Center for Comparative Immigration Studies
University of California, San Diego
Edited by Michael Stefanko
1986
1990
1993
1994
1995
1996
2006
Immigration Reform and Control Act
Immigration Act of 1990
Operation Hold the Line; El Paso, TX
Operation Gatekeeper; San Diego, CA
Operation Safeguard; Nogales, AZ
Operation Rio Grande; Southeast TX
Secure Border Initiative
Secure Fence Act
Operation Jumpstart
Operation Streamline
(Sisco and Hicken, Chapter 2 in Four Generations, 2009)
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The following are from an article in press:
(Hicken, Fischbein, Lisle) regarding a survey of
Tlacuitapenses
Between 1992 and 2008 the number of personhours of border agents increased by a factor of
four , the annual enforcement budget
increased from $1 billion to $9.5 billion
Looked at two effects: remote deterrence and
physical deterrence
Unauthorized Mexican residents increased
from 2.5 million in 1996 to 7 million in 20072010
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Number of unauthorized immigrants has
decreased significantly in the current economic
climate
Remote deterrence: evidence mixed – selfreported (Tlacuitapense ) intention to migrate
down, but reasons cited are more gang violence
and banditry than border enforcement
Physical deterrence: 9 of 10 surveyed
succeeded ; clandestine entry through ports of
entry more expensive but safer than through
deserts
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Age
1.063
0.954
1.039
1.074
1.069
0.943
Age 2
0.998
1
0.999
0.998
0.998
1
Male
3.062***
3.020***
2.879***
3.114***
3.034***
2.851***
Has ever migrated to the US
5.132***
4.880***
5.156***
4.924***
5.164***
4.714***
Married
0.54
0.506
0.517
0.506
0.551
0.449
Has Children
0.326***
0.355**
0.347**
0.341**
0.324***
0.396**
Number of family in the US
1.221***
1.224***
1.217***
1.213***
1.218***
1.210***
Wealth in Mexico
3.927
3.576
4.124
4.09
4.008
4.375
Knows someone who died
2.823**
Very Dangerous to cross
3.219**
0.544
Difficult to Cross
0.496*
2.493
Knowledge of Border Enforcement
2.921
0.931
0.919
constant
0.016*
0.04
0.034
0.006**
0.015*
0.029
N
358
357
355
350
358
349
r2_p
0.183
0.202
0.19
0.19
0.184
0.221
Robust predictors: male, previous migration, no children, family in US
• Apprehended 44 percent of the time between 2002 and 2010
•Over 90 percent eventually succeed in crossing
•Factors predicting success (from a regression analysis): previous
migration experience, month crossed (Oct-Dec) , running out of
money
•Non-significant factors: gender, location, port of entry or not,
with a coyote
•Major effect: increases in line-watch hours is matched by
increases in coyote fees (more demand for coyote services)
Mode of Entry
1965-1986
1986-1993
1994-2001
2002-2010
Overall
Walking
60.5%
52.4%
57.4%
60.0%
57.9%
Swimming
23.2%
11.9%
14.9%
3.1%
12.2%
Hidden in Vehicle
0.0%
16.7%
6.4%
21.5%
12.2%
Fake/Borrowed
Documents
9.3%
14.3%
19.1%
12.3%
13.7%
Other
7.0%
4.8%
2.1%
3.1%
4.1%
N=43
N=42
N=47
N=65
N=197
•Legal ports of entry: safer, less likely to be apprehended (averaged of
0.5 times versus 0.9 times), more expensive (average fee $3,314 – N=17,
versus average coyote fee of $1,791 – N= 37 for desert/mountains
•Family in US can fund crossings at ports of entry
•For desert/mountains: More concern about Mother Nature and
bandits than fence or Border Patrol/National Guard
•80 percent of those surveyed in Tlacuitapa knew someone who had
died in a border crossing
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Increased enforcement is leading to longer
stays in the US
Longer stays means male heads of household
are bringing dependents to US sooner
US-born children and wives are strong
supporters of staying permanently
More than one-third of those surveyed (1 in 10
of undocumented) owned property in the US
Erratic enforcement of interior policies (such as
against businesses) does not effect underlining
incentive structure for migrating