Looking back
25 years
EVOS in the rear
view mirror
Bob Spies
Oil Spill Response Symposium
University of New Hampshire
October 28, 2014
Overview
 I am an effects expert not a response expert; but
I have a few observations and opinions on
response (i.e., caveat emptor)
 History of the EVOS and the scientific effort
 Confronting uncertainty in spill science
 The early toll
 Early years: 1989-1994
 Late years: 1994-2002
 How “bad” was it?
 Lessons learned
EVOS: The black swan, a
metaphor and a real tragedy
 What happened in April 1989 in Prince William
Sound and the Gulf of Alaska?
 Also, what happened in Valdez, Cordova,
Anchorage, Juneau, Houston and Washington
D.C. after that?
 Context? How “bad” was it compared to the
1964 earthquake? Global warming or ocean
acidification?
 Lessons for the Arctic?
History of the spill-human
folly on full display
 Ship left Valdez March 23, 1989
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reef collision; 8/11 holds rupture
12M gallons spilled
Oil pooled near ship, then the storm
1500-2000km shoreline
contaminated
3-year cleanup
Small amount remains in beaches
Evidence for 15-20 year effect
Why did this happen?
Energy flow in
petroecology
Proximate
causes
In addition…
 Risk assessments were probably off (once in 200+
yrs); major spill 10 years after the oil started flowing
 Cleanup equipment not available
 Lack of tugs, radar
 Adds up to: complacency and lack of preparation.
Oil spreads through the
northern Gulf of Alaska
“Do something…”
Scientific studies
 Started immediately
 40+ in 1989; 100s over the next 20 years
 Assessed damage, tracked recovery, studied ecosystem
constraints to recovery
 Over 300 publications from EVOSTC studies, hundreds
from Exxon-sponsored scientists
Two scientific camps
 Exxon has had similar/parallel studies
with different conclusions
 Why?
 Different definitions of injury
 Different standards of proof
 Different frame of reference
 Different power of studies
An example of controversy..
 Effects of oil on juvenile pink salmon in PWS in
1989
 EXXON: “ Post hoc ergo propter hoc”
 One thing following another is not proof of
cause and effect…….
 Government:
 ….. nor is it reason to deny a relationship.
Weight of evidence approach.
Growth of oiled juvenile salmon
Oil biomarker in pink salmon
embryo
Juvenile
salmon
growth is
reduced
by oil in
food
Immediate spill toll

~2000 sea otters

~200-300 harbor seals

killer whales ?

150,000-250,000 sea birds

200-300 bald eagles

Early life history stages of pink
salmon and herring damaged

1500 kilometers of intertidal
habitat oiled
Early years 1989-1994
Science:
Mainly assessment of damage
i.e., how many of each species were killed
Workshops on pink salmon, sea otters, sockeye salmon,
murres, killer whales, harbor seals for litigation
Economic studies done in secret: Formulation of Restoration Plan
No publications in 1989-1990 because of litigation
Fisheries failures; oil persistence
Policy:
Trustee Council made most decisions; Management team was
in charge of day-to-day activities
Early settlement with Exxon for $1 billion
Peer review on sidelines after settlement in 1990
Injured species list
Policy:
Later years 1994-2002
Hickel becomes Governor; appts. Charley Cole.
Executive Director role expands; More reliance on peer review
input
Valdez blockade; SEA, NVP, APEX ecosystem studies
Science:
Why weren’t some species recovering?
Ecosystem studies brings integrative approach to science
Emphasis on publication
Gulf ecosystem monitoring: How to do it.
How bad was it? Context
Comparison with another natural catastrophe : 1964 earthquake
Common features:
Similar geographic area affected
Springtime
Big impact on intertidal zone
Impacted salmon spawning streams
25 years for recovery of resources ?
EVOS and long-term climate change
The scale of decadal change, i.e. the 1977 regime shift, has shown
Itself to be much more extensive than occurred as a result of
EVOS.
Extensive changes in the ecological communities on the shelf of
the northern GOA as a result of climate change provide a
potential measuring stick of the minimum magnitude of changes
to be expected from climate change.
Lessons learned
1. Value of ecosystem studies in understanding
perturbations.
2. Thorough study of injuries is necessary; emerging injuries.
3. Long-term dividends of study of ecosystem that supplies
irreplaceable services.
4. Ecosystem studies involving public agencies produce
synthetic advantages.
5. Dealing with uncertainty logically is key to moving from
findings to good policy decisions.
6. Strong peer review is necessary to make adaptive
management work in restoration.
What have we learned?
1. “Do something” is always the message, but not always a good idea
2. Clean up only recovers an insignificantly small proportion of spilled oil
3. Dispersants are oversold and work only under a narrow range of conditions
4. Booms often not very effective
5. Treatment of uncertainty is key to communicating spill effects
Drilling in the Chukchi Sea?
The margin for human error is much
slimmer
Oil spill clean-up is mostly wishful thinking