Complex Power Sharing
Key Sources:
• The Cambridge Carnegie Project on
Resolving Self-Determination Disputes
Using Complex Power-Sharing
[www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk/research/cps/]
• Institutional Design of Conflict Settlements
[www.stefanwolff.com/working-papers.htm]
Complex Power Sharing
• Self-governance PLUS further mechanisms for the
accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided
societies advocated by:
 liberal consociationalism
 integrationism
 power dividing
• Result of the implementation of a self-governance
regime whose success as a conflict settlement
device requires a relatively complex institutional
structure that cannot be reduced to
autonomy/(ethno-)federalism, (traditional)
models of power sharing or power dividing.
Institutional Design in Divided
Societies
• Structure and organisation of the state as a whole:
 symmetry and asymmetry in institutional design;
 distribution and separation of powers; and
 coordination mechanisms.
• Composition and powers of the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of government and the relationship
between them :
 the nature of the government system and the choice of the
electoral system;
 power sharing; and
 legal entrenchment.
• Relationship between individual citizens, identity groups
and the state:
 human and minority rights provisions; and
 recognition and protection of identities.
Main Institutional Arrangements
Recommended by Different
Theories of Conflict Resolution
Integrative
Power sharing
Liberal
Consociational
Power sharing
Power dividing
Principle
recomm.
Interethnic
cooperation and
moderation induced
by electoral system
design
Interethnic
cooperation at elite
level through
jointness of
executive
Cooperation
between different,
changing coalitions
through separation
of powers
Gov.
system
Presidential
Parliamentary or
Collective/Rotating
Presidential system
Presidential
Executive
power
sharing
Yes: voluntary
Yes: guaranteed
No, except in initial
transition phase
after civil wars
Electoral
system
Plurality preferential
PR list or PR
preferential
Plurality
Judicial
branch
Independent
Independent
Independent
Main Institutional Arrangements
Recommended by Different
Theories of Conflict Resolution
Integrationist
Power sharing
Liberal
Consociational
Power sharing
Power dividing
Unitary vs.
federal
territorial
organisation
Federal:
heterogeneous
units
Federal: units
based on selfdetermining
communities
Federal:
heterogeneous
units
Individual vs.
group rights
Emphasis on
individual rights
Emphasis on
combination of
individual and
group rights
Emphasis on
individual rights
Recognition of
distinct
identities
Yes, but primarily
as private matter
Yes, but as
private and public
matter
Yes, but primarily
as private matter
Legal
entrenchment
Yes
Yes
Yes
Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems
Central
parliamentary
system
Central
presidential
system
Sub-state
parliamentary
system
Belgium
Brussels
Italy
South Tyrol
Bosnia and
Herzegovina*
Sub-state
presidential
system
Federation of
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Macedonia
Moldova
Gagauzia
Ukraine*
United Kingdom
Crimea
Northern Ireland
Power Sharing Institutions
No
power
sharing
Horizontal
power sharing
at the centre
Horizontal power
sharing at substate level only
Horizontal power
sharing at the
centre and substate level
Macedonia
Crimea
BiH/Federation of
BiH
Moldova
Northern Ireland
Belgium/Brussels
South Tyrol
Human and Minority Rights
Provisions
Constit.
StateConstit.
Local
Local
Minority
wide
Human
Human
Min.
Rights
Min.
Rights
Rights Rights
Provisions Rights
Provisions
Legisl. Legisl.
Legisl.
Belgium/Brussels
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
BiH
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Italy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Macedonia
Yes
Yes
Yes
N.A.
N.A.
Moldova
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Ukraine
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
UK
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Some Tentative Conclusions
• Complex power sharing in practice
combines regimes of territorial selfgovernance with a variety of other macrolevel techniques of conflict resolution
 power sharing and power dividing
• and a range of ‘supplementary’
mechanisms
 specific electoral systems
 human and minority rights legislation
 coordination and arbitration mechanisms
Some Tentative Conclusions
• None of the three theories of conflict
resolution fully capture the current
practice of complex power sharing, BUT
 liberal consociationalism is most open to
incorporation of elements of integrationist
power sharing and power dividing
o judicial entrenchment and enforcement mechanisms;
o universally applicable and enforceable human rights
legislation;
o vertical division of power;
o preferential electoral systems
Some Tentative Conclusions
• Complex power sharing practice MAY eventually lead to
a synthesis of existing theories in a complex power
sharing framework, BUT there is as yet not enough realworld evidence about how stable such regimes can be
under varying conditions.
• Examples examined here indicate that some cases have
proven relatively stable over time (i.e., over ten years):
 Belgium, Brussels, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crimea, Gagauzia,
and South Tyrol
• Others are too short-lived to provide reliable data about
their long-term stability:
 Macedonia, Northern Ireland