question of the general morality
of the use of any particular method that might enable selection for heterosexuality.
For that reason, we will not discuss the merits and demerits of Ground 1, the general
moral objection to the use of a particular method, other than to note that, as a basis
for objecting to the avoidance of homosexual children, Ground 1 at least raises no
consistency problems. As will be seen, this cannot be said of Grounds 2 and 3.
Those grounds distinguish among interventions based on motives or purposes, and
thus raise questions other than that of the general moral acceptability of a given
method of intervention. It is, therefore, with Grounds 2 and 3 that we will concern
ourselves.
Ground 2—The Eugenics Objection
Ground 2 states a general moral objection to intervention for the purpose of
selecting a child’s characteristics (whatever those characteristics might be). We
may refer to this as the “eugenics” objection. This ground encompasses selection
on the basis of characteristics as diverse as, let us say, severe brain damage to
less-than-exceptional intelligence. Obviously, moral distinctions may be made
on the basis of the characteristics involved but this possibility is addressed in the
discussion of Ground 3, later. The objection stated in Ground 2 is not that it is wrong
to select for certain characteristics, but rather that, regardless of the characteristic,
such selection is wrong.
Proponents of this position often seek to support it by (1) asserting that attempts to determine children’s characteristics through genetic manipulation or
other such selection methods amounts to “playing God” (which apparently is
assumed to be morally wrong; Landers, 1993) or (2) equating such genetic manipulation or selection with certain practices engaged in or advocated by Nazi
scientists or other historical proponents of eugenics (e.g., Cashman, 1993). We
do not consider either of these arguments to be intellectually serious objections
to these selection practices. We frankly do not know exactly (or even approximately) how one is to distinguish between manipulations of nature, which are
sufficiently benign to be sanctioned by God (say, a tonsillectomy) and those
that are so intrusive as to impermissibly usurp God’s role. And, more fundamentally, playing God is a theological objection that derives its force, if any,
from religious doctrine. It has no place in a secular moral and policy analysis. The “Nazi” objection is the result of muddled thinking. Certainly, many
things the Nazis did were evils of a magnitude not seen before or since. Their
attempts at eugenics may be properly condemned because of the racial goals they
sought to achieve and because of the forcible and inhumane nature of their experiments. This amounts to a condemnation only of Nazi eugenics. The moral
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
427
status of eugenics in general is not determined by the horror of the Nazi version
of it.
Is the enterprise of, say, prenatal genetic selection to determine children’s
characteristics (whatever they might be) morally wrong? It is difficult to see why.
Women who smoke or drink to excess while pregnant are universally condemned
for, in effect, failing to engage in the proper prenatal selection of characteristics
(high birth weight, etc.). Parents who read to their children are universally praised
for attempting to make more likely their children’s possession of certain characteristics (intellectual proficiency, etc.). Putting aside any moral questions about the
method used in itself, it is not clear how, for example, prenatal genetic selection
is morally distinguishable from these practices. The argument is sometimes made
that allowing such interventions, because they might involve significant expense,
would result in various desirable characteristics being disproportionately concentrated among the wealthy (Krimsky and Hubbard, 1995; Wertz and Fletcher, 1989;
Wright, 1994). This might very well come to pass. But our economic system already results in the disproportionate possession by the wealthy of many goods
that contribute to children’s well-being and success (education, nutrition, medical
care, etc.). This may pose a moral problem for capitalism but it hardly constitutes
a legitimate moral objection to genetic or other selection per se. And, of course, it
would be highly questionable to argue that the solution to this disproportionality
problem would be to entirely ban more expensive education or medical care, so
that, for the sake of fairness, everyone is kept at the educational and medical level
of the poorest people in our society.
In short, then, parental (and societal) attempts, pre- and postnatal, to ensure,
to the extent possible, that children possess certain characteristics are universally
encouraged, and their neglect universally condemned (so long as the characteristics
are considered of the appropriate type—see the discussion of Ground 3, given later).
That the mechanism involved happens to be of a newer, more “technological,” or
more physically invasive nature, such as prenatal genetic selection by means of
abortion, has no apparent moral import (again assuming for argument’s sake, as
we do throughout this paper, that the method in itself raises no moral difficulties).
Ground 3—Selecting for Heterosexuality Is Wrong
Abortion. Political liberals tend, for whatever reason, to be ardent supporters
of both gay rights and pro-choice programs. For this reason, we suspect that many of
those who would object most vehemently to the notion of aborting a fetus because it
will be homosexual are also among the strongest supporters of abortion rights. Liberals often assert that abortion, at least at some relatively early stage of pregnancy,
simply has no moral dimension and that a woman has a moral right (and must continue to have a legal right) to have an abortion for virtually any reason she considers
appropriate. This position can give rise to two sorts of apparent inconsistency.
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
428
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Greenberg and Bailey
First, it is difficult to reconcile moral abhorrence toward the abortion of pregnancies likely to produce homosexual children with acceptance of abortion for
virtually any other reason, however trivial or selfish it may seem. Can it plausibly
be the case that a couple’s having an abortion because they wish to maintain their
high economic standard of living, or because the pregnancy came at an inconvenient time, raises no moral issue whatever, whereas an abortion to avoid having a
homosexual child is per se evil? We do not mean to assert here that it is not possible to draw moral distinctions among abortions based on the reasons of the people
having them, or that homosexual abortions are or are not morally acceptable. What
we do wish to point out, though, is a possible inconsistency in the level of moral
scrutiny applied to homosexual abortions as compared with other abortions. If it is
clearly wrong for people to abort gay fetuses because of their religious objections
to homosexuality or because they feel (correctly or not) that being gay subjects
a person to an unacceptable level of societal rejection, surely an already well-off
couple’s aborting a fetus to avoid the expense of a child at least raises a substantial
moral question.
There is, of course, an infinite number of possible ethical systems under which
homosexual abortions are always wrong whereas abortions for other reasons, including the trivial and selfish, are always acceptable. (One such system might have
as first ethical principles the propositions that the lives of only homosexual people are worthy of moral consideration and that life begins at conception. Another
might be derived from a belief that a particular pro-gay, pro-choice activist who
took this position was a prophet of God or God himself. These systems are limited
only by one’s imagination and in any case could be multiplied infinitely by adding
unrelated moral rules, e.g., it is wrong to wear red on Mondays, etc.) Under such a
system, any possible inconsistency is eliminated by hypothesis. However, the real
question is, given our commonly accepted moral principles, is any such system
plausible? We do not think so.
The second type of consistency problem faced by those who would condemn
homosexual abortions while maintaining that virtually all other abortions implicate
no moral issues can be illustrated by examining possible means other than abortion
of avoiding having gay children. Consider the following possibilities:
1. It is determined that eating shrimp during pregnancy will result in a gay
child.
2. It is determined that reading certain books to a young child will result in
his or her becoming gay.
3. A preconception genetic test is developed that tells couples with 100%
accuracy whether their children will be gay.
If, as maintained by this group, abortion in itself has no moral dimension,
but homosexual abortion is morally objectionable, consistency requires moral
objections of equal strength to (a) women not eating shrimp to avoid having gay
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
429
children, (b) parents not reading certain books to their children so they do not
become gay, and (c) couples who know from the preconception test that their
children would be gay taking steps not to conceive. If there is nothing wrong
with abortion in itself, then the only ground on which homosexual abortions can
be morally condemned is that they seek to avoid gay children. Consistency would
then require that all means of avoiding gay children be condemned with equal force.
But would members of this group really believe that women who refrain from
eating shrimp during pregnancy to avoid having gay children (or those who take the
other steps outlined earlier) deserve the same severe moral disapproval as women
who abort for that reason? Our guess is that the vast majority of them would not.
This may bespeak some unacknowledged level of moral discomfort with abortion
or it may indicate simply a failure to be logically consistent. One final possibility
is that our guess is incorrect. In any case, we think it is instructive to indicate the
positions entailed by the conjunction of the propositions that abortion is, in itself,
morally unproblematic and that homosexual abortions are morally wrong.
The Morality of Attempting to Avoid Having Homosexual Children. This
brings us to the more general question of the ethical status of attempts, by whatever
means (other than those that are obviously morally problematic, such as infanticide), to avoid having homosexual children. We propose to address that question
by examining two broad factors (whose relevance to the morality of acts we take, as
outlined earlier, as axiomatic for purpose of this discussion): the possible motives
of those engaged in selecting for heterosexual children, and the costs and benefits
of such selection.
As with virtually any human action, selecting for heterosexuality might be
motivated by many different factors or combinations of them. Perhaps the most
obvious and, arguably, pernicious of these is the potential parent’s belief that
homosexuality is wrong or evil and that homosexuals are therefore (at least if all
else is equal) less worthwhile or valuable people than heterosexuals. Because, as we
have assumed, homosexuality is ethically neutral, this point of view irrationally
devalues and denigrates a group of human beings in a way that has resulted in
much undeserved harm to that group. Those who subscribe to this view and, in
particular, those who subscribe to it so strongly that they act on it (though we defer
the discussion of such actions’ consequences) deserve moral condemnation.
Should our moral evaluation of such heterosexism be altered if its basis in a
particular person is a sincere adherence to a religion that condemns homosexuality?
One may intuitively feel that such a person is not as blameworthy as someone who
condemns homosexuality for some other reason. Still, having a religious ground
for the belief makes it no less irrational and no more respectful of homosexual
people’s legitimate claims of moral equality with heterosexuals. The nonreligious
heterosexist has made a specific irrational decision on this issue. The religious
heterosexist has made a general irrational decision to accept moral rules, regardless
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
430
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Greenberg and Bailey
of their individual merit, because they purport to derive from a certain source. It
is difficult to see why the latter decision is entitled to greater moral sympathy than
the former. It may be the case, as an empirical matter, that on average religious
heterosexists take positions of greater moral acceptability in areas not involving
homosexuality than do nonreligious heterosexists. This may be relevant to an
evaluation of the relative merits of the two groups as human beings, but it is
irrelevant to an evaluation of the relative merits of their positions in the area
of homosexuality. A religious basis, however sincere, for an indefensible and
harmful moral position makes it no more defensible and no less harmful. This
seems intuitively clear in the case of, for example, the moral acceptability of
discrimination against black people. It should be just as clear when people are
being discriminated against for any other irrational reason, including their sexual
orientation.
Parental desires to avoid having a homosexual child may, however, arise out
of motives that are less blameworthy than heterosexism. In fact, the motive may
be praiseworthy. In attempting to avoid having a homosexual child, a parent may
be motivated by a desire to spare the child the unhappiness that may arise out of
living in a society that often treats homosexual people badly in a variety of ways.
Surely such a motive deserves moral approval as would an action based on the
motive, at least so long as the benefits of sparing the child are not outweighed by
any harms the action might cause (see discussion of costs, given later).
Finally, selecting for a heterosexual child may stem from motives that are neither good nor bad, but simply acceptable, from a moral standpoint. For example,
parents may wish, understandably, to guarantee themselves the highest probability
of one day having grandchildren. Although homosexual people often have children, one’s chances of being a grandparent would certainly seem to be maximized
by having heterosexual children. The desire for grandchildren is one that seems
morally neutral and that a great many people would no doubt understand and
sympathize with.
Heterosexual parents may also wish to have heterosexual children for the
simple reason that they wish to have children more like themselves, with whom
they can more easily and completely fulfill the role of parent in connection with
their children’s sexual lives. That role involves such activities as teaching, advising,
empathizing, and vicariously experiencing, all of which would be, at least in many
cases, facilitated by parents’ sharing the sexual orientation of their children. A
comparison may be made here with a child’s religious upbringing. Catholic parents,
let us say, would very often be deeply disappointed and saddened by the conversion
to, say, Judaism, of their children. This is not necessarily because the parents are
anti-Semites or even value Judaism less than Catholicism. Rather, such parents may
wish to have children who are like themselves in this respect and with whom they
can share certain feelings and experiences that are important to them. Few people
would claim that such parents are acting immorally when they enculturate a child
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
431
in their religion. Similarly, heterosexual parents might wish to have heterosexual
children not because they object to homosexuality but to have more in common
with their children in an important area of life. Such a motive seems understandable
and morally acceptable.
The second factor we wish to consider in evaluating the morality of attempts
to avoid having homosexual children is the consequence of such avoidance or,
more specifically, its costs and benefits. The principal benefit of parents’ ability to
select their children’s sexual orientation is the furtherance of parental liberty. Moral
condemnation of such selection would to some degree limit, or at least impose a
cost on, the parents’ freedom to raise the sort of children they wish to raise. That
freedom has traditionally been very highly valued in our society and, like any
liberty, should not be restricted without good reason. Possible additional benefits
include the child’s avoidance of the difficulties often experienced by homosexual
people due to individual and societal intolerance, and the avoidance of similar
difficulties that might be experienced by the siblings of the homosexual child.
One putative benefit of selecting for heterosexuality is that homosexuality
is a disease whose elimination (or reduction in incidence) is therefore beneficial.
We will not here enter the debate over whether homosexuality is a disease, and in
fact there is no reason to do so. We have argued elsewhere (Greenberg and Bailey,
1994) that whether a given behavior or behavioral disposition is a disease is utterly
irrelevant to its moral status (as well as to any other interesting question about it).
To determine whether homosexuality is a disease, we need to know what characteristics define a disease and whether homosexuality has those characteristics.
If homosexuality is undesirable because it is a disease, it must be the case that
(1) homosexuality possesses at least one undesirable property, P, and (2) P is one
of the defining properties of disease. Clearly, though, because our moral decisions
are to be based on the desirability of homosexuality, we can make those decisions
using Proposition (1) alone, that is, before, and without, making the disease determination. Determining whether homosexuality is or is not a disease thus gives us
no relevant new information about it. Consideration of that question is therefore
fruitless, or worse, given that the proper definition of disease is a matter of some
dispute. Analysis should focus instead, as we do here, on the relevant characteristics of homosexuality, that is its costs and benefits (broadly conceived), and not
on whether those or other characteristics fit some definition of disease.
What harmful consequences or costs are to be weighed against the benefits
cited earlier? As discussed earlier, selecting for heterosexual children appears to
cause no direct harm to anyone. The result of such selection is that a child either
never comes into being (and a being that never existed cannot be harmed) or
is heterosexual rather than homosexual. Even if homosexuality is not inherently
inferior to heterosexuality in any way (and we believe that it is not) and even
if homosexual people did not experience societal intolerance and discrimination
(which of course they often do), it is quite difficult to see how being heterosexual
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
432
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Greenberg and Bailey
rather than homosexual causes any harm to the child himself. If selection for
heterosexuality causes any harm, that harm must be of some less direct variety and
must come to people other than the child himself. But the attributions of such less
direct harms or costs, moral and otherwise, made to selection for heterosexuality
are not convincing.
One such potential indirect cost would involve the possibility that widespread
heterosexual selection would eventually significantly reduce, or even eliminate, the
homosexual population. Homosexual people may be more likely to make certain
kinds of valuable contributions in areas such as the arts and obviously contribute
to certain kinds of social and cultural diversity. Such contributions and diversity
would be threatened by a substantial reduction in the homosexual population.
And, as is the case with the extinction of a species, we might irretrievably lose
valuable genetic or psychosocial characteristics possessed only, or primarily, by
gay people, of whose existence or utility we are presently unaware. In addition,
if the gay population were to shrink, gay political power might lessen as well,
possibly resulting in less effective governmental protection for those gays who
remain. Finally, if there were far fewer homosexual people, they might seem more
unusual and aberrant to others, which might result in more intolerance. These costs,
though certainly conceivable, seem highly speculative and unlikely to materialize
(particularly given the fact that the relevant selection method could presumably be
used by homosexual parents to select for homosexuality).
But even if we knew that such a drastic reduction in the homosexual population
and some or all of the consequent harms discussed earlier would result from
parental freedom to select heterosexual children, it is by no means clear that
those harms would outweigh parents’ liberty interest in raising the sort of children
they wished to raise. A religious analogy is again instructive. Like homosexual
people, Jewish people have made unique and valuable contributions to society
in many areas and are a small minority of the population traditionally subject to
irrational discrimination and intolerance. Suppose that for some reason the Jewish
population had greatly diminished and was in danger of disappearing altogether.
Suppose further that we knew of some risk-free and cost-free means (admittedly
difficult to imagine) by which non-Jewish parents could bear Jewish children.
Would anyone argue that non-Jewish parents would be acting immorally if they
chose to have children of their own religion rather than Jewish children despite
the likely consequence of the eventual extinction of the Jewish population? We
do not think that anyone would seriously take this position, the reason being
that, however unfortunate the eventual extinction of the Jewish population might
be, avoiding it would not be considered to outweigh the importance of parents’
liberty, in each individual case, to raise the sort of children they wished to raise.
This case is morally indistinguishable from that of parents choosing heterosexual
children notwithstanding the possible substantial diminution of the homosexual
population.
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
433
A second putative indirect harm arises out of those cases in which heterosexuality is selected out of parental heterosexism (though, as discussed earlier, this is
by no means the only possible motive for such selection). Certainly, heterosexism
is morally indefensible. It is difficult, though, to specify exactly what harm comes
from an act, otherwise harmless, that is caused by the actor’s heterosexism. It
is sometimes suggested that such acts further or somehow validate societal heterosexism (Murphy, 1990). We see no reason to think that this is so. In fact, the
only real consequence we can identify of such an act is that it notifies anyone
who knows of it and of its motive that the actor is heterosexist. Murphy (1990)
employs a racial analogy to condemn heterosexist attempts to avoid having gay
children—just as racist acts are morally wrong, so too are heterosexist acts. This
may seem quite plausible because the racist acts we typically think of are clearly
wrong—lynchings, Jim Crow laws, etc. Consider, however, the racist act of always
choosing vanilla ice cream over chocolate because the color of chocolate ice cream
reminds the racist of black people. Or suppose a racist were to wear a sign around
his neck or, better, post one in a private room in his home, saying “I am a racist.”
Because neither the sign nor the choice of ice cream harms anyone, it is difficult
to see that either compounds in any way the already existing moral wrong of the
person’s racism. The heterosexist, particularly one so extreme as to act on his
heterosexism, deserves moral condemnation. The act itself, though, selecting for
a heterosexual child, because it otherwise does no harm, serves only as evidence
of the actor’s bad state of mind, which already exists.
The alleged cost or harm that seems to be of most concern (its analog is
frequently cited as a reason to disapprove of or ban sex selection by parents)
is a more general version of this “heterosexist-motive” objection, namely, that
parental actions to avoid homosexual children, regardless of the parents’ motives,
would reinforce, validate or legitimate, and thereby increase societal heterosexism
(Schuklenk et al., 1997; Stein, 1998). This argument obviously requires that such
actions be done in a way that makes society at large aware of them. The most that
argument could prove, then, is that the publicizing of such an action, rather than
the action in itself, is morally wrong. In any case, the assertion that public parental
avoidance of homosexual children, or its public moral acceptance, would increase
general intolerance of homosexuality is, of course, an empirical prediction whose
truth value is unlikely to be determined by argument alone. Nevertheless, serious
doubt is cast on its truth by the closest analogs we can cite. To our knowledge, the
public’s undoubted awareness and acceptance of parental actions to ensure that a
child’s religion is the same as that of his parents has done nothing to increase intolerance of any religion. Similarly, we know of no reason to believe that avoidance of
genetically defective children, made possible by relatively recent technological advances, has increased general intolerance of those actually born with such defects.
The precise mechanisms by which parental selection will allegedly validate
and thereby increase societal intolerance are generally not made clear by the
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
434
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Greenberg and Bailey
proponents of this position. The general idea, though, seems to be something
like this:
1. Allowing, or failing to condemn, parental selction for heterosexuality will
be generally viewed as endorsing such selection.
2. People will generally attribute heterosexist motives to those parents engaging in such selection.
3. So, as a consequence of 1 and 2, allowing such selection will be seen as
endorsing those heterosexist parental motives.
4. Finally, this apparent endorsement of heterosexist motives will result in
an increase in intolerance and antihomosexual acts in society at large.
Each step in this argument is at least subject to serious question. As to
Steps 1–3, the notion that granting someone the freedom to do something is not
equivalent to endorsing that action or the motives underlying it is a simple and
commonplace one. Interestingly enough, two examples can be found in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That amendment guarantees freedom of
speech, regardless of the offensiveness or immorality of its content (with a handful
of narrow exceptions), and freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice, even
if those practices seem to most people to be incomprehensible or even harmful.
Few, if any, people take this protection of freedom to indicate our society’s legal
or moral endorsement of all such speech and religious practices.
Even if allowing parents the freedom to select for heterosexuality is seen as
an endorsement of the parents’ motives in so doing, it is highly questionable that
those motives will be assumed to be heterosexist. As discussed earlier, there are
several possible motives for wishing to have a heterosexual child, many of them
not based at all on heterosexism. We believe that many people would understand,
sympathize with, and share such nonheterosexist motives. This obviously calls
into question the notion, expressed in Step 2, that the general public would assume
that selection for heterosexuality would be done out of heterosexist motives.
Even if allowing (or not condemning) selection for heterosexuality were generally viewed as a societal endorsement of heterosexism, the extent to which this
would increase actual intolerance of and harm to homosexual people is not clear.
That that putative increase in intolerance and harm would outweigh the value of
allowing parents the freedom to raise the sort of children they wish to raise is a
generally tacit and undefended assumption of the proponents of this view.
Stein (1998) argues that the use of orientation–selection procedures would
cause people to view homosexuality as a physical disorder “by indicating that
screening for homosexuality is a reasonable and sanctioned medical procedure.”
Again, this is an empirical prediction that, though possibly accurate, seems implausible. It is a widely known and accepted fact that many medical procedures
(e.g., cosmetic surgery, sex-change operations, elective abortions) have nothing
to do with disorders of any kind. We know of no reason to think that screening
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
435
for homosexuality will be viewed as addressing a disorder merely because it is a
medical procedure, particularly if, as seems likely, medical techniques for selecting
other characteristics that are not related to disorders (e.g., high intelligence and
attractive appearance) are eventually developed and used.
Parents’ freedom to have heterosexual children, if they so choose, may be
very important to them and would not cause any direct harm to anyone. Those
who argue that that freedom should be denied on the basis of a putative long-term,
indirect, incremental harmful societal phenomenon should, it seems to us, bear the
burden of convincingly demonstrating that that harmful phenomenon will in fact
occur. But proponents of this view generally do not even attempt to make a case
for the accuracy of their empirical prediction that parental selection will cause real
harm by “validating” societal heterosexism. They are instead content merely to
assert it. We should treat with healthy skepticism any assertion that people should
not be free to live crucially important aspects of their lives in the ways they wish,
which directly harm no one, on the ground that some indirect harm will eventually
come to society as a result. This is true whether such arguments are used to attempt
to limit the freedom of homosexual people to live their lives as they see fit or of
parents to raise the sort of children they see fit to raise.
Even if increased intolerance of homosexuality did result from parental avoidance of homosexual children, that result would be the product of faulty moral
reasoning. As argued earlier, avoiding homosexual children by morally acceptable
means is, in itself, morally unobjectionable and implicates moral issues completely different from those raised by treating existing homosexual people badly.
The question thus becomes whether an act that is otherwise morally acceptable
becomes unacceptable because of mistaken conclusions people would draw (if in
fact they would) from its public proliferation or acceptance. We would suggest that
the best response in this type of situation would not be to deem the act (or, more
accurately, its publicizing) unacceptable but to educate those making the moral
error. An ethical system based even in part on people’s known misconceptions or
errors is bound to become rife with inconsistencies and unacceptable curtailments
of legitimate moral rights, as there is no reason to expect such misconceptions to
follow any logically consistent pattern or to properly take into account all relevant
moral factors.
It appears to be the case, then, that if allowing parents to select for heterosexuality is to be evaluated based on motive and consequence, one would be hardpressed to find it to be morally wrong. First, there are several plausible parental
motives that range from morally acceptable to morally praiseworthy. Furthermore,
parental freedom to select children’s important characteristics is a highly valuable, and highly valued, liberty. Finally, selection for heterosexuality (even when
done out of the worst motives) can benefit parents and children and seems unlikely to cause harm sufficient to outweigh those benefits and the value of parental
liberty.
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
16:21
436
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Greenberg and Bailey
CONCLUSION
We believe that many people find parental selection for heterosexuality intuitively troubling or even abhorrent. We also believe, however, that this is one of
those intuitions that does not stand up to rational analysis. The general enterprise
of attempting to influence what a child will be like cannot be objected to. Raising
a child consists exactly in attempting to dictate what that child will be like in a
multitude of ways. Virtually everyone believes, and rightly so, that it is, indeed, a
primary duty of parents to take steps, both pre- and postnatal, to assure that their
children possess certain characteristics and do not possess others. Assuming that
a particular method of selection, in itself, poses no moral problem, its use, as a
general matter, cannot be faulted.
Even assuming, as we do, that homosexuality is completely unobjectionable
morally and not inherently inferior to heterosexuality in any way, the specific enterprise of selecting for heterosexuality seems to be morally acceptable. Again
assuming that the method employed in itself raises no moral problem, one cannot consistently object to its use in selecting for heterosexuality with any greater
force than one would object to, for example, (1) parents genetically disposed
to homosexuality refusing to conceive; or (2) parents refusing to eat a certain
food while pregnant or to expose a child to certain books, if such actions were
found to increase the likelihood of a child’s being homosexual. These two actions do not seem to pose serious moral problems. More importantly, selection
for heterosexuality may tangibly benefit parents, children, and their families and
seems to have only a slight potential for any significant harm. Further, parents
making such selections may well be doing so out of good, or at least neutral,
motives. And even when the selection is made out of the worst motive, parental
heterosexism, the act itself serves only as evidence of that bad motive and does
nothing to compound it. Given this, we see no reason, in the case of the selection of a child’s sexual orientation, to deprive parents of the freedom (taken for
granted in a multitude of other contexts) to determine what their children will
be like.
REFERENCES
Allen, C. (1992, March 9 ). Politically incorrect abortion. The New Republic.
Bailey, J. M., and Pillard, R. C. (1991). A genetic study of male sexual orientation. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry
48: 1089–1096.
Bailey, J. M., Pillard, R. C., Neale, M. C., and Agyei, Y. (1993). Heritable factors influence sexual
orientation in women. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 50: 217–223.
Bancroft, J. (1993, July 16). Genetic basis for homosexuality, scientists claim. The Daily Telegraph.
Burr, C. (1993, March). Homosexuality and biology. The Atlantic 271: 47–65.
Campbell, J. (1992, May 11). Test will condemn babies born to be gay. Evening Standard.
Cashman, M. (1993, July 16). Genetic basis for homosexuality, scientists claim. The Daily Telegraph.
Greenberg, A. S., and Bailey, J. M. (1994). The irrelevance of the medical model of mental illness to
law and ethics. Int. J. Law Psychiatry 17: 153–173.
P1: GDB/GDP/GCX
P2: GCQ/LCR/GCY
Archives of Sexual Behavior [asb]
Tally: FTK
PP125-301061
April 24, 2001
Parental Selection of Children’s Sexual Orientation
16:21
Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
437
Hamer, D. H., and Copeland, P. (1994). The Science of Desire, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Hamer, D. H., Hu, S., Magnuson, V. L., Hu, N., and Pattatucci, A. M. L. (1993). A linkage between
DNA markers on the X chromosome and male sexual orientation. Science 261: 321–327.
Holtz, A. (1994, February 6). Perfect People, Part 6: Nightmare Generation? CNN Specials, Transcript
# 281–286.
Hu, S., Pattatucci, A. M. L., Patterson, C., Li, L., Fulker, D. W., Cherny, S. S., Kruglyak, L., and
Hamer, D. H. (1995). Linkage between sexual orientation and chromosome Xq28 in males but
not in females. Nat. Genet. 11: 248–256.
Knox, R. A. (1993, July 18). Existence of gay gene raises ethical concerns. Boston Globe.
Krimsky, S., and Hubbard, R. (1995). The business of research: Human embryo research. The Hastings
Center Report 25: 41–43.
Landers, P. (1993, April 18). If science plays God. Dallas Morning News.
LeVay, S. (1991). A difference in hypothalamic structure between heterosexual and homosexual men.
Science 253: 1034–1037.
LeVay, S. (1993). The Sexual Brain, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Meyer-Bahlburg, H. F. L. (1993). Psychobiologic research on homosexuality. Child Adolesc. Psychiatr.
Clin. N. Am. 2: 489–500.
Murphy, T. F. (1990). Reproductive controls and sexual destiny. Bioethics 4: 121–142.
Schuklenk, U., Stein, E., Kerin, J., and Byne, W. (1997). The ethics of genetic research on sexual
orientation. Hastings Center Report 4: 6 –13.
Stein, E. (1998). Choosing the sexual orientation of children. Bioethics 12: 1–24.
Wertz, D. C., and Fletcher, J. C. (1989). Hastings Center Report 19: 21–27.
Whitam, F. L., Diamond, M., and Martin, J. (1993). Homosexual orientation in twins: A report on 61
pairs and three triplet sets. Arch. Sex. Behav. 22: 187–206.
Wright, R. (1994, October 24). Mr. Clean Genes. The New Republic.