DOES SPOILS SYSTEM SPOIL
GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NEPAL
Shiva Hari Adhikari
Nepal Administrative Staff College
Introduction
Establishes and promotes informal governance
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002)
 Greater risk of despoiling the public fund for
personal purpose (Friedrich, 1937)
 Applies rules with partiality and some citizens
get preferential treatment
 Effective in implementing the decisions of
government

Introduction
Creates unauthorized transactions: developed
or, even, in not fully developed spoils system
 Establishes patron-client relation/network
 Holds control over policy decision and
implementation
 Encourages favouritism, nepotism and corrupt
practices

Spoils system
Patronage
Chooses public
officials on a
political and
not on a merit
basis
Creates
established
relation or
networks
Governance
Works for
mutual
material
advantage
Nepal
Recently experienced political and socioeconomic changes
 Governance has dual character: (In)formal
 They are less easily separable
 Chakari: originated during Rana regime
 Public Service Commission,1951, AntiCorruption Act, 1952, Civil Service Act, 1957,
and Commission for Controlling Abuse of
Authority, 1977

Nepal

Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation, 2011
 Informal
practices more prevalent
 Corruption
 Bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and
patronage

Dix, Hussmann, and Walton, 2012
 Patronage
system is apparent in society, economy
and politics
 Corruption
Objectives

The primary objective of this study is to test the
relationship between spoils system and
governance. The objectives are:
 to
seek the relationship between spoils and corruption,
and
 to evaluate the effect of spoils in the governance
system.
Research Question/Hypothesis



R.Q.: Does spoils system spoil governance?
Hypothesis 1: Spoils system has positive
significant relation with corruption
Hypothesis 2: Spoils recruitment and promotion
worsens the governance
Data and Model





Challenging task to measure governance and corruption
For more precise measure controlling for behaviour and
attitude is needed.
Research Design: descriptive as well as explanatory
Sample size (N) = 273: 106 (public officials), and 167
(students)
Peer review and pretest of questionnaire
Data and Model
Data collection and processing: 380
distributed, 324 returned (51 have quitted or
incomplete), 273 fully complete and usable,
85% return rate, 72% response rate
 Data analysis: Factor analysis, reliability test
and regression analysis

Summary of Variables
Type of
variable
Name of variable
Number of items Measurement
included
Dependent
Poor governance (newly
created)
Corruption (newly created)
5
Future intention of bribery
Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)
Political affiliation
Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)
Five response Likert
Scale
4
Five response Likert
Scale
Independent Spoils system (newly created) 4
Five response Likert
Scale
Control
Experience of bribery
Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)
Family member a government Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)
employee
Family member a politician
Yes/no question Nominal (Yes =1)
Variables and Their Descriptions
Variable
Statements incorporated to create new variable and its index
Spoils system Top executives are appointed as per personal connections with political leaders.
Top executives are promoted as per personal connections with political leaders.
Personal relationship matters in promotion.
Appointments to key positions are influenced by politics.
Poor
governance
Service receivers get poor service with less choice.
Service delivery mechanism is biased to benefit only a few.
Government regulations and procedures are not transparent.
Citizens do not get proper and timely services that they are entitled to.
Government agencies are not accountable for the application of regulations and
procedures.
Corruption
Corruption is widespread in our country.
Salaries are supplemented with bribes and kickbacks.
Civil servants involved in corrupt practices are not punished.
Corruption is reinforced by culture and tradition.
Statistical Analysis Results
DV: Corruption
Standardized
coefficients
DV: Poor governance
Sig.
Standardized
coefficients
t
Spoils system***
Experience of bribery [Yes=1]
Future intention of bribery [Yes=1]
Family
member
government
employee [Yes=1]
Family member a politician [Yes=1]
Political affiliation [Yes=1]
R-Square
Adjusted R-Square
F Value
Durbin-Watson value
Sig.
t
.458
8.41
.000
.534
10.245 .000
.060
1.097
.273
.071
1.342
.181
.109
1.968
.051
.085
1.608
.109
-.021
-.370
.712
.013
.250
.803
.026
.437
.662
.058
1.031
.304
-.009
-.158
.875
-.028
-.510
.610
.237
.302
.220
.286
13.783 (p < .0001)
19.191 (p < .0001)
1.689
1.611
Interpretation and Discussion




Curbing corruption and improving the governance:
Local, regional and global agenda
Good governance: extremely important but not
possible if there is spoils recruitment and promotion.
Although the spoils system causes corruption, the
adoption of spoils system might be effective in
implementing the decisions of government.
Positive effect of spoils in corruption and poor
governance should be carefully interpreted.
Interpretation and Discussion


The governance system in Nepal is not satisfactory
Other loopholes causing corruption and poor
governance regarding the spoils system
 Formal
vs informal governance
 Legal mechanisms vs implementation/rule of law
 Purely merit based vs spoils within merit