MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Negative 2.0
****Negative*****
LOST Bad – Navy Turn (1nc) ..................................................................................................................................2
LOST Bad – Navy Turn – Link extension ................................................................................................................4
A2: Military Exemptions Solve ...........................................................................................................................10
LOST Bad – Navy turn impact extension .............................................................................................................12
LOST Bad – PSI Turn (1nc) ...................................................................................................................................13
LOST Bad – PSI Turn – PSI succeeding now .........................................................................................................15
LOST Bad – PSI Turn – Link extension .................................................................................................................16
LOST Bad – PSI Turn – Solves proliferation .........................................................................................................17
LOST Bad - Economy ..........................................................................................................................................18
LOST Bad –US sovereignty .................................................................................................................................20
LOST Bad - Environment .....................................................................................................................................25
LOST Bad – China won’t follow ...........................................................................................................................26
A2 Arctic advantage ............................................................................................................................................27
A2 Trade Advantage ............................................................................................................................................34
CIL/SQ solves the benefits of LOST .....................................................................................................................37
*****Affirmative********
LOST Good – A2 Navy turn – LOST key to Navy ..................................................................................................38
LOST Good – A2 Navy Turn – Military exemption...............................................................................................43
LOST Good – A2 PSI Turn – PSI failing .................................................................................................................44
LOST Good – A2 PSI Turn – LOST supports PSI ....................................................................................................46
LOST Good – A2 Sovereignty...............................................................................................................................48
LOST Good – A2 Taxes/Royalty payments ..........................................................................................................49
1
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – Navy Turn (1nc)
LOST restricts our naval capacity and devastates national security.
Investor’s Business Daily 9-26-07 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2072171/posts
International Law: Time was, Ronald Reagan's 600-ship Navy gave us freedom of the seas. But if Joe Biden and the
Senate have their way, we'll need the permission of 21 judges in Hamburg. On Thursday, presidential wannabe
Biden will chair hearings intended to lead to the ratification of the quarter-century-old Law of the Sea treaty
(LOST), a document that would severely restrict our ability to use oceans to defend ourselves and would
turn over control of 70% of the world's surface to a U.N. bureaucracy. Supporters say we must be a
signatory to guarantee our share of the resources to be found under the world's oceans and to avoid situations like
the race to claim the sea bed under the Arctic between Russia, Canada and other states. But experience suggests a
Law of the Sea tribunal won't protect interests we should be protecting ourselves. LOST would create an
International Seabed Authority (ISA) with the power to regulate and tax things like seabed mining, fishing rights
and deep-sea oil exploration. The ISA would decide who gets access to the sea's resources, and the companies
granted these rights would pay a royalty to the ISA. When he refused to sign ISA in 1982, President Reagan rightly
decided the U.S. shouldn't be a part of this global resource grab and redistribution of wealth . It's in the area of
national security that LOST is most dangerous. The administration cites military support for the treaty
because of its uniform limit on territorial waters and its establishment of "rules of the road" for littoral
waters. But current international law already protects nonaggressive passage of military ships. When
Reagan vetoed the treaty, the U.S. Navy had 594 warships. We could protect our own right of passage. Today the
fleet has withered to 276 vessels. Is that why we need the treaty? The answer is to build more warships. Our
access to the seas should be guaranteed by the Navy and not a U.N. bureaucracy. David Ridenour, vice
president of the National Center for Public Policy in Washington, D.C., suggests: " The treaty could complicate
our efforts to apprehend terrorists, pirates or ships our intelligence believes are carrying WMDs by
subjecting our actions to review by an international tribunal, a body that is unlikely to be favorable to
the United States." Suppose the Navy intercepted a load of North Korean Scud missiles or weapons-grade
nuclear material destined for Syria. Under the treaty, which guarantees "innocent" passage, we'd have 10 days to
arrange international arbitration or the LOST tribunal could hold hearings for the vessel's prompt release.
According to George Mason University professor Jeremy Rabkin, many notable U.S. naval actions might have
been considered illegal under the treaty. Writing in the Weekly Standard, Rabkin notes a treaty like LOST might
have prevented President Kennedy's blockade of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis. We would've had to make our
case before those Hamburg judges. In the 1980 s, Libya declared the entire Gulf of Sidra to be under Libyan
authority, and ships entering the Gulf needed Libya's permission first. Reagan's response was to dispatch a carrier
task force that blew two Libyan patrol boats out of the water. His, and our, point was made.
2
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Naval mobility prevents global WMD conflicts.
Peele ‘97
(Reynolds B., Lieutenant, USMC, The Importance of Maritime Chokepoints, Parameters, Summer)
There are presently six
significant regional economic and military concerns that require constant strategic focus on
free access to sea lines of communication. • In the Middle East, Saddam Hussein's hegemonic activities remain a threat
to regional economic and political stability. State-sponsored terrorism originating in Libya and Iran contributes to concerns about
regional, as well as European, stability. • In Northeast Asia, North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear capability
exacerbates regional tension. For nearly 50 years, the United States has been committed to the defense of South Korea, helping to
maintain the balance of power and stability on the Korean peninsula. Also, the growth of Asia as a trading partner requires the United States to
discourage prospective regional hegemons.[37] • Stability within the Western Hemisphere is an enduring concern.
Examples include the need for stable democracies in Haiti and Cuba, while stability remains important if El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala
are to emerge from recent insurgencies with reasonable prospects for economic growth. Problems posed by the international drug trade are
addressed below. • Unrest in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia continues to disrupt regional stability. The
United States remains committed to ongoing peacekeeping operations in the search for peace in the Balkans. • Interventions in Africa to
prevent or end genocide (Rwanda and Somalia), support of UN efforts to reduce tensions between warring states (Angola and Mozambique),
and efforts to calm civil strife (South Africa and Namibia) can preclude second- or third-order effects of massive population shifts that have
plagued the region for nearly a decade. SLOCs are important if the United States is to shape favorable outcomes in such circumstances. • The
United States remains concerned about the regional dispute over the Spratly Islands. While it seems unlikely at present
that a direct threat to free access to the regional SLOCs will emerge, the statistics above demonstrate the importance of the South China Sea to
our own trade as well as that of our allies and trading partners. The foregoing list of US security and economic foreign policy interests is neither
exhaustive nor prioritized. The underpinning in each statement is an immediate or potential requirement to
deploy and sustain
substantial military force in the interest of free access to SLOCs or in response to threats to US interests or those of its
allies. The effects of disruptions within the associated SLOCs range from significant in the Middle East and Southeast Asia
to minimal around the coastal areas of Africa. However, all six would likely require the movement of land or naval
forces and equipment to crisis areas along key SLOCs to ensure that US security and economic interests can be
protected.
3
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – Navy Turn – Link extension
US accession will lead to UN power over navy decisions—UN will then control our
navy
Richard Douglas, has served as chief counsel of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and General Counsel of
the Senate Intelligence committee. He was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2009. He was
recalled to active duty and deployed to Iraq in 2006-07. In the 1970s he was a machinist’s mate on a fast attack
submarine, February 23, 2010, The UN Law of the Sea Treaty: Threatening to Put the U.S. Navy in a Straitjacket,
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.5571/pub_detail.asp
In like manner, if
the U.S. accedes to UNCLOS, the assurances given today to our Navy leadership won’t
mean a thing. It will emphatically not be Navy and State Department lawyers handing down
pronouncements on what UNCLOS (“military activity”) means. Rather, this function will be performed by the activist
UN tribunal itself. In other words, by accepting UNCLOS, U.S. bilateral leverage in navigational disputes will
disappear with the stroke of a pen. It will be replaced with a fervent hope, a wish, and a roll of the dice that activist UN judges
plucked from the developing world will resist the opportunity to go after our Navy and its global role – no matter what the Convention text says
about the sanctity of military operations. Cheered
on by our adversaries, these UN judges will freely hand down
restraining orders, advisory opinions, and decisions (whether we like it or not) about our Navy’s
navigational activity – and our intelligence activity – that are unreviewable. And unlike own system, under
UNCLOS there is no vigilant legislature capable of reining in the excesses of an overreaching and politicized UN tribunal. The only way to avoid
this is to avoid accession to UNCLOS.
The harm to the navy by ratifying lost is concrete—UN gains control
Richard Douglas, has served as chief counsel of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and General Counsel of
the Senate Intelligence committee. He was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2009. He was
recalled to active duty and deployed to Iraq in 2006-07. In the 1970s he was a machinist’s mate on a fast attack
submarine, February 23, 2010, The UN Law of the Sea Treaty: Threatening to Put the U.S. Navy in a Straitjacket,
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.5571/pub_detail.asp
In light of this, one may rightly wonder: if the Navy wants UNCLOS and UNCLOS simply replicates something that is
already in force and harmonious with U.S. interests, where is the harm in U.S. accession to UNCLOS? A good
question and here is the answer. The harm would be concrete, and potentially irreversible, in the following
way: the 1958 conventions did not interfere with the exclusive right of countries accepting these treaty
regimes to solve navigational disputes bilaterally (where our leverage is strongest). In contrast, UNCLOS
created a massive international UN court in Hamburg, Germany, to resolve disputes arising under the
Convention on issues like – you guessed it – freedom of navigation. Thus, U.S. accession to UNCLOS
would be a watershed moment, posing a very new and very concrete reality: for the first time, our
adversaries would be able to use a UN tribunal to help them restrict or hamper Navy navigational
decisions which may now, under the 1958 regime, be made freely and solely by our nation, without UN or other
international interference.
4
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Our signing of UNCLOS will lead to many problems for our navy—we will lose our
control over our own navy
Richard Douglas, has served as chief counsel of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and General Counsel of
the Senate Intelligence committee. He was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2009. He was
recalled to active duty and deployed to Iraq in 2006-07. In the 1970s he was a machinist’s mate on a fast attack
submarine, February 23, 2010, The UN Law of the Sea Treaty: Threatening to Put the U.S. Navy in a Straitjacket,
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.5571/pub_detail.asp
If the U.S. joins UNCLOS, inside our very own executive branch Navy shipdrivers will be far
outnumbered by UNCLOS supporters. The Navy will not be the final authority on whether and how
politicized UN tribunal decisions must be observed. Rather, this critically important prerogative will be asserted and
jealously guarded by State Department diplomats, State Department lawyers, NOAA oceans activists, and EPA environmentalists. Long history
and hard experience should remind Navy leaders that diplomats, environmental activists, and their lawyers cannot be expected to make calls
that warfighters, shipdrivers, or broader American interests will always welcome. It
should also be noted that U.S. accession
to UNCLOS will be a force-multiplier for home-grown opponents of Navy activity. Opponents of
SONAR training and other vital Navy operations will quickly use UNCLOS in U.S. federal and state
courts to hamstring our fleet. The Navy has battled back such challenges so far, but UNCLOS accession will change the
landscape dramatically in ways unfavorable to our fleet and its operational readiness. With the U.S. in UNCLOS, the Navy
will be forced to defend its equities – America’s equities – on at least three fronts: against at an unaccountable UN tribunal in Germany; within
our own executive branch here at home; and in our own federal and state courts.
No matter where you come down on
accession to UNCLOS, these are all bad things for the Navy. And they would be unavoidable. The
magnitude of the flaws permeating UNCLOS and the other unpersuasive arguments deployed in favor
of accession are beyond the scope of this article. But two glaring examples must be noted: the oft-repeated
myth that the Clinton administration somehow “repaired” the UNCLOS defects that led President
Reagan wisely to reject the Convention; and the myth that UNCLOS permits a specific U.S. “veto” over
activity within the Convention regime. In fact, the words “veto” and “United States of America” do not
appear anywhere in UNCLOS, its annexes, or the Clinton protocol.
5
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Crushes Intelligence Gathering and Naval Freedom of Action
Boston Herald, 2007 10/7/07
http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/opinion/editorials/2007/10/law_sea_treaty_bad_deal_us
The Bush administration wants the Senate to ratify a new incarnation of the Law of the Sea Treaty. No matter how
dressed up, though, the treaty should be rejected.
The treaty would effectively abolish the freedom of the United States to use force at sea on the rare occasions
when the national interest requires it. Instead, there would be compulsory arbitration.
Can you imagine President Ford sending to arbitration the Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez in 1975? He sent
the Marines.
Or President Reagan arbitrating Libya's claim of the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters? He sent two aircraft carriers
in 1986, which sank or damaged four Libyan patrol boats and knocked out a missile battery that disputed the
carriers' passage.
Suppose it had fallen to a U.S. warship, instead of Israeli forces, to intercept the Karine A carrying 50 tons of
weapons from Iran to Gaza in 2002. President Bush would have been insane to call for arbitration.
The treaty purports to uphold the long-established right of ``innocent passage'' through territorial waters. But it
says ships on such passage may not commit ``any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the
defense or security of the coastal state'' and ``submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate
on the surface and to show their flag.''
That would shut down a major source of intelligence, eavesdropping on telecommunications of potential enemies
by submarines lurking out of sight close to shore. It's a good bet that the Navy's subs have been brushing up
against whatever China and Iran use for lobster pots. One wonders if the Pentagon officials who endorse the treaty
have even read it.
The treaty went into effect for 120 nations in 1994. President Clinton sought ratification then, but the Senate
refused to take it up. There is now an International Seabed Authority to regulate mining on the ocean floor, an
unneeded job-creating machine for international bureaucrats. U.S. companies are not likely to prospect at sea
without ratification, but that's a small price to pay for retaining the Navy's freedom of action.
6
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Environmental Restrictions Crush Naval Effectiveness
Gaffney, 10/9/07 (Frank, President, Center Security Policy, Washington Times)
Fortunately, a necessary corrective was offered the next day by another distinguished retired four-star, Adm.
James "Ace" Lyons. In an article in The Washington Times' Commentary pages, the former Pacific Fleet commander
in chief declared: "It is inconceivable to this naval officer why the Senate would willingly want to forfeit its
responsibility for America's freedom of the seas to the unelected and unaccountable international agency that
would be created by ratification of LOST."
Adm. Lyons appreciates a reality apparently overlooked by those promoting the Navy's official line on LOST: The
treaty entails obligations that are at odds with the U.S. sea services' routine operations; involve sweeping
commitments to protect the "marine environment" the Navy will almost certainly contravene; and institute several
tribunals to prosecute complaints that arise in these or other areas.
Of all institutions, the Navy should be alive to the dangers that such a treaty entails. After all, the service's civilian
leader, Secretary Donald Winter, for one has expressed grave concerns about the impact domestic
environmentalists and their litigiousness currently have on Navy and Marine Corps' operations.
Such challenges are likely to pale by comparison with the edicts handed down by multilateral tribunals whose
deciding votes are, in every instance, selected by international bureaucrats (in the case of one arbitral panel, by
the U.N. secretary-general himself). A recent paper written by Dr. Jeremy Rabkin for the American Enterprise
Institute under the provocative title, "Do We Really Want to Place the U.S. Navy Under International Judicial
Supervision?" makes clear that, by so doing, we would open ourselves to expanded attacks via "Lawfare" - the
technique of using treaties, courts and international law as an asymmetric weapon against us:
"It is estimated that the United States has more practicing lawyers than all other countries put together.
Separation of powers and an active, independent judiciary invite challenges to decisions of officials in the
executive branch, just as we scrutinize and challenge so many other institutions in our society. What that means is
that it is much harder for the United States to shrug off international legal claims than it may be for more
centralized or repressive countries such as China."
7
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST impedes freedom of navigation by the navy and discourage innovation and
economic growth.
Smith, 10/4/07 (Fred, Head Competitive Enterprise Institute, CQ Congressional Testimony)
Some treaty advocates argue that it would help ensure passage for American shipping. This point is moot.
Irrespective of any treaty text, only the U.S. Navy can guarantee free ocean transit in situations where nations have
both the incentive and ability to interfere. That remains true under the U.S.'s status as a non- party to the treaty.
Were we to ratify LOST, the Law of the Sea Tribunal might declare such action unlawful. As noted, the treaty's best
provisions those covering navigation largely codify existing customary international law. Its worst provisions those
creating the seabed regulatory regime would discourage future minerals production as well as punish
entrepreneurship in related fields involving technology, software, and intellectual property that have an ocean
application. Since technology often has multiple uses, it would also slow innovation generally.
LOST ratification risks hostile international court rulings– undermining US Economy
and power projection capability
CTFP, 10/27/07 (Chatanooga Times Free Press, Copley News)
The Bush administration argues that the United States needs the treaty to protect U.S. interests in the world's
oceans and to ensure that the U.S. Navy can go where it needs to go. The problem with that argument is that if the
United States signs and ratifies the treaty, America will be bound to abide by its decisions.
Based on U.S. experience in other international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, decisions will
usually be contrary to U.S. security and economic interests. The U.S. Navy can already go wherever it needs to go,
and it should remain that way.
8
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Lost Undercuts Naval Strategy
Bolton and Blumenthal 2011
(http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/time-to-kill-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty--again/ Bolton is a Senior
Fellow and Blumenthal is a resident fellow at AEI written September 29th 2011 accessed July 14, 2014)
The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST)--signed by the U.S. in 1994 but never ratified by the Senate--is showing some signs of
life on Capitol Hill, even as new circumstances make it less attractive than ever. With China emerging as a major
power, ratifying the treaty now would encourage Sino-American strife, constrain U.S. naval activities, and
do nothing to resolve China's expansive maritime territorial claims.¶ At issue is China's intensified effort
to keep America's military out of its "Exclusive Economic Zone," a LOST invention that affords coastal states control over
economic activity in areas beyond their sovereign, 12-mile territorial seas out to 200 miles. Properly read, LOST recognizes exclusive economic
zones as international waters, but China
is exploiting the treaty's ambiguities to declare "no go" zones in regions
where centuries of state practice clearly permit unrestricted maritime activity.¶ Take the issues of
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, both by air and sea. LOST is silent on these subjects in the exclusive
zones, so China claims it can regulate (meaning effectively prohibit) all such activity. Beijing also brazenly
claims--exploiting Western green sensibilities--that U.S. naval vessels pollute China's exclusive zone, pollution being an
activity the treaty permits coastal states to regulate out to 24 miles.¶ China wants to deny American access to its nearby
waters so it can have its way with its neighbors. Beijing is building a network of "anti-access" and "area
denial" weapons such as integrated air defenses, submarines, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and
cyber and anti-satellite systems designed to make it exceedingly hazardous for American ships and aircraft to traverse China's
exclusive zone or peripheral seas.¶ If the Senate ratifies the treaty, we would become subject to its dispute-resolution mechanisms and
ambiguities. Right now, since
we are the world's major naval power, our conduct dominates state practice and
hence customary international law--to our decided advantage.¶ This dispute is not really about law.
China simply does not want the U.S. military to gather intelligence near its shores. And other nations quietly
support China's position, including Russia, Iran, Brazil and India. Given China's incessant incursions into
the exclusive zones of other Asian nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, these states may
seek to restrict international maritime activities in their exclusive zones as well, further complicating U.S.
efforts.¶ All Washington wants is to continue doing what it has been doing since it became a maritime power: use its Navy
to enhance international peace and security, deter conflict, reassure allies, and collect intelligence. LOST
undercuts these strategic imperatives, and that is why it has always been a bad idea for the U.S.--a formula
for endless legal maneuvering and the submission of conflicting claims to the treaty's international tribunal, where our prospects are uncertain
at best.¶ One hopes India and Japan will stop reflexively supporting LOST. They have significant alternatives to check China's growing power,
including closer cooperation with the United States. The treaty is not an answer--it is only a beguiling, flawed escape hatch from the hard work
America and others must do to meet China's challenge.¶ That hard work must include properly funding and equipping the Navy and exercising it
in China's exclusive zones, including especially on intelligence missions, based on long-established state practice. Together with diplomacy to
prevent nascent conflicts from escalating, these steps will reassure allies of full U.S. support in resolving disputes with China.
9
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
A2: Military Exemptions Solve
Arbitrators will apply environmental restrictions to Navy despite military activities
exemption – and independently they will enforce on civilian contractors – causing the
same effect – this crushes power projection and will force inevitable withdrawal from
the treaty later – turning the case.
Gaffney, 10/9/07 (Frank, President, Center Security Policy, Washington Times)
Faced with this worrisome prospect, the Navy's lawyers blithely contend the Law of the Sea Treaty permits
"military activities" to be exempted from the mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms. On this basis, they
believe the U.S. can continue with impunity practices flatly prohibited by various treaty provisions. (These include,
for example, requirements that the seas be used and marine research be performed exclusively for peaceful
purposes; submarines transit territorial waters on the surface; and no collection of intelligence take place within
those waters).
What would happen if, despite our protests, the treaty's arbitral panels wind up being used as other LOST
enthusiasts clearly intend, as a means of interfering with the Navy's activities? How about if the arbitrators assert
their jurisdiction and judge the Navy - or perhaps, as Adm. Lyons suggested, civilian contractors essential to
equipping its forces or their logistics - to be violating one or more provisions of the accord? A uniformed lawyer
recently had a remarkable, if wholly impracticable, answer: "We'll abrogate the treaty."
Could it be that the Navy's official stance on LOST is less an accurate indication of the merits of that treaty than a
measure of the increasingly parlous state of the nation's sea service? In a characteristically insightful Sept. 21 New
York Times op-ed, best-selling author and visiting professor at Annapolis, Robert Kaplan wrote: "China['s]...
production and acquisition of submarines is now 5 times that of America's Many military analysts feel it is
mounting a quantitative advantage in naval technology that could erode our qualitative one. Yet the Chinese have
been buying smart rather than across-the-board. In addition to submarines, Beijing has focused on naval mines,
ballistic missiles that can hit moving objects at sea, and technology that blocks G.P.S. satellites. The goal is 'sea
denial': dissuading American carrier strike groups from closing in on the Asian mainland wherever and whenever
we like."
The fact Adm. Ace Lyons felt compelled to do the almost unthinkable - break ranks with Navy colleagues of
decades duration - is a shot across the proverbial bow: Those in the Senate tempted to justify their inattention to
the details of the Law of the Sea Treaty on the grounds that the military "wants" it now must fulfill their
constitutional responsibility to provide rigorous quality control on this accord. If they do so, they are bound to act
as Ronald Reagan did and reject this defective treaty, sparing both the Navy and the nation its negative
repercussions.
Exemptions are not defined
Lyons, 10/5/07 (Retired Admiral, James, Commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military
representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations, Washington Times)
Regardless of what is promised by LOST's proponents, the Clinton administration did not fix the treaty's
objectionable clauses. For example, ratification of LOST would subsequently require the United States to submit to
mandatory dispute resolution with respect to the ability of the U.S. Navy to conduct its customary maritime
operations unfettered.
Further, although LOST allows a party to exempt itself from disputes concerning "military activities," the Treaty
does not define such activities, and it is therefore far from certain any U.S. decision to exempt itself from such
dispute resolution will be honored by the other parties or dispute resolution bodies - particularly in light of the fact
any supposedly exempt "military activity" can be framed as an "environmental activity" by those hostile to the
10
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
United States.
Any exemption would still undermine supply chain
Lyons, 10/5/07 (Retired Admiral, James, Commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military
representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations, Washington Times)
The military's supply chain is also vulnerable to compulsory dispute resolution in this regard. The military can also
be adversely affected by the LOST requirement that all state parties take all measures necessary to "prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source" (Article 194). This requirement could
also adversely affect the military's civilian supply chain and the industrial processes involved with supplying the
military.
Military Activities Exemption Doesn’t Solve
North, 10/12/07 (Oliver, Criminal Mastermind, Total Fucker, Yet Strangely Qualified, Fox News,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,301279,00.html)
LOST’s proponents discount these concerns by claiming the U.S. will simply exempt “military activities” from the
treaty’s compulsory dispute resolution requirements. However, the “opt out” clause in Article 298 fails to define
such operations. In our own Congress, intelligence functions are not considered to be military activities, so there is
far from certainty that the U.N. would accept the U.S. position that intelligence operations over, on or under the
seas are indeed military activities. If there is a dispute as to what is or isn’t a military activity, LOST requires the
matter to be resolved by international arbitration.
In 2003, Navy Admiral Michael Mullen, now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that rulings from these arbitration panels “could have an impact on operational planning and
activities, and our security.” Last week, in response to questions from Senator David Vitter (R-La.) during a
Committee hearing, Professor Bernard Oxman, a witness supporting LOST, admitted that if the parties to a dispute
can’t agree on the arbitration panel, the U.N. Secretary General will chose the arbitrators. Lawyers in Pyongyang,
Havana and Tehran: call Turtle Bay.
11
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – Navy turn impact extension
Naval access is the vital internal link to leadership.
Moore and Schachte ‘05
(John, Prof Law – U Virginia, and William, Retired Naval Rear Admiral, Journal of International Affairs, 9-22)
Myth: Freedom of navigation is only challenged from "[t]he Russian navy [that] is rusting in port [and] China has yet to develop a blue water
capability...." (14) The implication here is that the principal challenge to navigational freedom emanates from a major power and that we do
not have any particular national concerns about freedom of navigation. But the 1982 convention deals with the law of peace, not war or selfdefense. Thus, this argument misses altogether the serious and insidious challenge, which, again, is what the convention is designed to deal
with; these repeated efforts
by coastal nations to control navigation, including those from U.S. allies and trading partners,
have through time added up to death by a thousand pin-pricks. This is the so-called problem of "creeping jurisdiction"
which remains the central struggle in preserving navigational freedom for a global maritime power. After
years of effort, we have won in the convention a legal regime that supports our efforts to control this "creeping jurisdiction." To
unilaterally disarm the United States from asserting what was won against illegal claimants is folly and undermines our
national security.
12
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – PSI Turn (1nc)
PSI successful at weapons interdiction now.
Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst; (202) 463-8270 x102
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI Updated: June 2013 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) At a
Glance
PSI participants have conducted nearly 50 interdiction exercises since the initiative's inception. The
exercises, including mock ship boardings, are intended to increase the participants' capabilities to
cooperate with one another. They are also intended to put a public face on the initiative and act as a deterrent
to potential proliferators. U.S. officials claim that there have been successful interdictions since the
initiative's launch. In a June 2006 speech, then-Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph claimed that between
April 2005 and April 2006 the United States had cooperated with other PSI participants on “roughly two dozen”
occasions to prevent transfers of concern. Ulrik Federspiel, Denmark’s ambassador to the United States, asserted
at a May 2005 event that “the shipment of missiles has fallen significantly in the lifetime of PSI.” A recent
example of a PSI success was the June 2011 interdiction of the M/V Light, a Belizean flagged freighter
suspected of carrying ballistic missile technology from North Korea to Myanmar. U.S. naval forces
intercepted the vessel, and forced it to return to North Korea. Although the M/V Light was turned back
before it was inspected, the United States would have had the legal authority to do so through its ship-boarding
agreement with Belize, a PSI member state.
LOST collapses the PSI
Goodlander 7/19/07 MAGGIE, IS THE UNITED STATES READY TO APPROVE THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13851/
It would weaken U.S. national security. In a recent Washington Post piece, former assistant attorney
general and Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith and George Mason University law professor Jeremy
Rabkin raise concerns the treaty might hinder the U.S. Navy’s ability to make seizures of weaponsrelated material on the high seas. “In every case,” they argue, “a majority of non-American judges would
decide whether the U.S. Navy can seize a ship that it believes is carrying terrorist operatives or supplies
for terrorists.” Opponents say it would undermine counterterrorism efforts like the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
13
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
PSI key to solve global prolif
Mark Shulman, 06, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB652.pdf
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have menaced mankind for six decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the
threat has changed dramatically with the development of new weapons, with the rise of transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, and
with a diminishing capacity of some states to control the weapons they have. In the hands of an Al Qaeda, such a weapon threatens to kill tens
of thousands and destroy tens of billions of dollars worth of property.
It could bring global trade to a standstill and trigger
panic, economic depression, and widespread suffering the likes of which have not been seen for many
years. Containing the threat of WMD requires action on several fronts. States that legitimately possess nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons must work to ensure that they will not be used and that they eventually will be decommissioned. States that
illegitimately possess them must abandon them. States that do not possess them must refrain from obtaining them. Nonstate actors must
never possess them. One key to achieving these objectives is to halt the flow of WMD across borders. The
U.S.-led Proliferation
Security Initiative is a bold and timely multilateral initiative to prevent the proliferation of WMD and the
materials used to construct them. To accomplish this objective, the Initiative facilitates information-sharing in order to better
identify and locate shipments of WMD. It also contemplates the interdiction of shipments of weapons and materials—by force if necessary.
Since announced in 2003, the Initiative’s efforts have focused on halting the flow of WMD across the world’s oceans. In the future, its activities
may extend to land-based interdictions. While a product of a presidential administration infamous for its unilateralism, the Initiative has
received widespread support. United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan has explicitly endorsed it. At least 60 states are participating in
it at one level or another, including Great Britain, but also France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain. Unfortunately, support is not
universal. The
Initiative constitutes one of the most important recent developments in the area of
international peace and security, and may also add up to the most exciting changes in the area of public
international law. It has the potential to alter fundamentally the transnational legal framework for the use of force by states. Force may
become a more ordinary tool that sits on a spectrum of means by which political objectives can be achieved. By blurring the lines between war
and peace, the Initiative eventually may permit states to use highly targeted and entirely proportionate force for limited purposes to further
security objectives without triggering war and all the horrors that it entails. Implementation of this Initiative raises serious legal challenges by
questioning the basic principles of the international system: the sovereignty of states in general and freedom of the seas in particular. The
Initiative eventually may overcome these challenges by increasing the transparency of its decisionmaking apparatus and criteria, by continuing
to expand its base of support through diplomacy and dialogue, and working within the rule of law to
create a new base norm that
prohibits the proliferation of WMD. This monograph describes the Initiative, its legal status, and its prospects for becoming a
significant tool in the quest to prevent mass destruction.
Proliferation leads to nuclear war
Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director for Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analysis,
Summer 2002 (Survival) p. OUP Journals - http://survival.oupjournals.org
Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that such
shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the
weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror
the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six-shooters” on
their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all
gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
14
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – PSI Turn – PSI succeeding now
PSI successful now – documented examples of success
Stimson Research Center “Proliferation Security Initiative” May 31, 2007
http://www.stimson.org/proliferation-security-initiative-/
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort aimed at interdicting "the transfer or
transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern."[1] The program involves joint exercises and activities to interdict vessels
suspected of carrying WMD or their components on the high seas. To accomplish this, many states have begun to
adjust their legal frameworks to permit action, sign ship-boarding agreements and conduct joint exercises. As of August 2006, PSI has
conducted 23 "joint interdiction exercises."[2] Originally envisioned as part of the 2002 US National Strategy to Combat WMD Proliferation,
PSI received its final push toward realization when the international community was unable to interdict
a shipment of North Korean SCUD missiles to Yemen.[3] PSI was first announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, and
initially consisted of eleven participating states: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The original eleven states plus nine others (as of September 2006) are part of the Operational Experts Group
(OEG).[4] The OEG is supplemented by a large number of states which claim to endorse PSI's Statement of Interdiction Principles [See Annex A];
Participating states have been careful to note that PSI is an activity
rather than an organization.[6] Because of this amorphous structure, most activities carried out under
the guise of PSI have been ad hoc in nature. However, the actions that have been taken have advanced
PSI's goal of creating "a web of counterproliferation partnerships."[7] A High Level Political Meeting of participating
states in June 2006 expanded the focus of PSI to include financial transactions meant to facilitate WMD proliferation.[8] Several exercises
have been held to help train states in carrying out interdiction operations, including ANATOLIAN SUN, a three day
air/land/sea exercise in Turkey held in May 2006 that included representatives from 50 countries.[9] The US has been particularly
active in expanding the initiative. Ship boarding agreements have been signed with Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, the Marshall
at present participation includes 82 states.[5]
Islands, Panama, and Malta which grant the US permission to board and inspect any ships registered to those countries if they are suspected of
transporting WMD-related cargo.[10] These countries (except for Croatia) are said to have "flags of convenience," which means they allow
foreign-owned ships to fly their flags, making the foreign ships subject to their laws.[11]
Working Now – New Signatories
U.S. Department of State “Malaysia Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative” April 29, 2014
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225349.htm
The United States welcomes the Government of Malaysia’s endorsement of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), which it announced on April 27, 2014 during a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Najib and President Obama in
Putrajaya, Malaysia. Malaysia’s decision to endorse and participate in the PSI demonstrates Malaysia’s strong
commitment to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), enhancing the security and
safety of global trade, and promoting a peaceful Asia-Pacific region. The United States looks forward to working with Malaysia to advance the
nonproliferation goals of the PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles. Launched in Krakow, Poland in 2003, the PSI marked its 10th
anniversary in May 2013 with a High-level Political Meeting in Warsaw, Poland. PSI participants commit to undertake measures – on a voluntary
basis and consistent with national legal authorities, relevant international law and frameworks, and available resources – to interdict shipments
of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
They also work to exchange relevant information; strengthen legal authorities to conduct interdictions; and conduct exercises, workshops, and
other activities to improve their capacities to fulfill their PSI commitments. The
addition of each new participating state
strengthens the PSI and helps ensure that it will remain a durable international effort in the years ahead.
In marking the 10th anniversary, President Obama publicly urged partner states to undertake concrete,
tangible actions to strengthen the PSI and sustain it as a core element of the international
nonproliferation regime. As part of that effort, the United States and other PSI countries committed to work together to urge all
responsible states to endorse and participate in the Initiative.
15
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – PSI Turn – Link extension
LOST undermines the PSI
Environment and Energy Daily, 3/24/04
The major national security concern is that the treaty could undermine the Proliferation Security
Initiative, which is a coalition of U.S.-led countries which are committed to disrupting trade in weapons of mass
destruction by interdicting vessels in their territory or territorial waters. Gaffney said China is already claiming
the convention invalidates PSI because it limits the authority to intercept and board ships on the high
seas. Inhofe and Gaffney's worries are not shared by the Pentagon, which supports ratification on the grounds
that it would strengthen PSI by codifying navigation rights on the high seas.
Lost is detrimental to U.S. intelligence operations and weapons interdiction
Rabkin 2006
cei.org/pdf/5352.pdf Jeremy Rabkin is a professor of law at George Washington University written 2006 accessed July 14, 2014)
Nor is there much consolation in the prospect of appealing to ITLOS against the seizure of an American ship, since the most vulnerable American
ships would be small craft, gathering intelligence near the coasts of unfriendly states. UNCLOS couples transit rights with provisions for national
regulatory measures in coastal waters, including the right of the coastal state to prohibit intelligence gathering in these waters. Suppose
an
American ship were seized outside the territorial waters of a hostile state, on the claim that it had
earlier traversed these waters for illicit purposes and then been pursued into “contiguous” waters—as
UNCLOS allows, for a belt of water extending twelve nautical miles beyond the twelve mile reach of “territorial waters.”5 The United
States being required to document for ITLOS exactly what its ship was doing in exactly which waters
could very well compromise sensitive U.S. intelligence gathering operations.¶ It is not even clear that the United
States would benefit from having the option to pursue its own claims. In a direct confrontation over a seizure, the United
States has considerable resources—naval, diplomatic, and economic—to unilaterally pursue its demands
for immediate release. But having subscribed to UNCLOS, the United States would have much more
difficulty wielding such pressures, if the state which effected the seizure insisted that the matter should be taken to ITLOS for
resolution.
LOST crushes power projection and interdiction – Causing WMD Spread and
Undermining War on Terror
Lyons, 10/5/07 (Retired Admiral, James, Commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military
representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations, Washington Times)
The power of the U.S. Navy, not some anonymous bureaucracy, has been this nation's guarantee of our access to
and freedom of the seas. I can site many maritime operations - from our blockade of Cuba in 1962, to the
reflagging of ships in the Persian Gulf, to our submarine intelligence-gathering programs - that have been critical to
maintaining our freedom of the seas and protecting our waters from encroachment. All those examples would
likely have to be submitted to an international tribunal for approval if we become a signatory to this treaty.
In a word, this is incomprehensible. Given the current war on terror, we cannot deny our Navy the ability to carry
out legitimate naval intercept operations against vessels carrying possible nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction. But such actions would be subject to LOST's arbitration deliberations - a process that in most
cases would be decided unfavorably against the United States.
16
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – PSI Turn – Solves proliferation
PSI can solve proliferation – Nuclear Posture Review recommends
Mary Beth Nikitin (Specialist in Nonproliferation – Congressional Research Service) “Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI)” June 15, 2012
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CGcQFjA
J&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffas.org%2Fsgp%2Fcrs%2Fnuke%2FRL34327.pdf&ei=z5LEU7r1CIef8AHsooHICA&usg=AFQjCN
Hkxd8e_jjkal7jubgLSubmtHQheQ&bvm=bv.70810081,d.b2U
Although WMD interdiction efforts took place with international cooperation before PSI was formed,
supporters argue that PSI training exercises and boarding agreements give a structure and expectation of
cooperation that will improve interdiction efforts. Many observers believe that PSI’s “strengthened
political commitment of like-minded states” to cooperate on interdiction is a successful approach to
counter-proliferation policy. But some caution that it may be difficult to measure the initiative’s effectiveness,
guarantee even participation, or sustain the effort over time in the absence of a formal multilateral framework.
Others support expanding membership and improving inter-governmental and U.S. interagency coordination as
the best way to improve the program. President Obama in an April 2009 speech said that PSI should be turned into
a “durable international institution.” The Administration’s 2010 Nuclear Security Strategy said it would work to
turn PSI into a “durable international effort.” The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review included PSI as a key part of
the policy to impede sensitive nuclear trade.
PSI solves proliferation and was the driving force behind recognition of the dangers of
WMD
Mark J. Valencia (senior research associate at the Nautilus Institute and in the National Bureau of Asian
Research's National Asia Research Program) “Maritime Security Cooperation: The Politics of the Proliferation
Security Initiative”” September 14, 2010
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6401/maritime-security-cooperation-the-politics-of-theproliferation-security-initiative
The Proliferation Security Initiative, proposed by President George W. Bush in May 2003, is an
interdiction "activity" intended to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their
delivery systems and related materials from entering or leaving "states of proliferation concern." It
operates outside the U.N. system and instead relies heavily on a "coalition of the willing." Judging from
the claims of its founders and principal architects, one would think that it is the best and most effective
non-proliferation tool since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. To be fair, the PSI has improved the
awareness of the danger and of trade in WMD and the urgency of stopping it. And the focus on
interdiction has probably constrained some trade in WMD as well as their delivery systems and related
materials, or at least forced traders to change their tactics. PSI-driven training exercises have increased
national capacities for coordinated detection and interdiction of suspected shipments. Moreover, as a
result of the initiative, flag state consent for boarding to search for WMD has become a consensus
expectation, although not a legal obligation. Perhaps most important, PSI has evolved and
metamorphosed from a focus on interdiction of ships at sea, to now include inspection in ports,
transportation of WMD by aircraft, and disruption of financial networks that support such trafficking.
17
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad - Economy
LOST destroys the economy– it undermines innovation and competition, destroying
entrepeneurship and risking global redistribution of resources.
Smith, 10/4/07 (Fred, Head Competitive Enterprise Institute, CQ Congressional Testimony)
An analogous separation of the ocean resource into navigational rights and ocean floor rights poses no serious
difficulties. This would allow us to achieve the useful, if redundant, gains promised in the navigational area,
without hindering the creative and ongoing institutional innovations. Innovation is rare when resources are
relegated to "common property" status. Indeed, as the materials supplied to this Committee make clear, the
development goals of this treaty could far more effectively be advanced - without the risks of over-regulation and
over- litigation - by simply creating a claims office to allow ocean floor rights to be catalogued and titled. Private
property would do far more than UN bureaucracies to encourage the development of the ocean's resources in
mankind's interest. The Law of the Sea Treaty mandates global redistribution of resources and technology, creates
a monopolistic public mining entity, and restricts competition just the sort of statist panaceas that were
discredited by the collapse of Soviet communism and that have been largely abandoned everywhere.
Far from being a market-oriented system, as claimed by some conservatives who have been co-opted by treaty
enthusiasts on this issue, the treaty will forever discourage widespread exploration and production. The treaty's
purported benefits are illusory; the treaty's features would impose heavy costs on America and the world. LOST is
a heavily regulatory bill, creating a body charged with protecting the seas. But, everything eventually flows into the
seas. Thus, the UN gains the power to look upstream and into the skies to ensure that everything that has - or
might have - impact on the seas be scrutinized and disciplined. The unintended consequences of this regulatory
overreach cannot be under-estimated; its potential for damage is massive. This Committee has not done "due
diligence" on this topic. And, for the complacent, note that the proponents of this bill - environmental alarmists
and legal enthusiasts - are adept at converting hortatory language into legal prohibitions. Did anyone expect the
Endangered Species Act to become a national land use planning act? Did anyone expect Superfund to become one
of the most costly green pork barrel measures in history or that the Clean Water Act would compel the Corps of
Engineers to ban development throughout any area that might have been or might become at some time a
"wetland?" The treaty's regulatory approach would be guided by the precautionary principle, the serious
application of which would halt economic development, since it is impossible to prove a negative that a new
process or technology involves no risk
Indeed, it is the precautionary principle that has burdened Europe with a regulatory yoke only a bureaucrat could
love. As The Economist noted last week:
The European model rests more on the "precautionary principle", which underpins most environmental and health
directives. This calls for pre-emptive action if scientists spot a credible hazard, even before the level of risk can be
measured. Such a principle sparks many transatlantic disputes: over genetically modified organisms or climate
change, for example. . . Some Eurocrats suggest that the philosophical gap reflects the American constitutional
tradition that everything is allowed unless it is forbidden, against the Napoleonic tradition codifying what the state
allows and banning everything else. Regulatory Bonapartism may appeal to some Europeans, but it is not a model
to which America should ever subject itself.
18
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST gives the ISA too much control over our economic interests – should be rejected
Matt Cover, July 16, 2012, GOP Senators Sink Law of the Sea Treaty; 'This Threat to Sovereignty',
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/gop-senators-sink-law-sea-treaty-threat-sovereignty
Thirty-four Republican senators have now signed on to a letter circulated by Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.)
declaring that they will not support ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Ratification would have
required a two-thirds vote in the Senate to pass, meaning that 67 Senators would have needed to
vote for the treaty in order for the U.S. to formally agree to it. Now that 34 senators have pledged to
vote against ratification, there are not enough votes to ratify the treaty. “President Obama and
Massachusetts Senator John Kerry were trying to ram through a misguided treaty that conveys ownership of the oceans (2/3 of
the earth surface) to a United Nations agency and subjects the U.S. to international environmental judgments,” said Sen.
DeMint in a statement released today. “But conservatives defeated this threat to sovereignty by rallying together enough
senators to block the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST).” Earlier today, DeMint announced that four additional Republicans had
signed his opposition letter stating that they will vote against ratification. Those four senators – DeMint had collected 30
signatures as of last week – were Sen. Mike Johanns (R-Neb.), Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.), Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.), and Sen.
Rob Portman (R-Ohio.). The Law of the Sea Treaty – formally known as the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Seas (UNCLOS) – has been awaiting Senate ratification since 1982, when it was rejected by former
President Ronald Reagan whose administration had participated in drafting the treaty but ultimately
rejected the final document. The treaty was reworked in 1994 to satisfy concerns raised by the Reagan
and Bush administrations that it would disadvantage the United States. However, the Senate again failed to
get enough votes to ratify the treaty, citing some of the same concerns Reagan had originally cited. The treaty codifies the legal
obligations of all states regarding passage of ships and commerce in their territorial off-shore waters, defining each state’s
rights in what is known as the Outer Continental Shelf. It also provides for an international body whose purpose is to settle
claims and administer disputes in deep water, offshore areas known as the International Seabed Authority (ISA). Originally, the
United States rejected the treaty because it felt that ratifying it would cede some measure of sovereignty to the ISA. This
concern was addressed in the 1994 revision by giving the United States a permanent seat on the ISA’s
governing body and giving the U.S. government a veto over all ISA decisions. Still, many Republican
senators oppose the treaty on the grounds that the ISA would have too much power over U.S.
commercial interests. The treaty has the backing of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. military,
and all former U.S. secretaries of State.
19
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad –US sovereignty
LOST hurts fight against terrorism and loses U.S. sovereignty
Jim Backlin, Vice President for Legislative Affairs, Christian Coalition, No Date, United Nations Law of the Sea
Treaty, http://unlawofthesea.wordpress.com/opponents/
The LOS Treaty “would hamper America in the war against terrorism by seriously impairing the Navy’s ability to
stop and search vessels – a huge sacrifice of U.S. sovereignty and a serious threat to our national security. . . . The
new United Nations international regulatory agency would have the power to levy international taxes, for the first
time in United Nations’ history.
“The United Nations has proven its absolute ineffectiveness and its corruptness when it totally botched the U.N.’s
Oil for Food program which was intended to provide food for the children and the destitute in Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq. This is not the time to expand the authority of the United Nations. The Law of the Sea Treaty runs contrary to
both America’s national and wartime interests and the U.S. Senate must reject it.”
LOST is against American concepts—gives away our sovereign power
Free Republic,-“Action Alert”, No date, United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty,
http://unlawofthesea.wordpress.com/opponents/
“LOST is grounded in such un-American and concepts as global socialism and world government. There is precious
little American constituency today for giving more power and wealth to the United Nations, an organization whose
officials just committed the biggest corruption in history (the oil-for-food scandal) and continually use the United
Nations as a platform for anti-American diatribes. “LOST is so bad for Americans that it is a puzzlement how
anyone whose job it is to protect American interests could even CONSIDER supporting it with a straight face. LOST
would give its own creation, the International Seabed Authority, the power to regulate 70 percent of the world’s
surface area, a territory greater than the Soviet Union ruled at its zenith. LOST would give the authority power to
levy international taxes, one of the essential indicia of sovereignty. This authority power is artfully concealed
behind direct U.S. assessments and fees paid by corporations, but the proper word is taxes.”
LOST destroys sovereignty – allows redistribution of US resources to corrupt and
despotic regimes.
The Heritage Foundation- “U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: It’s Still a Bad Idea” -July 7, 2011http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/2011/07/un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-its-still-a-bad-idea
Redistribution of U.S. Wealth to
the “Developing World”
The U.S. currently enjoys full sovereignty over its entire continental shelf. It can claim all its
mineral resources (e.g., oil and gas) and can collect royalty revenue from oil and gas companies
for exploitation. If the U.S. joined UNCLOS, Article 82 would require the U.S. to transfer a
significant portion of any such royalties to the ISA for “redistribution” to the so-called
developing world, including corrupt and despotic regimes.
20
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST ruins US sovereignty
Jeremy Rabkin June 1, 2006 The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America ( Professor of Law at George
Mason University School of Law. He has written widely on issues of international law and national sovereignty.)
http://cei.org/
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was negotiated in the late 1970s, an era when Third World
nations looked to the U.N. to distribute resources from rich to poor nations. President Reagan rejected American participation in the 1980s.
Slight changes introduced in the 1990s persuaded the Clinton Administration to endorse the treaty. The Bush Administration, perhaps because
it is eager to improve its internationalist credentials, has also endorsed the treaty. But it remains
a bad deal for the United
States. The Law of the Sea treaty does not simply set rules for commercial activity beneath the high
seas. It establishes a new international tribunal and new international bureaucracies to interpret and
apply a wide range of rules for activities on the seas—and to proceed with such rules even against U.S. objections. It
threatens to introduce international legal complications into national security missions of the U.S. Navy.
It threatens to complicate not only deep-sea mining—if it ever becomes a realistic commercial prospect—but also fishing
and other commercial activities at sea and perhaps even on adjacent lands. Above all, it sets a very bad precedent.In the past, the
United States has jealously guarded its national sovereignty. It has never agreed to treaties under which new standards
can be imposed, without express U.S. consent, by the decision of international bureaucrats or by coalitions of hostile—and potentially hostile—
nations. What the United States does do in many areas it should do in regards to this treaty—assert its rights under customary international
law. The Law of the Sea treaty is not necessary to secure claims which the U.S. already makes on this basis (regarding economic rights in U.S.
It is a dangerous concession to international fashion to accept the
idea that U.S. rights are dependent on the approval of shifting majorities of other nations.
coastal waters and rights of passage elsewhere).
Ratifying UNCLOS would cause the United States to give up sovereignty and lose
royalty revenue.
Heritage Action for America, 6/17/2014, Why the Law of the Sea Treaty is still a bad idea,
http://heritageaction.com/stoplost/why-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-still-a-bad-idea/
• Another Unaccountable International Bureaucracy: UNCLOS establishes the International Seabed Authority (ISA), a new U.N.-style
bureaucracy located in Kingston, Jamaica. As only one of more than 160 countries in the ISA, the U.S. would have limited authority over its
decisions regarding the deep seabed. Just like the U.N. General Assembly, proceedings at the ISA would be dominated by anti-U.S. interests.¶ •
Redistribution of U.S. Wealth to the “Developing World”: The U.S. currently enjoys full sovereignty over its entire continental shelf. It can claim
all its mineral resources (e.g., oil and gas) and can collect royalty revenue from oil and gas companies for exploitation. If the U.S. joined
UNCLOS, Article 82 would require the U.S. to transfer a significant portion of any such royalties to the ISA for “redistribution” to the so-called
developing world, including corrupt and despotic regimes.¶ • Mandatory Dispute Resolution: Under Part XV, the U.S. would be required to
engage in mandatory dispute resolution for any claim brought against it by another member of UNCLOS. This may open the U.S. to any number
of specious allegations brought by opportunistic nations, including allegations of environmental degradation or polluting the ocean
environment with carbon emissions or even from land-based sources.¶ • U.S. Economic Interests at Risk: UNCLOS claims the deep seabed
resources of the oceans as “the common heritage of mankind” and forbids mining unless permission is first received by the ISA, which, of
course, takes into account the interests of “developing states” regarding the exploitation of those resources. UNCLOS encourages technology
transfers from advanced mining companies to support the mining activities by developing states, which is likely to discourage U.S. companies
from participating in such activities.¶ • The Convention Was Not “Fixed” in 1994: During the early 1990s the deep seabed mining provisions of
UNCLOS were renegotiated in the “1994 Agreement.” This addendum to the convention was signed by the Clinton Administration in July 1994.
While the 1994 Agreement improved many provisions of the convention, it did not secure “veto” power for the U.S. over the decisions of the
ISA.
21
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST kills U.S. military and sovereignty
Roff 12
(http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2012/05/10/kill-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty Peter Roff is a contributing editor at U.S. News &
World Report. Formerly a senior political writer for United Press International, he’s now affiliated with several public policy organizations
including Let Freedom Ring, and Frontiers of Freedom. His writing has appeared in National Review, Fox News’ opinion section, The Daily Caller,
Politico and elsewhere may 10 2012, accessed July 14, 2014)
The Law of the Sea Treaty is a complex international agreement that's been around since Ronald Reagan
was president. Its ostensible purpose is to define the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the
world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural
resources.¶ Reagan objected to several of the treaty's provisions and refused to sign it without
amendments changing it, but like a bad penny, it keeps turning up. In 1994 the United Nations attempted to
move the ball down the field by creating an "Agreement on Implementation" that would address the concerns
expressed by the United States and others. It didn't really make the treaty any better but President Bill Clinton
signed it anyway. The U.S. Senate, however, has never, as the Constitution requires, voted to ratify it. ¶ [See
pictures of Navy SEALs]¶ The global governance crowd remains undeterred. The treaty may again see the light of
day in the Senate, perhaps as early as next week. And this doesn't sit well with some people. ¶ "One of the primary
missions of the United States Navy for over two centuries has been to maintain freedom of the seas for all. As a
Navy veteran, I am offended to think that the Senate and the Chief of Naval Operations would even consider
ceding any part of that mission to the United Nations," said Colin Hanna, president of Let Freedom Ring—a
nonpartisan organization where I am a senior fellow.¶ In reality the Law of the Sea Treaty is one more step
towards a system of global governance under which U.S. sovereignty would be subordinated to an
international system managed by an unelected, self-perpetuating form of bureaucratic aristocracy that cares
little for democratic traditions. Which, Hanna suggests, is one of a series of reasons the Senate should continue to
vote down efforts to ratify it.¶ [See pictures of Iran participating in War Games]¶ The Law of the Sea Treaty
would do irreparable harm to U.S. military and intelligence operations and would force the United
States to hand over proprietary technology to countries actively hostile to U.S. interests. It would also
create a system for resolving disputes lying outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. legal system, leaving
American citizens and businesses at the mercy of international tribunals whose members are not
necessarily adherents to Western political or legal traditions and who may not hail from democratic nations. ¶ The
Law of the Sea Treaty, as previously mentioned, establishes a global bureaucracy that could leave U.S.
businesses awash in a sea of destructive environmental regulations that would be costly and
anticompetitive while these same bureaucrats handed out U.S. government money to give the economies of
unfriendly countries a boost. The treaty would, Hanna says, impose global royalties and fees on American
energy companies that will destroy U.S. jobs and make energy from traditional sources like natural gas
and oil even more expensive. It might also embolden the military of countries like the People's
Republic of China, who could use its language to justify a more aggressive posture in the South China
Sea, while at the same time impeding the ability of the United States to interdict weapons of mass
destruction being transported from one nation to another on the high seas.¶ [See pictures of U.S. military
power in the Persian Gulf]¶ Finally, says Hanna, "There is no guarantee that the treaty will remain what it is at the
time of ratification. Under its terms, its content can later be changed by an amendment process that does
not require the approval of the United States government. This undermines U.S. sovereignty and, to put
it bluntly, is unconstitutional."¶
22
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST hurts sovereignty—causes us to give royalties to other country
Larry Bell, endowed professor at the University of Houston, May 20, 2014, Will U.S. Sovereignty Be LOST At Sea?
Obama Supports U.N. Treaty That Redistributes Drilling Revenues,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/05/20/will-u-s-sovereignty-be-lost-at-sea-obama-signs-u-n-treatythat-redistributes-drilling-revenues/
A proposed Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST), which is supported by President Obama but has not yet
been ratified by Congress, will subordinate U.S. naval and drilling operations beyond 200 miles of our
coast to a newly established U.N. bureaucracy. If approved, it will grant a Kingston, Jamaica-based
International Seabed Authority (ISA) the power to regulate deep-sea oil exploration, seabed mining,
and fishing rights. As part of the deal, as much as 7% of U.S. government revenue that is collected
from oil and gas companies operating off our coast will be forked over to ISA for redistribution to
poorer, landlocked countries. This apparently is in penance for America’s audacity in perpetuating prosperity yielded by our
Industrial Revolution. Under current law, oil companies are required to pay royalties to the U.S. Treasury
(typically at a rate of 12 ½% to 18%) for oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico and off the
northern coast of Alaska. Treasury keeps a portion, and the rest goes to Gulf states and to the
National Historic Preservation Fund. But if LOST is ratified, about half of those Treasury revenues,
amounting to billions, if not trillions of dollars, would go to the ISA. We will be required to pay 1% of
those “international royalties” beginning in the sixth year of production at each site, with rates
increasing at 1% annual increments until the 12th year when they would remain at 7% thereafter. Like
the U.N.’s Kyoto Protocol debacle that preceded it, this most recent LOST cause embodies the
progressive ideal of subordinating the sovereignty of nation states to authoritarian dictates of a world
body. The U.S. would have one vote out of 160 regarding where the money would go, and be
obligated to hand over offshore drilling technology to any nation that wants it… for free. And who are those
lucky international recipients? They will most likely include such undemocratic, despotic and brutal governments as Belarus, Burma, China,
Cuba, Sudan and Zimbabwe…all current voting members of LOST. The treaty was originally drafted in 1968 at the behest of Soviet bloc and
Third World dictators interested in implementing a scheme to weaken U.S. power and transferring wealth from industrialized countries to the
developing world. It had been co-authored by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, a socialist and admirer of Karl Marx who ran the World Federation of
Canada. In a 1999 speech she declared: “The world ocean has been and is so to speak, our great laboratory for making a new world order.”
Recognizing this as a global grab, President Reagan thought it was such a lousy idea that he not only refused to sign, but actually fired the State
Department staff that helped negotiate it. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton warns that world circumstances are even much less favorable
to the U.S. for LOST enactment now: “With China emerging as a major power, ratifying the treaty would encourage Sino-American strife,
constrain U.S. naval activities and do nothing to resolve China’s expansive maritime territorial claims.” The
treaty has been pitched
as an effort to protect the world’s oceans from environmental damage and to avoid potential conflicts
between nations. Accordingly, ISA would settle international maritime and jurisdictional disputes, possibly even to the extent of
overriding our U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation and governing where ships can and cannot go. ISA’s prerogative to do so would be entirely
consistent with a “global test” definition advocated by key LOST proponent Senator John Kerry in 2004. The treaty contains a clause
empowering the ISA to take whatever steps it deems necessary to stop “marine pollution.” According to William C. G. Burns of the Monterey
Institute of International Studies, its expansive definition of pollution could be read to include “…the potential impact of rising sea surface
temperature, rising sea levels, and changes in ocean pH as a consequence of rising levels of carbon dioxide in sea water.” Burns warns that this
could “give rise to actions under the Convention’s marine pollution provisions to reduce carbon emissions worldwide.” He warns that this can
easily be expanded to include anti-global warming measures, and since it would be “self-executing”, U.S. courts can be used to enforce it.
Powerful environmental organizations love LOST because it will afford a legal system for dispute
resolution which culminates in a 21-member international tribunal (ITLOS) based in Hamburg which
can be enforced against American companies without possibilities of U.S. court appeal. Numerous lawsuits
charging global warming dangers linked to greenhouse emissions from ships will most likely supersede binding rules of the discredited Kyoto
Protocol which the U.S. wisely never ratified. The U.S. Navy maintains that we need LOST to guarantee free transit in dangerous waters, such as
in the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has threatened to block, and in the South China Sea which is dominated by China. Yet freedom of navigation
23
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
has been recognized under international law for centuries. It was policed by the British Navy over 400 years, and by ours since 1775. Since the
U.N. has no navy, it will still be up to us to continue this role. Given good prospects that the White House and Senate may have fewer Democrat
residents after November, Senator Kerry has been working hard to speed up the approval process before moving vans arrive. Republican
Senator Luger, another strong treaty supporter and career globalist, apparently didn’t want to highlight that fact during the course of his hardfought Indiana reelection campaign. Now, with nothing more to lose following his primary defeat, he can be expected to help push for Senate
ratification as early as next month. U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had both supported the treaty during their tenures, but they
never sent it to the Senate for ratification because of opposition over concerns that it will limit commerce and allow international bodies to
wield control over U.S. interests. During W’s term of office, then-Senator Joe Biden introduced LOST before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee he chaired in 2007, yet it was never brought to the floor for a vote. The Obama administration has now openly supported Senate
action since at least 2009 when it released its Treaty Priority List. Those who support the treaty argue that it will clarify rules regarding the high
seas…ocean waters beyond our national jurisdiction and in the Arctic Ocean where the U.S., Russia Canada, and several Scandinavian countries
have all claimed territorial rights. During her confirmation hearing for Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton said: “If people start drilling in areas
that are now ice-free most of the year, and we don’t know where they can or can’t drill or whether we can, we’re going to be disadvantaged. So
I think you will have a very receptive audience in our State Department and in our administration.” Peter Brooks, a former U.S. Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense and current Heritage Foundation senior fellow disagrees with that rationale. He argues that: “While LOST’s navigational
tenets for operations on high seas, including establishing waters and exclusive economic zones, are of little dispute, some of the other ‘nonnavigational’ provisions are what really frighten the treaty’s detractors.” And in addition to establishing and having to deal with still another
U.N. agency, and giving away many billions of dollars to “any number of bad actor, corrupt or anti-American regimes” at a time when our
country is facing enormous fiscal and budgetary challenges, LOST considers the deep seabed as the “common heritage of mankind”. Brooks
continues: “But what they’re really getting at is if you want to harvest Davy Jones’ locker you need to ask pretty please of…tahdah…the ISA. This
Mother-may-I would likely limit or discourage the private sector’s economic opportunities in the deep seabed, affecting the provision of this
likely-significant bounty to global markets. Global energy demand…and prices at the pump…seem to be going anywhere but down. We don’t
want to allow our energy exploration to be held hostage to the whims of some unaccountable international bureaucrats.” Steven Groves, an
international law fellow at the Heritage Foundation agrees, and observes that opposition from Republican members of Congress who have
objected reflects a legitimate deep-seated distrust of the United Nations and other international bodies, observing: “This seems to me a bit of a
Trojan Horse for the ability of one country to affect another country’s environmental policy. That’s generally something we do not like as
conservatives and Americans.” And why would anyone possibly doubt the U.N.’s objectivity and sagacity as an oversight organization? Well
perhaps we might think about the history of its Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which produced the 1992 Earth Summit Rio
Declaration’s rules which have been adopted by a new U.S. National Ocean Council (NOC) established by President Obama through an
Executive Order. Principal #15 states that: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” In other words, those protections can involve whatever
restraints on drilling and other activities an organization such as ISA may deem necessary to protect the planet from global warming… whether
or not they can scientifically establish that there is a problem…or whether or not those attempted interventions will make a bit of difference.
Headed by Science Czar and noted climate alarmist John Holdren, the NOC is seen by many as a back door way to sneak LOST in as a “soft law”,
the same tactic used when the U.N.’s Agenda 21 failed to pass Congress. This enables it to avoid a 2/3 Senate approval vote hurdle required for
all treaties.
24
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad - Environment
LOST ratification risks ocean stability – destroys status quo efforts to protect ocean
resources.
Smith, 10/4/07 (Fred, Head Competitive Enterprise Institute, CQ Congressional Testimony)
This treaty would relegate two-thirds of the world's potential resources to perpetual status as common property
resources "the common heritage of all mankind." But as Garrett Hardin noted long ago in his article, The Tragedy
of the Commons, policies that relegate resources to be managed by all, are all too likely to have tragic results.
Some nation states - the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, even China - have made dramatic steps in
moving land-based technology down to the sea. Other nations like New Zealand and Iceland have done much to
extend property rights into the fisheries area. These pioneering efforts to extend the institutions that have made
so much of the earth's land productive and beneficial to mankind to this most complex and costly world have been
encouraged by the hope that they will profit, that the knowledge they acquire will be theirs to make future steps
more efficient, that any profits they make will be retained. These positive trends will be weakened or destroyed if
LOST is ratified. Note that the United States has long recognized that ownership of the surface can - and in fact
should sometimes - be severed from ownership of subsurface resources. That creative extension and adaptation of
traditional private property encouraged exploration and development of the resources beneath the earth's
surface. This creative extension of property rights made possible the rapid development of oil, coal and other
mineral resources in the US.
25
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Bad – China won’t follow
It has been empirically shown that other countries do not follow all parts of UNCLOSChina proves.
Jerome Aning, 6/22/2014, China’s refusal to join arbitration a serious violation of Unclos,
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/106905/chinas-refusal-to-join-arbitration-a-serious-violation-of-unclos
China’s snub of the Philippine arbitral claim on the West Philippine Sea and the slew of building projects
initiated by Beijing on disputed reefs in the area are “a serious and belligerent violation” of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), a Filipino lawyer and international legal expert told a conference in Tokyo last week.¶ Speaking at
the fifth annual meeting of the Japan Society of International Law at the Chuo University Law School, Harry Roque Jr. said that being a signatory
to the Unclos, China “agreed to refer all matters involving interpretation and application of the Unclos to the compulsory and binding dispute
settlement procedure of the convention.”¶ Roque, who is also director of the University of the Philippines-Law Center’s Institute of
international Legal Studies, recalled that the international community took a very long time to agree on the provisions of Unclos because all
countries of the world wanted the convention to be the “constitution for the seas.”¶ “By prohibiting reservations and by adopting all provision
on the basis of consensus, it was the intention of the world community to do away with the use of force and unilateral acts in the resolution of
all disputes arising from maritime territory,” Roque said in a statement posted on his blog.¶ Roque also debunked the view expressed recently
by Judge Xue Hanquin, the Chinese judge in the International Court of Justice who said that states that made declarations when they ratified
the Unclos—China included—were deemed to have opted out of the dispute settlement procedure of the convention.¶ He noted that China’s
subsequent reservations only to specific subject matters from the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement procedures proves that China agreed to
be bound by the procedure.¶ Roque also said it would not do China any good if reports were confirmed it has been building artificial islands in
Mabini (Johnson South) Reef and expanding its artificial island at Kagitingan (Fiery Cross) Reef, and deploying its naval forces to ward off any
opposition.¶ ‘Nine-dash line’ illegal¶ The Philippine government has asked the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (Itlos) to declare that
China’s “nine-dash line” maritime boundary was illegal since it was not sanctioned by the Unclos.¶ The Philippines also asked the Netherlandsbased arbitral tribunal to declare that Panganiban (Mischief), McKennan, Burgos (Gaven) and Zamora (Subi) reefs—four “low-water elevations,”
so-called because they are only visible during low tide, and where China has build artificial islands—be declared as part of the continental shelf
of the Philippines.¶ The Philippines also wanted the Itlos to declare that the waters outside the 12 nautical miles of Panatag (Scarborough)
Shoal be declared as part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone.¶ According to Roque, the Chinese academic in the conference, professor
Zhang Xinjun of Tsinghua University, characterized the Philippine arbitral claim as a “mixed claim” because it involved both claims to
sovereignty arising from land territory and not just purely maritime territory.¶ This is why Beijing
maintains that the arbitral
tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the Philippine claim, Roque quoted Zhang as saying.¶ The UP professor,
however, said the three specific prayers of the Philippines involved interpretation and application of
specific Unclos provisions relating to internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zones, islands
and low-tide elevations.
China did not ratify Article 298 of LOST
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. "Declarations or Statements upon UNCLOS
Ratification." UN News Center. UN, 29 Oct. 2013. Web. 30 June 2014.
“The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for
in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in
paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.”
26
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
A2 Arctic advantage
No risk of Arctic conflict – ratification of LOST would have no measurable effect on US
interests there. The disads outweigh the benefits.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/06/accession-to-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-unnecessaryto-advance-arctic-interests
Much has been said in recent years about a “race” or “scramble” to secure resources in the Arctic Ocean
as polar ice recedes, inevitably leading to conflict in the region. But reality paints a very different picture.
Over the past decades, Arctic nations have worked together to advance their shared goals for the
region, and relations among the United States and other Arctic nations on Arctic issues are characterized
by collaboration, not conflict. In many ways, the Arctic serves as a model for regional cooperation and
multilateral coordination. Even before the end of the Cold War, the eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark (via
Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR, and the United States—met during 1989–1991 to
develop a plan for protecting the Arctic environment. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy that resulted
from these meetings was a groundbreaking step in multilateral cooperation among the Arctic states and formed
the basis for the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996. Yet proponents of U.S. accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) insist that the United States is greatly hindered or even
incapable of advancing its Arctic interests because it has not ratified the convention. The facts and
evidence prove otherwise. This paper demonstrates how the U.S. has successfully advanced its national security
and economic interests in the Arctic through domestic initiatives, bilateral and multilateral treaties, regional
cooperation, and U.S. membership in intergovernmental organizations focused on the Arctic. Part I provides an
overview of U.S. national interests in the Arctic according to executive orders and policy documents developed by
the Bush and Obama Administrations. Part II examines U.S. national security interests in the Arctic that are
relevant to UNCLOS (e.g., freedom of navigation) and discusses whether accession to the convention is necessary
to advance those interests. Part III describes U.S. economic interests in the Arctic—hydrocarbon resources,
maritime traffic, and commercial fishing—and the impact, if any, that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would have on
advancement of those interests. The United States has successfully protected its interests in the Arctic since it
acquired Alaska in 1867, has done so during the more than 30 years that UNCLOS has existed, and will continue to
do so even if it never joins the convention. Accession to UNCLOS would have no appreciable or measurable
effect on U.S. interests in the Arctic. Moreover, the harm that would be caused by the convention’s
controversial provisions—e.g., revenue sharing, deep seabed mining, and mandatory dispute
resolution—far outweighs any intangible benefit that allegedly would result from U.S. accession.
27
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
No risk of military conflict over the Arctic – and no need to ratify LOST to protect
national security interests.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
There is no reason to believe that the Arctic region will be characterized by military conflict between and
among Arctic and non-Arctic nations. The U.S. Department of Defense maintains that there is a “relatively low level of
threat” in the Arctic region because it is “bounded by nation states that have not only publicly
committed to working within a common framework of international law and diplomatic engagement,
but also demonstrated ability and commitment to doing so over the last fifty years.”[9] The “relatively low level
of threat” in the Arctic is reflected in the aforementioned Arctic policy documents. While these documents call for improvements in Arctic
infrastructure, they do not call for any significant military buildup in the region. These policy
documents also indicate that
there is minimal overlap between U.S. national security interests in the Arctic and U.S. accession to
UNCLOS. For example, the Obama Administration’s January 2014 Arctic strategy implementation plan lists six major national security
objectives for the Arctic region. Only one of these objectives—“Promote International Law and Freedom of the Seas”—intersects with
UNCLOS.[10] The implementation plan details the “next steps” for freedom of the seas in the Arctic. (See “Next Steps” text box.) None of these
“next steps” would be measurably advanced by U.S. membership in UNCLOS. For instance, the United States conducts maritime exercises and
operations on a global scale and has done so ever since it launched a blue-water navy. Next steps such as information sharing, relationship
building, and strategic communications are not contingent on UNCLOS membership and may be accomplished through any number of bilateral
and multilateral means, including the Arctic Council. The next steps listed in the implementation plan are important and should be pursued by
the responsible executive departments, but none of them require U.S. membership in UNCLOS.
Economic conflict is not inevitable in the Arctic – cooperation and coordination has
been empirically proven.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
If the Arctic fishing moratorium is lifted and to the extent that there exist migrating stocks of fish that straddle adjoining U.S.,
Canadian, and Russian EEZs, exploitation of such stocks will be governed by the U.N. Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement, which the United States ratified in 1996.[62] The United States is further committed to negotiate an
international agreement to prevent unregulated fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean.[63] Secretary Clinton’s allegation that “ships from all over
the world [will be] exploiting, fishing—taking advantage of what rightly should be American sovereign territory” in the Arctic is simply false. The
U.S. EEZ contains approximately 3.4 million square miles of ocean. But in 2008 the U.S. Coast Guard detected a mere 81 incursions by foreign
fishing vessels in the U.S. EEZ.[64] While such illegal fishing has occurred and will continue to occur in the vast U.S. EEZ, Secretary
Clinton’s imagined world of foreign fishing vessels running rampant through U.S. Arctic waters is
baseless. Like on other matters in the Arctic, curbing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is done
cooperatively with other Arctic nations, including Russia.[65] In sum, the pursuit of natural resources and
the management of maritime traffic in the Arctic is characterized by cooperation and coordination
among Arctic nations, not conflict. The idea that economic conflict in the Arctic is inevitable is a myth
peddled by proponents of U.S. accession to UNCLOS.
28
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
No race to exploit Arctic resources that will lead to conflict – history has definitively
debunked the notion that we can only make resource claims if we ratify LOST.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
Securing Arctic Hydrocarbon Resources. The
notion that there is a “race” to exploit Arctic resources that will
inevitably lead to conflict is farfetched. While many nations are interested in developing Arctic hydrocarbons, there is no
indication that Russia, Canada, or any other nation—Arctic or non-Arctic—will infringe in any way on
U.S. jurisdiction and control over its resources on the U.S. continental shelf, including its extended continental shelf
(ECS) that extends north of the 200 nm EEZ. Proponents of U.S. accession to UNCLOS claim that the United States cannot fully exploit
hydrocarbon resources on its ECS unless it joins the convention. For example, former Senator Richard Lugar (R–IN), a longtime supporter of U.S.
membership in the convention, maintained that accession is essential to establishing a valid claim to the ECS in the Arctic: “If the United States
does not ratify this treaty, our ability to claim the vast extended Continental Shelf off Alaska will be seriously impeded.”[26] To treaty
supporters, the right to claim resources on the U.S. ECS hinges on the approval of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),
a special committee established by UNCLOS to review the claims made by nations to areas of ECS. Yet history has
repeatedly and
definitively debunked the notion that recognition of U.S. ECS claims is contingent on U.S. membership in
UNCLOS or on the approval of an international commission. To the contrary, through bilateral treaties
with the Cook Islands, Cuba, Mexico, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela, the United States has
successfully established its various maritime boundaries and the limits of its continental shelf and ECS.
US can successfully advance all its economic interests in the Arctic without ratification
of LOST.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
The United States may successfully advance its economic interests in the Arctic—securing hydrocarbon resources,
facilitating maritime traffic, and regulating commercial fishing—without accession to UNCLOS. First, the United States has
engaged in hydrocarbon exploration activities in the Arctic Ocean within its 200 nm EEZ since 1979.[25]
No foreign nation has challenged the U.S. right to do so or has interfered with U.S. exploration efforts. Extending beyond
the U.S. EEZ toward the North Pole is a large area of “extended continental shelf” over which the United States has jurisdiction and control to
develop hydrocarbon resources to the exclusion of all other nations. Second,
to the extent that melting Arctic ice results in
increased commercial shipping in Arctic waters, any resulting maritime traffic will be facilitated by
international cooperation and adherence to existing multilateral agreements. Commercial shipping on the world’s
oceans is largely governed by international custom and specialized maritime treaties negotiated under the auspices of the International
Maritime Organization. Finally, no commercial fishing by either the U.S. or foreign nations is permitted in the waters of the U.S. Arctic EEZ north
of the Bering Strait. If
in the future the United States lifts its moratorium, it is fully capable of regulating
commercial fishing activities without UNCLOS membership, pursuant to existing treaties and domestic
legislation.
29
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
All Arctic related nations accept LOST provisions as binding customary law – no
conflict risk
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
Moreover, it
is irrelevant that other Arctic nations are party to UNCLOS. Those nations enjoy no more
navigational rights and freedoms in the Arctic than are enjoyed by the United States and the 25 other
nations that have not ratified the convention.[13] That is because all Arctic nations and almost all other nations—
UNCLOS members and nonmembers alike—accept UNCLOS’s navigational provisions as binding customary law. The
Restatement of the Law, Third, of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States notes: [B]y express or tacit agreement accompanied by
consistent practice, the United States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions of the Convention, other than those
addressing deep sea-bed mining, as statements of customary law binding upon them apart from the Convention.[14] This
has long been
the U.S. position. Since the Reagan Administration, the official U.S. policy has been that UNCLOS provisions on the traditional uses of the
oceans, including the provisions on navigation and overflight, confirm international law and practice.[15] Specifically, in March 1983, President
Reagan released a statement on U.S. oceans policy in light of his decision not to sign UNCLOS.[16] Reagan stated that “the United States is
prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as navigation and
overflight” and “will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and
freedoms of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states.”[17]
LOST won’t advance Arctic interests – our objectives our met through other bilateral
and multilateral organizations.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
A cost-benefit analysis of UNCLOS vis-à-vis U.S. Arctic policy establishes that accession would not
materially advance any U.S. national interest in the region and that the costs would outweigh any
intangible benefits of accession. The U.S. has already secured and continues to pursue its national
security and economic objectives in the Arctic through bilateral and multilateral treaties that are not
saddled with UNCLOS’s baggage. U.S. membership and participation in multilateral organizations—such as
the Arctic Council, the Northern Chiefs of Defense Conference, and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable—
provide the necessary “seat at the table” to secure U.S. national interests in the region in the years
ahead without accession to a deeply flawed treaty.
30
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST ratification is not necessary to preserve US navigational rights in the Arctic.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
Protecting U.S. Navigational Rights and Freedoms. The primary U.S. national security interest in the Arctic
region related to UNCLOS is to preserve navigational rights and freedoms in the Arctic Ocean, which the
U.S. is perfectly capable of accomplishing without joining the convention. For more than 200 years, the
United States has successfully protected its navigational rights and freedoms on a global basis. U.S.
membership in UNCLOS would not confer any maritime right or freedom upon the United States that it
does not already enjoy in the Arctic or any other ocean.
The United States need not accede to UNCLOS in order to successfully assert its navigational rights and
freedoms in the Arctic Ocean. Throughout its history, the United States has successfully protected its maritime
interests without UNCLOS membership. Simply put, enjoyment of the convention’s navigational provisions—in the
Arctic and elsewhere—is not restricted to UNCLOS members. Those provisions represent widely accepted
customary international law, some of which has been recognized as such for centuries.
No risk of nations hindering our ability to act in the Arctic
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
The U.S. has made clear that it will act in accordance with the customary international law of the sea,
including the navigational provisions of UNCLOS, and will recognize the maritime rights of other nations
in the Arctic Ocean and elsewhere. When other nations assert claims contrary to customary international law,
the United States actively contests such claims through the FON Program. No evidence suggests that any Arctic
nation plans to hinder U.S. military mobility in the Arctic Ocean by making excessive maritime claims.
Nor is there evidence that any Arctic or non-Arctic nation intends to disregard U.S. sovereignty over its
territorial sea off Alaska.
While the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard strongly favor U.S. accession to UNCLOS, neither has said that they
are incapable of performing their respective missions without membership in the convention. The
navigational rights and freedoms enjoyed by the United States and its armed forces in the Arctic are guaranteed
not by membership in a treaty, but rather through a combination of long-standing legal principles and persistent
naval operations.
31
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Changes in the Arctic environment will have no effect on cooperation in the region.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
It is of little relevance to U.S. national security interests in the Arctic that the sea ice in the region is
melting. The legal status of Arctic waters does not change as sea ice melts. As polar ice melts it simply
creates new areas of open water. Changes in Arctic temperature do not affect the legal regimes set forth in
UNCLOS on the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the high seas.
While receding ice will provide more ocean area in which military vessels may maneuver, that does not alter the
legal regime governing navigation in the Arctic Ocean.
Arctic nations are committed to concord in the region, not conflict. The top national military officers from
the eight Arctic nations meet annually for the Northern Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference. Denmark hosted the
2013 conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, where the officers discussed issues ranging from information sharing
about operational challenges in the Arctic environment, responsible environmental stewardship, and the role that
the military can play in supporting civilian authorities.[7] Supplementing the annual Northern CHOD Conference
are the semiannual meetings of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, attended by senior officers of the Arctic
nations, joined by selected allies such as France and the United Kingdom.[8]
32
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
No impending conflict between Russia and the United States in the Arctic. Claims will
be peacefully resolved and we won’t be forfeiting resources to them by not ratifying
LOST.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
In the Arctic, much of the supposed distress voiced by UNCLOS proponents stems from Russia’s vast claim of Arctic
ECS that it submitted to the CLCS in 2001. The proponents incorrectly imply that Russia’s claim will result in
the loss of Arctic resources that belong to the United States. According to Senator Lisa Murkowski (R–AK), for
example, the U.S. failure to accede to UNCLOS would cause “a negligent forfeiture of valuable oil, gas and mineral
deposits.”[35]
But the United States has not and will not “forfeit” a drop of Arctic oil to Russia or any other nation. For
one thing, Russia’s claimed ECS area does not overlap any part of the U.S. Arctic ECS. To the contrary,
Russia’s claim respects a boundary that the United States and the USSR negotiated in 1990—the “Baker–
Shevardnadze line.”[36]
The Russian claim extends the Baker–Shevardnadze line from the Bering Strait all the way to the North Pole, likely
resulting in an excessive ECS claim in the central Arctic. However, Russia’s potentially excessive claim is located to
the north of the limits of the U.S. ECS area. While the Russian claim may overlap with Canada’s ECS claim, it does
not overlap any U.S. ECS area.[37]
In short, there is no conflict between the United States and Russia regarding the division of Arctic
resources, including hydrocarbons. Even if there were a conflict, Russia’s claim cannot be approved by
the CLCS and would not be recognized by the United States (or Canada). Both UNCLOS and the CLCS’s
procedural rules prevent the commission from considering any ECS area where there are overlapping
claims: “In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a
submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute.”[38]
LOST ratification will not more effectively resolve Arctic disputes – causes tension with
Russia.CTFP, 10/27/07 (Chatanooga Times Free Press, Copley News)
One of the silliest arguments is that the United States needs the treaty to guard against Russian claims to the
North Pole and its oil riches. If the United States ratifies the treaty, America would have to accept the treaty
tribunal's decision.
Even though the United States already has valid claims to the North Pole region under the Doctrine of Discovery,
the chances of the treaty bureaucrats ruling for the United States against Russia are about 1 in 155
33
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
A2 Trade Advantage
No evidence exists that LOST key to trade – “seat at the table” is not a benefit –
meetings are not substantively relevant to ocean policy.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
Simply no evidence at present indicates that U.S. accession to UNCLOS would appreciably affect the
advancement of U.S. national interests in the Arctic region. No foreign nation has attempted to exploit
Arctic natural resources (e.g., hydrocarbons, fish, and minerals) that belong to the United States. Nor has the
U.S. Navy and Coast Guard been prohibited from performing any mission in the Arctic Ocean due to U.S.
nonmembership in the convention.
Nevertheless, some proponents of U.S. accession maintain that joining the convention would assist the United
States in attaining its interests because it establishes a legal framework for virtually all maritime issues and codifies
widely accepted international law. It is challenging to assess with any certainty the merits of such vague claims
promising intangible benefits.
The intangible benefits, if any, that may or may not come from having a “seat at the table” at the
UNCLOS annual meetings of states parties is by its nature difficult to prove or quantify in any meaningful
way. The agenda of these conferences in New York is concerned with nonsubstantive matters—e.g., the
nomination, election, and remuneration of representatives to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
the CLCS, budgetary matters, and credentialing for conference attendees.[66]
No great debates are taking place at these annual meetings regarding maritime hydrocarbon resources,
excessive maritime claims, proper and improper activities within the EEZ, commercial fishing,
development of the continental shelf, or seemingly any other substantive matter dealing with the law of
the sea in the Arctic or elsewhere.
Many UNCLOS proponents maintain that the United States would benefit from joining the convention because it
could nominate a U.S. national to the CLCS. These proponents imply that a U.S. national on the CLCS will directly
benefit the United States and help to advance its ECS claims. Secretary Clinton, for example, testified, “We need to
be on the inside [of the CLCS] to protect and advance our interests.”[67] Yet any U.S. national elected to the
commission serves in his “personal capacity,” meaning that he cannot defend or otherwise represent the views or
interests of the United States on any U.S. ECS claim.[68] Additionally, the substantive analysis of any ECS claim
made by the United States would be conducted by a seven-member subcommission on which the U.S. member
may not sit.[69]
34
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Unilateral action works for the US to set maritime boundaries and claim resources –
no nation has ever disputed our CIL claims.
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
The United States has also acted unilaterally through presidential proclamations and acts of Congress to
set its maritime boundaries and lay claim to the natural resources within its maritime zones and
continental shelf: In 1945, President Harry Truman issued two proclamations. The first, the Policy of the United
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, claimed
jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the U.S. continental shelf.[27] Truman’s second proclamation
established a conservation zone for U.S. fishery resources contiguous to the U.S. coast.[28] In 1953, Congress
codified Truman’s continental shelf proclamation by enacting the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which
declared that “the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition.”[29] In 1983, in the wake of his decision not to sign UNCLOS,
President Reagan proclaimed the existence of “an Exclusive Economic Zone in which the United States will exercise
sovereign rights in living and nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast.”[30] In 1988, Reagan
followed up his EEZ proclamation by extending the breadth of the U.S. territorial sea from 3 nm to 12 nm.[31] In
1999, building on Reagan’s maritime proclamations, President Bill Clinton extended the U.S. contiguous zone from
9 nm to 24 nm.[32] No nation or group of nations, much less the “international community” as a whole, has
objected to or otherwise challenged the unilateral proclamations by Presidents Truman, Reagan, and Clinton. No
nation disputes that the United States has a 12 nm territorial sea, a 24 nm contiguous zone, a 200 nm
EEZ, or jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of its continental shelf and ECS. In fact,
foreign nations recognize and respect U.S. maritime claims and boundaries, and vice versa, as long as
those claims and boundaries conform to widely accepted international law, including provisions of
customary international law reflected in UNCLOS.
US can still object to ECS claims regardless of ratifying LOST
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
The United States may object to excessive ECS claims made by any member of UNCLOS even though the
U.S. is not a party to the convention. Indeed, after Russia made its 2001 claim, the United States, Canada,
Denmark, Japan, and Norway each filed objections with the CLCS. In June 2002, as a result of the objections, the
CLCS recommended to Russia that it provide a “revised submission” on its Arctic ECS claim.[39] Russia reportedly
will make an amended submission to the CLCS at some point in the future. The major remaining U.S. ECS
boundary to be determined in the Arctic is shared by the United States and Canada. As was the case
with Russia, the U.S. and Canada have approached the demarcation of this boundary cooperatively. The
two nations have a mutual interest in determining the extent of their respective continental shelves and
identifying their respective areas of ECS.
35
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
36
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
CIL/SQ solves the benefits of LOST
Customary international law is accepted by the US and the provisions of LOST are a
part of it – resolves all benefits of ratification
Steven Groves Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at
The Heritage Foundation. Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests
June 26, 2014
The “law of the sea” was not invented when UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 at the end of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), but rather “has its origins in the customary practice of nations spanning several centuries.”[11] It developed as
“customary international law,” which is “that body of rules that nations consider binding in their relations with one another.”[12]
Although not a party to UNCLOS, the United States acts in accordance with the international law of the sea and
considers many parts of UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law. Most of the UNCLOS
navigational provisions have long been recognized as customary international law. The convention’s articles
regarding the high seas (Articles 86–115) and territorial waters (Articles 2–32) were copied almost verbatim from the Convention on the High
Seas and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which were adopted in 1958. The United States is party to both
agreements. Other navigational provisions such as transit passage through international straits (Articles 34–44) and archipelagic sea lanes
passage (Articles 49–54) codify passage rights that existed prior to the adoption of UNCLOS, but were refined during the UNCLOS III
negotiations.
Customary International Law already solves all the benefits of LOST ratification
Goldsmith and Rabkin, 7/2/07 (Jack, Law Prof @ Harvard, Jeremy, Law Prof @ George Mason, Washington
Post)
Supporters note that many of the treaty's "freedom of the seas" provisions favor U.S. interests. But the United
States already receives the benefits of these provisions because, as Negroponte and England acknowledged, they
are "already widely accepted in practice." They maintain that ratifying the convention would nonetheless provide
"welcome legal certainty." In recent years, however, the United States has not received much legal certainty from
international tribunals dominated by non-American judges, and what it has received has not been very welcome.
There is little reason to expect different results from these tribunals.
President Bush invokes a different rationale for ratifying the convention, arguing that it would "give the United
States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted." What this
really means is that American views of the law of the sea, even on issues related to national security, could be
outvoted by a majority in an international forum. How can this make us safer?
Your impacts are empirically false – hysterical warnings have been happening for
years.
Bandow, 7/31/07 (Doug, Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, American Spectator)
The LOST lobby issued a profusion of hysterical warnings of impending chaos and violence on the high seas, but
nothing happened. Life went on as usual. No one other than the transies noticed the absence of a ratified LOST.
However, internationalist goo-goos never rest and State Department employees act like moths around a light when they near a treaty. So
President George H.W. Bush began negotiations to "fix" LOST, a process completed by the usual suspects in the Clinton administration.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed success in producing a new and improved variant of LOST, and the rush began: Washington
signed as a cascade of ratifications brought the treaty into effect, leading to demands for formal American assent.
37
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Good – A2 Navy turn – LOST key to Navy
Ratifying LOST helps ensure our Navy’s ability to move as necessary on the high seas
U.S. Navy JAG core “The Convention on the Law of the Sea” April 2012
http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_law_of_the_sea.htm
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) supports implementation of the National
Security Strategy, provides legal certainty in the world's largest maneuver space, and preserves essential
navigation and overflight rights. One hundred and sixty nations and the European Union are Party to the
Convention – but not the United States, the world's leading maritime nation. Becoming a Party to the Law of
the Sea Convention would help to ensure the Navy's ability to move forces on, over, and under the
world's oceans, whenever and wherever needed, and is an important asset in the Global War on
Terrorism. The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable
maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit
passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictional creep" by preventing
coastal nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of
warships, auxiliaries and government aircraft. Specifically, the Convention recognizes and preserves for our
ships and aircraft the freedom to conduct: •Innocent passage in territorial waters. •Transit passage through
international straits (surface, air and subsurface), including the approaches to those straits. •Unrestricted military
activities in high seas. •Military surveys. •Approach and visit of vessels suspected of engaging in piracy and
stateless vessels. Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by
enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest
continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept
of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to
conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.
Navy supports ratification
Philip Ballentine (national security team intern at the Center for American Progress) “Republicans Criticize
Military Brass For Supporting Law Of The Sea Treaty” June 19, 2012
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/06/19/502356/republicans-criticize-military-brass-for-supporting-law-ofthe-sea-treaty/
At the hearing, the Generals and Admirals spoke unanimously asking for Senate ratification of UNCLOS.
Adm. James Winnefeld, the Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that joining “will fortify our
credibility as the world’s leading naval power and allow us to bring to bear the full force of our
influence on maritime disputes.” The other panelists, including the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the heads of US Northern, Pacific, and Transport Commands, all
agreed. The military, business leaders, environmentalists, and labor groups all support ratification.
38
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Ratification key to avoiding navy cut off at global choke points
Leigh Ratiner (one of the pioneer US government officials who got the Law of the Sea Conference started in
1967 (Then called the Seabed Committee) and ended as its chief negotiator in the Reagan Administration) “US
Must Adopt Law of the Sea – Comments” March 16, 2013 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-must-adopt-lawsea
An excellent article and comments. However, if we want the U.S. to ratify we must simplify the issues for a
Congress that simply cannot get its act together. There is one winning argument; rarely mentioned in recent
times. In full disclosure, I was one of the pioneer US government officials who got the Law of the Sea Conference
started in 1967 (Then called the Seabed Committee) and ended as its chief negotiator in the Reagan
Administration. It was also pioneered by five other colleagues and by the governments of the USSR and Great
Britain. One reason for doing it was to expand Russia's fishing grounds and another to which I will devote this
comment was to guarantee freedom of navigation through, under and in the airspace of 116
international straits which present choke points around the world to give the ability of the US Navy and
Air Force to maneuver without delay; particularly in times of crisis. The US and the USSR were both
worried that expanding 12 mile territorial seas would jeopardize the navigation of their ballistic missile
submarine fleets and other military equipment. In the meantime coastal resource claims were proliferating to
200 miles. U.S. coastal fisherman would have been delighted. The Japanese and Russians not so much. Thus the
original purpose of the treaty was to ensure that in the 116 international straits which would be overlapped by
territorial seas of twelve miles the treaty would retain through those straits a "high seas corridor". Eventually, after
many concessions on deep sea resources, archipelago claims, land-locked states claims, mineral producing
countries' claim's and environmental claims it was understood that freedom of navigation would be preserved in
straits which became overlapped by twelve mile claims. The U.S. was in a good bargaining position because it
only claims a three mile territorial sea and made it crystal clear that absent an adequate treaty on
international straits it would only observe and respect the three mile limit. After a few years of negotiating
the U.S. shocked the world by declaring it's own twelve mile territorial sea without yet having a treaty in hand that
protected freedom of navigation in overlapped straits like Hormuz or Gibraltar. In doing so the U.S. gave away its
only bargaining chip and can no longer lawfully claim that there is high seas running through international straits
overlapped by territorial sea claims of twelve miles. That is the critical reason for the U.S. to ratify to the LOS
Treaty. It always was and it still is. National security depends on freedom of navigation for ships,
submarines and aircraft through those 116 international straits without having an argument and
diplomatic contretemps with coastal states Spain, Indonesia, Malaysia and even Iran if it ratifies the
treaty one day. Many others can be added to the list. Lets keep our eye on the ball. Nothing has changed since
1967 when we conceived this new Law of the Sea Conference of any overriding national security importance. We
must ratify the Convention and the Conservatives in Congress would be supporting it if only they understood the
stakes.We have lost priceless legal rights to navigate freely in international straits and can only gain them
back by ratification of the treaty. Liberal and Conservatives should have identical views on this subject.
Conservative objections to the International Seabed Authority are mooted by the support of the mining industry
which supports ratification because they cannot obtain secure tenure on a plot of land at the bottom of the oceans
unless the world agrees to it. No bank will lend a half trillion dollars to develop a mine site for a non-party to this
treaty. Conservatives: Please wake up.
39
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Best way to protect naval mobility and navigational freedom is to ratify LOST
PGEARHISER – JUNE 21, 2012 Law of the Sea Convention – What is it? What is the Navy’s Role?
http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2012/06/21/the-law-of-the-sea-convention/
The Law of the Sea Convention supports implementation of the National Security Strategy, provides legal certainty
in the world’s largest maneuver space, and preserves essential navigation and overflight rights for the U.S. military.
As a party to the Convention, the U.S. can best protect the navigational freedoms enshrined in the
agreement and exert the level of influence that reflects our status as the world’s foremost maritime
power. The Convention is in the national interest of the U.S. military. Specifically, it: Establishes stable
maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas. Works against “jurisdictional creep”
by preventing coastal nations from expanding their maritime zones. Codifies innocent passage in
territorial waters; transit passage through international straits (surface, air and subsurface), including
the approaches to those straits; and the archipelagic sea lanes passage rights. For our ships and aircraft,
recognizes and preserves the freedom to: Conduct military activities in foreign exclusive economic zones. Conduct
military surveys. Approach and visit vessels suspected of engaging in piracy and suspected stateless vessels.
Reinforces sovereign immunity of warships, other vessels operated by the government on non-commercial service,
and government aircraft. Relying on customary international law as the basis for maritime rights and
freedoms is an unwise and unnecessary risk. Our service members put their lives on the line to preserve the
rights and freedoms codified in the Convention; they deserve to be on the firmest legal ground possible as they go
into harm’s way; they deserve the legal certainty that accrues from treaty-based rights.
LOST supports naval mobility – Navy supports ratification
John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law Should the United States
ratify the UN Law of the Sea? http://www.cfr.org/treaties-and-agreements/should-united-states-ratify-un-lawsea/p31828 Nov 2013
The Convention provides clear, treaty-based rights for U.S. ships and aircraft to travel through and over
the territorial seas of other coastal states. This is why the U.S. Navy, with the largest fleet in the world, has
long supported the treaty. In this time of shrinking defense budgets, the Navy wants clear legal rights to
freedom of navigation when it cannot have more ships to assert these rights in practice.
LOST key to naval mobility and power projection.
Moore and Schachte ‘05
(John, Prof Law – U Virginia, and William, Retired Naval Rear Admiral, Journal of International Affairs, 9-22)
Myth: The convention was drafted before the inception of the war on terror and without regard to what the United States must do to wage it
successfully. It is true that the convention was drafted before the war on terror began. However, the convention enhances, rather than
undermines, our ability to successfully wage this campaign. The convention
assures the maximum maritime naval and air
mobility that is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. It also provides the necessary
stability and framework for our forces, weapons and materiel to arrive at the fight without hindrance, and ensures that our forces will
not be hindered in the future. Thus, the convention supports our war on terrorism by providing important stability for navigational and overflight freedoms, and preserves the right of the U.S. military to use the world's oceans to meet national security requirements. It
is essential
that key sea and air lanes are not contingent upon approval from nations along these routes. A stable legal regime
for the world's oceans will support global mobility for our armed forces.
40
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
Lack of U.S. accession unravels LOST naval access provisions, collapsing hegemony.
Sandalow ‘04
(David B., Scholar – Foreign Policy Program at Brookings and Frm Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, “Law of
the Sea Convention: Should the US Join?”, http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb137.htm)
U.S. military operations depend on naval mobility. By codifying navigational and overflight freedoms long asserted
by the United States, the Convention improves access rights in the oceans for our armed forces, reducing
operational burdens and helping avert conflict. Historically, the U.S. Navy was required to contend with widely varying and
excessive claims by coastal nations concerning access to the oceans. In the 1940s, for example, Chile asserted the right to control access
by all vessels within two hundred miles of its coast. Later, Indonesia asserted a similar right with regard to all waters between its many islands.
These claims and many others are effectively resolved by the Convention, which recognizes navigational and overflight
freedoms within 200-mile exclusive economic zones and through key international straits and archipelagoes. The Convention also recognizes
rights of passage through territorial seas, without notice and regardless of means of propulsion, as well as navigational and overflight freedoms
on the high seas. The results include less need for military assets to maintain maritime access rights and reduced risk of conflict. However,
the failure of the United States to join the Law of the Sea Convention puts these gains at risk. First, there is a risk that
important provisions could be weakened by amendment, beginning in November 2004, when the treaty is open for
amendment for the first time. Currently, for example, the Convention prohibits coastal states from denying transit rights to a vessel based upon
its means of propulsion. Some states, however, may propose to amend this provision to allow exclusion of nuclear-powered vessels. Under the
Convention, no amendment may be adopted unless the parties agree by consensus (or, if every effort to reach consensus failed, more than
two-thirds of the parties present agree both on certain procedural matters and on the proposed amendment). As a party, the United States
would have a much greater ability to defeat amendments that are not in the U.S. interest, by blocking consensus or voting against such
amendments. Second, by
staying outside the Convention, the United States increases the risk of backsliding by
nations that have put aside excessive maritime claims from years past. Pressures from coastal states to expand their
maritime jurisdiction will not disappear in the years ahead—indeed such pressures will likely grow. Incremental
unraveling of many gains under the Convention is more likely if the world's leading maritime power remains a
non-party.
LOST assures naval access that sustains leadership.
Clark and Pickering ‘07
(Vernon, Fmr Chief Naval Operations and Thomas, Fmr Chief Delegate to the UN, “A Treaty That Lifts All Boats,
New York Times, 7-14, Lexis)
AS the world's most significant maritime power, the United States protects its national security interests by
full freedom of navigation around the globe. The seas make up about 70 percent of the surface of the earth. Yet we have not
ratified an international treaty that would enable our armed forces to defend us at home and abroad with legal
certainty, and would vastly increase our sovereign rights off the coasts of the United States. That treaty is the
Convention of the Law of the Sea, and the Senate should ratify it during this session of Congress as President Bush has requested. Joining
the treaty is a national security action that would protect our country and its interests. The treaty provides our military the rights
of navigation, by water and by air, to take our forces wherever they must go, whenever it is necessary to do so. Our
ships -- including vessels that carry more than 90 percent of the logistic and other support for our troops overseas -- are given the right
of innocent passage through the territorial seas of other states. In addition, the treaty permits American warships to board
stateless vessels on the high seas. The treaty also provides an absolute right of passage through, over and under
international straits and through archipelagoes like Indonesia. These rights -- the crown jewels of the treaty -- did not exist before 1982,
when the Convention was concluded. Our security and economic interests are tied directly to these rights. Another provision in the treaty
establishes the breadth of the territorial sea -- the area within which a state may exercise sovereignty -- at 12 miles. This
allows the United States to extend its territorial sea from three miles to 12 miles, while making several other nations
reduce their excessive claims.
41
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST ratification is the best way to preserve naval mobility and prevent rising claims
of territory from China.
Nina Hachigian is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. China’s Rise Is A Big Reason to Ratify the
Law of the Sea Convention 2012
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/news/2012/06/12/11698/chinas-rise-is-a-big-reason-to-ratify-thelaw-of-the-sea-convention/
Here is another critical point: The 163 parties to Law of the Sea Convention could choose to change the
convention’s terms at any time. After all, the convention as it stands today is not the same as earlier versions. In
fact, there is a marked trend now toward coastal states claiming more jurisdiction over their adjacent
waters than the current convention recognizes. Chances are that any new version of the convention
called for by Brazil, China, and other emerging coastal powers would push in favor of a more “Chinese”
definition of exclusive economic zone transit rights. They might call for a larger zone with more limited rights
for noncoastal states. That would be a disaster for the United States. America, with the most powerful
Navy in the world and trade links that span the globe, needs full freedom of navigation in the world’s
oceans. If we do not ratify the Law of the Sea, we will have a very hard time stopping that kind of
change, and the longer we wait, the weaker our position will be. We should lock in the beneficial rules—the ones
that we helped draft—now. As it is the United States follows customary maritime law. But customary law can
also change over time in ways we cannot control. If the world’s other coastal states such as China start
claiming that U.S. military assets can’t transit their exclusive economic zones without permission, that practice
could enter customary maritime law. Then the United States would have a hard time arguing that it was
going to ignore customary maritime law and instead follow the terms of a treaty that it had never
ratified.
42
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Good – A2 Navy Turn – Military exemption
US opted out of military jurisdiction- no foreign court will control us
GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CQ Congressional Testimony 9-27-07
-- The Senate can ensure that international tribunals do not gain jurisdiction over our military activities
Administration worked closely with the Committee to develop a proposed
Resolution of Advice and Consent --- which we continue to support --- that contains a declaration regarding choice
of procedure for dispute resolution. The United States rejected the International Court of Justice and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and instead chose arbitration. That choice-of-procedure election is
expressly provided for in the Convention itself. In addition, and again in accordance with the express terms of the Convention,
the draft Resolution of Advice and Consent completely removes our military activities from the dispute
resolution process. Furthermore, each State Party, including the United States, has the exclusive right to determine which of its activities
when we join this Convention. In 2003, the
constitutes a military activity, and that determination is not subject to review.
No tribunal will be able to judge the US military
John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary Department of State, CQ Congressional Testimony 9-27-07
Myth: The Convention would permit an international tribunal to second-guess the U.S. Navy.
Reality: No international tribunal would have jurisdiction over the U.S. Navy. U.S. military activities,
including those of the U.S. Navy, would not be subject to any form of dispute resolution. The Convention
expressly permits a party to exclude from dispute settlement those disputes that concern "military
activities." The United States will have the exclusive right to determine what constitutes a military activity.
Tribunal can’t force us to let ships go
John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary Department of State, CQ Congressional Testimony 9-27-07
Myth: The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea could order the release of a vessel apprehended by the U.S.
military. Reality: The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to order release in such a case. Its authority to address the
prompt release of vessels applies only to two types of cases: fishing and 1 protection of the marine
environment. Further, even if its mandate did extend further - which it does not - the United States will be taking
advantage of the optional exclusion of military activities from dispute settlement. As such, in no event would the
Tribunal have any authority to direct the release of a vessel apprehended by the U.S. military.
43
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Good – A2 PSI Turn – PSI failing
PSI use is declining now and no details of its success can be confirmed.
Ian Williams Posted on May 28, 2013 by ianw1383
Proliferation Security Initiative: Ten Years On
http://armscontrolnow.org/2013/05/28/proliferation-security-initiative-ten-years-on/
According to State Department records, the number of OEG meetings that occurred during the Bush
administration numbered between 3-5 per year. Since 2009, that number has declined to 1-2 per year.
The number of PSI-related training exercises and activities has also declined by around half. The
administration has countered these critiques, by pointing out that there have been numerous interdictions of
WMD consignments in transit under its watch. David Asher, Center for a New American Security senior fellow and
former George W. Bush administration official, noted in a recent interview that more interdictions have
occurred during President Obama’s time in office than during the early years of PSI during the Bush
Administration. However, it is very difficult to confirm any details about PSI operations through open
sources, since so very few interdictions are ever made public. Moreover, the overall lack of transparency
makes it difficult for open source analysts and think tanks to assess the overall success of the initiative. It also
makes it hard to evaluate how the initiative could be improved. Even the discussions that take place at
OEG meetings are generally kept secret and only brief concluding statements are released.
PSI failing now – lacks regulatory framework necessary to be effective
Council on Foreign Relations “The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime” June 25, 2013
http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/global-nuclear-nonproliferationregime/p18984
Alongside the efforts of the GICNT, many countries are developing a comprehensive detection mechanism to
monitor trafficking in nuclear material and related financial transactions. The U.S.-led Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), established in 2003, today involves more than ninety-eight countries in developing the best
practices, joint training exercises, and information-sharing activities to improve multilateral interdiction efforts.
Although often cited as a flexible approach to coordinating the international response to proliferation, PSI
does not grant any legal authority for ship-boarding or interdiction beyond the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea Treaty and various bilateral agreements. India and China, which do not participate in PSI,
have questioned the legality of its interdictions. PSI also cannot interdict ships of nonmember states
unless master consents to being boarded are allowed, such as Iran and Pakistan. Whether the 2003
interdiction of a ship supplying nuclear materials to Libya was the direct result of PSI activities, for example, is still
disputed. Analysts have also criticized the PSI for being a club of developed economies and not
addressing the problem of increasing independence among a growing number of developing countries
and nonstate actors from the controls enacted by the traditional supporters of the nuclear
establishment. Others have pointed out that the initiative is limited by having neither an independent budget nor
coordinating mechanisms, and does not provide a legal framework in which to lock in long-term, verifiable,
and irreversible member state commitments. However, as a sign that progress may be forthcoming, the
United and States and China jointly installed a nuclear radiation detection system at the Yangshan port in Shanghai
in December 2011. Two years earlier, the U.S. Navy was also able to successfully pressure a North Korean vessel—
which many suspected to be carrying illicit nuclear weapons materials destined for Myanmar—to return to port by
tailing the ship in open waters.
44
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
PSI failing now – quantitative data proves
Ian Williams (Arms Control Association) “Proliferation Security Initiative: Ten Years On”
May 28, 2013
http://armscontrolnow.org/2013/05/28/proliferation-security-initiative-ten-years-on/
Recently, the Obama administration has been criticized by some Republican congressmen for allowing
the PSI to “languish,” and encouraged increasing interdiction efforts. There is some evidence to suggest PSI
activity has declined since 2009, at least quantitatively. According to State Department records, the
number of OEG meetings that occurred during the Bush administration numbered between 3-5 per year.
Since 2009, that number has declined to 1-2 per year. The number of PSI-related training exercises and
activities has also declined by around half. The administration has countered these critiques, by pointing out
that there have been numerous interdictions of WMD consignments in transit under its watch. David Asher, Center
for a New American Security senior fellow and former George W. Bush administration official, noted in a recent
interview that more interdictions have occurred during President Obama’s time in office than during the early
years of PSI during the Bush Administration. However, it is very difficult to confirm any details about PSI
operations through open sources, since so very few interdictions are ever made public. Moreover, the
overall lack of transparency makes it difficult for open source analysts and think tanks to assess the
overall success of the initiative. It also makes it hard to evaluate how the initiative could be improved. Even the
discussions that take place at OEG meetings are generally kept secret and only brief concluding statements are
released.
45
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Good – A2 PSI Turn – LOST supports PSI
LOST key to successful implementation of PSI
Kirstin Margosian “Fighting nuclear proliferation on the high seas” July 02, 2012
http://thebulletin.org/fighting-nuclear-proliferation-high-seas
American assent to the Law of the Sea could be a powerful bargaining chip to be traded for a
strengthening of the Proliferation Security Initiative. If the United States were to promise ratification
and Article 27 of the Law of the Sea were to be amended to allow for the seizure of WMD-related
materials, the Proliferation Security Initiative would gain the legitimacy and capability it currently lacks,
and the critical states withholding participation in the initiative would have a hard time justifying their
lack of support. The Law of the Sea and the Proliferation Security Initiative are now at odds. Making
them support one another -- in a way that serves the interests of parties to both -- would create a safer
world.
Objections to the treaty have been fixed- their args are myths. LOST actually supports
the PSI.
Judge Advocate General's Corps Director, international and operational law Pentagon
Washington , Washington Times 11-14-07
The editorial "Defeat the Law of the Sea Treaty" (yesterday) contained four errors. First, President Reagan
supported the convention except for six specific objections to Part XI on deep seabed mining. Those objections
were fixed in the 1994 agreement formally modifying Part XI, to which the United States is a signatory.
Mandatory technology transfer was rescinded outright in Section 5, paragraph 2 of the agreement
annex. Second, the convention's provisions on "peaceful purposes" do not constrain U.S. military
activities. They restate binding obligations we already have and support under the U.N. Charter. The negotiating
history on this point is clear. In 1976, Ecuador attempted to turn the "peaceful purposes" provisions into arms
control obligations. They went nowhere. Why does The Washington Times raise today a long-discredited and failed
socialist argument from the 1970s? Third, the convention not only supports the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), but not being a party hinders efforts to recruit PSI countries. But you don't have to believe
me: As then-Under Secretary John Bolton testified before the Senate in 2005 , "the PSI statement of interdiction
principles says very clearly that any actions taken pursuant to PSI would be done in accordance with
existing national and international authority. And of course all of our other core group members of the
PSI are states party to the Law of the Sea Treaty." The PSI interdiction of the vessel BBC China, which
broke the back of Libya's weapons of mass destruction program, was conducted in accordance with the Law of
the Sea Convention. Fourth, our maritime interdictions as well as all our military activities will be exempt
from dispute resolution. Article 298.1 of the convention expressly provides that it is the right of a state, and solely the state, to preemptively and completely reject all the dispute resolution procedures for activities it determines are military activities. All permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (except us) and numerous other countries have taken the military activities exemption. They,
like us, would never accept a court or tribunal acting ultra vires - beyond the limits of the convention itself. And by the way: Iran is not a party
to the convention; like us, North Korea, Libya and Syria they are on the outside. Also, the Senate resolution will reject the World Court and
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and instead choose arbitration for dispute resolution of nonexempt issues. The Times should
know better than to repeat myths on important national security matters. We are at war. The president, his war cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the commandant of the Coast Guard agree that joining
the Law of the Sea Convention will enhance our
national security.
46
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
UNCLOS doesn’t hurt PSI
Moore 9-22-05, J. of Intfl Affairs The Senate should give immediate advice and consent to the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea: why the critics are wrong; POSITION PAPERS
Myth: The convention is harmful to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Again, this is false. The PSI
has already been negotiated explicitly in conformance with the convention, and not surprisingly so, since
the nations with which we coordinate in that initiative are parties to the convention. This charge apparently rests
on the false belief that if the United States does not adhere to the convention, it will be free from any constraints
in relation to oceans law. Again, this is a false assumption; we are today a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention
that is much more restrictive than the 1982 convention now before the Senate. This charge is also misguided as it
fails to understand the critically important interest we have in protecting navigational freedoms on, in and above
the world's oceans. The convention allows our vessels to get on station, a capability that is essential
before any issue even arises about boarding. Moreover, we emphatically do not want a legal regime that
would permit any nation to seize U.S. commercial vessels in the world's seas. That would be a massive loss
of U.S. sovereignty! The PSI was carefully constructed with parties to the 1982 convention, using the flag
state, port state and other jurisdictional provisions of the 1982 convention precisely to avoidthis
problem. Nor is this charge at all realistic in failing to notethat nothing in the Law of the Sea Convention could
or does trump our inherent rights to individual and collective self-defense. Most recently, we note, UnderSecretary of State John Bolton, a principal architect of the PSI, testified to the Senate that adhering to
the convention will not harm the PSI.
47
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Good – A2 Sovereignty
Sovereignty arg is a myth- the treaty actually expands US sovereignty
John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary Department of State, CQ Congressional Testimony 9-27-07
Myth: Joining the Convention would surrender U.S. sovereignty.
Reality: On the contrary. Some have called the Convention a "U.S. land grab ." It expands U.S. sovereignty and
sovereign rights over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its coast, as described earlier
in my testimony. It is rare that a treaty actually increases the area over which a country exercises
sovereign rights, but this treaty does. The Convention does not harm U.S. sovereignty in any respect. As
sought by the United States, the dispute resolution mechanisms provide appropriate flexibility in terms of both the
forum and the exclusion of sensitive subject matter. The deep seabed mining provisions do not apply to any
areas in which the United States has sovereignty or sovereign rights; further, these rules will facilitate
mining activities by U.S. companies. And the navigational provisions affirm the freedoms that are important to
the worldwide mobility of U.S. military and commercial vessels.
48
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
LOST Good – A2 Taxes/Royalty payments
Taxes don’t go to the UN, US is immune from most, they don’t take effect for 5 years,
and are only on profits- the alt is no resource extraction
John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary Department of State, CQ Congressional Testimony 9-27-07
Myth: The Convention gives the UN its first opportunity to levy taxes.
Reality: Although the Convention was negotiated under UN auspices, it is separate from the UN and its institutions
are not UN bodies. Further, there are no taxes of any kind on individuals or corporations or others.
Concerning oil/gas production within 200 nautical miles of shore, the United States gets exclusive
sovereign rights to seabed resources within the largest such area in the world. There are no financerelated requirements in the EEZ. Concerning oil/gas production beyond 200 nautical miles of shore, the
United States is one of a group of countries potentially entitled to extensive continental shelf beyond its
EEZ. Countries that benefit from an Extended Continental Shelf have no requirements for the first five years of
production at a site; in the sixth year of production, they are to make payments equal to 1% of production,
increasing by 1% a year until capped at 7% in the twelfth year of production . If the United States were to pay
royalties, it would be because U.S. oil and gas companies are engaged in successful production beyond
200 nautical miles. But if the United States does not become a party, U.S. companies will likely not be
willing or able to engage in oil/gas activities in such areas, as I explained earlier. Concerning mineral activities
in the deep seabed, which is beyond U.S. jurisdiction, an interested company would pay an application fee for the
administrative expenses of processing the application. Any amount that did not get used for processing the
application would be returned to the applicant. The Convention does not set forth any royalty requirements for
production; the United States would need to agree to establish any such requirements. In no event would any
payments go to the UN, but rather would be distributed to countries in accordance with a formula to
which the United States would have to agree.
ISA Doesn’t control 7/10ths of the planet
John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary Department of State, CQ Congressional Testimony 9-27-07
Myth: The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has the power to regulate seven-tenths of the Earth's surface.
Reality: The Convention addresses seven-tenths of the earth's surface; the ISA does not. First, the ISA does not
address activities in the water column, such as navigation. Second, the ISA has nothing to do with the
ocean floor that is subject to the sovereignty or sovereign rights of any country, including that of the
United States. Third, the ISA only addresses deep seabed mining. Thus, its role is limited to mining
activities in areas of the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. It has no other role and no general
authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and overflight.
49
MSDI 2014
LOST Neg 2.0
#debatelikeabear
50