GAO’s Work on
Radiological Security
David Trimble
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Presentation for Organization of Agreement States (OAS)
2014 Annual Meeting
Chicago, IL
August 26, 2014
For more information, contact David Trimble, trimbled@gao.gov, 202-512-3841
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U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
• The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works
for Congress.
• Our Mission is to support the Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the
performance and ensure the accountability of the federal
government for the benefit of the American people.
• We provide Congress with timely information that is objective,
fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced.
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U.S. and International Nuclear Security and
Cleanup Mission Group
• The U.S. and International Nuclear Security and Cleanup mission
group covers a wide range of nuclear issues involving:
• The U.S. nuclear weapons security enterprise;
• Cleanup of U.S. nuclear facilities and Cold War sites;
• Special nuclear material production, consolidation, and
storage;
• Physical and cyber security of U.S. nuclear facilities;
• Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship;
• Nuclear nonproliferation;
• Nuclear and radiological smuggling and terrorism;
• International worker and nuclear safety;
• Department of Energy's project management and contracting.
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GAO’s Focus on Nuclear and Nonproliferation
Issues
• Key areas of focus for nuclear and radiological nonproliferation
include:
• Combating Nuclear Smuggling Overseas—GAO has issued
several reports identifying challenges impacting the
effectiveness of DOE’s Second Line Defense program, which
provides the majority of radiation detection equipment at
international border sites and seaports;
• Securing U.S. Borders—GAO has reported on DHS’s Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) since 2006, and identified
challenges in developing a Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, replacing radiation detection equipment, and
coordinating R&D across the agency;
• Securing Radiological Materials—GAO has issued several
reports on federal efforts to secure potential “dirty bomb”
material both overseas and in the U.S., with recent work
focusing on securing radiological materials in the U.S.
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Recent Congressional Interest in Radiological
Security
•
•
GAO testimonies
• “Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of U.S. Industrial Radiological
Sources”, before Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (U.S.
Senate, June 12, 2014);
• “Further Actions Needed by U.S. Agencies to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear and
Radiological Materials”, before Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (U.S. Senate, March 14, 2012).
Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Bill for FY2015 (June 16, 2014)
• Within 5 years, NRC shall establish mandatory security standards for all
equipment using high risk radiological material in the U.S.;
• NRC shall base new mandatory security standards on security criteria established
by NNSA/GTRI;
• During 5-year period NRC develops and implements new minimum security
standards, facilities have option to receive NNSA/GTRI support on a cost share
arrangement (GTRI provides no more than 50% of total costs), but after 5 years
facilities responsible for all costs;
• NNSA/GTRI will create program to explore use of non-radioactive or very shortlived radioactive replacement technologies and within 15 years NRC will
discontinue licensing for new high-risk radiological sources unless replacement
technologies are not available.
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GAO’s Recent Focus on Domestic Radiological
Source Security
• Reported on industrial radiological security in the U.S. in June
2014
• “Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of U.S.
Industrial Radiological Sources” (GAO-14-293)
• Reported on radiological security at U.S. medical facilities in
September 2012
• “Additional Actions Needed to Improve Security of
Radiological Sources at U.S. Medical Facilities” (GAO-12925)
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GAO Report on Industrial Radiological Security
• Visited 33 facilities in 6 states, including: California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming.
• Types of facilities included: industrial radiographers using Ir192 radiography cameras, well loggers within Am-241 well
logging devices, Co-60 panoramic irradiators, and Cs-137
research irradiators used in aerospace and manufacturing
sectors.
• Primary federal agencies we spoke to: NRC, NNSA, and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
• Met with Agreement State officials from California, Colorado,
Texas, and Washington State.
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Main Findings in Industrial Radiological
Security Report
• Challenges exist in reducing risks for mobile and stationary
industrial radiological sources
• We identified four cases in which radiological sources were
stolen while on trucks since NRC’s increased controls security
order was issued in December 2005;
• We identified two cases of individuals impersonating state
radiological safety and security inspectors at remote worksites
where mobile sources were being used.
• Licensees face challenges in protecting against an insider threat
• Officials at 7 of the 33 facilities we reviewed said that they have
granted unescorted access to high-risk radiological sources to
individuals with criminal histories;
• We found two cases where employees of industrial
radiographers in two different states were granted unescorted
access despite having serious criminal records (including one
individual with two convictions for terroristic threats).
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Recommendations Addressing Industrial
Radiological Security
• GAO made four recommendations to strengthen the security of
industrial radiological sources in the U.S.
• NRC should obtain the views of key stakeholders, such as
licensees, during the development of the Best Practices Guide.
• NRC should reconsider whether the definition of collocation
should be revised for well logging facilities that routinely keep
radiological sources in a single area but secured in separate
storage containers.
• NRC should conduct an assessment of the T&R process to
determine if it provides reasonable assurance against insider
threats. Specifically, why criminal history was not provided to a
licensee during the T&R process, and if NRC should consider
whether certain criminal convictions or other indicators should
disqualify an employee from T&R status or trigger a greater role
for NRC.
• NNSA, NRC, and DHS should review their existing collaboration
mechanism for opportunities to enhance collaboration,
especially in the development of new technologies.
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GAO Report on Radiological Security at U.S.
Medical Facilities
• Visited 26 hospitals in California, Maryland, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington,
D.C.
• Mainly visited hospitals and bloods banks with Cs-137
irradiators and Co-60 gamma knife machines.
• Main federal agencies visited were NRC and National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). Also, met with officials from
DOD and the VA.
• Met with Agreement State Officials from 20 of the 37
Agreement States.
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Main Findings in Medical Radiological Security
Report
•
•
Some medical facilities licensed by NRC are more vulnerable than others
to potential sabotage and theft because of security weaknesses.
• At one hospital we observed that the interior door to the hospital blood
bank had the combination to the lock written on the door frame;
• At another hospital, we were told that the current data system does not
allow entering more than 500 individuals with unescorted access. In
the past, the hospital had as many as 800 people with T&R status.
NNSA has completed security upgrades at more than 300 medical
facilities, but some hospitals do not participate in the voluntary program.
• NNSA does not expect to complete security upgrades at all facilities
until 2025;
• As of July 2012, 14 facilities containing over 41,000 curies of high-risk
material, have declined to participate in the NNSA program.
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Recommendations Addressing Medical
Radiological Security
• GAO made four recommendations to address radiological
security at U.S. medical facilities.
• NRC, NNSA, and Agreement State Officials increase
outreach efforts to promote awareness of and participation
in NNSA’s security upgrade program.
• NRC strengthen its security requirements by providing
hospitals and medical facilities with specific measures they
must take to develop and sustain a more effective security
program.
• NRC ensure that NRC and Agreement State inspectors
receive more comprehensive security training.
• NRC supplement existing guidance for facilities in how to
adequately secure equipment containing high-risk
radiological sources.
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Ongoing and Planned Nonproliferation
Portfolio
• Current nonproliferation engagements:
• Second Line Defense;
• Status of four-year nuclear material security initiative.
• Areas of new work that are not yet underway:
• Security of high risk radiological material in transit;
• Alternative/substitute technologies for high-risk radiological
sources.
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GAO on the Web
Web site: http://www.gao.gov/
Congressional Relations
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(202) 512-4800, U.S. Government Accountability Office
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