Relationship of explanatory flexibility and explanatory style to each other and to depression, anxiety, and emotion regulation
Daniel Button, Michael T. Moore, Shane A. Mares, & David M. Fresco
INTRODUCTION
ABSTRACT
The reformulated learned helplessness theory
(Abramson et al., 1978) as well as the hopelessness
theory (Abramson, et al., 1989) are cognitive diathesisstress models of depression which follow from the
original learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1974).
The reformulated learned helplessness theory
(Abramson, et al., 1978) infused attribution theory into
the original model and posited that the causal attributions
that individuals assign to events in their lives would
confer protection from- or risk for depression.
Specifically, the attributional component of the
reformulated learned helplessness theory, referred to as
explanatory style, is defined as an individual’s relatively
stable tendencies in assigning causes to negative
events. Individuals who attribute negative life events to
internal, (i.e. “It’s all my fault”), stable (i.e. “It will be
around for a long time”) and global (i.e. “It will affect
everything I do”) causes are thought to be more
vulnerable to depression when confronted by these
events in the reformulated learned helplessness theory.
Hopelessness theory retains the causal attribution
component but de-emphasizes the internality dimension
in favor of the stability and globality dimensions.
Considerable evidence supports the relationship of
cognitive content to the etiology, maintenance, and
treatment of emotional disorders (Alloy, et al., 1999;
Abela & Seligman, 2000). However, this focus on
cognitive content has left room for inquiries into the
nature of cognitive processes in predicting depression.
The present study sought to explore the relationship of explanatory flexibility to explanatory style and to examine the differences in explanatory style as a
function of explanatory flexibility, with regard to depression, anxiety, emotion regulation and emotional intelligence. Two samples of undergraduate students
were collected, sample 1 (n = 725) completed the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982), which serves as both a measure of
explanatory style and explanatory flexibility. Sample 2 (n = 202) completed measures of both explanatory style, explanatory flexibility, depression, anxiety,
emotion regulation, and emotional intelligence. In sample 1, explanatory style and explanatory flexibility were found to be independent of one another, with
this nearly result (p = .06) corresponding to Cohen’s convention for a small effect size (Cohen, 1992; Cohen’s w = .10). Sample 2 also revealed that
explanatory flexibility and explanatory style were largely independent, although the nonsignificant result in sample 2 (p = .14) suggests this to a lesser
extent (w = .25). The interaction of explanatory flexibility and explanatory style was also assessed in sample 2, and it was found that: (1) rigid versus flexible
pessimists were found to exhibit higher levels of anxious arousal (d = -.31), (2) rigid optimists showed a trend towards higher levels of fear of potent positive
emotions (d = .27), as well as significantly higher levels of fear of anxiety and a greater need to control their emotions, (d = .32), and (3) flexible optimists
were found to seek novel situations more (d = .30), have a higher degree of engagement with their surroundings (d = -.39), exhibit more open-mindedness
(d = -.32), and show a trend towards greater willingness to experience and express positive emotions (d = -.28) than rigid optimists. All findings
corresponded to between small and medium effect sizes (d = .25 – .39).
Explanatory flexibility (Fresco et al., 2000) has been
defined as the process by which attributions to life events
are made. Explanatory flexibility assesses the relative
variability of respondents’ self-ratings on the stable and
global dimensions of the Attributional Style
Questionnaire. Specifically, individuals with a large
standard deviation are able to attribute events to a
variety of causes, and are regarded as flexible, whereas
individuals with a small standard deviation are regarded
as rigid.
The current study sought to extend previous research
showing that explanatory flexibility is an independent
construct from explanatory style (Fresco & Craighead,
2002; Fresco & Seligman, 2003; Fresco et al., 2000) and
exploring the differences in explanatory style as a
function of explanatory flexibility, with regard to
depression, anxiety, emotion regulation and emotional
intelligence.
METHODS
Participants
Sample 1
• 725 undergraduate students
• 33% male, 67% female
• 1% Asian, 13% African American, 82% Caucasian, 2%
Hispanic, 2% Other
• Participants ranged from 16-78 years of age (M = 19.37
SD = 4.52)
Sample 2
• 202 undergraduate students
• 38% male, 62% female
• Participants ranged from 17-54 years of age (M = 22.04,
SD = 8.02)
Measures
Fig. 2
•Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982)
•Mood & Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (Watson & Clark, 1991)
•Affective Control Scale (Williams, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1997)
•Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby et al., 1994a; 1994b)
•Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003)
•Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale (Hayes & Feldman, 2004)
•Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991)
•Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (Hayes et al., 2004)
•Langer Mindfulness Scale (Langer, 1999)
DISCUSSION
RESULTS
To examine the independence of explanatory style and explanatory
flexibility, both were divided into tertiles, thereby creating a 3x3 matrix. A
Chi-Square analysis was then conducted, revealing a generally
comparable distribution across the 3x3 matrix. The results were:
•In sample 1: 2(4, N = 725) = 9.27, p = .06, w = .10
•In sample 2: 2(4, N = 202) = 6.98, p = .14, w = .25
Participants were then classified into one of 9 groups based on
their tertile membership status ranging from rigid optimists to
flexible pessimists. A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to
determine any relationships between levels of optimism and
flexibility to other criterion measures. Two non-orthogonal planned
contrasts were conducted to permit comparisons of rigid optimists
to flexible optimists and between rigid pessimists to flexible
pessimists. Omnibus and the contrast analysis revealed no group
differences in depression as a function of optimism and flexibility
status.
•In contrast 1, rigid versus flexible pessimists were found to exhibit
higher levels of anxious arousal, [t(193) = -2.13, p = .04, d = -.31]. No
other significant differences were detected between flexibility and
depression for either optimists or pessimists
•In contrast 2, rigid optimists showed a trend towards higher levels of
fear of potent positive emotions [t(193) = 1.85, p = .07, d = .27], as well
as significantly higher levels of fear of anxiety and a greater need to
control their emotions, [t(193) = 2.24, p = .03, d = .32]. Flexible
optimists were found to seek novel situations more [t(192) = -2.08, p =
.04, d = -.30], have a higher degree of engagement with their
surroundings [t(192) = -2.70, p < .01, d = -.39], exhibit more openmindedness [t(192) = -2.23, p = .03, d = -.32], and show a trend towards
greater willingness to experience and express positive emotions [t(192)
= -1.91, p = .06, d = -.28] than rigid optimists.
•All findings corresponded to between small and medium effect sizes
(Cohen’s d = .25 to .39)
These findings indicate that explanatory flexibility is
a distinct construct from explanatory style, with
differential relationships with extra-test measures
of negative affect, emotional intelligence, and
emotion regulation. Specifically:
• Rigid pessimists evidenced higher levels of
anxiety
• Rigid optimists evidenced higher levels of fear of
both positive and negative emotions, and
increased need to control these emotions as a
result
• Flexible optimists evidenced increased
engagement with their environment, openmindedness, seeking of novel situations, and the
experience and expression of positive emotions
Limitations
• Participants consisted of relatively highfunctioning college students, resulting in uncertain
generalizability to the general public
Future Studies
• Replicating the current study utilizing a more
representative population
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