Ford Foundation/MINDS Conference
New Economic Thinking, Teaching and
Policy Perspectives: A Brazilian Perspective
within a Global Dialogue
The BICs in the Renewed “Global” Coordinating Bodies:
What has happened so far and what should be happening?
Lori Wallach lwallach@citizen.org
Global Trade Watch www.tradewatch.org
Rio de Janeiro, November, 8 2011
Renewed….?
WTO Stuck in 1994: Enforcing
Comprehensive Rules
Implementing “Faith-based”
Model of Globalization
1994: WTO global governance system replaces
GATT trade rules as “Uruguay Round” goes
into effect
From Actual Trade Agt. to an Expansive Int’l
Governance Regime Branded as “Free Trade”
The Bretton Woods Era (post-WWII to mid-1970s)
The Bretton Woods Era
GATT 1947
IMF
World Bank
• Trade in goods
• Gold standard
• Short-term trade floats
• Finance rebuilding of
Europe & Japan
• Tariffs and quotas
(early 1990s to
present day)
(early ‘90s to
present day)
Corporate Globalization Era II
WTO
NAFTA,
CAFTA,
(binding dispute
settlement)
“Free Trade”
Agreements
BITS
GATT
These pacts are not “Free Trade”
• Adam Smith
Adam Smith and David
Ricardo rolling in their
graves?
Free trade: an appealing
brand, but not what is
contained in the 900 pages of
non-tariff rules of the WTO or
U.S. and EU Free Trade
Agreements
“We are writing the
constitution for a single
global economy."
- Candid revelation from the
WTO’s 1st Director General
Renato Ruggerio, 1995
Not Mainly About “Trade”, but a System of
Enforceable Global Governance

WTO/FTAs REQUIRE: “Each Member shall ensure the conformity
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.” –Art. XVI-4,
Agt. Establishing the WTO
(Annexed agreement refers to 16 major “Uruguay Round” WTO agts.
Only a minority of them focus on trade per se. Went into effect in 1995
with some phase ins for developing countries)

These rules are enforced by binding dispute resolution via
foreign tribunals with ruling enforced by trade indefinite
sanctions; No due process; No outside appeal

Cross retaliation: goods (tariffs on Brazilian soy, beef eg)
for financial service/financial stability measures
Attacks Against Domestic Laws at the
WTO Almost Always Succeed
All WTO
Disputes
United States United States
as Plaintiff
as Defendant
Plaintiff Win
156
32
58
Defendant
Win
16
6
6
Total % WTO
Cases Won
by Plaintiffs
90.7%
84.2%
90.6%
Free Trade Agts, EU “Economic Partnership Agts”
Even More Comprehensive; Plus 2500 BITS Impose
Same Investment Regime, Private Enforcement
Everything in WTO, PLUS

Special rights and privileges for foreign investors PREESTABLISHMENT and elevate individual private investor to equal
status of nation-state: empower corporations to directly enforce
by challenging domestic health, environmental laws in foreign
tribunals

Expansive TRIPS-plus patent rights, data exclusivity, linkage

Expansive top-down service sector rules (financial deregulation,
‘market access’ rights that promote privatization, concentration,
forbid common policies)

Top-down comprehensive procurement rules
Washington Consensus Dead? WTO, FTAs
living delivery mechanisms for package of
“neoliberal” policies with enforcement…




New foreign investor rights:
no approvals of foreign
ownership, limits on
industrial policy/
performance requirements
Finance liberalization -no
currency controls, radical
deregulation
Establish expansive IP
rights
Privatize public
procurement sector – no
domestic preferences




Privatize, deregulate
services (health, energy,
water, education)
Food traded like any other
good, not a necessity of life
Cut, weaken or harmonize
to global norms domestic
regulatory standards
Commodify ‘commons’ –
establish tradable units of
natural resources, water,
human genes, biodiversity
What has happened so far and
what should be happening?

1994: WTO starts. US & EU have leftover agenda, dubbed “New
Issues” or “Singapore Issues” pushed by multinat’l corp. sector:
more financial liberalization & deregulation; expansive foreign
investor privileges; procurement sector disciplines; competition
policy (right for private firms to compete w/ “monopoly” govt
services); trade facilitation (prioritize govt $$ for ports, customs)

“New Issues” pushed at 1996 Singapore Ministerial, 1999 Seattle
Ministerial. Then US, EU use post 9-11 political dynamic to launch
2001 Doha Round cynically dubbed “Development Round” over
“Implementation Agenda” favored by developing countries. 2003,
“New Issue” largely forced off agenda – Brazil plays key role.

DESPITE GLOBAL FIN. CRISIS, SHIFTS IN THINKING: US, EU, SOME
OTHERS & WTO SECRETARIAT STILL PUSHING OLD AGENDA. US
& EU now blocking even review of ‘90s WTO fin. service dereg rules
WTO’s Gen. Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
& FTA service sector chaps vs. Financial Regulation

5 interlocking WTO agreements: GATS, 2 GATS Annexes on
Financial Services, the 2nd and 5th Protocols to GATS (the 5th
Protocol established WTO Financial Services Agreement (FSA)) &
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services

Plus countries’ GATS schedules of financial services commitments –
Brazil limited, so targeted in Doha Round

Scope wide: covers govt policies of general application that ‘affect
services.” Even covers delegated authority: eg. credit rating
agencies;Only services provided exclusively by the govt, not on
market basis or also in private sector excluded from coverage

AGREEMENTS THAT REGULATE REGULATION…
Service Sector Privatization and Dereg:
WTO GATS and FTAs Chaps 12 & 13

WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services & FTA service
sector chapters cover every way a service may be delivered
- “Mode 4” is immigration policy: “movement of natural persons
across borders to deliver a service”
- “Mode 2” is consumption abroad: cannot stop capital flight if
banking Mode 2 commitments
- “Mode 3” is foreign investment: right to enter and operate under
deregulatory trade pact rules

100 WTO members took financial service commitments. 40
developing countries that have Mode 3 commitments. 26
developed countries took unlimited Mode 1 commitments. 22 more
took significant Mode 1 commitments. Turkey, Sri Lanka, Nigeria,
Aruba, Netherland Antilles and 8 transitional economies now in EU
used “Understanding”

Brazil took mainly Mode 3 – foreign presence- commitments in
financial services.
Problem #1: GATS conflates
liberalization and deregulation…
“Market Access” (GATS Art XVI-2) simply
forbids countries from using a list of 5
non-discriminatory regulatory measures
in financial sectors they committed to
WTO liberalization:
“In sectors where market-access commitments are
undertaken, the measures which a Member shall not
maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional
subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless
otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as…”
GATS conflates liberalization & deregulation II
CANNOT BAN A SERVICE, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT IN
COMMITTED SECTOR
“(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the
form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers
or the requirements of an economic needs test;”
-
Some fin services/products so dangerous, lacking in social utility, should be
banned. BUT 2004 WTO ruling In Internet Gambling case: regulatory ban is a
forbidden zero quota.
-
SEC-proposing ban on naked short sales/flash trades; German ban on spec.
short-selling: European Centre for Int’l Political Economy says Germany’s
ban is a GATS violation & not defensible under prudential defense b’ while
non-discriminatory it’s beyond other countries’ approach
-
WTO Secretariat 2/ 2010 paper: “an outright prohibition to provide a certain
financial service would be a trade measure subject to scheduling under the
GATS” IE. if a country’s deregulation-prone gov’t did not think to schedule
a ban during the ‘90s (as the U.S. did with respect to securities and
derivatives, but only for onions futures), imposing a ban now in a committed
sector would put the country in violation of WTO
GATS conflates liberalization & deregulation III
NO LIMITS ON SIZE OR FIREWALLS
“(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas
or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c)
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output
expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an
economic needs test;
-
Some countries (Brazil) scheduled specific exceptions to allow such
measures. US committed to “reform” Glass-Steagall to make it GATS
compatible
-
GEITHNER via FOIA: April 1990 - under-30 year-old Treasury Dept
official named Timothy Geithner raised the possibility that GlassSteagall firewalls, state level regulations, and other prudential
measures could be challenged under the new global rules…
-
See, Markus Krajewski & Petros Mavroidis (was a lawyer at WTO
Secretariat) re. problems with these rules
-
See http://www.citizen.org/documents/memo-gats-conflict-with-banksize-limits-may-10-2011.pdf for more details and how to fix problem
GATS conflates liberalization & deregulation IV
CANNOT REQUIRE COMMITTED SERVICE ONLY BE
OFFERED VIA SPECIFIC LEGAL FORMS
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or
joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service;”
IF YOU LIBERALIZE UNDER GATS, CANNOT ALSO
LIMIT DEGREE OF FOREIGN CONTROL
“(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value
of individual or aggregate foreign investment.”
This last constraint is only “Market Access” rule that refer
to degree of “access” – all of the rest are limits on nondiscriminatory regulation
Problem #2: Bans capital management
techniques in committed sectors…

When a country commits to allow cross-border trade (Mode
1) in a specific sector, cannot restrict/delay current &
capital inflows/outflows related to service When a country
commits to allow foreign direct investment (Mode 3), it
commits to allow capital inflows. (Brazil took some Mode 3
commitments in banking and securities…)
GATS Art. XVI fn 8: “If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in
relation to the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in
subparagraph 2(a) of Article I [i.e. Mode 1] and if the cross-border movement of
capital is an essential part of the service itself, that Member is thereby committed to
allow such movement of capital. If a Member undertakes a market-access
commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the
mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I [i.e. Mode 3], it is
thereby committed to allow related transfers of capital into its territory.”
Bans capital management techniques in
committed sectors…

When a country commits to allow foreign direct
investment (Mode 3), it commits to allow current
inflows and outflows related to that service.
(GATS Art. XI)
GATS Article XI: Payments and Transfers
“1. Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article XII, a Member shall not
apply restrictions on international transfers and payments for current transactions
relating to its specific commitments.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the members
of the International Monetary Fund under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund,
including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the Articles of
Agreement, provided that a Member shall not impose restrictions on any capital
transactions inconsistently with its specific commitments regarding such
transactions, except under Article XII or at the request of the Fund.”
Ban on capital management
techniques in committed sectors…

These limits on capital management policy apply to all
service sectors bound to GATS (and the FTAs have similar
language.) But when applied to fin servs commitments
have effect of severely limiting countries’ abilities to
manage their current and capital accounts

No “limitations” on these obligations can be scheduled

Only exception is in GATS Art. XXII: short term use in
balance of payments crisis with IMF ok. So, cannot have in
place to stop in flows of hot money

More at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/MemoonCapitalControls.
pdf
WTO Secretariat 2/2010 Report Affirms




“Although its main focus is on the liberalization of trade in
financial services, the GATS could require individual
Members to allow capital movements associated with a
broad range of – primarily – financial services, depending
on the level of specific commitments undertaken…”
“Cross-border trade in some other services, for example,
acceptance of deposits, lending, or trading in securities, is
inseparable from capital movements. Hence, liberalizing
such services transactions requires the liberalization of the
related capital flows to make the transactions effective…
“restrictions on transfers and payments for current
transactions must not be maintained where a Member has
made a commitment on financial services…
“Members undertake not to impose restrictions on any
capital transactions inconsistently with its specific
commitments regarding those transactions.”
Financial Transaction Tax as GATS
Violation? Economists Call for Changes
Unhappy example comes from EC staff before last G-20:
“the compatibility of such a levy with Article XI of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which provides that WTO
Members cannot apply any restrictions on international transfer
and payments for current transactions relating to their specific
commitments, would have to be further assessed. As the EU has
taken specific commitments relating to financial transactions,
including lending, deposits, securities and derivatives trading and
these commitments relate to transactions with third countries, a
currency transactions tax could constitute a breach of the EU's
GATS obligations.”
-
EC staff working document, “Innovative financing at a
global level,” SEC(2010) 409 final, 4/l/10
1/2011 Letter to Geithner, Clinton, USTR Kirk: eliminate limits
on capital management polices from trade agreements from
260 mainly pro-free trade economists, organized by Kevin
Gallagher
Problem #3: Limits on other forms of
domestic regulation (licensing, etc)



GATS Art VI-4: Domestic Regulations
-covers qualification requirements and
procedures, technical standards and licensing
requirements (Brazil took exception that EU wants
you to remove…)
- Tribunal decides if reg was “foreseeable”
and/or is “more burdensome than necessary to
ensure the quality of the# service”
Working Party on Domestic Regs = more
disciplines
Accountancy Disciplines from Arthur Anderson
Problem #4: Possible Exception for
“Prudential Measures” Is Ambiguous at Best
GATS Annex on Financial Services, Art. 2(a)
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy
holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the
integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the
provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s
commitments or obligations under the Agreement” [italics added].
Agreement it is unclear if/how it can be used. May be
self-cancelling. Weakest of 5 versions put forth in
1990s. And, even if it is operation would not cover nonprudential matters, like policies directing finance to
development (X% of loans must be in Y sector),
banning speculation in food futures to counter price
crisis, etc. More at
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=783
Part of Financial Stability Problem not absence of a
global regime of financial regulation…
BUT, existence of a binding global
financial governance regime via WTO and
other ‘trade’ agts that explicitly constrains
governments’ domestic financial
regulatory space and includes strongly
enforced provisions that conflict with
‘commitments’ or recommendations at G20, UN Special Commission on Crisis,
UNCTAD related to global norms and
domestic reregulatory efforts
WTO Secretariat says…

Countries should have taken exceptions back in the 1990s (using
crystal ball about future “innovations” they wanted to regulate?)

Prudential “carve out”

Countries can negotiate compensation to remove sectors – GATS
Art. XXI

No challenges yet… yes, during era of deregulation, but now as
countries reregulate, threats starting.

Responses at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/That%27sAllTheyGot.pdf
UN Commission Crisis, UNCTAD on
WTO- Financial Regulation Conflict
Agreements that restrict a country’s ability to revise its
regulatory regime – including not only domestic prudential but,
crucially, capital account regulations – obviously have to be
altered, in light of what has been learned about deficiencies in
this crisis. In particular, there is concern that existing
agreements under the WTO’s Financial Services Agreement
might, were they enforced, impede countries from revising their
regulatory structures in ways that would promote growth, equity,
and stability.”
– Stiglitz Commission
UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2-11 pages 100-103
goes through problems citing provisions.
World changed, but not WTO…

Despite financial crises, current trend towards reregulation,
1990s policies remain in place, with enforcement

Doha Round core element is more financial deregulation, both
more commitments and new constraints on regulation. Brazil
one of top targets. Post crisis, US and EU continue to push for
more financial dereg. See
www.tradewatch.org/DohaMoreDereg

And full bore effort by WTO Secretariat and US and EU not to
even discuss possible problems, review old rules…
U.S. and EU target BRICS
FINANCIAL SERVICES, EC REQUEST TO BRAZIL (Leaked)
Brazil has committed this sector only partially. The EC requests that it be
committed as follows:
GENERAL
Brazil has not yet accepted the Fifth protocol. EC Request: Ratify.
- EC Request: Undertake commitments in accordance with the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
INSURANCE
- Mode 3: MA and NT- In direct insurance (life and non-life), reinsurance and
insurance intermediation, direct branching, is not allowed. EC Request: Allow
direct branching.
-Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT – MAT insurance is only partly committed. EC Request:
Take full commitments in accordance with the Understanding.
-Mode 3: MA- In life and non-life insurance, requirement of enactment of a
Presidential decree for the establishment of a commercial presence (i.e. case-bycase authorisation by the Executive Branch). EC Request: Eliminate requirement.
-Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT - Reinsurance and retrocession are unbound. EC
Request: Take full commitments.
More EC WTO Doha Round Financial
Sector Demands on Brazil
INSURANCE CONTINUED
-Mode 3: MA and NT – State monopoly on reinsurance and retrocession services.
EC Request: Open to competition and undertake full
-Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT- Unbound in insuranceintermediation (agencies and
brokers). EC Request:
commitments for reinsurance, retrocession services. Commit intermediation of
reinsurance and of MAT
insurance in accordance with the Understanding.
BANKING AND OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES
Various activities are not covered: credit, charge and debit cards, pension fund
management, and provision and transfer of financial information. EC Request:
Take full commitments in modes 1,2 and 3 for provision and transfer of
financial information, in modes 2 and 3 in other sub-sectors, and commit in
mode 4 as referred to in the section “Horizontal commitments”
Mode 2: MA and NT- Unbound in all sub-sectors. EC Request: Take full
commitments.
More EC WTO Financial Sector Demands on Brazil
BANKING AND SECURITIES CONT.
Mode 3: MA- For all financial institutions, requirement of a case-by-case
authorisation by Presidential decree (subject to unspecified criteria) for the
establishment of a commercial presence. EC Request: Eliminate this restriction.
-Mode 3: MA- Existence of discriminatory limitations on the expansion of the
number of branches (including ATMs). EC Request: Remove this limitation.
-Mode 3: Foreign banks’ branches and subsidiaries cannot establish as “universal
banks”. EC Request: Allow establishment as universal banks.
- Modes 1 and 2: MA and NT- Unbound for advisory services. EC Request: Take
full commitments.
-Mode 3: NT – Forbidden to maintain accounts denominated in foreign currencies
in Brazil. EC Request: Open up this possibility.
-Mode 3: Only Brazilian financial institutions are entitled to provide asset
management services for federal and State agencies and companies. EC Request:
Open these asset management services to foreign companies established in Brazil.
-Mode 3: Only State-owned banks are entitled to provide commercial banking
services to federal, state or municipal agencies and companies. EC Request: Open
to competition these services.
More EC WTO Financial Sector Demands on Brazil
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
EC REQUEST TO BRAZIL: Brazil has committed this sector only partially. The
EC requests that this sector is committed as follows:
B. ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND BOOKKEEPING SERVICES (CPC 862)
- Mode 1: MA and NT – This mode remains unbound. EC Request: Take full
commitments, i.e. schedule “none”, under MA and NT for accounting and
bookkeeping services
- Mode 2: MA and NT – This mode remains unbound. EC Request: Take full
commitments, i.e. schedule “none”, under MA and NT for the entire CPC 862
- Mode 3: MA – Prohibitions concerning participation of non-residents in
juridical persons and use of foreign names. EC Request: Remove
•
- Mode 3: NT – Requirements concerning registration and use of standards. EC
Request: Remove. In accordance with the Scheduling Guidelines adopted by
the Council of Trade in Services (S/L/92 of March 2001), such entry does not
need to be scheduled
US, EU and their large financial firms
even oppose REVIEW of current rules


2010: Fought Brazil, Ecuador, S Africa, Argentina, India requests
for review of bailouts
Last week blocked Ecuador’s “Proposal for furthering work on
Regulatory Measures in Financial Services, for inclusion in the
Ministerial Declaration”
" …In the context of the current international financial crisis, Ministers
instruct the Committee on Trade in Financial Services to continue to review
the WTO rules so as to promote and ensure the preservation of policy space
for macro-prudential regulations and the integrity and stability of the
financial system..."

South Africa, India, China, Argentina, Barbados, Dominican
Republic, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Norway and Turkey strongly
supported; Brazil, less strong; US, EU, Canada and Australia
oppose
Foreign Investor Rights: WTO TRIMS
and NAFTA “Chapter 11”

WTO & NAFTA: Ban common performance requirements,
domestic content rules. In FTAs, this is absolute ban, not only re.
investors from signatories.

Post-establishment nat’ treatment (Once established, foreign
firms must get same treatment as domestics re. taxes,
conditions, regulation – Brazil took horizontal natl treatment
exception for research and development subsidies) “In accordance
with laws and regulations governing foreign investment, all foreign
capital invested in Brazil must be registered with the Central Bank of
Brazil to be eligible for remittances. The Central Bank establishes
procedures related to remittances and transfer of funds abroad. “

Ban on capital transfers limits, with limited exceptions for short
term IMF-ordered actions for BOP crises
FTA Investment Rules




Pre-establishment nat’l treatment
Guaranteed minimum standard of treatment
Compensation for indirect “regulatory” takings
(government action that diminishes values of
investment, undermines expected future profit)
Private investor-state enforcement - foreign
investors skirt domestic courts & laws to
privately enforce new “trade” pact rights via
claims at World Bank and UN tribunals for
taxpayer compensation over alleged violations of
FTA rights
Some NAFTA and CAFTA “InvestorState” Cases
Over $350 million in public funds paid to investors so far





Metalclad v. Mexico - toxic waste & land use
Ethyl v. Canada – Chemical ban/public health
Loewen v. U.S. - U.S. civil court judgment
Methenex – MTBE ban (US dodges bullet and STILL pays
legal fees!)
Pac Rim, Renco mining cases
$12 billion in pending claims under NAFTA, CAFTA and
Peru FTA relating to environmental, public health &
transportation policy – not trade issues.
Comprehensive list of all cases, summaries at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart-april-2011.pdf
Government procurement: WTO AGP,
FTA Procurement Chapters


Constraints on how govts may spend public revenues in
construction projects, purchase of goods & services
Creates new privately tradable units from what is otherwise
a policy tool for job creation, development of domestic
capacity/ know-how
-Foreign firms be provided same access as domestic firms
-Limits on allowable bidder conditions (cannot require they
use domestically-manufactured inputs or provide training
-Limits on specifications for goods & services sought; only
functional descriptions. (X gH electricity is ok, requiring
‘renewable source’ electricity is not)
It is a POLITICAL QUESTION
JUST ON FINANCIAL SECTOR…

Institutional turf wars or silos/lack of coordination/ ignorance) w/in nat’l
govs: e.g. regulators/Central Banks v. trade negotiators
(It’s a financial crisis, do you know where your trade negotiator is…?)

Policy incoherence:
- Domestic: Industrial policy in Brazil’s dom. strategy v. WTO position
- G-20 calls for conclusion of Doha Round & for financial reregulation

Threats of challenges against others while simultaneously reregulating
– chilling effect

Role of extremely powerful financial firms at WTO, in US and EU ‘trade’
policymaking vs. diffuse public interest
BICs Special Role…
•
At Cancun 2003 Minist., G-20 (WTO version) led by Brazil organize, exert
power, get “New Issues” thrown off Doha Round agenda. Example of
potential, effective use of new power - leveraging WTO consensus
process. Brazil leadership, partnership w/ India, South Africa etc key.
•
But, then, US and EU seduction strategy to invite Brazil, China, India to be
new G-5 at WTO. This group then revived anti-development Doha Round…
Appeal to BIG versus developing. Example of threat of cooption via
invitation to table.
•
Then, NAMA (industrial) 11 bloc forms to defend industrial policy space:
Brazil, Arg., Venezuela, and S. Africa, Venezuela, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Namibia, Philippines, Tunisia. BrazIL policy: MERCOSUR b4 WTO, unity
w/ Argentina on NAMA. Example of potential of coordinated strategy.
•
But, July 2008: Brazil in Green Room, agrees to deal with US, EU, India,
China. Based on 12/2008 texts: NAMA terms would have wiped out
Brazil’s tariffs, industrial policy space. Even if trade off was for agribiz,
limited US concessions on subsidies… Example of use by others of BICs
for divide and conquer among developing countries (US corporate lobby
insisted US double back and say no.)
•
NAMA 11 never really been a cohesive force since then. Major set back
developing country power on industrial policy. South Africa, Argentina
still very strong, but lonely.
New IP Protections Required: WTO
TRIPS and FTA TRIPS-plus


30 year monopoly patents covering wide
range of subject matter
- climate/energy technologies
- manufacturing innovations
- medicines (in FTAs, even testing data)
Signatories required to put CRIMINAL
sanctions for TRIPS/FTA IP violations in their
domestic law to be in compliance with pacts
BICs Special Role…




Because of almost-deal ok’d by BICs, December 2008
WTO development-MIA texts are operating texts since.
Only stuck because US is demanding more.
Now, what will BICs role be at WTO? WTO Ministerial 122011 to set future agenda. Major structural, policy issues
eg. “Zombie Doha Round and New Issues” versus
“Implementation Agenda
Opportunity: Counterforce to US, EU bloc (and
corporations their position represent) when there is unity,
quais-formal blocs formed, policy silos broken, unified
strategy worked out, counter initiatives created.
What will future agenda of WTO be? Ministerial this
December. Will it get “toxic assets” of its books? Power of
BICs because they are key to WTO’s legitimacy, role…
More of same Model that Proved to be
Damaging or New Economic Thinking?