L15-Logistics

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The Impact of Logistics on War
Lesson Objectives
• Define "logistics”
• Begin to understand its importance in modern war.
Logistics Case Study
The Russian Campaign of 1812
Napoleonic Empire 1812
Russian Campaign
1812
Why did Napoleon attack Russia?
Strategic Objectives
"I have come to finish off, once and for all, the Colossus of
Northern Barbarism. The sword is drawn. They must be thrust
back into their snow and ice, so that for a quarter of a century at
least they will not be able to interfere with civilied [sic] Europe."
Napoleon I
June 1812
With Napoleon in Russia: The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza (From the
original memoirs as edited by Jean Hanoteau. Abridged, edited, and with an introduction by
George Libaire) (1935 William Morrow & Co. New York).
Quoted in:
Richard Orsinger
“France During the French Revolution and Under Napoleon Bonaparte”
http://www.txdirect.net/users/rrichard/napoleo1.htm
Operational Objective
Engage and destroy the Russian army just inside the border
• No intention to go on to Moscow (reported)
Chronology
1812
June 24
Crossed Nieman River into Russia
Napoleon Enters Russia
June 24, 1812
Napoleon entered Russia with > 400,000 men *
* Reports vary from 400,000 to 685,000
The Russian Campaign


Konigsberg to Moscow ~ 680 miles (~ 1,100 Km)
TheMinard’s
RussianGraphic
Campaign
Charles Joseph Minard
"It may well be the best statistical graphic ever drawn.“
Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 1983
Minard’s Graphic
Charles Joseph Minard
Minard’s Graphic
Charles Joseph Minard
"It may well be the best statistical graphic ever drawn.“
Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 1983
Chronology
1812
June 24
Crossed Nieman River into Russia
September 7
Battle of Borodino
• Indecisive; enormous losses for both sides
September 14
Entered Moscow
Battle of Borodino
Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights
September 7, 1812
Battle of Borodino
September 7, 1812
Moscow
Napoleon arrived September 15, 1812 with ~100,000 men
Chronology
1812
June 24
Crossed Nieman River into Russia
September 7
Battle of Borodino
• Indecisive; enormous losses for both sides
September 14
Entered Moscow
October 18
Began retreat from Moscow
December 14
Remnants of Grand Armee left Russia
Retreat From Moscow
Napoleon’s Retreat From Moscow
Adolph Northern
•
Retreat From Moscow
"I have no army any more! For many days I have been
marching in the midst of a mob of disbanded, disorganized
men, who wander all over the countryside in search of food."
Napoleon Bonaparte, 1812
In 1812
Illarion Pryanishnikov
•
The Russian Campaign
Russian Campaign
Napoleon entered Russia with > 400,000 men
June 1812
Napoleon left Russia with 20,000 to 45,000 men
December 1812
" ... the most conspicuous logistical failure
in the history of warfare."
Stanley L. Falk Introduction to Pure Logistics
What Went Wrong?
The Magnitude of the Problem
Napoleon’s Challenge
Entered Russia with over 400,000 men
150,000 “primary” horses
120,000 supply train horses
Feed ration per horse: 8 lbs. oats + 12 lbs. hay = 20 lbs/horse/day
Feed for 270,000 horses = 5,400,000 lbs. = 2,700 tons/day!
For one week of travel (~100 miles), fodder requirement is
19,800 tons!
… just for the horses!
Napoleon’s Challenge
Put another way:
Using this technology
Napoleon’s Challenge
Accomplish this:
Twice each week
… for 100 miles
Napoleon’s Challenge
More
Assuming only half the 120,000 provision horses
were used to draw wagons,
At six horses per wagon,
… that would be 10,000 wagons at ~2 tons each
Napoleon’s Challenge
Allowing ~100 ft. per wagon, that’s about 50 wagons/mile
so …
10,000 wagons single file would stretch 200 miles!
What Went Wrong?
Plenty of food in the storehouses
Food and fodder available in the countryside
… if properly requisitioned
Transportation resources poorly managed
• Could not provide enough wagons
• Wagons available not effectively used
First echelons plundered as they went
• Left nothing for those who followed
Returned over much the same route as ingress
What Went Wrong?
“ …the Grande Armee’s problems were at all times, including the
retreat from Moscow, largely due to bad discipline. This, of
course, was partly due to logistics shortages.”
“It would, however, be unwise to attribute this solely to the
problems of supply. The need to protect enormously long
lines of communication and to leave garrisons behind and
the effects of distance per se were also factors of major
importance.”
Martin van Creveld
Supplying War
The Russian Campaign
Russian Campaign
Consequences
Europe realized that Napoleon was not invincible
Reinforced the importance of logistics in war
… one more time!
What Have People Said About
Logistics Over the Ages?
“Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the
conduct of military operations, logistics the
means therefore.”
George Thorpe
Pure Logistics
What Have People Said About
Logistics Over the Ages?
“Strategy decides where to act;
logistics brings the troops to this point.”
Baron de Jomini
A
What Have People Said About
Logistics Over the Ages?
The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…”
Sun Tzu
What Have People Said About
Logistics Over the Ages?
Amateurs talk strategy.
tactics.
Professionals talk logistics
Different
Author Unknown Author
So what is Logistics?
So what is Logistics?
“Logistics is the ‘practical art of moving armies.’”
Baron de Jomini
Logistics
The art and science of managing and controlling
the flow of goods, energy and information
• production and procurement (strategic)
• transportation (operational)
• distribution (tactical)
• maintenance (all)
The Logistician
Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who are very much in demand in war,
and who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only in facts, but must work
for men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much a
Generals are
happily
blessed
race who
radiate
confidence
power.
fact.aThey
disappear
in peace because
peace is
mostly theory.
The peopleand
who merchant
in theories,
who employ
logisticians
war and
ignore them
peace, are
generals.
They feed only
on and
ambrosia
and
drink inonly
nectar.
In in
peace,
they
stride
confidentlyGenerals
and can
a world
simply
sweeping
their
hands
are a invade
happily blessed
race who
radiate by
confidence
and power.
They
feed only on
ambrosia
and
drink
only
nectar.
In
peace,
they
stride
confidently
and
can
invade
a world
grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain
simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up
corridors, and
defiles
sides
their
terrainblocking
corridors, and
blocking and
defilesobstacles
and obstacles with
with thethe
sides
of theirof
hands.
In war,
they must
stride
morestride
slowly because
general
has a logistician
on his has
back
hands. In war,
they
must
moreeach
slowly
because
eachriding
general
and he knows that, at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No,
a logistician
his
backfear
and
he knows
anygenerals
moment,
the
youriding
can't do on
that."
Generals
logisticians
in warthat,
and inat
peace,
try to forget
logistician logisticians.
may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that."
Generals fear
logisticians
war, and
in peaceandgenerals
to forget
Romping
along besideingenerals
are strategists
tacticians. try
Logisticians
despise
strategists and tacticians. Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until
logisticians.
they grow to become generals -- which they usually do.
Sometimes a logistician becomes a general. If he does, he must associate with generals
whom he hates; he has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises; and, on
his back, is a logistician whom he fears. This is why logisticians who become generals
always have ulcers and cannot eat their ambrosia.
Author Unknown
http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.ht
m
Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power.
They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride
confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands
grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain
corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their
hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has
a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the
logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that."
Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget
logisticians.
Author Unknown
http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm
Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power.
They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride
confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands
grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain
corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their
hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has
a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the
logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that."
Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget
logisticians.
Author Unknown
http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm
Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power.
They feed only on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace, they stride
confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands
grandly over a map, pointing their fingers decisively up terrain
corridors, and blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their
hands. In war, they must stride more slowly because each general has
a logistician riding on his back and he knows that, at any moment, the
logistician may lean forward and whisper: "No, you can't do that."
Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace generals try to forget
logisticians.
Author Unknown
http://logistics.about.com/library/bllogistician.htm
Definitions
(review)
Strategy
A plan to match resources to objectives
[basic definition]
“Matching ends to means”
Definitions
Strategy
A plan to match resources to objectives
Logistics
Process of putting resources to work
to achieve objectives
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