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Tarynn Everett
Professor Dutkowsky
HHS 300W
9 December 2013
Session Paper Final: Abortion
Abortion is one of the most highly contested topics that our nation faces and has
been so for almost a half a century. Understandably this topic is wrapped in strong
emotions. It seems we must pit two core instincts against each other; the
paternal/maternal instincts to protect the young and vulnerable versus the right to
determine what is best for ourselves. To add to the confusion the various religions of
the world have differing opinions on the topic and politicians have routinely used
abortion as a spring board for debates. With so much emotion clouding our judgment
how could we possibly attack this topic objectively? I myself have been caught up in the
rhetoric of this debate and have seen myself sway to other sides of the topic based on
my current position in life. During my reflection on this topic and the writing of this paper
I can only describe the process as frustrating. To take an educated stance on this issue
is daunting. There are too many facets of the argument to consider. There are no black
and white answers. This topic has been debated by a myriad of people and some of the
world’s sharpest minds with no accepted resolution. After working through all the
possibilities that could exist (rape, incest, developmentally challenged parents, unfit
parents etc.) I feel that one stance cannot work as an umbrella to cover all of the
permutations that exist within this topic. For the purpose of this essay I will address one
facet of the argument; whether or not an embryo should be considered a human. I
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believe that an embryo from the time of conception is a human person and should be
afforded at least basic moral rights. I will not delve into the debate on whether the
embryo’s rights supersede the mothers or vice versa. I feel that this is where
circumstance becomes more of a determining factor and the discussion becomes more
convoluted.
Not being a strongly religious I find it interesting that my thoughts on this portion
of the topic are aligned with the Catholic Church. As taken from Pope John Paul II’s
position paper the Church’s stance is as follows “from the time that the ovum is
fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor the mother; it is rather the
life of a new human being with its own growth. It would never be made human if it were
not human already.” (544) I feel that this is an important statement. Excluding this
benchmark the remainder of the abortion argument is entirely subjective. The point of
conception seems to be the only portion of the argument which is objective and can be
supported by the scientific process. Once a sperm has successfully penetrated the wall
of the egg a process begins, the sharing of genetic material and the process of cell
division. At this point the embryo has its own genetic makeup and barring any outside
interference its own predetermined course of life. That is not to say that every fetus will
grow into a healthy child. Flaws in genetic coding, current health of the mother and
other variables influence this process. But I see these as internal variables and not
outside influence such as abortion or automobile accidents.
In the next few sections I will examine some of the arguments that challenge or
support my position. First I will look at Marry Anne Warrens list of five traits define
personhood or humanity. Warren’s list is as follows;
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1. Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the
being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain.
2. Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively
complex problems)
3. Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either
genetic or direct external control)
4. The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an
indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of
possible contents, but on indefinitely many topics.
5. The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or
racial or both. (551)
Warren argues that a fetus meets none of the above criteria to determine
personhood. I feel that Warren is mistaken in this statement. Criteria number one is
easily discounted when thought about in a different context. One of Warren’s qualifying
factors is the ability to feel pain. I do not know if this theory has been tested in utero or
not but anyone who has spent time in a PICU with premature delivered babies can
attest that even a 24 week old baby reacts to injections and therefore “feels” pain. It
would make sense then that if a 24 week old baby feels pain so would a 24 week old
fetus. Therefore a fetus meets the first criteria. Criteria two I will surrender only
because I have not seen concrete evidence to support one direction or another. Criteria
three I feel is obvious, any parent who has watched their ultrasound has seen fetal
movement. This movement is independent of either genetic or external control and
therefore a fetus meets the qualifications on criteria number three. I concede criteria
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number four as well as number five. In summary as demonstrated a fetus meets
criteria’s one and three. As stated in Warren’s paper “We needn’t suppose that an entity
must have all of these attributes to be properly considered a person; (1) and (2) alone
may well be sufficient for personhood, and quite probably (1)-(3) are sufficient.” (551)
So according to Warren’s criteria a fetus should be considered a person.
In the above section I have showed that a fetus at least in its twenty fourth week
of life should be considered a person. This fact partially supports by stance but leaves
the time up until the twenty fourth week open for discussion. My thoughts are that we
are attempting to craft a stance that will stand the test of time. With the current progress
of medicine I feel that it would be hazardous to put a time frame on when a fetus
reaches “personhood”. Thirty years ago babies born before their thirtieth week of
gestation had an extremely high mortality rate. Today babies born at the twenty fourth
week are surviving without further issues and babies have survived as early as twenty
one weeks. What does the future hold? Will we see babies delivered at sixteen weeks
without issue? Will there be the chance of one week old zygotes being transferred out of
the womb and surviving? One never knows what the future holds. But one thing is for
certain, technology and medicine are progressing at an exponential pace. This is one
reason I feel that marking “personhood” at the time of conception is a rational decision.
If we were to define personhood at twenty months we may have to change our
definitions ten years down the road.
Even the pro-abortion stance of Judith Jarvis Thompson’s paper “A Defense of
Abortion” concedes that an embryo/fetus should be considered a person from the time
of conception. Thompson also hazards “drawing a line” through a point of fetal
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development to define “personhood”. Thompson states “I am inclined to think also that
we shall probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human person well
before birth.” (564) Thompson supports both her and my position with the following
statement, “By the tenth week, for example, it already has a face, arms and legs, fingers
and toes; it has internal organs, and brain activity is detectable.” (564)
As I discussed above technology impacts how we must view this debate. I have
discussed how the potential of technological advance may change how early a fetus
can survive outside the womb. There is another technology presently available that also
sheds light on this discussion. The technology I speak of is In Vitro Fertilization or IVF.
In this process the sperm and egg are combined outside of the body and then placed
into the uterus. Although this technology has its own moral questions associated with it I
feel it illustrates two important points. First if an embryo can be implanted within hours
after being created in a laboratory then we can argue that all embryos/fetuses are viable
at the moment of conception. Secondly it shows that life does begin at the time of
conception even if said conception occurs in a laboratory. As soon as the sperm and
egg are combined a new entity is formed and begins to grow.
As I noted in the early sections of this essay I feel that Pope John Paul Jones II’s
statement on this topic was extremely telling. The portion of his above mentioned quote
I want to now focus on is “…a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor of the
mother…” (544) What is he saying? And why do I feel that this statement is so
important? If we look at Pope John Paul’s statement in a scientific and biological
context it would read more like this.
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“Within a short time after insemination, a man’s gamete may meet and
penetrate a women’s ovum. If so, fertilization takes place, a process of
about twenty four hours duration in which the haploid chromosome sets of
the respective gametes commingle to create a single celled embryo with a
full, normal complement of forty six chromosomes.” (Rubenfeld 617)
What I take from these two passages is that a new fully complete entity has been
created. A human with forty six chromosomes which did not exist before the sperm and
egg came together. To further support this train of thought from this single celled
“human” another or several more “humans” may be created by cellular division resulting
in twins or multiples. “In rare cases, the opposite can occur-sibling embryo’s may fuse
and develop into a single person who, though otherwise perfectly normal, carries two
genetically distinct sets of cells.” (Rubenfeld 617) If we consider this process in terms of
cloning how could a cell which was not human be split or cloned and then develop into a
human? The other ability of this single cell that I feel is important to this debate is the
fact that this cell or zygote has the ability to develop into a complete human being. Not a
brain or a heart but a complete entity. This ability is something no other single celled
organism can achieve.
A theme that is common in the abortion debate when discussing an embryo is
the topic of potential or capacity. Is an embryo “human” at conception in scientific sense
or because of its potential to become what we envision as a human? Until this point of
the paper I have attempted to stay within the scientific boundaries which can be
supported with empirical data. I would argue that the data presented to this point
supports my position that life begins at the point of conception. But there are other
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facets of the debate which should be addressed if I am to say I have done my due
diligence. For this portion of the discussion I will have to delve into the philosophical
arena.
In the discussion of potential Warren brings up an interesting point. Warren
makes the following (I feel controversial) statement;
Thus it is clear that even a seven or eight-month fetus has features
which make it apt to arouse in us almost the same powerful protective
instinct as is commonly aroused by a small infant, nevertheless it is not
significantly more personlike than is a very small embryo. It is somewhat
more personlike; it can apparently feel and respond to pain, and it may
even have a rudimentary form of consciousness, insofar as its brain is
quite active. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that it is not fully
conscious, in the way that an infant of a few months is, and that it cannot
reason, or communicate messages of indefinitely many sorts, does not
engage in self-motivated activity, and has no self-awareness. Thus, in the
relevant respects, a fetus, even a fully developed one, is considerably less
personlike than is the average mature mammal, indeed the average fish.
And I think that a rational person must conclude that if the right to life of a
fetus to be based upon its resemblance of a person, then it cannot be said
to have any more right to life than, let us say, a newborn guppy (which
also seems to be capable of feeling pain), and that a right of that
magnitude could never override a women’s right to obtain an abortion, at
any stage of her pregnancy. (552-553)
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The flaw that I find with Warren’s line of reasoning in this excerpt is her example
of a near full term fetus being less developed than an infant of a couple months. Before
I go farther let me state for the record that I agree there is a developmental difference
between the two ages. My question has to do with the potential one day old or one
week old infant. Using Warrens reasoning a mother would be justified in terminating her
newborns life during the first couple of days. Warren’s postscript on infanticide clears up
her reasoning but I ask you to consider this next question using Warren’s logic. Does a
forty year old human being have more cognitive power than a one year old human? I
think we can all agree that the forty year does have more cognitive power. Does that
make the one year old less of a human? Let’s make it more emotional and confusing;
how about comparing a severally mentally handicapped forty year old and a high
functioning forty year old prominent member of society? That example becomes more
confusing but I don’t feel that anyone would support the killing of the mentally
handicapped individual because he is less of a “human”. It is situations similar to these
that steer me towards my position. I don’t think that a strong position can be taken when
defining any human as more human or less human. Also not to forget that not that long
ago in our societies history a large percentage of the population believed that African
Americans were not and should not be considered people or “humans” but more of a
livestock or commodity. Society at large would not support the killing of a person today
based on their race or color but it was common less than two hundred years ago. Again
this points out a potential flaw in the philosophical approach to abortion. The times
change and with it what we may believe.
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Another potential issue I find with the philosophical approach to determining at
what point a fetus achieves personhood comes down to motivation. Why does one
argue this point? Normally arguments are based on a vested interest and heavily
plagued with emotion. Philosophical arguments come down to beliefs and the desire to
set a standard which is beneficial to those beliefs. Rubenfeld brings forth an interesting
example that I feel exemplifies this phenomenon. “To see why this is so, suppose a
state declared that personhood ends at sixty five and on that basis withdrew all
protection of life, liberty and property from individuals over that age. Or suppose an
overpopulated state embarked on a campaign of infanticide, supporting its measures
with the determination that human life did not begin until the age of five.” (Rubenfeld
616) Rubenfeld brings to light an important point, the age of personhood cannot be
arbitrarily chosen. The problem with the philosophical argument is it only makes sense if
it is in line with you beliefs. That is why I chose to utilize a more scientific approach.
In this paper I have discussed the reasoning behind my stance that life or
personhood begins at conception. This is the only scientifically defendable point at
which this determination can be made. I have shown and hopefully enlightened some to
the potential pitfalls in some of the philosophical arguments regarding abortion. I do find
it interesting that two organizations that have historically disagreed on almost every
topic share a common stance on such a volatile debate. There may be some credence
to that. As I stated in the beginning of this paper I did not address the issue of the
mother’s rights superseding those of the fetuses or vice versa. That question will have
to be answered in the philosophical realm and that is an area I am not currently
comfortable operating in. With that being said this paper reflects my opinion of when life
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and the rights associated with said life begin. It does not reflect my overall position on
abortion. As I mentioned above the overall topic has so many facets and permutations
that I don’t feel that one position can cover all possibilities. Abortion may be a viable
option when other alternatives do not accommodate the needs of the situation.
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Works Cited
Paul II, Pope, John. “The Unspeakable Crime of Abortion” Ethical Issues in Modern
Medicine. 8th Edition. Steinbock, London and Arras. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013. 543 –
545. Print
Rubenfeld, Jed. On the Legal Status of the Proposition That “Life Begins at Conception”.
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43 Num. 3 (Feb. 1991) Pages 599-635. Web. Accessed 1211-13.
Thompson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion” Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine. 8th
Edition. Steinbock, London and Arras. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013. 545 – 555. Print
Warren, Mary, Anne. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” Ethical Issues in Modern
Medicine. 8th Edition. Steinbock, London and Arras. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013. 545 –
555. Print