Ian Kershaw
Sir Ian Kershaw, FBA (born 29 April 1943) is a British historian of 20th-century Germany
whose work has chiefly focused on the period of the Third Reich. He is regarded by many as
one of the world's leading experts on Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and is particularly
noted for his monumental biography of Hitler.
He was the leading disciple of the late West German historian Martin Broszat, and (until his
retirement) professor at the University of Sheffield. Kershaw has called Broszat an
"inspirational mentor" who did much to shape his understanding of National Socialist
Germany.[1] Kershaw served as historical adviser on numerous BBC documentaries, notably
The Nazis: A Warning From History and War of the Century. He taught a module entitled
'Germans against Hitler'.[2]
His wife Dame Betty Kershaw was Professor of Nursing and Dean of the School of Nursing
Studies at the University of Sheffield.
Background
Kershaw was born into a Roman Catholic family in Oldham, Lancashire, England, to parents
Joseph Kershaw and Alice Robinson. He was educated at St Bede's College, Manchester, the
University of Liverpool (BA) and Merton College, Oxford (D.Phil), Kershaw was originally
trained as a medievalist but turned to the study of modern German social history in the 1970s.
At first, Kershaw was mainly concerned with the economic history of Bolton Abbey. As a
Lecturer in Medieval History at Manchester, Kershaw learned German to study the German
peasantry in the Middle Ages.[3] In 1972, Kershaw visited Bavaria and was shocked to hear
the views of an old man he met in a Munich café who told him: "You English were so
foolish. If only you had sided with us. Together we could have defeated Bolshevism and
ruled the earth!", adding in for good measure that "The Jew is a louse!"[3] As a result of this
incident, Kershaw became keen to learn how and why ordinary people in Germany could
support the ideology Nazism (National Socialism).[3]
Bavaria Projectedit
In 1975, Kershaw joined Martin Broszat's "Bavaria Project".[3] During his work, Broszat
encouraged Kershaw to examine how ordinary people viewed Hitler.[3] As a result of his
work in the 1970s on Broszat's "Bavaria Project", Kershaw wrote his first book on the Third
Reich, The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich which was first published in
German in 1980 as Der Hitler-Mythos: Volksmeinung und Propaganda im Dritten Reich.[3]
This book examined the "Hitler cult" in Germany, how it was developed by Joseph Goebbels,
what social groups the Hitler Myth appealed to and how it rose and fell.
Also arising from the "Bavaria Project" and Kershaw's work in the field of Alltagsgeschichte
was Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. In this 1983 book, Kershaw
examined the experience of the Third Reich at the grass-roots in Bavaria. Kershaw showed
how ordinary people reacted to the Nazi dictatorship, looking at how people conformed to the
regime and to the extent and limits of dissent. Kershaw described his subject as ordinary
Bavarians, or as he referred to:
"the muddled majority, neither full-hearted Nazis nor outright opponents, whose attitudes at
one and the same time betray signs of Nazi ideological penetration and yet show the clear
limits of propaganda manipulation".[4]
Kershaw went on to write in his preface:
"I should like to think that had I been around at the time I would have been a convinced antiNazi engaged in the underground resistance fight. However, I know really that I would have
been as confused and felt as helpless as most of the people I am writing about".[5]
Kershaw argued that Goebbels failed to create the Volksgemeinschaft (people's community)
of Nazi propaganda, and that most Bavarians were far more interested in their day to day
lives than in politics during the Third Reich.[6] Kershaw concluded that the majority of
Bavarians were either antisemitic or more commonly simply did not care about what was
happening to the Jews.[7] Kershaw also concluded that there was a fundamental difference
between the antisemitism of the majority of ordinary people, who disliked Jews and were
much colored by traditional Catholic prejudices, and the ideological and far more radical
völkische antisemitism of the Nazi Party, who hated Jews.[7] Kershaw found that the majority
of Bavarians disapproved of the violence of Kristallnacht pogrom, and that despite the efforts
of the Nazis, continued to maintain social relations with the members of the Bavarian Jewish
community.[5] Kershaw documented numerous campaigns on the part of the Nazi Party to
increase antisemitic hatred, and noted that the overwhelming majority of antisemitic activities
in Bavaria were the work of a small number of committed Nazi Party members.[5] Overall,
Kershaw noted that the popular mood towards Jews was indifference to their fate.[5] Kershaw
argued that during World War II, most Bavarians were vaguely aware of the Holocaust, but
were vastly more concerned about and interested in the war than about the "Final Solution to
the Jewish Question".[5] Kershaw made the notable claim that:
"the road to Auschwitz was built by hate, but paved with indifference".[8][9]
By this, Kershaw meant the progress leading up to Auschwitz was motivated by antisemitism
of the most vicious kind held by the Nazi elite, but it took place in a context where the
majority of German public opinion was completely indifferent to what was happening.
Kershaw's assessment that most Bavarians, and by implication Germans were "indifferent" to
the Shoah faced criticism from the Israeli historian Otto Dov Kulka and the Canadian
historian Michael Kater. Kater contended that Kershaw downplayed the extent of popular
antisemitism, and that though admitting that most of the "spontaneous" antisemitic actions of
Nazi Germany were staged, argued that because these actions involved substantial numbers
of Germans, it is wrong to see the extreme antisemitism of the Nazis as coming solely from
above.[10] Kulka argued that most Germans were more antisemitic than Kershaw portrayed
them in Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, and that rather than
"indifference" argued that "passive complicity" would be a better term to describe the
reaction of the German people to the Shoah.[11]
The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of
Interpretation[edit]
In 1985, Kershaw published a book on the historiography of Nazi Germany entitled The Nazi
Dictatorship, in which Kershaw reflected on the problems in historiography of the Nazi
era.[12] Kershaw noted the huge disparity of often incompatible views about the Third Reich
such as the debate between:




those who see the Nazi period as the culmination of Deutschtum (Germanism), and
Marxists who see National Socialism as the culmination of capitalism
those who argue for a Sonderweg, and those who argue against the Sonderweg
concept
those who see National Socialism as a type of totalitarianism, and those who see it as
a type of fascism
those historians who favour a "functionalist" interpretation with the emphasis on the
German bureaucracy and the Holocaust as an ad hoc process, and those who favour
an "intentionalist" interpretation with the focus on Hitler and the argument that the
Holocaust had been something planned from early on in Hitler's political career.[13]
As Kershaw noted, these divergent interpretations such as the differences between the
functionalist view of the Holocaust as caused by a process and the intentionalist view of the
Holocaust as caused by a plan are not easily reconciled, and that there was in his opinion the
need for a guide to explain the complex historiography surrounding these issues.[13] Likewise,
if one accepts the Marxist view of National Socialism as the culmination of capitalism, then
the Nazi phenomenon is universal, and fascism can come to power in any society where
capitalism is the dominant economic system, whereas the view of National Socialism as the
culmination of Deutschtum means that the Nazi phenomenon is local and particular only to
Germany. For Kershaw, any historian writing about the period had to take account of the
"historical-philosophical", "political-ideological" and moral problems associated with the
period, which thus poses special challenges for the historian.[12] In The Nazi Dictatorship,
Kershaw surveyed the historical literature, and offered his own assessment of the pros and
cons of the various approaches.[12] In a 2008 interview, Kershaw lists as his major intellectual
influences Martin Broszat, Hans Mommsen, Alan Milward, Timothy Mason, Hans-Ulrich
Wehler, William Carr and Jeremy Noakes.[14] In the same interview, Kershaw expressed
strong approval of Mason's "Primacy of Politics" concept, in which it was German Big
Business that served the Nazi regime rather than the other way around, against the orthodox
Marxist "Primacy of Economics" concept.[14] Despite his praise and admiration for Mason, in
the 2000 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship, Kershaw was highly sceptical of Mason's "Flight
into War" theory of an economic crisis in 1939 forcing the Nazi regime into war.[15]
In the Historikerstreit (Historians' Dispute) of 1986 to 1989, Kershaw followed Broszat in
criticizing the work and views of Ernst Nolte, Andreas Hillgruber, Michael Stürmer, Joachim
Fest and Klaus Hildebrand, all of whom Kershaw saw as German apologists attempting to
white-wash the German past in various ways. In the 1989 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship,
Kershaw devoted an entire chapter towards rebutting the views of Nolte, Hillgruber, Fest,
Hildebrand and Stürmer. In regard to the debate between those who regard National
Socialism as a type of totalitarianism (and thus having more in common with the Soviet
Union) versus those who regard Nazism as a type of fascism (and thus having more in
common with Fascist Italy), Kershaw, though feeling that the totalitarianism approach is not
without value, has argued that in essence, Nazism should be viewed as a type of fascism,
albeit fascism of a very radical type.[16] Writing of the Sonderweg debate, Kershaw finds the
moderate Sonderweg approach of Jürgen Kocka the most satisfactory historical explanation
for why the Third Reich occurred.[17] In the 2000 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship, Kershaw
wrote he considered Gerhard Ritter's claim that one "madman" (i.e. Hitler) single-handedy
caused World War II to that of a German apologist, and that he found the historical approach
of Ritter's arch-enemy Fritz Fischer to be a far better way of understanding German
history.[18] Along the same lines, Kershaw criticized as German apologetics the 1946
statement by the German historian Friedrich Meinecke that National Socialism was just a
particularly unfortunate Betriebsunfall (industrial accident) of history.[18] Kershaw was later
in a 2003 essay to criticize both Ritter and Meinecke as German apologists who either
through the Betriebsunfall theory and by blaming everything upon Hitler were seeking to
white-wash the German past.[1] Writing of the work of the German historian Rainer
Zitelmann, Kershaw has argued that Zitelmann has elevated what were merely secondary
considerations in Hitler's remarks to the primary level, and that Zitelmann has not offered a
clear definition of what he means by "modernization".[19]
With regard to the Nazi foreign policy debate between "globalists" such as Klaus
Hildebrand, Andreas Hillgruber, Jochen Thies, Gunter Moltman and Gerhard
Weinberg, who argue that Germany aimed at world conquest, and the "continentalists"
such as Hugh Trevor-Roper, Eberhard Jäckel, and Axel Kuhn, who argue that
Germany aimed only at the conquest of Europe,[20] Kershaw tends towards the
"continentalist" position.[21] Kershaw agrees with the thesis that Hitler did formulate a
programme for foreign policy centring around an alliance with Britain to achieve the
destruction of the Soviet Union, but has argued that a British lack in interest doomed
the project, thus leading to the situation in 1939, where Hitler went to war with Britain,
the country he wanted as an ally, as an enemy, and the country he wanted as an enemy,
the Soviet Union, as his ally.[22] At the same time, Kershaw sees considerable merit in
the work of such historians as Timothy Mason, Hans Mommsen, Martin Broszat and
Wolfgang Schieder, who argue that Hitler had no "programme" in foreign policy, and
instead contend that his foreign policy was simply a kneejerk reaction to domestic
pressures in the economy and his need to maintain his popularity.[23]
Regarding the historical debates about Widerstand (resistance) in German society, Kershaw
has argued that there are two approaches to the question, one of which he calls the
fundamentalist (dealing with those committed to overthrowing the Nazi regime) and the
societal (dealing with forms of dissent in "everyday life").[24] In Kershaw's viewpoint,
Broszat's Resistenz (immunity) concept works well in an Alltagsgeschichte approach, but
works less well in the field of high politics, and moreover by focusing only on the "effect" of
one's actions, fails to consider the crucial element of the "intention" behind one's actions.[25]
Kershaw has argued that the term Widerstand should be used only for those working for the
total overthrow of the Nazi system, and those engaging in behavior which was counter to the
regime's wishes without seeking to overthrow the regime should be included under the terms
opposition and dissent, depending upon their motives and actions.[26] In Kershaw's opinion,
there were three bands ranging from dissent to opposition to resistance.[27] Kershaw has used
the Edelweiss Pirates as an example of a group whose behavior initially fell under dissent,
and who advanced from there to opposition and finally to resistance.[28] In Kershaw's view,
there was much dissent and opposition within German society, but outside of the workingclass, very little resistance.[29] Though Kershaw has argued that the Resistenz concept has
much merit, he concluded that the Nazi regime had a broad basis of support and it is correct
to speak of "resistance without the people".[30]
Regarding the debate in the late 1980s between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer over
Broszat's call for the "historicization" of National Socialism, Kershaw wrote that he agreed
with Friedländer that the Nazi period could not be treated as a "normal" period of history, but
he felt that historians should approach the Nazi period as they would any other period of
history.[31] In support of Broszat, Kershaw wrote that an Alltagsgeschichte approach to
German history, provided that it did not lose sight of Nazi crimes, had much to offer as a way
of understanding how those crimes occurred.[31]
During the "Goldhagen Controversy" of 1996, Kershaw took the view that his friend, Hans
Mommsen, had "destroyed" Daniel Goldhagen's arguments about a culture of "eliminationist
antisemitism" in Germany during their frequent debates on German TV.[32] Kershaw wrote
that he agreed with Eberhard Jäckel's assessment that Hitler's Willing Executioners was
"simply a bad book".[33] Though Kershaw had little positive to say about Goldhagen, he wrote
that he felt that Norman Finkelstein's attack on Goldhagen had been over-the-top and did
little to help historical understanding.[34] However, Kershaw later went on to recommend
Norman Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn's extremely critical assessment of Goldhagen's
book, A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth; stating that
"Finkelstein and Birn provide a devastating critique of Daniel Goldhagen's simplistic and
misleading interpretation of the Holocaust. Their contribution to the debate is, in my view,
indispensable."
Structuralist views[edit]
Like Broszat, Kershaw sees the structures of the Nazi state as far more important than the
personality of Hitler (or any other individual for that matter) as an explanation for the way
Nazi Germany developed. In particular, Kershaw subscribes to the view argued by Broszat
and the German historian Hans Mommsen that Nazi Germany was a chaotic collection of
rival bureaucracies in perpetual power struggles with each other. In Kershaw's view, the Nazi
dictatorship was not a totalitarian monolith, but rather comprised an unstable coalition of
several blocs in a "power cartel" comprising the NSDAP, big business, the German state
bureaucracy, the Army and SS/police agencies (and moreover, each of the "power blocs" in
turn were divided into several factions).[35] In Kershaw's opinion, the more "radical" blocs
such as the SS/police and the Nazi Party gained increasing ascendency over the other blocs
after the 1936 economic crisis, and from then onwards increased their power at the expense
of the other blocs.[36]
Adolf Hitler, topic of several books of Kershaw
For Kershaw, the real significance of Hitler lies not in the dictator himself, but rather in the
German people's perception of him.[37] In his biography of Hitler, Kershaw presented him as
the ultimate "unperson"; a boring, pedestrian man devoid of even the "negative greatness"
attributed to him by Joachim Fest.[38] Kershaw rejects the Great Man theory of history and
has criticised those who seek to explain everything that happened in the Third Reich as the
result of Hitler's will and intentions.[39] Kershaw has argued that it is absurd to seek to explain
German history in the Nazi era solely through Hitler, as Germany had sixty-eight million
people during the Third Reich, and to seek to explain the fate of sixty-eight million people
solely though the prism of one man is in Kershaw's opinion a flawed position.[40] Kershaw
wrote about the problems of an excessive focus on Hitler that "... even the best biographies
have seemed at times in danger of elevating Hitler's personal power to a level where the
history of Germany between 1933 and 1945 becomes reduced to little more than an
expression of the dictator's will".[40] Kershaw has a low opinion of those who seek to provide
"personalized" theories about the Holocaust and/or World War II as due to some defect,
medical or otherwise, in Hitler.[7] In his 2000 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship, Kershaw
quoted with approval the dismissive remarks made by the German historian Hans-Ulrich
Wehler in 1980 about such theories. Wehler wrote:
"Does our understanding of National Socialist policies really depend on whether Hitler had
only one testicle? ... Perhaps the Führer had three, which made things difficult for him, who
knows? ... Even if Hitler could be regarded irrefutably as a sado-masochist, which scientific
interest does that further? ... Does the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" thus become
more easily understandable or the "twisted road to Auschwitz" become the one-way street of
a psychopath in power?"[7]
Kershaw shares Wehler's opinion, that, besides the problem that such theories about Hitler's
medical condition were extremely difficult to prove, they had the effect of personalizing the
phenomena of Nazi Germany by more or less attributing everything that happened in the
Third Reich to one flawed individual.[7]
Kershaw's biography of Hitler is an examination of Hitler's power; how he obtained it and
how he maintained it.[41] Following up on ideas that he had first introduced in a 1991 book
about Hitler, Kershaw has argued that Hitler's leadership is a model example of Max Weber's
theory of Charismatic leadership.[12][42] Kershaw's 1991 book Hitler: A Profile in Power
marked a change for Kershaw from writing about how people viewed Hitler to about Hitler
himself.[12] In his two-volume biography of Hitler published in 1998 and 2000, Kershaw
stated "What I tried to do was to embed Hitler into the social and political context that I had
already studied".[12] Kershaw finds the picture of Hitler as a "mountebank" (opportunistic
adventurer) in Alan Bullock's biography unsatisfactory, and Joachim Fest's quest to
determine how "great" Hitler was senseless.[43] In a wider sense, Kershaw sees the Nazi
regime as part of a broader crisis which afflicted European society from 1914 to 1945.[44]
Though in disagreement with many of their claims (especially Nolte's), Kershaw's concept of
a "Second Thirty Years' War" reflects many similarities with Ernst Nolte, A. J. P. Taylor and
Arno J. Mayer who have also advanced the concept of a "Thirty Years' Crisis" to explain
European history between 1914 and 1945.[44]
In the Functionalism versus intentionalism debate, Kershaw has argued for a synthesis of the
two schools, though Kershaw leans towards the functionalist school. Despite some
disagreements, Kerhaw has called Mommsen a "good personal friend" and an "important
further vital stimulus to my own work on Nazism".[1] Kershaw has argued in his two-volume
biography of Hitler that Hitler did play a decisive role in the development of policies of
genocide, but also argued that many of the measures that led to the Holocaust were
undertaken by many lower-ranking officials without direct orders from Hitler in the
expectation that such steps would win them favour.[45] Though Kershaw does not deny the
radical antisemitism of the Nazis, he favors Mommsen's view of the Holocaust being caused
by the "culminative radicalization" of the Third Reich caused by the endless bureaucratic
power struggles and a turn towards increasingly radical antisemitism within the Nazi elite.
Despite his background in the functionalist historiography, Kershaw admits that his account
of Hitler in World War II owes much to intentionalist historians like Gerhard Weinberg,
Hugh Trevor-Roper, Lucy Dawidowicz and Eberhard Jäckel.[12] Kershaw accepts the picture
of Hitler drawn by intentionalist historians as a fanatical ideologue who was obsessed with
Social Darwinism, völkisch antisemitism (in which the Jewish people were viewed as a "race"
biologically different from the rest of humanity rather than a religion), militarism and the
perceived need for Lebensraum.[12] However, in a 1992 essay, "'Improvised genocide?'", in
which Kershaw traces how the ethnic cleansing campaign of Gauleiter Arthur Greiser in the
Warthegau[46] region annexed to Germany from Poland in 1939 led to a campaign of
genocide by 1941, Kershaw argued that the process was indeed "improvised genocide" rather
the fulfilment of a master plan.[47] Kershaw views the Holocaust not as a plan, as argued by
the intentionists, but rather a process caused by the "culminative radicalization" of the Nazi
state as articulated by the functionalists. Citing the work of the American historian
Christopher Browning in his biography of Hitler, Kershaw argues that in the period 1939–41
the phrase "Final Solution to the Jewish Question" was a "territorial solution", that such plans
as the Nisko Plan and Madagascar Plan were serious and only in the latter half of 1941 did
the phrase "Final Solution" come to refer to genocide.[48] This view of the Holocaust as a
process rather than a plan is the antithesis of the extreme intentionist approach as advocated
by Lucy Dawidowicz, who argues that Hitler had decided upon genocide as early as
November 1918, and that everything he did from that time onwards was directed towards that
goal.[49]
In recent years Kershaw has come to form a thesis based on the ideas of both traditions of
Nazi theory.
The "Working Towards the Führer" concept[edit]
Kershaw disagrees with Mommsen's "Weak Dictator" thesis: the idea that Hitler was a
relatively unimportant player in the Third Reich. However, he has agreed with his idea that
Hitler did not play much of a role in the day-to-day administration of Nazi Germany.
Kershaw's way of explaining this paradox is his theory of "Working Towards the Führer", the
phrase being taken from a 1934 speech by the Prussian civil servant Werner Willikens.[50]
"Everyone who has the opportunity to observe it knows that the Fuhrer can hardly dictate
from above everything which he intends to realise sooner or later. On the contrary, up till
now everyone with a post in the new Germany and worked best when he has, so to speak,
worked towards the Fuhrer. Very often and in many spheres it has been the case - in previous
years as well - that individuals have simply waited for orders and instructions. Unfortunately,
the same will be true in the future; but in fact it is the duty of everybody to try to work
towards the Fuhrer along the lines he would wish. Anyone who makes mistakes will notice it
soon enough. But anyone who really works towards the Fuhrer along his lines and towards
his goal will certainly both now and in the future one day have the finest reward in the form
of the sudden legal confirmation of his work."[51]
Kershaw has argued that in Nazi Germany officials of both the German state and Party
bureaucracy usually took the initiative in initiating policy to meet Hitler's perceived wishes,
or alternatively attempted to turn into policy Hitler's often loosely and indistinctly phrased
wishes.[50] Though Kershaw does agree that Hitler possessed the powers that the "Master of
the Third Reich" thesis championed by Norman Rich and Karl Dietrich Bracher would
suggest, he has argued that Hitler was a "Lazy Dictator"; an indifferent dictator who was
really not interested in involving himself much in the daily running of Nazi Germany.[52] The
only exceptions were the areas of foreign policy and military decisions, both areas that Hitler
increasingly involved himself in from the late 1930s.[52]
In a 1993 essay entitled "'Working Towards the Führer'", Kershaw argued that the German
and Soviet dictatorships had more differences than similarities.[17] Kershaw argued that Hitler
was a very unbureaucratic leader who was highly averse to paper work in marked contrast to
Stalin.[17] Likewise, Kershaw argued that Stalin was highly involved in the running of the
Soviet Union in contrast to Hitler whose involvement in day-to-day decision making was
limited, infrequent and capricious.[53] Kershaw argued that the Soviet regime, despite all of its
extreme brutality and utter ruthlessness, was basically rational in its goal of seeking to
modernize a backward country and had no equivalent of the "cumulative radicalization"
towards increasingly irrational goals that Kershaw sees as characteristic of Nazi Germany.[54]
In Kershaw's opinion, Stalin's power corresponded to Weber's category of bureaucratic
authority, whereas Hitler's power corresponded to Weber's category of charismatic
authority.[55] In Kershaw's view, what happened in Germany after 1933 was the imposition of
Hitler's charismatic authority on top of the "legal-rational" authority system that had existed
prior to 1933, leading to a gradual breakdown of any system of ordered authority in
Germany.[56] Kershaw argues that by 1938 the German state had been reduced to a hopeless,
polycratic shambles of rival agencies all competing with each other to win Hitler's favor,
which by that time had become the only source of political legitimacy.[57] Kershaw sees this
rivalry as causing the "cumulative radicalization" of Germany, and argues that though Hitler
always favored the most radical solution to any problem, it was German officials themselves
who for the most part, in attempting to win the Führer's approval, carried out on their own
initiative increasingly "radical" solutions to perceived problems like the "Jewish Question",
as opposed to being ordered to do so by Hitler.[58] In this, Kershaw largely agrees with
Mommsen's portrait of Hitler as a distant and remote leader standing in many ways above his
own system, whose charisma and ideas served to set the general tone of politics.[58] As an
example of how Hitler's power functioned in practice, Kershaw used Hitler's directive to the
Gauleiters Albert Forster and Arthur Greiser to "Germanize" the part of north-western Poland
annexed to Germany in 1939 within the next 10 years with his promise that "no questions
would be asked" about how this would be done.[59][60] As Kershaw notes, the completely
different ways Forster and Greiser sought to "Germanize" their Gaue with Forster simply
having the local Polish population in his Gau signing forms saying they had "German blood"
and Greiser carrying out a program of brutal ethnic cleansing of Poles in his Gau showed
both how Hitler set events in motion, and how his Gauleiters could carry out totally different
policies in pursuit of what they believed to be Hitler's wishes.[59][60] In Kershaw's opinion,
Hitler's vision of a racially cleansed Volksgemeinschaft provided the impetus for German
officials to carry out increasing extreme measures to win his approval, which ended with the
Shoah.[61]
The Israeli historian Otto Dov Kulka has praised the concept of "working towards the Führer"
as the best way of understanding how the Holocaust occurred, combining the best features,
and avoiding the weaknesses of both the "functionalist" and "intentionalist" methods.[62]
Kulka argued that Kershaw demonstrated both Hitler's central role in the "Final Solution" and
why there was no need for any order from Hitler for the Holocaust, as the progress that led to
the Shoah was "worked out" toward the Führer by almost everyone in Germany.[62]
Thus, for Kershaw Nazi Germany was both a monocracy (rule of one) and polycracy (rule of
many). Hitler held absolute power but did not choose to exercise it very much; the rival
fiefdoms of the Nazi state fought each other and attempted to carry out Hitler's vaguely
worded wishes and dimly defined orders by "Working Towards the Führer".
Honours and memberships[edit]








Fellow of the British Academy
Co-Winner of the British Academy Book Prize, 2001 [63]
Fellow of the Royal Historical Society
Member of the Historical Association
Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin[64]
2002, Knighthood for Services to History[65]
2004, A collection of scholarly essays in Honour of Sir Ian Kershaw was
published.[66]
2005, Elizabeth Longford Prize for Historical Biography for Making Friends with
Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis, and the Road to War
Published work[edit]














Bolton Priory Rentals and Ministers; Accounts, 1473–1539, (ed.) (Leeds, 1969)
Bolton Priory. The Economy of a Northern Monastery, (Oxford, 1973).
"The Persecution of the Jews and German Popular Opinion in the Third Reich" pages
261–289 from Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, Volume 26, 1981.
Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria, 1933–45,
(Oxford, 1983, rev. 2002), ISBN 0-19-821922-9
The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, (London, 1985,
4th ed., 2000) ISBN 0-340-76028-1
The 'Hitler Myth'. Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1987, rev. 2001).
ISBN 0-19-280206-2
Weimar. Why did German Democracy Fail?, (ed.) (London, 1990) ISBN 0-31204470-4
Hitler: A Profile in Power, (London, 1991, rev. 2001)
"'Improvised genocide?' The Emergence of the 'Final Solution' in the 'Wargenthau"
pages 51–78 from Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Volume 2, December
1992.
"Working Towards the Führer: Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship"
pages 103–118 from Contemporary European History, Volume 2, Issue #2, 1993;
reprinted on pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London:
Blackwell, 1999, ISBN 0-631-20700-7.
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, (ed. with Moshe Lewin)
(Cambridge, 1997) ISBN 0-521-56521-9
Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris, (London, 1998) ISBN 0-393-32035-9
Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis, (London, 2000) ISBN 0-393-32252-1
The Bolton Priory Compotus 1286–1325 (ed. with David Smith) (London, 2001)







Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry and the British Road to War,
(London, 2004) ISBN 0-7139-9717-6
"Europe's Second Thirty Years War" pages 10–17 from History Today, Volume 55,
Issue # 9, September 2005
Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940–1941 (London, 2007)
ISBN 1-59420-123-4
Hitler, The Germans, and the Final Solution (Yale, 2008) ISBN 0-300-12427-9
Hitler (one-volume abridgment of Hitler 1889–1936 and Hitler 1936–1945; London,
2008) ISBN 1-84614-069-2
Luck of the Devil The Story of Operation Valkyrie, (London: Penguin Books, 2009),
ISBN 0-14-104006-8
The End: Hitler's Germany 1944-45, (Allen Lane, 2011), ISBN 0-7139-9716-8
Endnotes[edit]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
^ Jump up to: a b c Kershaw, Ian (February 2004). "Beware the Moral High Ground". H-Soz-u-Kult.
Retrieved 2009-05-05.
Jump up ^ Arana, Marie (2008-10-19). "Ian Kershaw: Casting light on the shadows". Washington
Post Book World. p. 11.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f Snowman, Daniel "Ian Kershaw" pages 18–20 from History Today Volume 51,
Issue 7, July 2001 page 18
Jump up ^ Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 page 89.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 page 90.
Jump up ^ Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 pages 89–90.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 pages 90–
91.
Jump up ^ Evans, Richard In Hitler's Shadow, New York, NY: Pantheon, 1989 page 71
Jump up ^ Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 page 91.
Jump up ^ Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 page 92.
Jump up ^ Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000 page 93.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g h Snowman, Daniel "Ian Kershaw" pages 18–20 from History Today Volume
51, Issue 7, July 2001 page 19
^ Jump up to: a b Snowman, Daniel "Ian Kershaw" pages 18–20 from History Today Volume 51, Issue
7, July 2001 pages 18–19
^ Jump up to: a b Interview with Ian Kershaw. History. May 14, 2008. Retrieved 2009-06-09.
Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 pages 88–89
Jump up ^ Kerhsaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 pages 45–46.
^ Jump up to: a b c Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 234
^ Jump up to: a b Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation,
London: Arnold Press, 2000 pages 7–8
Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 pages 246–247
Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 pages 134–137
Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 pages 154–159
Jump up ^ Roman, Thomas (October 14, 2002). "Interview with Ian Kershaw". Eurozine. Retrieved
2007-06-21.
Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 pages 137–139
Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 page 198
25. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 pages 198–199
26. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 pages 206–207.
27. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 page 207.
28. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 page 204.
29. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 pages 207–216.
30. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 pages 215–217.
31. ^ Jump up to: a b Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 page 235
32. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 page 254
33. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 page 255
34. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems & Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000 page 258
35. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 page 58
36. Jump up ^ Kerhsaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London:
Arnold Press, 2000 page 61
37. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 pages xii–xiii
38. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 pages xxiii–xxv
39. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 page xx
40. ^ Jump up to: a b Lukacs, John The Hitler of History, New York: Vintage Books, 1997, 1998 page 32
41. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 page xxvi
42. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 page xiii
43. Jump up ^ Snowman, Daniel "Ian Kershaw" pages 18–20 from History Today Volume 51, Issue 7,
July 2001 pages 19–20
44. ^ Jump up to: a b "Europe's Second Thirty Years War" pages 10–17 from History Today, Volume 55,
Issue # 9, September 2005
45. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 pages 530–531
46. Jump up ^ Apparently, Kershaw himself misspelled this as Wargenthau.
47. Jump up ^ "'Improvised genocide?' The Emergence of the 'Final Solution' in the 'Wargenthau" pages
51–78 from Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Volume 2, December 1992
48. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Nemesis, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001 page 927
49. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian The Nazi Dictatorship London: Edward Arnold 2000 page 97
50. ^ Jump up to: a b Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 pages 529–
531
51. Jump up ^ Werner Willikens quoted in Kershaw, Ian. "'Working Towards the Führer.'Reflections on
the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship." Contemporary European History (1993): 103-118.
52. ^ Jump up to: a b Kershaw, Ian Hitler 1889–1936 Hubris, W.W. Norton, New York, 1998 pages 531–
533
53. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
pages 235–236
54. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 240
55. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 243
56. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 244
57. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 245
58. ^ Jump up to: a b Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 246
59. ^ Jump up to: a b Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
page 248
60. ^ Jump up to: a b Rees, Laurence The Nazis: A Warning From History, New York: New Press, 1997
pages 141–142
61. Jump up ^ Kershaw, Ian "'Working Towards the Führer' Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship" pages 231–252 from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz, London: Blackwill, 1999
pages 246–247
62. ^ Jump up to: a b Kulka, Otto Dov (February 2000). "The Role of Hitler in the 'Final Solution',". Yad
Vashem. Retrieved 2009-05-05.
63. Jump up ^ "British Academy: The British Academy Book Prize – Result of the 2001 Competition".
Britac.ac.uk. Retrieved 2012-05-04.
64. Jump up ^ "Professor Sir Ian Kershaw, B.A. (Liv.), D.Phil. (Oxon.), F.B.A.". Archived from the
original on 2007-12-24. Retrieved 2008-04-21.[dead link]
65. Jump up ^ "sheffield Research Leaders". Retrieved 2008-04-21.
66. Jump up ^ "Working Towards the Fuhrer: Essays in Honour of Sir Ian Kershaw", edited Anthony
McElligott, Tim Kirk, Manchester University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-7190-6732-4